Anderson v. Yolo County Social Services Department

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 2/14/2017 re 4 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss: IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended Complaint be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file a second amended complaint, if she can do so consistent with this Order. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 IVY ANDERSON, CIV. NO. 2:16-cv-2466 WBS DB Plaintiff, 13 14 v. 15 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS YOLO COUNTY, 16 Defendant. 17 ----oo0oo---- 18 Plaintiff Ivy Anderson filed this action against 19 20 defendant Yolo County, alleging that defendant racially 21 discriminated against her when it reduced the in-home supportive 22 service (“IHSS”) funds of her developmentally delayed son, 23 Daytrail Swan. 24 (“FAC”) (Docket No. 1).) 25 Motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended Complaint. 26 (Docket No. 4).) 27 I. 28 (Notice of Removal Ex. A, First Am. Compl. Before the court now is defendant’s (Def.’s Mot. Factual and Procedural Background The state of California provides IHSS funds to low1 1 income elderly and disabled persons to assist with their daily 2 living needs. 3 Cal. 2009). 4 the supervision of the California Department of Social Services 5 (“DSS”). 6 2010). 7 recipient, it “either obtains and pays [an IHSS] provider or pays 8 the recipient who hires one.” 9 862, 868 (1983). V.L. v. Wagner, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1109 (N.D. The IHSS program is administered by counties under Basden v. Wagner, 181 Cal. App. 4th 929, 934 (3d Dist. When a county authorizes the provision of IHSS funds to a Miller v. Woods, 148 Cal. App. 3d In many cases, the recipient uses his or her 10 IHSS funds to pay a relative, who provides IHSS to the recipient. 11 Putz v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-00344 CW, 2010 WL 1838717, at *1 12 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2010). 13 Plaintiff is the IHSS provider for her 37-year-old son, 14 Swan, who has been diagnosed with developmental delay. 15 7.) 16 Until June 10, 2015, defendant had been issuing nearly 250 hours’ 17 worth of IHSS funds to Swan each month, which plaintiff had been 18 keeping as income.1 Defendant administers Swan’s IHSS funds. 19 (FAC ¶ (See id. at 1-2.) (See id. ¶ 8-9.) On June 10, 2015, defendant sent a social worker to 20 plaintiff’s home to conduct an assessment of Swan’s IHSS needs. 21 (Id. ¶ 9.) 22 worker “was demeaning, unprofessional, and continuously wrote 23 down statements that were never spoken by either Plaintiff or her 24 son.” 25 notified plaintiff that it would be reducing Swan’s IHSS funds to 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff alleges that at the assessment, the social (Id. ¶ 27.) Three weeks after the assessment, defendant Plaintiff deals directly with defendant and signs IHSS documents on her son’s behalf. (See FAC ¶ 21; Decl. of Sean O’Dowd Ex. 6, IHSS Recipient/Employer Responsibility Checklist (signed by plaintiff on Swan’s behalf) (Docket No. 4-3).) 2 1 22.5 hours per month. 2 (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff challenged the reduction via the DSS’ 3 administrative appeals process. 4 the matter, the DSS affirmed defendant’s reduction in large part, 5 ordering that Swan’s IHSS funds be reduced to 44 hours and 4 6 minutes per month. 7 DSS’ decision, which DSS declined to grant. 8 9 (Id. ¶ 13.) (Id. ¶ 12.) After a hearing on Plaintiff sought a rehearing on (Id. ¶ 15.) On July 20, 2016, plaintiff filed this action in the California Superior Court. (Notice of Removal at 1.) She 10 amended her complaint on September 12, 2016. 11 Plaintiff does not name her son as a plaintiff in the amended 12 Complaint, nor does she bring any claims on his behalf. 13 Instead, plaintiff, who is African-American, (see id. ¶ 45), 14 alleges that defendant racially discriminated against her by 15 reducing her son’s IHSS funds, thus in effect reducing her 16 income. 17 that her race was a factor in Defendants’ [decision to cut her 18 son’s IHSS funds] . . . .”).) 19 against defendant: (1) race discrimination in violation of the 20 California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal Gov. 21 Code §§ 12940 et seq.; (2) “Negligent Failure to Prevent 22 Retaliation”; and (3) race discrimination in violation of 42 23 U.S.C. § 1981 (“section 1981”). 24 (See FAC at 7.) (See id. ¶ 25 (“Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges She brings the following claims (Id. at 3-7.) Defendant removed plaintiff’s action to this court on 25 October 17, 2016. (Notice of Removal.) 26 dismiss plaintiff’s amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 27 28 3 Defendant now moves to 1 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 2 II. (Def.’s Mot.) Legal Standard 3 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 4 under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations in the 5 pleadings as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 6 the plaintiff. 7 overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 8 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 9 motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), To survive a 10 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 11 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Bell The “plausibility” standard, “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and 2 Defendant also moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that plaintiff does not have Article III standing because “she has no entitlement to welfare benefits that belong to [her son].” (See Def.’s Mot., Mem. at 7 (Docket 4-1).) District courts in this circuit have held, however, that the indirect “economic harm” IHSS providers suffer as the result of government reductions of their clients’ IHSS hours is sufficient to confer standing. Oster v. Lightbourne, No. C 094668 CW, 2012 WL 691833, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012); see also Martinez v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-02306 CW, 2009 WL 3353227, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2009) (finding that IHSS providers have standing to challenge state reduction of IHSS funds). The Ninth Circuit appears to have ratified that holding sub silentio. See Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger, 596 F.3d 1087, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court decision in which district court found that IHSS providers have standing to challenge state reduction of IHSS funds), vacated on other grounds in Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s reduction of IHSS funds caused her “emotional distress,” which, in itself, “can confer [Article III] standing.” Leung v. XPO Logistics, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The court need not decide the standing issue in light of other deficiencies in plaintiff’s amended Complaint. 4 1 where a plaintiff pleads facts that are “merely consistent with a 2 defendant’s liability,” the facts “stop[] short of the line 3 between possibility and plausibility.” 4 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 6 to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 7 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 8 ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 9 conclusions . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation 10 omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 11 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” 12 and “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 13 allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 14 conclusions.” 15 III. Discussion Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 16 Of the three causes of action alleged by plaintiff in 17 her amended Complaint, only her section 1981 claim arises under 18 federal law.3 19 defendant is a municipality located in California, (FAC ¶¶ 1-2), 20 thus there is no diversity jurisdiction in this case. 21 jurisdictional basis for plaintiff’s state law claims, therefore, 22 is supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“section 23 1367(c)”). 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff is a resident of California, and The only Plaintiff’s section 1981 claim, like her other claims, alleges that defendant racially discriminated against her by 3 Plaintiff’s second cause of action for “negligent failure to prevent retaliation” cites no statute. Thus, the court construes that claim to be a negligence claim brought under California common law. 5 1 reducing her son’s IHSS funds. 2 her claim that defendant cut her son’s IHSS funds because of her 3 race, plaintiff alleges that the social worker who conducted her 4 son’s assessment spoke to her in a “demeaning” and 5 “unprofessional” tone, “repeatedly cut[ her ]off from speaking,” 6 and “falsified . . . statements” that defendant later used to 7 justify her son’s IHSS reduction. 8 9 (See FAC ¶ 28.) In support of (Id. ¶¶ 27, 46.) Section 1981 states, in relevant part: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 10 right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 11 give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 12 proceedings for the security of persons and property as is 13 enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 14 United States Supreme Court explained in Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. 15 McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) that “[a]mong the many statutes 16 that combat racial discrimination, § 1981 . . . has a specific 17 function: It protects the equal right of ‘[a]ll persons within 18 the jurisdiction of the United States’ to ‘make and enforce 19 contracts’ without respect to race.” 20 brought under § 1981, therefore, must initially identify an 21 impaired contractual relationship under which the plaintiff has 22 rights.” 23 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Id. at 474. The “Any claim Id. at 476 (internal citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that “a prima facie section 24 1981 case, like a prima facie disparate treatment case under 25 Title VII, requires proof of intentional discrimination.” 26 Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 27 538 (9th Cir. 1982). 28 Title VII plaintiff, must allege facts that plausibly indicate Gay v. Thus, a section 1981 plaintiff, like a 6 1 defendant was “motivated by a discriminatory animus.” 2 Id. Although it is questionable whether plaintiff’s IHSS 3 arrangement with defendant constituted a “contractual 4 relationship under which [she] has rights,” even assuming that 5 such a relationship existed, plaintiff has not alleged facts that 6 plausibly indicate defendant’s conduct was motivated by “a 7 discriminatory animus.” 8 9 Plaintiff’s allegations that defendant’s social worker spoke to her in a “demeaning” tone and falsified statements, 10 while perhaps indicative of condescension and hostility, are not 11 sufficient, in themselves, to plausibly suggest that defendant 12 had a racially discriminatory motive. 13 Inc., 84 F. App’x 863, 865 (9th Cir. 2003) (allegations that 14 employer made “condescending statements” towards plaintiff are 15 insufficient to support an “inference of [racial] 16 discrimination”); Potash v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 972 F. 17 Supp. 2d 557, 568, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (declining to find 18 discriminatory motive despite evidence of employer’s “hostile 19 attitude” towards plaintiff) ; Soria v. Univision Radio Los 20 Angeles, Inc., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59, 79 (2d Dist. 2016) 21 (“[S]howing the employer was lying [about the reason for 22 employee’s discharge] . . . is not enough to infer discriminatory 23 animus.”).4 See Berry v. Chevron USA, 24 4 25 26 27 28 The court may consider Title VII cases, such as Berry, Postash, and Mancell, in deciding claims brought under section 1981. See Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 930 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In analyzing . . . claims under § 1981, we apply the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.”). FEHA cases, such as Soria, are also instructive. See Peralta v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 427 F. App’x 616 (9th 7 1 It is entirely possible, for example, that the social 2 worker was condescending and hostile towards plaintiff because 3 she is poor, or because he had a personal dislike for her. 4 “[M]ere dislike of an employee does not support a determination 5 of pretext or discriminatory intent.” 6 Supp. 3d 1190, 1201 (D.N.M. 2015). 7 that the social worker was condescending and hostile toward 8 everyone without regard to their race or any other personal 9 characteristics. 10 Mancell v. McHugh, 111 F. It is also just as possible Additionally, defendant appears to have conducted a 11 thorough review of Swan’s mental condition before reducing his 12 IHSS funds. 13 (providing table breakdown of Swan’s IHSS funds with explanations 14 as to why hours were being reduced) (Docket No. 4-3); id. Ex. 2, 15 ALJ Decision at 3-5 (recounting numerous tests performed by 16 social worker at Swan’s in-home assessment).5) 17 plaintiff’s appeal affirmed defendant’s decision in large part, 18 agreeing with defendant on its key finding that Swan no longer 19 needed protective supervision, (ALJ Decision at 15), which had (See Decl. of Sean O’Dowd Ex. 1, Notice of Action The ALJ who heard 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Cir. 2011) (analyzing FEHA and section 1981 claims together). 5 As plaintiff’s Notice of Action and the ALJ’s decision are both matters of administrative record and incorporated by reference in plaintiff’s amended Complaint, the court hereby takes judicial notice of them pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Smith v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 843, 851 n.10 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that “courts routinely take judicial notice of . . . records and reports of administrative bodies”); see also Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he incorporation by reference doctrine . . . permits [courts] to take into account documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions.”). 8 1 accounted for 180 of the nearly 250 IHSS hours he had been 2 receiving prior to the assessment, (see Notice of Action at 1). 3 The thoroughness of defendant’s in-home assessment and the ALJ’s 4 confirmation of its key finding suggest that the assessment, not 5 racism, was the basis for defendant’s reduction of Swan’s IHSS 6 hours. 7 In light of defendant’s assessment and plaintiff’s 8 inability to allege facts that plausibly suggest a racially 9 discriminatory motive, the court finds that plaintiff has failed 10 to state a plausible claim under section 1981. 11 at 538. 12 1981 claim. 13 See Gay, 694 F.2d Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s section A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental 14 jurisdiction . . . [if it] has dismissed all claims over which it 15 has original jurisdiction.” 16 v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) 17 (en banc) (explaining that a district court may decide sua sponte 18 to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). 19 whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s 20 state claims, the court must consider the principles of “judicial 21 economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” 22 Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). 23 case in which all federal-law claims are [dismissed] before 24 trial, the balance of factors to be considered . . . will point 25 toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining 26 state-law claims.” 27 28 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Acri In deciding Carnegie–Mellon “[I]n the usual Id. Because plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim under federal law, and because the gravamen of her amended 9 1 Complaint is that defendant unlawfully administered a state 2 benefits program, the court will decline to exercise supplemental 3 jurisdiction over her state law claims. 4 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s Motion to 5 dismiss plaintiff’s first amended Complaint be, and the same 6 hereby is, GRANTED. 7 PREJUDICE. 8 9 Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file a second amended complaint, if she can do so 10 consistent with this Order. 11 Dated: February 14, 2017 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10

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