Spears v. El Dorado County Courts et al

Filing 10

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 12/11/18 ORDERING that plaintiff may file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. (Plummer, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BRIAN SPEARS,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:16-CV-2655-DMC-P

v.

ORDER

EL DORADO COUNTY COURTS, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges the

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El Dorado County Courts, El Dorado County C.P.S., El Dorado County Public Guardian and

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individuals Joan Barbie, and Ken Barber, violated his rights under the federal constitution and the

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California state constitution. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the due

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process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

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Amendment, Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, and his due process,

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equal protection, and right against cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the California

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constitution.

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “…short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v.

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Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual

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allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

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(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s

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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.

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Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their

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pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

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338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be

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facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer

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that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation

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marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The

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sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with

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liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks

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omitted); Moss, 572F.3d at 969.

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II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff’s claims arise out of a series of family law proceedings and events

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relating to the custody of his children. This Court identifies 7 claims raised in the complaint. (1)

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Plaintiff alleges the El Dorado County Courts deprived him of due process under the Fifth and
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Fourteenth Amendments by failing to provide him with notice of hearings, denying him the

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ability to appear at his termination of parental rights hearing, denying him the appointment of

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counsel, and terminating his parental rights without giving him a chance to speak or be heard; (2)

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Plaintiff alleges the El Dorado County Courts violated his due process and equal protection rights

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during proceedings that involved certain property interests; (3) Plaintiff asserts that the El Dorado

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County Courts, El Dorado County, C.P.S., and a non-defendant named Gary Slossberg, violated

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his equal protection and due process rights by incorrectly preparing court orders, acting outside

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their jurisdiction, and denying petitioner meaningful access to the court system; (4) Plaintiff

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alleges the El Dorado County Public Guardian’s Office violated his due process rights by holding

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conservator hearings concerning his son, Brian Jr., without notifying him prior to the hearings,

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and by denying plaintiff the ability to speak with his son; (5) Plaintiff contends that the alleged

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constitutional violation committed by the El Dorado County Public Guardian’s Office amount to

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a violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and usual punishment as they caused him

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“sleepless, tearful nights over the concern about his son;” (6) Plaintiff alleges Joan Barbie

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violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by intentionally

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manipulating reports and ignoring court orders to ensure Plaintiff would not receive fair treatment

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in court; (7) Plaintiff alleges that the El Dorado County Courts, El Dorado County C.P.S., El

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Dorado County Public Guardian, Joan Barbie, and Ken Barber violated his equal protection and

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due process rights, as well as his right against cruel and usual punishment, under the California

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constitution.

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III. ANALYSIS
A.

Federal Claims Against El Dorado County Superior Courts
Plaintiff’s first and second claims in their entirety, and Plaintiff’s third claim in

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part, are against the El Dorado County Superior Courts. The Superior Court for El Dorado

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County is an arm of the state and thus under the Eleventh Amendment cannot be sued in federal

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court. See, e.g., Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.

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2003) (11th Amendment bars suit against state superior court and its employees); Hyland v.

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Wonder, 117 F.3d 405, 413 (9th Cir.), amended, 127 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (state case law
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and constitutional provisions make clear that California Superior Court is a state agency);

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Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir.1995) (California municipal court is arm of

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state protected from lawsuit by 11th Amendment immunity); Greater Los Angeles Council on

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Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 & n. 10 (9th Cir.1987) (11th Amendment bars suit

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against Superior Court of State of California regardless of relief sought). Thus, claims one and

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two fail to state cognizable claims, and claim three fails to state a cognizable claim as to El

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Dorado County Superior Courts.

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B.

Federal Claims Against El Dorado County C.P.S. and El Dorado County
Public Guardian’s Office

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Plaintiff alleges that both the El Dorado County C.P.S. and El Dorado County

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Public Guardian’s Office violated his constitutional rights. “[M]unicipalities and other local

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government units . . . [are] among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell v. Dep’t of

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Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A local governmental unit may not be held responsible for

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the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of Cty.

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Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Therefore, a plaintiff must go beyond the

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respondeat superior theory of liability and demonstrate that the alleged constitutional deprivation

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was the product of a policy or custom of the local governmental unit, because municipal liability

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must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not the actions of the employees of the

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municipality. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.

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“A municipality is responsible for a constitutional violation, …, only when an

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‘action [taken] pursuant to [an] official municipal policy of some nature’ caused the violation.”

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Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654, 670 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of

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Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Even if there is not an explicit policy, a plaintiff may

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establish municipal liability upon a showing that there is a permanent and well-settled practice by

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the municipality which gave rise to the alleged constitutional violation. See City of St. Louis v.

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Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). The plaintiff may also establish municipal liability by

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demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation was caused by a failure to train municipal

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employees adequately. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-91 (1989).
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El Dorado County C.P.S.
Plaintiff alleges in this third claim that the El Dorado County C.P.S. violated his

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due process and equal protection rights by denying him contact with his son and improperly

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placing his son in the custody of his son’s mother. This claim does not allege any facts related to

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a policy, custom, or lack of training by the county agency. Instead, the complaint seems to focus

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on Plaintiff’s challenges to the individual decisions made, in part, by the El Dorado County

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C.P.S. These allegations, related to such individual decisions, are not sufficient to establish that

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the alleged constitutional violation was the product of a policy or custom of the El Dorado

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County C.P.S. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (holding plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat

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superior theory of liability and demonstrate that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the

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product of a policy or custom of the local governmental unit).

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Further, even if Plaintiff could allege facts sufficient to establish municipal

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liability, this claim would still fail to state a cognizable claim. This section of the complaint

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challenges the individual decisions of the El Dorado County C.P.S. and reads more like an appeal

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of Plaintiff’s family law matter than an allegation of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff identifies

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no liberty or property interest that was violated and provides no facts to indicate that he was

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discriminated against on the basis of a protected class. Because this claim is really a challenge to

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state court family law proceedings, not a federal constitutional tort claim, it would be impossible

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to cure via amendment. Thus, the remainder of Plaintiff’s third claim related to El Dorado

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County C.P.S. also fails to state a cognizable claim.
El Dorado County Public Guardian’s Office

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2.

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Plaintiff alleges, in his fourth claim, that the El Dorado County Public Guardian’s

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Office violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and in his

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fifth claim that the El Dorado County Public Guardian’s Office violated his Eighth Amendment

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right against cruel and unusual punishment. Turning first to Plaintiff’s due process claim,

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Plaintiff contends the El Dorado County Public Guardian’s Office violated his due process rights

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during the conservatorship proceedings related to Petitioner’s adult son, Brian Jr. Plaintiff argues

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he was deprived of due process because he was not notified of the conservatorship proceedings or
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given information regarding the welfare of his son. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the El

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Dorado County Public Guardian’s Office erroneously limited his communication with Brian Jr. to

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letters. This limitation, Plaintiff contends, also amounts to a violation of his due process rights.

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Plaintiff does not argue that these alleged due process violations are the result of a

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policy, custom, or failure to train on the part of the county. Rather, Plaintiff seems to simply

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argue that these discrete, individual acts, were lone violations of his due process rights. For that

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reason, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim under the theory of local

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government or municipal liability. However, even if Plaintiff had argued these alleged violations

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were a part of a policy or custom, there are insufficient facts to support a due process claim as

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Plaintiff has failed to identify a liberty or property interest for which protection in sought. See

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Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).

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In other words, Plaintiff has failed to identify a right, protected by the due process clause, that

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was violated. Thus, Plaintiff’s fourth claim fails. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to

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amend in order to allege sufficient facts to establish municipal liability and to identify a liberty or

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property interest, conferred by the due process clause, that was violated.

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Turning now to Plaintiff’s claim alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

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Plaintiff contends that the alleged violations of his due process rights by the El Dorado County

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Public Guardian’s Office caused Plaintiff severe mental stress and resulted in sleepless, tearful

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nights over the concern for his son. This, Plaintiff argues, amounts to cruel and unusual

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punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because this claim is rooted in the same

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factual allegations as the due process claim discussed above, it too fails to allege sufficient facts

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to state a claim under the theory of local government or municipal liability. See Monell, 436 U.S.

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at 690-91 (holding plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat superior theory of liability and

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demonstrate that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the product of a policy or custom of

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the local governmental unit).

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Further, even if Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to establish municipal

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liability, his Eighth Amendment claim would still fail to state a claim upon which relief could be

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granted. The actions outlined by Plaintiff have nothing to do with the imposition of a punishment
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or the conditions of his confinement. Rather, they seem to be allegations of harm resulting from

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the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights. In other words, this is an argument about

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damages relating to Plaintiff’s due process claim against the El Dorado County Public Guardian’s

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Office, not a separate constitutional tort. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim as to the

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alleged Eighth Amendment violations.

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C.

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Federal Claim Against Joan Barbie
Plaintiff alleges C.P.S. Officer Joan Barbie violated his equal protection rights

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under the fourteenth amendment by intentionally manipulating reports, ignoring court orders, and

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depriving him of fair access to the courts because of racial animus. Equal protection claims arise

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when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are intentionally treated differently

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without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School District v.

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Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Sufficient facts exist within the complaint to support a colorable

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equal protection claim against Joan Barbie.

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D.

State Law Claims
Plaintiff alleges, in his seventh claim, violations of the California state

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constitution. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has

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original jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims

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in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

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under Article III [of the Constitution],” with specific exceptions. “Pendent jurisdiction over state

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claims exists when the federal claim is sufficiently substantial to confer federal jurisdiction, and

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there is a ‘common nucleus of operative fact between the state and federal claims.’” Brady v.

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Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 421

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(9th Cir.1991)). “[O]nce judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention of supplemental

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jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc.,

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114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims

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are dismissed before trial,... the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers

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of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

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Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, and fifth claims all fail to state cognizable
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claims. For that reason, Plaintiff’s only remaining federal claim is the equal protection claim

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against Joan Barbie. This singular federal claim and the facts supporting it are insufficient for

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this court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state claims against any defendant other than

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Joan Barbie. Because the only cognizable claim relates to Joan Barbie, it necessarily follows that

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the only cognizable state claim before this court must arise out of the same facts and

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circumstances surrounding the allegations against Joan Barnie. Thus, claim seven fails to state a

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cognizable claim as to the following defendants: the El Dorado County Courts, the El Dorado

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County C.P.S., the El Dorado County Public Guardian’s Office, and Ken Barber.

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IV. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT

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Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be

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cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203

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F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an

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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

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1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the

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prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An

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amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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This means, in practical terms, if Plaintiff files an amended complaint he must not only cure the

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deficiencies identified in this order, but also reallege the cognizable claim(s) discussed in this

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Court’s order.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Because the complaint appears to state at least one cognizable claim, if no

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amended complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the court will issue findings and

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recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such
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further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claim(s).

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V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a first amended
complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

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Dated: December 11, 2018
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DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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