Blackshire v. Sacramento County Sheriff

Filing 13

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes on 11/26/2018 DENYING 2 Motion to Proceed IFP. Plaintiff shall submit within 30 days from the date of service of this order, an updated application to proceed IFP or pay the $400 filing fee in f ull. 1 Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is granted 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. (Huang, H)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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PATRICK BLACKSHIRE,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:16-cv-02538 DB

v.

ORDER

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendant.

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Plaintiff is proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

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that he was imprisoned by the Sacramento County Sheriff beyond his release date. (ECF No. 1.)

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Plaintiff is not currently incarcerated. (Id.) Presently before the court is plaintiff’s complaint for

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screening (ECF No. 1) and his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). For the reasons

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set forth below the court will dismiss the complaint with leave to amend.

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IN FORMA PAUPERIS

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Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff has not,

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however, filed a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement for the six-month period

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immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Plaintiff was

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previously instructed to file a prison trust account statement, but failed to do so. (ECF No. 9.)

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Plaintiff filed an untimely response stating he is no longer incarcerated and the trust account is

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not mentioned in the original complaint. (ECF No. 11.) If plaintiff still wishes to proceed IFP, he
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must submit an updated application under § 1915(a)(1). See DeBlasio v. Gilmore, 315 F.3d 396,

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398 (4th Cir. 2003); Adler v. Gonzalez, No. 1:11-cv-1915-LJO-MJS (PC), 2015 WL 4041772, at

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*2 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2015), report and reco. adopted, 2015 WL 4668668 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6,

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2015).

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SCREENING

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I.

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Legal Standards
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. §

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1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims

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that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

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Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

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490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

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pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

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However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must

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contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain

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factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic,

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550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

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allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

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738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all

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doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

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Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .
. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here, the defendants must act under color of federal law. Bivens, 403 U.S. at

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389. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

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Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

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(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

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complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of

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their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant

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holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional

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violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

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Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

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concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

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Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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II.

Allegations in the Complaint

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Plaintiff names as defendant in this action the Sacramento County Sheriff. He alleges he

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was sentenced to two years with half time credit, but had credit for over 1000 days, time served.

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He also states he was held beyond his release date on three separate occasions. He specifically

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claims a judge ordered him to be released on May 11, 2015 and he was not released for

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approximately one week. Plaintiff requests reparations for the time served beyond the sentence.

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III.

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Unlawful Detention Beyond Release Date
Detention beyond the termination of a sentence could constitute cruel and unusual

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punishment if it is the result of “deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s liberty interest, see

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Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06

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(1976)); otherwise, such detention can be held to be unconstitutional only if it violates due

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process. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
“In the context of an Eighth Amendment claim for incarceration without penological

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justification . . . a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements to establish § 1983 liability against a

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prison official: (1) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner’s problem and thus the risk that

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unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the official either failed to act or

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took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his response to the problem

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was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s plight; and (3) a causal connection

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between the official’s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.” Montanez v.

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Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 252 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Sample v. Dieks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1110 (3d

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Cir. 1989).

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IV.

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Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

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process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of

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action for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

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interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests created by state law are generally

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limited to free from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

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relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

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A prisoner may claim a Fourteenth Amendment “liberty interest” in avoiding

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incarceration beyond his or her release date. “[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that an

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individual has a liberty interest in being free from incarceration absent a criminal conviction.”

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Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d

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1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, prison officials may be held liable under §1983 if they

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extend an inmate’s prison term, or the inmate’s incarceration is otherwise continued past his or
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her release date without affording the inmate “a meaningful hearing” in advance. See Haygood,

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769 F.2d at 1355-58.

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V.

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Heck Bar
Generally, a plaintiff may not utilize § 1983 to challenge the legality or duration of his or

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her custody, or raise a constitutional challenge which could entitle him or her to an earlier release;

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he or she must seek such relief through a writ of habeas corpus. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.

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74, 78 (2005); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874,

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876 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Further, relief under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment

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does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512

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U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994). “[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior

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invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the

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prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in

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that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”

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Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82 (2005) (emphasis in original).

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VI.

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Analysis
Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim. Plaintiff has named only the Sacramento

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County Sheriff as the defendant in this action. However, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits

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federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state. Brooke v. Sulphur

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Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also

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Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v.

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Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676,

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677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well as those

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where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural Resources Defense Council v.

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California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v.

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List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a

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state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit).

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Because the Sacramento County Sheriff is a state agency it is entitled to Eleventh

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Amendment Immunity from suit. Accordingly, plaintiff may not pursue a claim against the

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department. However, plaintiff will be given the opportunity to amend the complaint to name a

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proper defendant. Plaintiff must state specific facts as to each individual defendant’s deliberate

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indifference. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1988); see Haygood, 769 F.2d at

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1354-55 (“deliberate indifference standard requires a finding of some degree of individual

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culpability”) (citation omitted). There must be an affirmative link between a defendant’s actions

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and the claimed deprivation. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

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Additionally, to the extent plaintiff intends to bring a claim for unlawful detention beyond

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the release date, plaintiff must allege facts showing a prison official was aware that plaintiff had

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sufficient credits to be released, that the official failed to act or acted in deliberate indifference to

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his plight, and that there is a causal connection between the official’s response and the unjustified

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detention. If the basis for plaintiff’s claim is a due process violation, plaintiff must state facts

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showing he informed prison officials there was an error in calculating the term of his confinement

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and the official(s) refused to provide a meaningful and expeditious consideration of his claim that

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his sentence was miscalculated. Finally, the complaint does not contain sufficient facts to

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determine whether or not plaintiff’s claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

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However, plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action for damages for wrongful imprisonment, or

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for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence

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invalid, unless that conviction or sentence has already been determined to be wrongful. Heck,

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512 U.S. at 486-87.

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AMENDING THE COMPLAINT

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As set out above, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim and he will be given the

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opportunity to amend the complaint.
Plaintiff is advised that in an amended complaint he must clearly identify each defendant

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and the action that defendant took that violated his constitutional rights. The court is not required

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to review exhibits to determine what plaintiff’s charging allegations are as to each named

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defendant. If plaintiff wishes to add a claim, he must include it in the body of the complaint. The
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charging allegations must be set forth in the amended complaint so defendants have fair notice of

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the claims plaintiff is presenting. That said, plaintiff need not provide every detailed fact in

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support of his claims. Rather, plaintiff should provide a short, plain statement of each claim. See

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

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Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought

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in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must

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contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who

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personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right.

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Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation

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of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act

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he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation).

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In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or

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occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

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The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d

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1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any

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heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)”); Fed. R. Civ. P.

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84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading). Plaintiff’s claims must be

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set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

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N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system,

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which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

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An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.

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E.D. Cal. R. 220. Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, all prior pleadings are superseded.

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By signing an amended complaint, plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry and

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has evidentiary support for his allegations, and for violation of this rule the court may impose

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sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is denied without prejudice;

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2. Plaintiff shall submit within thirty days from the date of service of this order, an updated

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application to proceed IFP in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1015(a)(1); or pay the $400

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filing fee in full. Failure to submit an updated application or pay the filing fee will result

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in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to

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prosecute and failure to obey court order.

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3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend for failure to state a claim.

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4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint

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that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the

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docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.”

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5. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be

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dismissed.

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Dated: November 26, 2018

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