Porteous v. Kernan
Filing
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ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 11/6/2017 DENYING 14 Motion to Stay. Petitioner to file any opposition to 11 Motion to Dismiss within 30 days of the date of this order. (Henshaw, R)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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LARRY BRIAN PORTEOUS,
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Petitioner,
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vs.
ORDER
SCOTT KERNAN,
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Respondent.
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/
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No. 2:16-cv-2406-CMK-P
Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 11). In
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response, petitioner filed a motion to stay this action (Doc. 14). Petitioner requested a stay issue
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in this action based on a pending appeal filed in Porteous v. Fisher, Jr., 2:15-cv-1817-GEB-KJN.
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In that earlier action, which appears to challenge a separate conviction, petitioner had appealed a
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finding that the petition filed in that action was barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner
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contends that his mental disorders impaired his ability to timely file his petition. That issue was
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raised in his appeal of the dismissal issued in 2:15-cv-1817-GEB-KJN.
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Respondent originally filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion to stay.
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However, since that filing, respondent has reported to the court that petitioner’s request for a
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certificate of appealability in case 2:15-cv-1817-GEB-KJN has been denied by the Ninth Circuit
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Court of Appeals. Respondent contends there is no longer a basis for the stay.
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The district court is not required to sua sponte consider stay and abeyance in the
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absence of a request from the petitioner, see Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.
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2007), or to inform the petitioner that stay and abeyance may be available, see Brambles v.
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Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2005). When a stay-and-abeyance motion is filed,
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there are two approaches for analyzing the motion, depending on whether the petition is mixed or
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fully exhausted. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005). If the petitioner seeks a
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stay-and-abeyance order as to a mixed petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted
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claims, the request is analyzed under the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Rhines v.
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Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). See Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. If, however, the petition currently
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on file is fully exhausted, and what petitioner seeks is a stay-and-abeyance order to exhaust
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claims not raised in the current federal petition, the approach set out in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d
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1063 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins, 481 F.3d 1143, applies. See
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Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661.
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Under Rhines, as a threshold condition for this court to exercise its discretion to
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issue a stay-and-abeyance order as to mixed petitions, the court must determine that there was
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good cause for failing to exhaust claims before raising them in the federal case. See Rhines v.
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Weber, 544 U.S. at 277. If there is good cause for petitioner’s failure to exhaust, it may be an
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abuse of discretion to deny stay and abeyance where there is no indication of intentional dilatory
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litigation tactics. See id. at 278. Stay and abeyance is not appropriate where the unexhausted
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claim is plainly meritless. See id. at 277. If a stay-and-abeyance order is issued with respect to a
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mixed petition, the district court may employ a three-step procedure which involves: (1) the
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dismissal of unexhausted claims from the original petition; (2) a stay of the remaining claims
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pending exhaustion; and (3) amendment of the original petition to add newly exhausted claims
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that then relate back to the original petition. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Taylor),
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134 F.3d 981, 986-88 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Under Kelly, the district court is required to “consider the option of holding the
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exhausted petition in abeyance so that the petitioner would be able to exhaust his claims in state
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court before attempting to amend his federal petition to include the newly exhausted claims.”
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Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661 (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070). Whether to exercise this option is
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within the discretion of the district court. See Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070. However, the Ninth
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Circuit has recognized the “clear appropriateness of a stay when valid claims would otherwise be
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forfeited.” Id. Moreover, a stay under such circumstances promotes comity by deferring the
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exercise of federal jurisdiction until after the state court has ruled. See id.
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Here, it appears the petition filed in this case is fully exhausted. Neither party
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argues to the contrary. The reason petitioner gives for requesting the stay of these proceedings is
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the appeal he filed in his prior case. That appeal has now been resolved. Thus, the undersigned
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finds no reason to grant the motion to stay.
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
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Petitioner’s motion to stay these proceedings (Doc. 14) is denied; and
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Petitioner shall file any opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss
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within 30 days of the date of this order.
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DATED: November 6, 2017
______________________________________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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