Mann v. Mutual of Omaha

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 2/9/2017 re 7 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss: IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file a first amended complaint, if he can do so consistent with this Order. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 13 DONALD MANN, Plaintiff, 14 15 16 CIV. NO. 2:16-02560 WBS CMK MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS v. MUTUAL OF OMAHA; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants. 17 18 ----oo0oo---- 19 Plaintiff Donald Mann brought this action against 20 21 defendant Mutual of Omaha, asserting claims arising out of 22 defendant’s denial of benefits under a long-term care insurance 23 policy. 24 to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 25 Procedure 12(b)(6). 26 I. 27 28 The matter is now before the court on defendant’s motion (Def.’s Mot. (Docket No. 7).) Factual and Procedural History Defendant issued a “Comprehensive Long-Term Care Insurance Policy” to plaintiff whereby defendant would provide 1 1 daily payments to plaintiff if plaintiff developed a cognitive 2 impairment as a result of sickness or injury.1 3 (Docket No. 1).) 4 and suffered a head injury. 5 submitted a claim for benefits under the policy on March 30, 6 2010. 7 . [defendant] has failed and refused and continue[s] to fail and 8 refuse to provide benefits to Plaintiff” under the policy. 9 ¶ 8.) 10 (Id.) (Compl. ¶¶ 3-4 On September 12, 2009, plaintiff allegedly fell (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff allegedly Plaintiff alleges that “[s]ince March 30, 2010, . . (Id. Plaintiff initiated this suit in Sacramento County 11 Superior Court on September 2, 2016, alleging breach of contract, 12 breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 13 intentional infliction of emotional distress, and financial abuse 14 of an elder. 15 Defendant now moves to dismiss the entire Complaint. 16 II. Legal Standard 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant removed this case to federal court. On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 1 A court may take judicial notice of “documents . . . alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading . . . even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Because plaintiff’s Complaint “incorporates” the policy and neither party questions its authenticity, the court takes judicial notice of the policy. (See Thompson Decl., Ex. A (“Policy”) (Docket No. 7-1).) “[T]he court cannot consider material . . . such as facts presented in briefs, affidavits, or discovery materials.” Allison v. Brooktree Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (citing McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990)). The court will thus not consider plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit. (See Barr Decl. ¶ 1 (Docket No. 9-1).) 2 1 reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 2 Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by 3 Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 4 319, 322 (1972). 5 must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 6 plausible on its face.” 7 544, 570 (2007). 8 ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 9 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Scheuer v. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a Ashcroft v. 10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 11 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 12 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 13 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 14 standard, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it 15 strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is 16 improbable.” 17 “A claim has facial Id. Under this Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 18 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 19 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While 20 legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 21 must be supported by factual allegations.”). 22 III. Discussion 23 Defendant first argues that the court must dismiss the 24 Complaint because the applicable statute of limitations bars all 25 claims. 26 defense, if ‘apparent from the face of the complaint,’ may 27 properly be raised in a motion to dismiss.” 28 Entm’t Ltd. v. Content Media Corp., 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. (Def.’s Mot. 1:8-11.) “A statute-of-limitations 3 Seven Arts Filmed 1 2013) (quoting Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 2 119 (9th Cir. 1980)). 3 denial of coverage commences the running of the . . . statute of 4 limitation.” 5 1142, 1146, 1149 (2001) (citing Neff v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 30 6 Cal. 2d 165, 169 (1947)). 7 Under California law, “an unconditional Vu v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 26 Cal. 4th The Complaint does not allege when defendant 8 unconditionally denied plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff alleges that 9 defendant has “failed and refused and continue[s] to fail and 10 refuse to provide benefits to plaintiff” since plaintiff first 11 submitted his claim on March 30, 2010. 12 alleges that defendant “has repeatedly stated that it is 13 investigating the claim” and that defendant has “adopted a policy 14 of delay and deny.” 15 alleges that defendant has been investigating plaintiff’s claim 16 and has, during this time period, “refused to make any payments 17 to Plaintiff.” 18 (Compl. ¶ 8.) (Id. ¶¶ 8-9 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff He further (Id. ¶ 9.) While defendant allegedly did not accept plaintiff’s 19 claim on March 30, 2010, a refusal to pay benefits pending an 20 investigation is not an unconditional denial. 21 Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 4th 135, 142 (4th Dist. 1998) 22 (holding the statute of limitations began running after “a claim 23 has been made, the carrier has pursued its investigation, and the 24 claim has been denied.”). 25 the Complaint that the statute of limitations bars plaintiff’s 26 claims, the court cannot dismiss the Complaint on that ground. 27 28 See Singh v. Because it not clear from the face of However, defendant also argues that the Complaint must be dismissed because the policy contains a suit limitations 4 1 clause and plaintiff did not file suit within the contractually 2 agreed-upon period. 3 may contain contractual limitations clauses limiting the 4 insured’s right to sue the insurer to enforce the policy to a 5 period shorter than the statute of limitations. 6 v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604, 611 (2013) 7 (holding a provision in a contract can limit “the time for 8 bringing an action on such contract to a period less than that 9 prescribed in the general statute of limitations”); Wetzel v. Lou (Def.’s Mot. 1:12-14.) Insurance policies See Heimeshoff 10 Ehlers Cadillac Grp. Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 11 643, 650 (9th Cir. 2000). 12 contractual limitations provision unless “the period [to bring 13 suit] is unreasonably short.” 14 Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 15 683 (1990). The court will enforce a policy’s Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 612; see 16 The policy explicitly provides that “plaintiff cannot 17 bring a legal action to recover under [the] policy for at least 18 60 days after [plaintiff] ha[s] given [defendant] proof of loss.” 19 (Policy at 17 (Docket No. 7-1).) 20 start such an action more than 3 years after the date proof of 21 loss is required,” and the policy requires that plaintiff “must 22 give [defendant] written proof of loss within 90 days after the 23 date of such loss.” 24 contractually required to commence any action within three years 25 and ninety days after the date he allegedly became entitled to 26 benefits under the policy. 27 not unreasonable. 28 Co., Case No. 14-cv-00614-SI, 2015 WL 1967260, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Further, plaintiff “cannot (Id. at 16-17.) Plaintiff was thus This contractual time limitation is See Bonin v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. 5 1 May 1, 2015) (upholding three-year contractual limitation 2 period); Frazier v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 3 103 (2d Dist. 1985) (upholding two-year contractual limitation 4 period on a life insurance policy). 5 Plaintiff allegedly suffered his head injury on 6 September 12, 2009, and submitted his claim for deterioration of 7 his mental cognitive capacity on March 30, 2010. 8 Plaintiff initiated this action in August 2016, over six years 9 after plaintiff incurred the alleged injury and submitted his 10 claim for coverage. 11 complaint that plaintiff did not bring a legal action within the 12 time period proscribed in the suit limitations clause. 13 (See id. at 1.) (Compl. ¶ 7.) It thus appears from the Plaintiff argues that defendant never informed 14 plaintiff of the applicable time limits that apply to his claim 15 and thus is estopped from asserting the suit limitation 16 provision. 17 required “to notify a claimant of any applicable time limits that 18 might apply to the claim.” 19 Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 132 Cal. App. 4th 1076, 1091 (2d Dist. 20 2005); see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 10, § 2695.4 (“Every insurer 21 shall disclose to a first party claimant or beneficiary, all . . 22 . time limits . . . of any insurance policy issued by that 23 insurer that may apply to the claim presented by the claimant.”). 24 However, the Complaint contains no allegation that defendant 25 failed to inform plaintiff of the applicable suit limitations 26 provision, however. (Pl.’s Opp’n 6:3-14 (Docket No. 9).) Insurers are Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Ass’n, Thus this argument fails. 27 Because the policy contains a valid suit limitations 28 clause, plaintiff failed to file suit within the contractually 6 1 required time period, and there is no allegation of an applicable 2 exception, the court must grant defendant’s motion to dismiss the 3 Complaint for failure to file suit within the contractual 4 limitations period. 5 Defendant also separately moves to dismiss plaintiff’s 6 third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 7 distress because plaintiff does not allege defendant engaged in 8 any extreme and outrageous conduct. 9 While an insurance company’s handling of a claim may result in (See Def.’s Mot. 9:9-10:10.) 10 liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Mintz 11 v. Blue Cross of California, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1594, 1608 (2d 12 Dist. 2009), “[m]ere denial or delay of insurance benefits does 13 not constitute outrageous conduct,” Cooper v. TriWest Healthcare 14 Alliance Corp., No. 11-CV-2965-L(RBB), 2013 WL 55883784, at *6 15 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013). 16 Here, plaintiff fails to allege any conduct by 17 defendant that could be construed as extreme and outrageous 18 conduct. 19 of this cause of action in his papers or at oral argument. 20 Pl.’s Opp’n 9:15-16.) 21 defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s third cause of action 22 for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 23 Plaintiff’s counsel does not dispute the insufficiency (See Accordingly, the court must grant IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 24 dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint be, and the same hereby is, 25 GRANTED. 26 27 Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file a first amended complaint, if he can do so 28 7 1 consistent with this Order. 2 3 Dated: February 9, 2017 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8

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