Sykes, et al. v. Shea, et al.

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND, MOTION TO BIFURCATE, AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 10/31/2017: IT IS ORDERED that 22 Defendants' partial motion for summary judgment be, a nd the same hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiff Tyeshina Sykes may not recover damages for non-economic losses to compensate for her pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, or other nonpecuniary damages in this action; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 21 Defendants' motion to bifurcate be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as moot; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 20 Defendants' motion to amend answer be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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----oo0oo---TYESHINA SYKES, an
CIV. NO. 2:16-02851 WBS GGH
individual, and JLS, by and
through her guardian ad litem
TYESHINA SYKES, an
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
individual,
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO AMEND,
Plaintiffs,
MOTION TO BIFURCATE, AND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
v.
DONALD JAMES SHEA, an
individual; KUNKEL TRUCK
LINES, INC., a South Dakota
Corporation; and DOES 1-30;
Defendants.

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DONALD JAMES SHEA, an
individual and KUNKEL TRUCK
LINES, INC., a South Dakota
Corporation,
Counter-Claimants,

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v.
TYESHINA SYKES, an
individual, and Does 1-10,
Counter-Defendants.
----oo0oo---1

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Tyeshina Sykes (“Sykes”) initiated this action on

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behalf of herself and J.S., a minor, against defendants Donald

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James Shea (“Shea”) and Kunkel Trucking, Inc. (“Kunkel”) alleging

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negligence based personal injury claims related to a motor

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vehicle collision involving a truck driven by Shea and owned by

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Kunkel.

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Answer (Docket No. 20)1; (2) defendants’ partial Motion for

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Summary Judgment (Docket No. 22); and (3) defendants’ Motion to

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Bifurcate (Docket No. 21).

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I.

Before the court are: (1) defendants’ Motion to Amend

Background

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On May 11, 2015, Sykes was driving a Toyota Avalon on

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Highway 5 when her vehicle hit a pothole, causing her lights to

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go out and engine to stop running.

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Supp. of Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Partial Mot. for Summ. J.

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(“Horwitz Decl.”) ¶ 2 (Docket No. 28-1).)

Sykes’ sister and

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child, J.S., were in the car at the time.

(Id.)

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her vehicle on the side of the road and exited the vehicle.

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(Id.)

Sykes’ vehicle was then struck by a truck operated by

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Shea.

(Id.)

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personal injuries after defendants’ vehicle struck Sykes’ parked

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vehicle.

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(Decl. of Lauren Horwitz in

Sykes parked

The complaint alleges that plaintiffs sustained

(Compl. ¶ 20 (Docket No. 1-1).)
At the time of the incident, Sykes owned the Toyota

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Avalon she was driving.

(Decl. of J. Stephanie Krmpotic in Supp.

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of Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Krmpotic Decl.”), Ex. A,

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Sykes’ Interrog. Resp. No 13 (Docket No. 22-2).)

During Sykes’

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Plaintiffs do not oppose defendants’ Motion to Amend
Answer. Accordingly, the motion is granted and will not be
discussed in this memorandum.
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deposition, although Sykes claimed she had insurance for the car

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at the time of the accident, she conceded that she did not know

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the time period covered through her supposed policy.

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Decl., Ex. B, Sykes’ Dep. 87.)

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remember when she last paid any premiums for her insurance, and

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she was uncertain whether she kept a certificate of insurance in

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her car.

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limits, how much she paid for the insurance policy, or whether

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she had any documents indicating that she had insurance.

(Id.)

(Krmpotic

Additionally, she could not

She also could not remember her insurance

(Id.)

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Sykes later admitted that she did not have an insurance policy in

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effect at the time of the collision.

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to Bifurcate 3 (Docket No. 30).)

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(Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.

Sykes assigned a cash deposit of $35,000 with the

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Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) after the collision.

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On January 21, 2016, Sykes received a letter from the DMV that it

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had received and accepted her deposit.

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in Supp. of Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 3

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(Docket No. 28-2).)

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(Id.)

(Decl. of Tyeshina Sykes

On October 31, 2016, plaintiffs commenced this action

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in the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento.

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complaint identified one cause of action against all defendants

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for general negligence and alleged loss of income and earning

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capacity, past and future medical expenses, and general (non-

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pecuniary) damages for injuries to both plaintiffs.

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21-23.)

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2016.

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II.

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The

(Compl. ¶¶

The action was removed to federal court on December 2,

(Docket No. 1.)

Partial Motion for Summary Judgment
A partial motion for summary judgment is governed by
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the same standard as a motion for summary judgment.

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Civ. P. 56.

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there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

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P. 56(a).

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of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

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reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

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favor.

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(1986).

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See Fed. R.

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that

Fed. R. Civ.

A material fact is one that could affect the outcome

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must

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view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party

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opposing the motion and draw all justifiable inferences in its

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favor.

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determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of

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legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not

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those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

“Credibility

Defendants move for partial summary judgment pursuant

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to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(a) on Sykes’ claim for

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non-economic damages.

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arises out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle which Sykes

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owned, and the vehicle was not insured as required by California

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Civil Code § 3333.4(a)(2), she is barred from receiving non-

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economic damages.

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should not be able to recover non-economic damages because Sykes

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was the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident and she

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cannot establish her financial responsibility pursuant to

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California Civil Code § 3333.4(a)(3).

Defendants argue that because Sykes’ claim

In the alternative, defendants argue Sykes

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In relevant part, California Civil Code § 3333.4
states:
(a)

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In any action to recover damages arising out of
the operation or use of a motor vehicle, a person
shall not recover non-economic losses to
compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, disfigurement, and other
nonpecuniary damages if any of the following
applies:
(2) The injured person was the owner of a vehicle
involved in the accident and the vehicle was
not insured as required by the financial
responsibility laws of this state.
(3) The injured person was the operator of a
vehicle involved in the accident and the
operator can not establish his or her
financial responsibility as required by the
financial responsibility laws of this state.

Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.4(a)(2)-(3).
A.

Operation and Use of Vehicle

Although Sykes was not in her vehicle when the accident
occurred, she was nevertheless required to possess automobile
insurance or otherwise establish her financial responsibility in
order to comply with Civil Code § 3333.4(a).

See Harris v.

Lammers, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1072 (1st Dist. 2000) (holding that §
3333.4(a) applied to case in which plaintiff was struck in
parking lot while standing outside her vehicle because action was
one “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.”)

The Harris

court determined that although plaintiff was not in her vehicle
when she was injured, she was still obligated to possess
automobile insurance in order to recover non-economic damages.
Plaintiff seeks to distinguish Harris on the ground
that plaintiff in that case had been handing supplies to her
children seated inside the car, and it was the act of loading the
vehicle that constituted use of the car.
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However, the Harris

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court explained that plaintiff had used her “car to transport her

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children and supplies and the accident arose out of and flowed

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from that use.

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accident occurred precisely because she was using the car to

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transport her children and supplies.”

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the fact that Sykes was not loading or unloading her car is

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irrelevant.

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and herself.

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vehicle to the location where the accident occurred, and thus was

Plaintiff was in the parking lot where the

Id. at 1077.

Accordingly,

Sykes had been using her car to transport her child
As in Harris, Sykes had driven her uninsured

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on the side of the highway precisely because she was using the

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car for transportation.

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differentiate Harris on this ground fails.

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was not physically in contact with the car does not mean that she

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was not using it.

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Accordingly, plaintiff’s attempt to
The fact that Sykes

Plaintiff further attempts to distinguish Harris by

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arguing that Sykes had left her car for approximately fifteen to

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twenty minutes before the accident occurred, and thus too much

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time had elapsed for Sykes’ actions to constitute use of the car.

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However, in Harris length of time was not discussed, and there is

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no case law indicating that fifteen minutes is too great a period

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of time.

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twenty minutes before she was struck by it after defendants’

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vehicle collided with her vehicle, but that fact is not

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sufficient to distinguish the case at hand from Harris.

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Sykes may have been outside of her parked vehicle for

Accordingly, Sykes’ claim is one that arises out of the

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operation of a motor vehicle.

Therefore, § 3333.4 applies, which

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bars Sykes from asserting a claim for non-economic damages if she

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lacked insurance at the time of the incident or cannot otherwise
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establish her financial responsibility pursuant to §

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3333.4(a)(3).

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B.

Insurance and Financial Responsibility

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The California Vehicle Code sets forth four methods by

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which one may establish compliance with the financial

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responsibility laws.

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have insurance or a bond at the time of the accident.

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Veh. Code § 16054.)

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responsibility may be established by depositing cash with the

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Three of the methods require the person
(See Cal.

The fourth method provides that financial

(See Cal. Veh. Code § 16054.2)2

DMV.

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It is undisputed that, at the time of the accident,

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Sykes had no form of financial responsibility in effect.

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concedes that she did not possess insurance at the time, and she

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did not deposit money with the DMV until after the accident.

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(Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Bifurcate 3.)

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argues that her post-accident cash deposits with the DMV make her

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“financially responsible” and thus eligible to recover non-

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economic damages.

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(Docket No. 28).)

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Sykes

However, Sykes

(Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 10

The “requirement of financial responsibility”

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referenced in § 3333.4 “is found in Vehicle Code section 16020,

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and defined by Vehicle Code section 16021.”

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Fit Enterprises, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 4th 508, 512 (2d Dist. 1998).

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Section 16020 provides that “all drivers and all owners of a

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Goodson v. Perfect

Section 16054.2(a) states that “evidence may also be
established by any of the following: By depositing with the
department cash in the amount specified in Section 16056.”
Section 16056(a) requires that the deposited amount be at least
$35,000.00.
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motor vehicle shall at all times be able to establish financial

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responsibility pursuant to Section 16021, and shall at all times

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carry in the vehicle evidence of the form of financial

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responsibility in effect for the vehicle.”

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financial responsibility that must be “in effect” at “all times”

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is any cash deposit with the DMV.

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see also Figueroa v. United States, Civ. No. 15-555 JFW ASX, 2015

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WL 11438605, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2015) (rejecting

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plaintiffs’ contention that their cash deposits with the DMV two

Among the forms of

See Cal. Veh. Code § 16021(d);

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years after the accident made them financially responsible).

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Accordingly, the financial responsibility referenced in § 3333.4

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is “a responsibility concurrent with vehicle ownership or

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operation.”

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Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 1285 (1st Dist.

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1987) (“The financial responsibility law is intended to provide a

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guarantee that every driver will be financially responsible

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before he begins driving.”).

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Goodson, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 515; see Ruttenberg v.

Sykes argues that the cash deposit does not need to be

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in effect at the time of the accident.

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cash-deposit statute does not include a timing requirement like

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the other methods set forth in the Vehicle Code, thereby

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indicating that the California Legislature intended there to be a

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difference in meaning.

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determined that:

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She contends that the

However, California courts have

The Legislature declared that drivers of
automobiles in the state shall be
financially capable of providing monetary
protection to those suffering injury to
their person or property by reason of the
use of such vehicle regardless of fault of
the drivers and such capability shall be
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deemed as a concurrent responsibility of
such motor vehicle operation.

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(Id.) (citations omitted).

further clarified that “the intent of the Legislature in passing
the act is unambiguous.”

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(Id.)

Accordingly, plaintiff’s

contention that the cash deposit does not need to be made prior
to the collision is unpersuasive.

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The Ruttenberg court

Because Sykes was not insured as required by the
California financial responsibility laws at the time of the
collision and her deposits with the DMV after the accident do not
render her “financially responsible,” she cannot establish that
she was compliant with section § 3333.4 at the time of the
accident.

Accordingly, she is precluded from recovering non-

economic damages and the court must grant defendants’ partial
motion for summary judgment.
III. Motion to Bifurcate
Defendants submitted this motion only in the event that
their partial motion for summary judgment was denied.

Because

the court will grant defendants’ partial motion for summary
judgment, their motion to bifurcate is now moot.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ partial motion
for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.
Plaintiff Tyeshina Sykes may not recover damages for non-economic
losses to compensate for her pain, suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, disfigurement, or other nonpecuniary damages
in this action;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to
bifurcate be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as moot; and

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to amend

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answer be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

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Dated:

October 31, 2017

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