Calloway v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation et al
Filing
23
ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 6/13/2019 DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend and plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days. (Yin, K)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
JAMISI JERMAINE CALLOWAY,
12
Plaintiff,
13
14
15
No. 2:16-CV-2532-WBS-DMC-P
v.
ORDER
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION, et al.,
16
Defendants.
17
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18
19
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff
20
alleges, generally, Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment, Eighth
21
Amendment, and under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
22
///
23
///
24
///
25
///
26
///
27
///
28
///
1
1
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD
2
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
3
against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
4
§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
5
malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
6
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “…short and
7
8
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v.
9
Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual
10
allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
11
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
12
(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s
13
allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.
14
Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
15
omitted).
16
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their
17
pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
18
338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be
19
facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer
20
that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation
21
marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The
22
sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with
23
liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks
24
omitted); Moss, 572F.3d at 969.
25
///
26
///
27
///
28
///
2
1
2
II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) J. Lewis (2) R. Briggs (3) M.
3
Vcong (4) D. Artis (5) T. Lee (6) C. Hammond (7) R. Pimental (8) M. Hodges (9) A. Pacillas (10)
4
D. Goree (11) K. Cribbs (12) J. Jasso (13) D. Ramos (14) T. Vang (15) D. Nelson (16) T.
5
Cherukuri (17) A. Infants (18) T. Ordonez (19) D. Hermosillo (20) M. Carrasquillo (21) K.
6
Martin (22) L. Donnelly (23) A. Poythress (24) M. Lowe (25) E. Facio Jr. (26) A. Adams (27) G.
7
Williams (28) D. Julie Jacobs (29) J. Wang (30) C. Cryer Jr. (31) C. McCabe (32) G. Ugwwzze
8
(33) Butts (34) Church (35) Enenmoh (36) White (37) Nguyen (38) Pham (39) Benson (40)
9
Guyaallen (41) Patel (42) Lipster (43) Brizendine (44) M. Fritz (45) Orelino (46) Ping (47)
10
Schafer (48) Abu (49) T. Wells (50) K. Min (51) Foroutan (52) Alex (53) Frant (54) Sagreddy
11
(55) Kent (56) Pat (57) Carman (58) Steve (59) Candy (60) Denice (61) R.J. Rackely (62) B.
12
Duffy (63) S. Sherman (64) M. Jennings (65) F. Vasquez (66) V.J. Singh (67) P.S. Nowling (68)
13
J. Zamora (69) J. Neely (70) C. Shirley (71) T. Macias (72) C. Cryer (73) S. Vemuri (74) R.
14
Shephard (75) A. Iadson (76) A. Baer (77) M. Gamboa (78) D. Brittin (79) M.S. Thomas (80) A.
15
Romero (81) J. Peudhel (82) R. Vogel (83) Heyer (84) K. Lewis (85) Roman (86) D. Martin (87)
16
M. Pendel (88) S. Hart (89) M. Howard (90) T. Black (91) C. Cisneas (92) Singh (93) Cruz (94)
17
Spualden (95) Chistopher (96) McGuire (97) Jimenez (98) Miller (99) California Department of
18
Corrections and Rehabilitation. See ECF No. 1, at 1-6.
19
Plaintiff raises three claims. First, Plaintiff alleges Defendants, employees of the
20
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
21
Amendment right to Due Process by conspiring to discriminate, defraud, and destroy pertinent
22
evidence to fabricate documents that caused Plaintiff to be wrongfully housed in an “Enhance Out
23
Patient Hub.” Id. at 6-7. Second, Plaintiff alleges that by housing him in the “Enhance Out
24
Patient Hub,” Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights because it caused him to
25
“mentally and physically decompensate from unwanted stress and injuries.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff’s
26
alleged injuries resulting from the Enhance Out Patient Hub include clotting in his right upper
27
arm from the misuse of restraints during his hemodialysis treatment, which led to additional
28
surgeries and hospitalizations to correct the injury. Id. Plaintiff asserts, while housed in the
3
1
Enhanced Out Patient Hub, Defendants deliberately delayed treatment to “declot” his arm
2
because there is a facility policy to prioritize profit over his medical needs. Id. Plaintiff claims
3
Defendants’ actions placed his life in imminent danger because he did not receive adequate
4
medical treatment for his serious life sustaining medical needs while in the Enhanced Out Patient
5
Hub. Id. at 8.
6
Third, Plaintiff alleges Defendants retaliated against him, in violation of his First
7
Amendment rights, because he complained about the poor health care at CHCF-Stockton. Id. at
8
7-8. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants deliberately misplaced, destroyed, and stole his
9
personal property and legal documents. Id. at 7-8. Further, Plaintiff alleges his First Amendment
10
rights were violated by Defendants because their alleged retaliatory acts were meant to provoke
11
Plaintiff to violence, silence him, and further delay his access to the courts. Id.
12
13
III. DISCUSSION
As currently set forth, the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a
14
15
cognizable claim under § 1983. Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the First
16
Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
17
Plaintiff’s claims all fail to meet the pleading standard outline under Federal Rule of Civil
18
Procedure Rule 8 as Plaintiff fails to specify which Defendant engaged in the conduct that lead to
19
the alleged constitutional violations. Further, even if Plaintiff had established factual links
20
between the individual Defendants and the constitutional violations, Plaintiff’s claims would still
21
fail to pass screening as they lack sufficient factual allegations to support each alleged
22
constitutional violation.
23
A.
Pleading Standard—Rule 8
24
Turning first to the pleading standard under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
25
8. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link
26
between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t
27
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person
28
‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he
4
1
does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which
2
he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v.
3
Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the
4
involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of
5
Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to
6
each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v.
7
Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
8
9
Here, Plaintiff alleges all the named Defendants, generally, acted on behalf of the
CDCR by collectively conspiring against him in order to place him in the “Enhance Out Patient
10
Hub.” Plaintiff does not specifically name or address any individual Defendant in the complaint,
11
nor does Plaintiff allege how the named Defendants’ personal conduct violated Plaintiff’s
12
constitutional or statutory rights. Because Plaintiff fails to allege any facts indicating which
13
Defendant engaged in the alleged unconstitutional action, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Rule 8
14
pleading standard. Further, because Plaintiff failed to attribute any of the alleged unconstitutional
15
conduct to any individual Defendant, this Court is unable to engage in a substantive analysis to
16
determine if sufficient facts exist, as to each Defendant, for any of the claims to pass screening.
17
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims cannot pass screening as they fail to satisfy the pleading
18
standard under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff will be provided an
19
opportunity to amend the complaint to set forth specific facts as to each named Defendant
20
demonstrating what each Defendant did and how that action or inaction violated Plaintiff’s
21
constitutional rights.
22
B.
Supervisory Liability
23
The Court turns now to the substantive defects in Plaintiff’s complaint, beginning
24
first with supervisory liability. The Court observes multiple Defendants named in the complaint
25
hold supervisory positions. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the
26
actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
27
there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the
28
constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations.
5
1
See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable
2
based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because
3
government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her
4
own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
5
Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation
6
of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be
7
liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v.
8
Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
9
When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such
10
defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.
11
Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
12
1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in
13
civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
14
Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
15
official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.
16
Here, Plaintiff appears to allege some of the Defendants are liable as supervisory
17
personnel—asserting that as supervisors, these Defendants are liable for the conduct of their
18
subordinates. This is a respondeat superior theory of liability, which is not cognizable under §
19
1983. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff is advised that in
20
amending the complaint, he should be cognizant of the legal standard related to supervisory
21
liability, outlined above, and note that a supervisor can only be held liable for their own actions or
22
inactions resulting in the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, not the actions or inactions
23
of their subordinates.
24
C.
First Amendment
25
1. Retaliation
26
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, the prisoner must
27
establish that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that the retaliatory
28
action was not related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving institutional
6
1
security. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In meeting
2
this standard, the prisoner must demonstrate a specific link between the alleged retaliation and the
3
exercise of a constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995);
4
Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989). The prisoner must also
5
show that the exercise of First Amendment rights was chilled, though not necessarily silenced, by
6
the alleged retaliatory conduct. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000), see also
7
Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the prisoner plaintiff must
8
establish the following in order to state a claim for retaliation: (1) prison officials took adverse
9
action against the inmate; (2) the adverse action was taken because the inmate engaged in
10
protected conduct; (3) the adverse action chilled the inmate’s First Amendment rights; and (4) the
11
adverse action did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568.
12
As to the chilling effect, the Ninth Circuit in Rhodes observed: “If Rhodes had not
13
alleged a chilling effect, perhaps his allegations that he suffered harm would suffice, since harm
14
that is more than minimal will almost always have a chilling effect.” Id. at n.11. By way of
15
example, the court cited Pratt in which a retaliation claim had been decided without discussing
16
chilling. See id. This citation is somewhat confusing in that the court in Pratt had no reason to
17
discuss chilling because it concluded that the plaintiff could not prove the absence of legitimate
18
penological interests. See Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808-09. Nonetheless, while the court has clearly
19
stated that one of the “basic elements” of a First Amendment retaliation claim is that the adverse
20
action “chilled the inmates exercise of his First Amendment rights,” id. at 567-68, see also
21
Resnick, 213 F.3d at 449, the comment in Rhodes at footnote 11 suggests that adverse action
22
which is more than minimal satisfies this element. Thus, if this reading of Rhodes is correct, the
23
chilling effect element is essentially subsumed by adverse action.
24
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish a First Amendment
25
violation because it is unclear which Defendants engaged in the retaliatory action of deliberately
26
misplacing, destroying, and stealing his personal property. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations related
27
to this alleged retaliation are vague and conclusory. Plaintiff alleges no facts indicating whether
28
any of the Defendants had knowledge of the grievance that lead to the alleged retaliation and
7
1
alleges no facts demonstrating Plaintiff’s speech was chilled. Because Plaintiff fails to identify
2
which Defendants engaged in the alleged retaliatory conduct, and because Plaintiff alleges
3
insufficient facts to establish a retaliation claim generally, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation
4
claim cannot pass screening.
5
2. Lack of Access to the Courts
6
Prisoners have a First Amendment right of access to the courts. See Lewis v.
7
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Bradley v. Hall, 64
8
F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the right in the context of prison grievance
9
procedures). This right includes petitioning the government through the prison grievance process.
10
See id. Prison officials are required to “assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful
11
legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
12
persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The right of access to the courts, however,
13
only requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions
14
of confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57. Moreover, the right is limited to non-frivolous
15
criminal appeals, habeas corpus actions, and § 1983 suits. See id. at 353 n.3 & 354-55.
16
Therefore, the right of access to the courts is only a right to present these kinds of claims to the
17
court, and not a right to discover claims or to litigate them effectively once filed. See id. at 354-
18
55.
19
As a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner
20
must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. “Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to
21
contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-
22
frivolous claim. See id.; see also Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Delays in
23
providing legal materials or assistance which result in prejudice are “not of constitutional
24
significance” if the delay is reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. Lewis, 518
25
U.S. at 362.
26
Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants deliberately misplaced, destroyed, and stole his
27
personal property and legal documents in order to incite and provoke violence, which delayed his
28
access to the court. However, as noted above, Plaintiff failed to allege the specific Defendants
8
1
that participated in the deliberate acts that delayed his access to the courts. Further, Plaintiff fails
2
to allege an actual injury resulting from the alleged delay, such as an inability to meet a filing
3
deadline. Because a plaintiff must allege “actual injury” to establish a First Amendment access to
4
courts claim, Plaintiff’s failure to assert an actual injury is fatal to his claim. Thus, Plaintiff’s
5
First Amendment claim for a lack of access to the courts cannot pass screening.
6
7
D.
Eighth Amendment – Medical Needs
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the
8
prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel
9
and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,
10
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts
11
of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
12
(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.
13
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with
14
“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,
15
801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when
16
two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such
17
that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)
18
subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of
19
inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison
20
official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.
21
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious
22
injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105;
23
see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health
24
needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is
25
sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant
26
injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
27
1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
28
Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition
9
1
is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily
2
activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See
3
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
4
The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases
5
than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with
6
medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,
7
974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to
8
decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.
9
1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See
10
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical
11
treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See
12
Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate
13
that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
14
Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give
15
rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a
16
difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate
17
course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,
18
90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
19
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish an Eighth Amendment
20
violation. Plaintiff did not allege facts supporting an allegation that any Defendant acted
21
unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm on Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff
22
failed to identify the specific defendants who misused the restraints during his hemodialysis
23
treatment that led to blood clotting and additional surgeries. Additionally, it appears Plaintiff’s
24
claim is, at least in part, based on a theory of negligence. Because negligence in treating a
25
medical condition does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, any allegations related to
26
alleged negligence fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Because
27
Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish an Eighth Amendment claim, failed to
28
link any Defendant to any alleged misconduct, and rooted his allegations in a theory of negligent
10
1
2
3
medical treatment, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim cannot pass screening.
E.
Fourteenth Amendment – Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or
4
property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to
5
state a claim of deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a liberty or
6
property interest for which the protection is sought. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672
7
(1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Due process protects against the
8
deprivation of property where there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property. See Bd.
9
of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577. Protected property interests are created, and their dimensions are
10
defined, by existing rules that stem from an independent source – such as state law – and which
11
secure certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to those benefits. See id.
12
Liberty interests can arise both from the Constitution and from state law. See
13
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-27 (1976);
14
Smith v. Sumner, 994 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993). In determining whether the Constitution
15
itself protects a liberty interest, the court should consider whether the practice in question “. . . is
16
within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to
17
impose.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557-58; Smith, 994 F.2d at 1405. Applying this standard, the
18
Supreme Court has concluded that the Constitution itself provides no liberty interest in good-time
19
credits, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557; in remaining in the general population, see Sandin v. Conner,
20
515 U.S. 472, 485-86 (1995); in not losing privileges, see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,
21
323 (1976); in staying at a particular institution, see Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225-27; or in
22
remaining in a prison in a particular state, see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-47 (1983).
23
In determining whether state law confers a liberty interest, the Supreme Court has
24
adopted an approach in which the existence of a liberty interest is determined by focusing on the
25
nature of the deprivation. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). In doing so, the
26
Court has held that state law creates a liberty interest deserving of protection only where the
27
deprivation in question: (1) restrains the inmate’s freedom in a manner not expected from the
28
sentence; and (2) “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
11
1
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 483-84. Prisoners in California have a liberty interest in
2
the procedures used in prison disciplinary hearings where a successful claim would not
3
necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 853, 859 (9th
4
Cir. 2003) (concluding that a due process challenge to a prison disciplinary hearing which did not
5
result in the loss of good-time credits was cognizable under § 1983); see also Wilkinson v.
6
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (concluding that claims which did not seek earlier or immediate
7
release from prison were cognizable under § 1983).
8
9
Where a prisoner alleges the deprivation of a liberty or property interest caused by
the random and unauthorized action of a prison official, there is no claim cognizable under 42
10
U.S.C. § 1983 if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Zinermon v. Burch,
11
494 U.S. 113, 129-32 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). A state’s post-
12
deprivation remedy may be adequate even though it does not provide relief identical to that
13
available under § 1983. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 531 n.11. A due process claim is not barred,
14
however, where the deprivation is foreseeable and the state can therefore be reasonably expected
15
to make pre-deprivation process available. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 136-39. An available
16
state common law tort claim procedure to recover the value of property is an adequate remedy.
17
See id. at 128-29.
18
Finally, with respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, due process requires
19
prison officials to provide the inmate with: (1) a written statement at least 24 hours before the
20
disciplinary hearing that includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the inmate,
21
and an explanation for the disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary
22
evidence and call witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security;
23
and (3) legal assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff, 418
24
U.S. at 563-70. Due process is satisfied where these minimum requirements have been met, see
25
Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), and where there is “some evidence” in the
26
record as a whole which supports the decision of the hearing officer, see Superintendent v. Hill,
27
472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The “some evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and is
28
satisfied where “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached.”
12
1
Id. at 455-56. However, a due process claim challenging the loss of good-time credits as a result
2
of an adverse prison disciplinary finding is not cognizable under § 1983 and must be raised by
3
way of habeas corpus. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997).
4
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient factual allegations to support a Fourteenth
5
Amendment violation claim under the Due Process Clause. Plaintiff alleges all the defendants
6
discriminated, defrauded, and destroyed pertinent evidence by fabricating documents that caused
7
Plaintiff to be wrongfully housed in the “Enhance Out Patient Hub.” As discussed above,
8
Plaintiff failed to identify the specific defendants who allegedly discriminated, defrauded,
9
destroyed evidence, and fabricated documents. Further, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are too
10
vague—it is unclear how Plaintiff was specifically discriminated against, how he was defrauded,
11
and what pertinent evidence was destroyed through fabrication. Thus, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
12
Amendment claim under the Due Process Clause cannot pass screening.
13
14
IV. CONCLUSION
15
Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be
16
cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the
17
entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff
18
is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
19
Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
20
amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
21
complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
22
plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
23
plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
24
complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
25
If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the
26
conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
27
Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
28
each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
13
1
between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
2
164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
3
Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by
4
amendment, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now
5
has the following choices: (1) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the
6
claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and
7
the court will address the remaining claims; or (2) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which
8
continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the court will issue findings and
9
recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders
10
11
and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims.
Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
12
time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
13
1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
14
with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
15
See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
16
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
17
1.
Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
18
2.
Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
19
service of this order.
20
21
22
23
24
Dated: June 13, 2019
____________________________________
DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
25
26
27
28
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?