Owens v. Defazio et al
Filing
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ORDER and FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 10/3/2017 DENYING 43 Motion for Entry of Default; GRANTING Request for Extension of Time by defendants Blessing, Drake, Murillo, Martinez, Bettencourt, Lebeck, Brady, Burke, and DeFazio who shall all file an answer to the complaint on or before 30 days after the court issues a final ruling on the Motion to Dismiss; and RECOMMENDING 37 Motion to Dismiss be partially granted and partially denied, as detail ed in this Order and Findings and Recommendations, and defendants Rashev, Guffee, Matthews, Mercado, Okoroike, Martinick, Schultz, and Eldridge be ordered to file an answer within 30 days of the adoption of findings and recommendations. Referred to Judge John A. Mendez. Objections due within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations. (Henshaw, R)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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THEON OWENS,
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No. 2: 16-cv-2750 JAM KJN P
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
JOSEPH DEFAZIO, et al.,
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Defendants.
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I. Introduction
Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant
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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 37.) After carefully considering the record,
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the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion be granted in part and denied in part.
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II. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss Brought Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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12(b)(6)
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Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to dismiss for
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“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In
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considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court
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must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
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(2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v.
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McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir.
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1999). Still, to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must contain more
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than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
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cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words,
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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
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statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim
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upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
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draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
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U.S. at 678. Attachments to a complaint are considered to be part of the complaint for purposes
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of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Reiner & Co.,
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896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990).
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A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears
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beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would
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entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In general, pro se
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pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner,
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404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe such pleadings liberally. Bretz
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v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal
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interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not
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pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
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III. Background
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On December 8, 2016, the undersigned ordered service of the original complaint on
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defendants Eldridge, Martineck, Schultz, Couch, Mercado, Blessing, Drake, Murillo, Martinez,
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Byers, Bettencourt, Guffee, Rashev, Matthews, Lebeck, Brady, Burke, Defazio, Okoroike and
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Staggs-Boatright. (ECF No. 4.)
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On March 2, 2017, the undersigned referred this action to the Post-Screening ADR
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Project. (ECF No. 22.) On March 23, 2017, a settlement conference was held. The action did
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not settle.
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On July 20, 2017, defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 37.) The
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motion to dismiss is made on behalf of Rashev, Byers, Guffee, Matthews, Mercado, Okoroike,
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Staggs-Boatright, Eldridge, Couch, Schultz and Martineck. The remaining defendants, i.e.,
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defendants Blessing, Drake, Murillo, Martinez, Bettencourt, Lebeck, Brady, Burke and Defazio,
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request a thirty day extension of time after the court rules on the motion to dismiss to file an
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answer. Good cause appearing, this request is granted.
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IV. Plaintiff’s Allegations
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To put the motion to dismiss in context, the undersigned herein describes plaintiff’s
allegations against all defendants.
Plaintiff alleges that on February 18, 2015, defendants Byers and Rashev were passing out
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the daily breakfast and lunch meals on the top tier. (ECF No. 1 at 15.) Plaintiff alleges that
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defendants Byers and Rashev walked past plaintiff without offering him his meals. (Id.) When
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defendants passed plaintiff’s cell, he asked if he could get his meals. (Id.) Defendants ignored
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plaintiff. (Id.)
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Plaintiff confronted non-defendant Potter about the denial of food. (Id. at 16.) Potter
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allegedly refused to intervene. (Id.) Plaintiff became upset after being denied his meals. (Id.)
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Plaintiff began to throw water at his cell door throughout the morning. (Id.) At approximately
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1225 hours, defendants Martineck, Byers, Blessing, Bettencourt and Rashev, and Potter,
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approached plaintiff’s cell door. (Id.) Defendant Martineck told plaintiff that Potter alleged that
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plaintiff had gassed him (i.e. thrown urine or feces at him). (Id.) Defendant Martineck asked
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plaintiff to submit to mechanical restraints so that his cell could be searched and all liquid
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removed from his cell. (Id.)
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Plaintiff complied with defendant Martineck’s request and submitted to restraints. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Martineck then instructed his subordinates to place plaintiff in the
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upper tier shower. (Id. at 16-17.) Once plaintiff was in the shower, defendant Martineck
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instructed his subordinates to search plaintiff’s cell and remove all containers. (Id. at 17.) Once
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the cell was searched, defendant Martineck instructed his subordinates to put plaintiff back in his
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cell. (Id.)
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Defendant Bettencourt then used a wet swab on Potter’s shirt sleeve. (Id.) Plaintiff was
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written up for a rules infraction. (Id.) Potter then sat in front of plaintiff’s cell. (Id.)
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At approximately 1315 hours, defendants Defazio, Brady, Lebeck and Burke came to
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plaintiff’s cell. (Id.) These defendants instructed plaintiff to cuff up, informing him that an
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“unidentified c/o (defendant Bettencourt)” said that he had been gassed by plaintiff. (Id.)
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Plaintiff told defendants that he had not gassed anyone and did not want to come out of his cell.
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(Id.) Plaintiff told them that defendant Martineck had already addressed the allegation and had
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already searched his cell. (Id. at 17-18.)
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Defendant Defazio told plaintiff that defendants Blessing and Martineck wanted him to
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cuff up and come down to the rotunda to talk and that if he refused, he would be extracted from
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his cell. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff then agreed to submit to mechanical restraints. (Id.) Defendant
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Defazio then signaled for tower officer defendant Matthews to open plaintiff’s cell door. (Id.)
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Defendant Defazio then grabbed plaintiff’s arm and slammed him on the concrete floor. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that the other defendants who were present then began to strike plaintiff in the
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face with their clenched fists. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that this beating took place in the presence of defendant Matthews and
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non-defendant Brown. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff alleges that neither defendant Matthews nor non-
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defendant Brown attempted to stop the attack or sound the unit alarm. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that during the beating, defendant Defazio punched plaintiff in the mouth,
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knocking out several of his teeth. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Defazio also tore 25 to 30
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dreadlocks out of plaintiff’s head. (Id.)
After plaintiff saw blood gushing from his mouth, he yelled out, “HIV,” in an attempt to
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stop the attack. (Id. at 20.) At that time, all defendants stopped attacking plaintiff except for
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defendant Defazio. (Id.) Defendant Defazio said to plaintiff, “No you don’t nigger. You think
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you run this place, you walk around here like you run this place. You’re going to learn nigger.”
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(Id.) One of the correctional officers then told defendant Matthews to sound the unit alarm,
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which then occurred. (Id.)
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Defendant Martinez then ran into the section and up the stairs. (Id.) Defendant Martinez
pulled the plaintiff’s legs up and kicked him in the testicles. (Id.)
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Defendants Blessing, Bettencourt and Rashev then came into the section. (Id.)
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Defendants Rashev and Bettencourt came up the stairs, and were later joined by defendant
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Blessing. (Id.) After he came up the stairs, defendant Blessing kicked plaintiff in the face with
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his steel work boot. (Id.) Then “all present defendants” began to kick and hit plaintiff in the face.
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(Id.) Defendant Guffee, who was at the bottom of the stairs, observed this violence. (Id. at 21.)
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Defendant Guffee did not attempt to stop this violence, nor did he object. (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff
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alleges that defendant Matthews also saw this violence but failed to intervene. (Id.)
By this time, plaintiff’s left eye was completely swollen shut and bleeding, and his right
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eye was swollen shut approximately 80%. (Id.) Defendants Drake and Murillo entered the
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section and came up the stairs. (Id.) Defendant Blessing told defendants Drake and Murillo to
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take plaintiff to the rotunda holding cell. (Id.) Defendants Drake and Murillo grabbed plaintiff
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and began to drag him down the stairs. (Id.)
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Once defendants Drake and Murillo had dragged plaintiff to the bottom of the stairs, they
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slammed plaintiff’s head into the door frame. (Id. at 21-22.) Plaintiff alleges that once
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defendants Drake and Murillo had dragged him into the rotunda, they held him up so that the
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other defendants could strike plaintiff. (Id. at 22.) Defendants Defazio and Blessing then began
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striking and kicking plaintiff in the face. (Id.) While plaintiff was being struck in the head, he
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saw a flash of light which was a concussion. (Id.) Defendants Murillo and Drake then threw
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plaintiff into the holding cage. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Blessing then called the other defendants into the office.
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(Id. at 23.) Defendant Blessing told the other defendants, “We have to cover our asses.” (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that the defendants began to conspire regarding how to cover-up what they had
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done to plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff heard defendant Defazio say, “I’m going to put in my report that
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he attempted to head butt me and spit on me.” (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff heard non-defendant Potter
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tell the inmate worker to clean up the blood and hair on the tier. (Id.)
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Approximately fifteen minutes later, a guard contacted defendant Nurse Okoroike,
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requesting that she medically evaluate plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant Okoroike asked plaintiff what
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happened to him. (Id.) Plaintiff told defendant Okoroike what happened, i.e., he was beaten and
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kicked by defendants. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Okoroike did not ask the Correctional
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Officers to pull plaintiff from the holding cell so that she could perform her duty and do a full
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body inspection. (Id.) Defendant Okoroike noted a few injuries on plaintiff’s face, then left.
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(Id.)
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Approximately three minutes later, defendant Martineck arrived on the unit. (Id. at 2425.) Defendant Martineck grabbed the CDCR 7219 Medical Report of Injury or Unusual
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Occurrence from defendant Blessing. (Id. at 25.) Defendant Martineck instructed defendant
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Blessing to follow him out on to the yard. (Id.) Plaintiff was unable to make out what they were
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saying. (Id.) While defendant Blessing was talking, defendant Martineck became agitated and
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began talking in a loud, aggressive manner. (Id.)
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Defendant Martineck returned to the rotunda and began to exit the unit door. (Id.)
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Plaintiff asked if he could speak with him. (Id.) Defendant Martineck said, “not now, I have to
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go take care of something.” (Id.) As defendant Martineck exited the unit, defendant Blessing
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held up his middle finger toward defendant Martineck and said in a low tone, “Fuck you. You’re
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going to take his side over me. He is an inmate.” (Id.)
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At approximately 1335 hours, plaintiff was taken to A Facility Triage by non-defendant
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McCarvel and defendants Murillo and Drake. (Id.) Plaintiff complained that he was unable to
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focus his vision, seeing double and feeling dizzy. (Id. at 26.) Non-defendant Dr. Wedell told
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plaintiff that these symptoms would pass. (Id.) Defendant Mercado then entered the Triage area
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to relieve defendant McCarvel, so that McCarvel could prepare his report regarding his
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involvement in the incident. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that his concussion symptoms persisted and he became irritable because
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of the circumstances of the beating. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he began to swear and state his
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thoughts out loud about the defendants. (Id.) Based on plaintiff’s statements, as well as
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plaintiff’s injuries, defendant Mercado became aware of what had happened. (Id.) In an attempt
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to cover-up for the defendants who had inflicted the beating, plaintiff alleges that defendant
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falsely charged plaintiff with threatening staff.1 (Id. at 26-27.)
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Plaintiff alleges that non-defendant Dr. Wedell instructed his assistant, non-defendant
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Nurse Nicolaou, to apply an ice pack to plaintiff’s eyes to stop them from swelling shut. (Id. at
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27.) Defendant Mercado told Nurse Nicolauo, “No, he cannot have an ice pack.” (Id.) Nurse
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Nicolaou told plaintiff that she would document that defendant Mercado said that he could not
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have an ice pack. (Id.)
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Plaintiff was then taken to a use of force interview. (Id.) As plaintiff was wheeled back
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to his cell after the interview, he saw defendant Byers. (Id. at 28.) Plaintiff asked defendant
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Byers, “is that how you are getting down, jumping on inmates with their hands cuffed behind
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their back and knocking out their teeth.” (Id.) Defendant Byers replied, “Yeah.” (Id.)
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Approximately three hours after the incident, defendant Defazio asked defendant
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Psychiatric Technician Staggs-Boatright to write a CDCR 7219 alleging that he, defendant
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Defazio, had suffered injuries during the incident. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Staggs-
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Boatright did not see any injuries on defendant Defazio, but agreed to help him anyway. (Id.)
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Defendant Boatright wrote that defendant Defazio had pain in his chest from being head butted by
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plaintiff and that his hand hurt from punching plaintiff in the face. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this
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report was a “job insurance” plan so defendant Defazio would not get fired for violating the law.
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(Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that on February 19, 2015, defendant Byers and non-defendant Parker
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denied him his breakfast and lunch. (Id. at 29.) Later that day, non-defendants Igbowke and
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Babbit denied plaintiff his evening meal. (Id.) On February 20, 2015, defendant Byers and non-
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defendant Parker denied plaintiff his “breakfast meals.” (Id.)
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Plaintiff does not allege a claim against defendant Mercado for making the allegedly false
charges. In any event, the issuance of a false rules violation report does not, in and of itself,
support a claim under section 1983. See Ellis v. Foulk, 2014 WL 4676350 at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
(“Plaintiff’s protection from the arbitrary action of prison officials lies in ‘the procedural due
process requirements as set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell.’”) (citing Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d
1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984).
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Later that day, plaintiff told defendant Martineck that staff was refusing to give him food.
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(Id.) Plaintiff also told defendant Martineck that he feared for his safety. (Id.) Defendant
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Martineck told plaintiff to say he was suicidal so that he could get him off the block. (Id.)
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Plaintiff told defendant Martineck that he was suicidal and that he wanted his food. (Id.)
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Defendant Martineck had plaintiff moved to a different housing block. (Id. at 29-30.)
Later that day, plaintiff was put in a holding cage, per defendant Martineck’s order to have
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him evaluated by a psychologist based on his claims of feeling suicidal. (Id. at 30.) While he
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was in the holding cell, defendant Matthews began taunting plaintiff, mimicking the sounds
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plaintiff made as he was beaten. (Id.)
On March 3, 2015, non-defendant Demps came to plaintiff’s housing unit and provided
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him with copies of the Rules Violation Reports that had been written against plaintiff. (Id.)
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Demps asked plaintiff to write down the names of any witnesses and documentary evidence he
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wanted to present at the disciplinary hearing. (Id.)
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After reviewing the documentation regarding the incident, plaintiff discovered that
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defendant Martineck had helped to cover-up the incident. (Id.) Defendant Martineck had
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allowed staff to change their story and report things that did not happen. (Id.) Plaintiff also
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alleges that he discovered that defendant Okoroike had attempted to conceal the injuries that he
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suffered. (Id. at 31.) Plaintiff again alleges that defendant Staggs-Boatright prepared a report
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falsely stating that defendant Defazio had suffered injuries during the incident, i.e., pain in his
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chest and hand. (Id. at 32.)
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Plaintiff alleges that on April 2, 2015, defendant Couch was assigned as an Investigative
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Employee to help plaintiff prepare for the disciplinary hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff told defendant
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Couch that there were witnesses and documentary evidence. (Id. at 32-33.) Plaintiff told
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defendant Couch that the names of the eyewitnesses were on the CDC 115-A form. (Id.)
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Plaintiff also told defendant Couch that he (plaintiff) had prepared questions for the witnesses.
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(Id. at 33.) Defendant Couch said he had received the questions and that he would interview the
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witnesses and gather the documents identified by plaintiff. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that on April 22, 2015, he received defendant Couch’s report. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Couch attempted to conceal witness testimony and had tampered
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with evidence. (Id.) Defendant Couch had prepared a new report stating that plaintiff had not
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requested anything. (Id.) Defendant Couch also refused to ask the witnesses the questions
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proposed by plaintiff. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that on May 28, 2015, defendant Schultz held the disciplinary hearing
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regarding the charges made against plaintiff by defendant Defazio. (Id. at 34.) Plaintiff alleges
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that defendant Schultz refused plaintiff’s request for witnesses and to present documentary
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evidence. (Id. at 34-35.) Defendant Schultz found plaintiff guilty of head butting defendant
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Defazio. (Id.) Defendant Schultz told plaintiff that he would not consider his evidence and
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witnesses because, “I am not going to deal with all of that, the office of Internal Affairs can deal
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with that since they are investigating the assault and battery that happen[ed] to you.” (Id. at 35.)
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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Schultz denied his request for witnesses by stating, “This R.V.R.
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[rules violation report] is what I have to go off of.” (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that after being found guilty, he was punished by being deprived of all
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personal property, vendor packages, and telephone privileges for 90 days. (Id. at 35, 37.) In
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addition, plaintiff was referred to the Classification Committee, which sentenced him to an 18
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Month Aggravated Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) term. (Id. at 35, 37.) Plaintiff alleges that the
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SHU requires that inmates are housed in an isolated cell for up to 22 hours a day. (Id. at 37.)
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Inmates in the SHU have limited visiting privileges, are denied personal property and telephone
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privileges, have limited access to the commissary, have limited access to packages, limited access
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to educational, rehabilitative and recreational programs, movement outside the cell is restricted to
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mechanical restraints, are unable to work and have limited law library access. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that on June 17, 2015, defendant Mercado came to his cell door and said,
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“I wanted to see your smile. Have they fixed your two teeth yet, let me see.” (Id. at 36.) Plaintiff
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felt attacked by defendant Mercado’s comments and told him to get the “fuck away” from the
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door. (Id.) Defendant Mercado then told plaintiff, “that’s why you got your ass beat down and
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your teeth knocked down your throat, you little bitch.” (Id.) Plaintiff and defendant Mercado then
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began to argue. (Id.) Defendant Mercado told plaintiff, “You bitch, you’re lucky I was not there
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because I would have knocked out even more.” (Id.) Plaintiff then said, “You would not have
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done shit but write a fake report like you did.” (Id. at 37.) Defendant Mercado replied, “You got
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found guilty didn’t you.” (Id.) At that time, other staff began to enter the section. (Id.)
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Defendant Mercado noticed the other staff and walked away. (Id.)
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On June 30, 3015, defendant Eldridge upheld defendant Schultz’s findings. (Id. at 35-36.)
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On August 26, 2015, the Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) reviewed the
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rules violation report. (Id. at 37.) The ICC upheld the actions and findings of defendants
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Eldridge, Schultz and Couch. (Id.) The ICC sentenced plaintiff to an 18 month Security Housing
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Unit (“SHU”) term. (Id.)
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V. Discussion
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Defendants move to dismiss all claims against defendants Rashev, Byers, Guffee,
Matthew, Mercado, Okoroike, Boatright-Staggs, Eldridge, Couch, Schultz and Martineck.
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A. Defendants Rashev and Byers
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Alleged Denial of Food
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Plaintiff alleges that on February 18, 2015, defendants Byers and Rashev denied him his
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breakfast and lunch. Plaintiff alleges that on February 19, 2015 defendant Byers denied him his
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breakfast and lunch. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his evening meal on February19, 2015,
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by non-defendants. Plaintiff alleges that on February 20, 2015, defendant Byers denied him his
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“breakfast meals.”
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The Eighth Amendment protects a prisoner’s right to receive food “adequate to maintain
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health.” Lemaire v. Maas, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit has held that
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denial of 16 meals in 23 days “is a sufficiently serious deprivation because food is one of life's
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basic necessities.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2009). In that case, the
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court did not reach the conclusion whether the meals plaintiff did receive were adequate to
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maintain his health. Other cases finding a sufficiently serious deprivation involve the plaintiff
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being deprived of food entirely for more than two consecutive days. See Dearman v. Woodson,
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429 F.2d 1288, 1289 (10th. Cir. 1970) (no food for twelve days); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849,
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853 (7th Cir. 1999) (“infirm” plaintiff did not receive food for 3-4 days at a time); Robles v.
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Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1983) (no food for 12 days, some consecutive, out of 53-day
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period). In another case, the Eighth Circuit found that depriving plaintiff of four consecutive
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meals in two days is a sufficiently serious deprivation. Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805, 809 (8th
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Cir. 1998).
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As discussed above, plaintiff alleges that defendant Rashev denied him breakfast and
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lunch on one day. Based on the case law cited above, the undersigned finds that this claim
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against defendant Rashev does not state a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment claim.
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Accordingly, this claim against defendant Rashev should be dismissed.
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Plaintiff alleges that Byers denied him five meals over three days. However, plaintiff is
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also claiming that he was denied four consecutive meals (breakfast, lunch and dinner on February
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19, 2015, and breakfast on February 20, 2015), and that defendant Byers denied him three of
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those four meals. Even assuming defendant Byers knew that plaintiff would not and did not
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receive his fourth meal, for the reasons stated herein, the undersigned finds no Eighth
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Amendment violation.
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As discussed above, in Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805 (1998), the Eighth Circuit found
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that inmates’ rights were violated when they were denied four consecutive meals. The
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undersigned finds Simmons distinguishable from the instant action. In reaching this holding, the
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Eighth Circuit found an Eighth Amendment violation based on the totality of the conditions of the
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plaintiffs’ confinement. 154 F.3d at 808. The inmates in Simmons were paraplegic, wheelchair
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bound and confined in inadequate maximum security cells where the defendants made sure that
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the plaintiffs were unable to access their food trays (their wheelchairs could not reach the food
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slots), and were not given the appropriate supplies and assistance so that they could have bowel
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movements. The Eighth Circuit found that “[s]uch conditions denied [plaintiffs] ‘the minimal
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civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. at 808, citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
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(1994).
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In the instant case, plaintiff alleges that he did not receive breakfast and lunch on
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November 18, 2015 (thus he received dinner that day), that he received no meals on November
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19, 2015, and no breakfast on November 20, 2015. Based on the case law discussed above, the
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undersigned finds that such facts, and the absence of any other conditions of confinement claims
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alleged to have occurred in combination with such deprivations on these dates, fail to state a
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claim under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss this claim against
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defendant Byers should be granted.
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Excessive Force
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Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a potentially
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colorable excessive force claim against defendant Rashev. Defendants argue that plaintiff makes
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no specific allegations of excessive force against defendant Rashev. Defendants argue that
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plaintiff merely lumps defendant Rashev with the other alleged excessive force defendants based
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upon his alleged presence at the incident.
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When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial inquiry is
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“... whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
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maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992);
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Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as
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opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims,
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is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect
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on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475
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U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following
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factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship
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between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably
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perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.
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See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
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Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against defendant Rashev follows herein:
Defendants Blessing, Bettencourt and Rashev then came into the
section. Rashev and Bettencourt came up the stairs, while Blessing
immediately started clearing the alarm. Once the alarm was cleared
Blessing then came up the stairs and then he kicked the plaintiff in
the face with his steel toe work boot. At which time all present
defendants then began to kick and hit the plaintiff in the face.
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(ECF No. 1 at 20.)
While defendants argue that plaintiff fails to attribute any particular alleged excessive
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force acts to defendant Rashev, the complaint alleges that “all present defendants,” which
4
included defendant Rashev, kicked and hit plaintiff in the face. Plaintiff also clearly describes the
5
movements of defendant Rashev prior to the alleged excessive force, i.e., coming into the section
6
and then going up the stairs. These allegations are more than “naked assertions,” “labels and
7
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Defendants’ motion
8
to dismiss plaintiff’s excessive force claim against defendant Rashev should be denied.
9
10
B. Defendants Guffee and Matthews
Defendants move to dismiss the claims against defendants Guffee and Matthews. Plaintiff
11
alleges that defendants Guffee and Matthews observed the alleged incidents of excessive force
12
but failed to intervene. The undersigned describes these allegations herein.
13
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Matthews witnessed defendant DeFazio and other
14
defendants beat plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at 18.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Matthews observed
15
this beating while he was in the tower, which was approximately 20 to 25 feet from where the
16
attack occurred. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Matthews opened the cell door for
17
defendant Defazio. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Matthews did not attempt to stop
18
the attack or sound the unit alarm. (Id. at 19.)
19
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Guffee failed to intervene when defendants Blessing,
20
Bettencourt and Rashev kicked and hit plaintiff in the face. (Id. at 20-21.) Plaintiff alleges that
21
defendant Guffee, who was at the bottom of the stairs when this beating occurred, did not stop the
22
violence or object. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Matthews also saw this violence and
23
failed to intervene. (Id.)
24
A prison official who does not himself use force may violate the Eighth Amendment if he
25
has a reasonable opportunity to intervene in other officials’ use of excessive force but does not do
26
so. See Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995).
27
Defendants argue that plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts demonstrating that defendant
28
Matthews had a reasonable opportunity to intervene. Defendants argue that plaintiff alleges that
13
1
defendant Matthews was in the control booth, 20-25 feet away, and has pled no facts showing that
2
defendant Matthews was aware that defendants used excessive force. Defendants also argue that
3
by the time defendant Matthews would have been able to observe the force, the incident would
4
have been over by the time he arrived at the incident.
5
For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has pled sufficient facts
6
supporting a claim that defendant Matthews saw the beatings as they occurred. As discussed
7
above, plaintiff alleges that defendant Matthews witnessed the first beating by defendant Defazio
8
and the other defendants, and the second beating by defendants Blessing, Bettencourt and
9
Rasheve. Regarding the first incident, plaintiff alleges that it occurred “in the presence” of
10
defendant Matthews, who failed to intervene. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) Regarding the second incident,
11
plaintiff alleges that defendant Matthews “observed the violations occurring,” but failed to
12
intervene. (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Matthews later taunted plaintiff, by
13
mimicking the crying sounds that plaintiff made during the beatings “while Matthews watched
14
from the tower.” (Id. at 30.) Based on these allegations, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has
15
pled sufficient facts supporting a claim that defendant Matthews was aware of the alleged
16
beatings when they occurred.
17
Defendants’ argument that plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts demonstrating that
18
defendant Matthews had a reasonable opportunity to intervene is without merit. Plaintiff alleges
19
that defendant Matthews sounded the unit alarm only after his teeth were knocked out, his
20
dreadlocks were torn out of his head, and after he yelled, “HIV.” Based on these allegations,
21
plaintiff has stated a potentially colorable claim that defendant Matthews violated his Eighth
22
Amendment rights by failing to sound the alarm sooner than he did. Plaintiff also alleges that
23
defendant Matthews failed to sound the alarm when he was beaten again by defendants Blessing,
24
Bettencourt and Rashev. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the claims against defendant
25
Matthews should be denied.
26
Defendants argue that plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts demonstrating that defendant
27
Guffee had a reasonable opportunity to intervene. Defendants argue that plaintiff has not alleged
28
how defendant Guffee could see the alleged excessive force if he was at the bottom of the stairs
14
1
when it occurred or how he had an opportunity to intervene.
2
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Guffee “observed” the alleged excessive force from the
3
bottom of the stairs. (ECF No. 1 at 21.) For purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
4
12(b)(6), these allegations are sufficient to demonstrate that defendant Guffee had knowledge of
5
the alleged excessive force. Whether defendant Guffee was actually able to see, or hear, the
6
alleged incident from this viewpoint is better left for summary judgment. These allegations are
7
also adequate to state a claim that defendant Guffee had an opportunity to intervene, either by
8
coming up the stairs or, possibly, sounding an alarm. Whether defendant Guffee was actually
9
able to intervene is also better left for summary judgment. For these reasons, the motion to
10
dismiss the claims against defendant Guffee should be denied.
11
C. Defendants Mercado, Staggs-Boatright, Okoroike and Martineck
12
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims against defendants Mercado, Staggs-Boatright,
13
Okoroike and Martineck for violating his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care
14
should be dismissed. Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s verbal harassment claim against
15
defendant Mercado.
16
Legal Standard for Eighth Amendment Claim Alleging Inadequate Medical Care
17
To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on a prisoner's medical treatment, the prisoner
18
must demonstrate that the defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to his “serious medical needs.”
19
Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). To establish a “serious medical need,” the
20
prisoner must demonstrate that “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further
21
significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096
22
(citation omitted).
23
To establish “deliberate indifference” to such a need, the prisoner must demonstrate: “(a)
24
a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm
25
caused by the indifference.” Id. Deliberate indifference “may appear when prison officials deny,
26
delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which
27
prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. (citations omitted). The defendant must have been
28
subjectively aware of a serious risk of harm and must have consciously disregarded that risk. See
15
1
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994).
2
Defendant Mercado-Eighth Amendment
3
The undersigned restates plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Mercado
4
5
herein.
Plaintiff alleges that after the beatings, he was seen by Dr. Wedell. (ECF No. 1 at 27.)
6
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Wedell instructed Nurse Nicolaou to apply an ice pack to his eyes to stop
7
them from swelling shut. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Mercado told Nurse Nicolaou that
8
plaintiff could not have an ice pack. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Nicolaou told plaintiff that
9
she would document that defendant Mercado stated that plaintiff could not have an ice pack. (Id.)
10
11
12
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s failure to receive an ice pack does not state a claim for
deliberate indifference. Defendants cite three cases in support of this argument.
First, defendants cite Mouton v. Villagran, 2015 WL 5935316 (N.D. Cal. 2015). In
13
Mouton, the plaintiff fell down from a bus returning to jail from court. 2015 WL 5935316 at *1.
14
The plaintiff complained of a scrape to her knee and a sore back, which she rated as a 3 on a 10
15
point scale. (Id.) The defendant cleaned and dressed the abrasion on the plaintiff’s knee. (Id.)
16
The plaintiff was able to walk. (Id.) The defendant ordered an ice pack for three days, apparently
17
for the back injury. (Id.) The defendant did not provide pain medication, because the plaintiff
18
was already receiving pain medication for an unrelated condition. (Id.) The defendant also did
19
not order x-rays, because it was a minor fall with minor injuries. (Id.)
20
In addressing the summary judgment motion, the court in Mouton stated that it was not
21
clear whether the plaintiff’s injuries qualified as serious medical needs. (Id. at 3.) Assuming that
22
the scraped knee and sore back were serious medical needs, the court found no deliberate
23
indifference. (Id.) In Mouton, the plaintiff alleged, in part, that her failure to receive an ice pack
24
until three hours after the incident violated her Eighth Amendment rights. (Id.) The district court
25
summarily rejected this claim. (Id.) The district court also found that treating plaintiff’s injuries
26
with an ice pack, rather than providing additional treatment, was not unconstitutional.
27
28
Mouton can be distinguished from the instant case. The injuries in Mouton, for which ice
pack was prescribed, were not clearly serious. In the instant case, plaintiff alleges that he was
16
1
prescribed the ice pack to prevent his eyes from swelling shut, i.e., a serious injury. In addition,
2
the court in Mouton found no Eighth Amendment violation based on a three hour delay in
3
plaintiff’s receipt of the ice pack. In the instant case, plaintiff alleges defendant Mercado
4
prevented him from receiving an ice pack. In addition, Mouton was decided on summary
5
judgment, rather than on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For these reasons, the
6
undersigned is not persuaded by defendants’ citation to this case.
7
Defendants next cite Micenheimer v. CDCR Pers. In Their Individual Capacity, 2016 WL
8
4203819 (C.D. Cal. 2016). Defendants state that in Micenheimer, the court found that the
9
plaintiff’s claim that he was forced to go without ice packs following an injury was not sufficient
10
to state a claim for deliberate indifference.
11
In Micenheimer, the plaintiff alleged that he was “denied appropriate medical care, forced
12
to endure severe pain, denied adequate therapy, forced to walk with a buckling knee with no cane,
13
left to develop a crippling hand disability, left to develop a deformity in his shoulder and hand,
14
and forced to go without ice packs.” 2016 WL 4203816 at *2. The court found that these
15
allegations were “wholly conclusory and devoid of supporting facts.” (Id. at *4.) The court
16
found that, “merely making these conclusory statements and attaching dozens of medical records
17
is insufficient to adequately set forth a deliberate indifference claim.” (Id.)
18
Micenheimer can be distinguished from the instant case. The court in Micenheimer found
19
that the plaintiff’s claims regarding the ice pack were conclusory and devoid of supporting facts.
20
In the instant case, plaintiff’s claims regarding defendant Mercado’s alleged denial of the ice pack
21
are neither conclusory nor devoid of supporting facts.
22
Finally, defendants cite Jones v. Blanas, 2007 WL 137168 (E.D. Cal. 2007). Defendants
23
state that in Jones, the court found that where deliberate indifference was based on denial of an
24
ice pack for a swollen ankle, disagreement over whether treatment should have included icing to
25
ease the swelling reflected a mere difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment,
26
which does not rise to a constitutional claim.
27
In Jones, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Dr. Mabeus, provided inadequate
28
medical care for his sprained ankle. Plaintiff alleged, in part, that defendant Dr. Mabeus refused
17
1
to give plaintiff an ice pack. 2007 WL 137168 at *7. The court granted summary judgment to
2
defendant Dr. Mabeus on the grounds that the disagreement over whether treatment of plaintiff’s
3
sprained ankle should have included icing to ease the swelling reflects a mere difference of
4
opinion about the proper course of treatment that does not raise to the level of a cognizable
5
constitutional claim. (Id.)
6
Jones can be distinguished from the instant case. Jones involved an inmate disagreeing
7
with a doctor regarding whether icing was the appropriate treatment for a sprained ankle. In the
8
instant case, plaintiff alleges that defendant Mercado, a non-medical offer, directed Nurse
9
Nicolaou to, in essence, disobey Dr. Wadell’s order that plaintiff receive an ice pack to prevent
10
his eyes from swelling shut. These allegations do not involve a mere difference of opinion
11
regarding appropriate medical care.
12
Plaintiff’s allegation that that defendant Mercado refused to allow plaintiff to receive the
13
ice pack states a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment claim. Accordingly, defendants’
14
motion to dismiss this claim should be denied.
15
Defendant Staggs-Boatright
16
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Staggs-Boatright prepared a report falsely stating that
17
defendant Defazio had suffered injuries during the incident. (ECF No. 1 at 28.) Plaintiff alleges
18
that defendant Staggs-Boatright saw no injuries on defendant Defazio, but wrote in the report that
19
defendant had pain in his chest from being head butted by plaintiff and hand pain. (Id.) Plaintiff
20
alleges that defendant Staggs-Boatright prepared this report as “job insurance” for defendant
21
Defazio so he would not get fired. (Id.)
22
Defendants argue that the allegations against defendant Staggs-Boatright do not
23
demonstrate that she was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff following the alleged excessive force
24
incident. The undersigned does not construe plaintiff’s allegations to state an Eighth Amendment
25
claim for denial of adequate medical care. Instead, plaintiff is alleging that defendant Staggs-
26
Boatright prepared a false report in order to help defendant Defazio cover-up the alleged
27
excessive force incident, i.e., defendant Staggs-Boatright conspired with defendant Defazio to
28
violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
18
A conspiracy claim brought under section 1983 requires proof of “an agreement or
1
2
meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th
3
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and an “actual deprivation
4
of...constitutional rights [that] resulted from the alleged conspiracy.” Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d
5
1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To be liable, each
6
participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must
7
at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (internal
8
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Staggs-Boatright do not state a potentially
9
10
colorable conspiracy claim for the following reasons. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Staggs-
11
Boatright prepared a report containing defendant Defazio’s description of his injuries. These
12
injuries were not based on defendant Staggs-Boatright’s personal observations of defendant
13
Defazio, but were instead based on what he told her. These allegations do not demonstrate that
14
defendant Staggs-Boatright falsely reported her own observations in an attempt to cover-up the
15
alleged excessive force. Under these circumstances, defendant Staggs-Boatright’s preparation of
16
the report based on what defendant Defazio told her about his injuries does not demonstrate that
17
she conspired with defendants to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, the claims
18
against defendant Staggs-Boatright should be dismissed.
19
Defendant Okoroike
20
Plaintiff alleges that after the beatings, a guard contacted defendant Nurse Okoroike,
21
requesting that she medically evaluate plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at 24.) Defendant Okoroike came to
22
the holding cell where plaintiff was held and asked plaintiff what happened to him. (Id.) Plaintiff
23
told defendant Okoroike that he had been beaten up. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant
24
Okoroike did not ask the correctional officers to pull plaintiff from the holding cell so that she
25
could perform her duty and do a full body inspection. (Id.) Instead, she noted a few injuries that
26
were on plaintiff’s face, and then she left. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Okoroike
27
prepared a false report in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at 43.)
28
////
19
Defendants argue that defendant Okoroike’s failure to remove plaintiff from his cell to
1
2
evaluate his injuries does not state a potentially cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.
3
In his opposition to the pending motion, plaintiff clarifies that he is raising two claims
4
against defendant Okoroike. First, plaintiff is alleging that defendant Okoroike failed to provide
5
him with adequate medical care. Second, plaintiff is alleging that defendant Okoroike prepared a
6
report falsely documenting plaintiff’s injuries in an attempt to cover-up the alleged excessive
7
force.
8
9
The undersigned agrees that plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to support a claim that
defendant Okoroike denied him medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff
10
alleges that later the same day, he was taken to A Facility Triage where he received treatment for
11
his injuries. Thus, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Okoroike is based on a
12
delay in his receipt of medical treatment. A delay in treatment does not violate the Eighth
13
Amendment unless the delay caused further harm. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60
14
(9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any harm as a result of the delay in his
15
receipt of treatment. Accordingly, this Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Okoroike
16
should be dismissed.
17
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Okoroike prepared a report minimizing his injuries in an
18
attempt to cover-up the alleged excessive force. These allegations state a potentially colorable
19
conspiracy claim. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss this claim should be denied.
20
Defendant Martineck
21
It appears that the gravamen of plaintiff’s claim against defendant Martineck is that he
22
attempted to cover-up the alleged excessive force by preparing false reports, etc. In relevant part,
23
plaintiff alleges,
24
25
26
27
28
Upon receiving written documentation regarding the incident of
February 18, 2015, it was found that Lt. Martineck had committed
the act of deliberate indifference by the specific acts of aiding and
abetting and attempting to conceal evidence, by continuously
allowing involved staff to change their story of the event, by
allowing them to submit clarification reports one after the next, and
by helping them on what to say, by leading them with his questions.
He also tampered with evidence/documents by adding things that
did not happen on his CDCR 831-A1 crime/incident report Part A120
Supplemental (CDCR 831-A1) page 2 of 8 (e.g., “Officer Defazio
attempted to apply a spit net to Owens head and Owens again tried
to bite Officer Defazio at which time Officer Defazio again struck
Owens in the head area), and minimizing the injuries the plaintiff
suffered (e.g. he stated that the plaintiff received [A] missing tooth,
[an] abrasion to the lip, [a] swollen and dislocated left eye, as well
as reddened forehead area) on his CDCR 837-A1 page 2 of 8. He
also did not have all staff that were mentioned in other reports write
a report.
1
2
3
4
5
6
(ECF No. 1 at 31.)
Defendants argue that plaintiff is claiming that defendant Martineck, a lieutenant, merely
7
8
oversaw the preparation of the crime incident report. Defendants argue that to the extent plaintiff
9
is attempting to impose liability on defendant Martineck on a theory of supervisory liability based
10
simply on his position as the lieutenant and supervisor of the defendants who allegedly used
11
excessive force on plaintiff, that theory is improper.
The undersigned agrees with defendants that supervisory personnel are generally not
12
13
liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and,
14
therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him
15
and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607
16
F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979) (no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation);
17
Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978) (no liability where there is no evidence of
18
personal participation), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
Plaintiff does not allege that defendant Martineck merely oversaw the preparation of the
19
20
incident reports. Instead, plaintiff alleges that defendant Martineck directly participated in the
21
preparation of the incident report by adding things that did not happen and minimizing plaintiff’s
22
injuries. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Martineck allowed staff to change their story in an
23
attempt to cover-up the alleged excessive force. These allegations state a potentially colorable
24
claim against defendant Martineck for conspiring to cover-up the alleged incidents of excessive
25
force. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against defendant
26
Martineck should be denied.
27
////
28
////
21
1
Defendant Mercado-Verbal Harassment
2
Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s claim against defendant Mercado for verbally
3
harassing him on June 17, 2015.
4
“[V]erbal harassment or abuse...[alone] is insufficient to state a constitutional deprivation
5
under 42 U.S.C. 1983.” Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and
6
internal quotation omitted). “A mere threat may not state a cause of action” under the Eighth
7
Amendment, even if it is a threat against exercising the right of access to the courts. Gaut v.
8
Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Only verbal harassment clearly intended to
9
humiliate or endanger the inmate may, in certain circumstances, violate the Constitution. See
10
Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1997); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th
11
Cir. 1996), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d
12
97, 100 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding potentially cognizable Eighth Amendment claim based on the
13
plaintiff's allegation that a correctional officer “pointed a lethal weapon at the prisoner, cocked it,
14
and threatened him with instant death”).
15
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Mercado taunted him and told plaintiff what he (defendant
16
Mercado) would have done to him had he been present during the alleged beatings. Defendant
17
Mercado did not threaten plaintiff with imminent or future injury. Based on the law cited above,
18
the undersigned finds that these allegations do not state a potentially colorable Eighth
19
Amendment claim. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss this claim should be granted.
20
D. Defendants Couch, Schultz and Eldridge
21
Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Couch, Schultz and Eldridge are based on their
22
participation in the disciplinary proceedings after plaintiff was charged with a rules violation
23
report in connection with the alleged excessive force incidents. Plaintiff alleges that these
24
defendants violated his right to due process. (ECF No. 1 at 44.)
25
Defendant Couch
26
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Couch was assigned to be his Investigative Employee.
27
Plaintiff alleges that he gave defendant Couch the names of witnesses and questions for
28
witnesses. Plaintiff also alleges that he told defendant Couch about documentary evidence.
22
1
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Couch prepared a report falsely stating that plaintiff had requested
2
no investigation.
3
“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full
4
panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
5
U.S. 539, 556 (1974). With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, the minimum procedural
6
requirements that must be met are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between
7
the time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may
8
prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and
9
reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses and present
10
documentary evidence in his defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly
11
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner
12
where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Id. at 563–71.
13
Confrontation and cross examination are not generally required. Id. at 567.
14
Regarding legal assistance, the law distinguishes between staff assistants and investigative
15
employees. A staff assistant, when assigned, is responsible for informing the inmate of his rights
16
and of the disciplinary hearing procedures, advising and assisting the inmate in preparation for the
17
hearing, and representing the inmate’s position at the hearing. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3318(b).
18
An investigative employee, when assigned, is responsible for interviewing the charged inmate,
19
gathering information, questioning staff and inmates with relevant information, and screening
20
prospective witnesses. Cal.Code. Regs. tit. 15, § 3318(a).
21
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Couch was an investigating employee. Unlike a staff
22
assistant, an investigative employee is appointed to assist the hearing officer, not the inmate. Cal.
23
Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3318(a). There is no federally recognized constitutional right to an
24
Investigative Employee. Larkin v. Davey, 2015 WL 1440616, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015)
25
(“[T]here is no right to a thorough investigative report or even an investigation, nor even a right
26
to assignment of an investigative employee, which was provided to petitioner in this case.”);
27
Fuqua v. Swarthout, 2013 WL 5493373, *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2013) (no right to investigative
28
employee); Tolliver v. Santoro, 2016 WL 8732347, at *11 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2016), report and
23
1
recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4035958 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2016) (“[T]he Court has been
2
unable to locate, any authority, federal or otherwise, establishing that an inmate is guaranteed the
3
effective assistance of his assigned investigative employee.”)
4
Because plaintiff had no constitutional right to an investigative employee, his claim that
5
defendant Couch failed to perform his duties as an investigative employee does not state a
6
potentially colorable due process claim. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss defendant
7
Couch should be granted.
8
Defendant Schultz
9
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Schutz conducted the disciplinary hearing regarding the
10
charges made against plaintiff by defendant Defazio. Plaintiff alleges that during the disciplinary
11
hearing, defendant Shultz refused his request to call witnesses and present documentary evidence
12
to rebut the charge that he headbutted defendant Defazio. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Schultz
13
denied his request for witnesses by stating, “This R.V.R. [rules violation report] is what I have to
14
go off of.” Defendant Schultz allegedly told plaintiff, “I am not going to deal with all of that, the
15
Office of Internal Affairs can deal with that since they are investigating the assault and battery.”
16
Defendant Schultz found plaintiff guilty of the charges.
17
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Schultz violated his right to due process by denying his
18
request to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. Defendants move to dismiss this
19
claim on the grounds that plaintiff has not alleged a sufficient liberty interest entitling him to
20
these procedural due process protections.
21
The Supreme Court has held that the procedural protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth
22
Amendment Due Process Clause only apply when a constitutionally protected liberty or property
23
interest is at stake. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). The Due Process Clause
24
itself does not give prisoners a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of
25
confinement. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). However, states may create
26
liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. These circumstances generally
27
involve a change in condition of confinement that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship
28
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S.
24
1
472, 484 (1995).
2
Defendants incorrectly assert that the liberty interest plaintiff alleges is the right to be free
3
from false charges. Plaintiff is alleging that his 18 month SHU term, imposed after being found
4
guilty of the charges by defendant Schultz, is the liberty interest at stake. Plaintiff’s description
5
of the conditions of the SHU, set forth above, are sufficient to allege a potentially colorable
6
liberty interest in support of his due process claim. Defendants’ argument that plaintiff did not
7
allege a sufficient liberty interest is without merit.
8
9
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Schultz denied his request for witnesses and to present
documentary evidence because defendant Schultz did not want to “deal with all of that.” In other
10
words, plaintiff is claiming that defendant Schultz did not consider institutional safety or
11
correctional goals when denying his request for witnesses and to present documentary evidence.
12
Plaintiff has stated a potentially colorable due process claim based on the denial of his request to
13
call witnesses and present documentary evidence.
14
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Schultz’s decision finding him guilty was not
15
supported by adequate evidence. Due process is satisfied where there is “some evidence” in the
16
record as a whole which supports the decision of the hearing officer. See Superintendent v. Hill,
17
472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The “some evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and is
18
satisfied where “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached.”
19
Id. at 455-56. However, the “some evidence” standard does not apply where a prisoner alleges
20
the rules violation report is false. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1997).
21
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Schultz relied only on the allegedly false rules violation
22
report to find him guilty. (ECF No. 1 at 35.) Based on plaintiff’s claim that he told defendant
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Schultz that the charges that he head butted defendant Defazio were false, that he had witnesses
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who would testify in his favor, and that defendant Schultz claimed knowledge of the related
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Internal Affairs investigation, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has stated a potentially colorable
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due process claim against defendant Schultz for finding him guilty based on insufficient evidence.
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Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim should be denied.
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////
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Defendant Eldridge
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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Eldridge, the Associate Warden and Chief Disciplinary
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Officer (see ECF No. 1 at 11), reviewed and upheld defendant Schultz’s decision finding him
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guilty of the rules violation.
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On June 30, 20-15, defendant A.W./C.D.O. Eldridge reviewed the
findings of SHO Schultz’s action of finding the plaintiff guilty, he
reviewed all related documents, and the methods used by Schultz.
He also reviewed the I.E.’s report and the reasons given by Couch
to decline to ask questions of eye witnesses, defendant Eldridge’s
affirmed all actions taken, even though they were unconstitutional
and there were clear due process violations on the face of the report.
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(Id. at 35-36.)
To the extent plaintiff argues that defendant Eldridge violated his right to due process by
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affirming defendant Couch’s failure to perform his duties as an Investigative Employee, this
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claim must be dismissed because (as discussed above) plaintiff has no constitutional right to an
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investigative employee.
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Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Eldridge reviewed “the methods used by Schultz” and
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affirmed all actions taken “even though they were unconstitutional.” Liberally construing these
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allegations, plaintiff is claiming that defendant Eldridge approved defendant Schultz’s decision to
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deny plaintiff’s request to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. Plaintiff is also
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challenging defendant Eldridge’s decision to uphold the guilty finding on the grounds that it was
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not supported by sufficient evidence. As discussed above, plaintiff has stated a potentially
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colorable due process claim against defendant Schultz based on these allegations. For the same
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reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has stated potentially colorable due process claims
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against defendant Eldridge. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss these claims should be denied.
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VI. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default
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On August 31, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion requesting that default be entered against
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defendants Blessing, Drake, Murillo, Martinez, Bettencourt, Lebeck, Brady, Burke and Defazio.
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(ECF No. 43.) As discussed above, in the motion to dismiss, these defendants requested an
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extension of time to answer the complaint until 30 days after the court issues a final ruling on the
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motion to dismiss. Based on this request for extension of time, these defendants are not in
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1
default. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for entry of default is denied.
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
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1. Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default (ECF No. 43) is denied;
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2. The request for extension of time by defendants Blessing, Drake, Murillo, Martinez,
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Bettencourt, Lebeck, Brady, Burke and Defazio is granted; these defendants shall file an answer
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to the complaint on or before 30 days after the court issues a final ruling on the motion to dismiss;
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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
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1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 37) be granted as follows: a) claim alleging
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defendants Byers and Rashev denied him food; b) conspiracy claim against defendant Staggs-
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Boatright; c) claim that defendant Okoroike denied plaintiff medical care in violation of the
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Eighth Amendment; d) claim alleging verbal harassment by defendant Mercado; e) due process
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claim against defendant Couch; f) claim that defendant Eldridge violated due process by
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upholding alleged misconduct by defendant Couch;
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2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 37) be denied as to the following claims: a)
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claim alleging defendant Rashev used excessive force; b) failure to intervene claims against
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defendants Guffee and Matthews; c) claim alleging defendant Mercado denied plaintiff an ice
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pack; d) conspiracy claim against defendant Okoroike; e) conspiracy claim against defendant
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Martineck; f) claims alleging due process violations by defendants Schultz and Eldridge based on
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alleged denial of request to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, and insufficient
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evidence to support disciplinary conviction;
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4. Defendants Rashev, Guffee, Matthews, Mercado, Okoroike, Martinick, Schultz and
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Eldridge be ordered to file an answer within thirty days of the adoption of these findings and
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recommendations.
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These findings and recommendation be submitted to the United States District Judge
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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days
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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the
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objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The
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parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
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appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Dated: October 3, 2017
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