Palla v. L M Sports, Inc. et al

Filing 142

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 10/18/18 GRANTING 52 L M Sports' Motion for Summary Judgment on the express contractual indemnity and declaratory relief claims. (Kastilahn, A)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 MANISHA PALLA, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 No. Plaintiff, v. L M SPORTS, INC. dba LAKESIDE MARINA and dba ACTION WATERSPORTS OF TAHOE; LT LEASING, INC.; PAUL GARCIA; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, ORDER GRANTING THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EXPRESS CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY CLAIM Defendants. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 2:16-cv-02865-JAM-EFB IN THE MATER OF THE COMPLAINT OF LT LEASING, INC.; L M SPORTS, INC. DBA LAKESIDE MARINA AND DBA ACTION WATERSPORTS OF LAKE TAHOE AND ACTION WATERSPORTS AT LAKE TAHOE AND DBA ACTION WATERSPORTS; TAMARA HASSETT, INDVIDUALLY; AND ROBERT HASSETT, INDIVIDUALLY Plaintiffs-in-Limitation, 28 1 1 2 3 4 LT LEASING, INC.; L M SPORTS, INC. dba LAKESIDE MARINA and dba ACTION WATERSPORTS and dba ACTION WATERSPORTS AT LAKE TAHOE; TAMARA HASSETT, individually, and ROBERT HASSETT, individually 5 6 7 8 Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. EVAN BOTWIN, REGAN ROBERTS, SEAN O’Dea, EFE ӦZYURT, and NICHOLAS CARSCADDEN, 9 Cross-Defendants 10 11 AND RELATED THIRD-PARTY ACTION. 12 I. 13 INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 14 L M Sports and L T Leasing (collectively “L M Sports”) are 15 defendants in a negligence suit that was filed by Manisha Palla 16 (“Palla”)—a woman who was injured while using boating and tubing 17 equipment leased from L M Sports. 18 stand as Third-Party Plaintiffs, seeking indemnification from 19 Evan Botwin, Sean O’Dea, and Nicholas Carscadden (“Third-Party 20 Defendants”) based on a rental agreement the Third-Party 21 Defendants signed. ECF No. 1. L M Sports also ECF No. 17. After Palla filed her negligence suit against L M Sports, 22 23 and Paul Garcia, ECF No. 1, L M Sports filed a Complaint for 24 Exoneration or Limitation of Liability. 25 ECF No. 1. 26 23. 27 28 See Case No. 2:17-cv-41, The Court consolidated these two actions. ECF No. L M Sports then filed a third-party complaint against Evan Botwin, Nicholas Carscadden, Sean O’Dea, Efe Ӧzyurt, and Regan 2 1 Roberts (“Third-Party Defendants”). Case No. 2:16-cv-02865, ECF 2 No. 17. 3 boat involved in this incident and were on the boat when the 4 accident occurred. 5 settlement with L M Sports, ECF No. 86, and a default was entered 6 against Efe Ӧzyurt. These individuals signed the rental agreement for the Regan Roberts subsequently entered into a ECF No. 51. 7 A motion and cross-motions for summary judgment were filed 8 by L M Sports and Third-Party Defendants and a hearing on these 9 motions was held on September 18, 2018. At the hearing, this 10 Court granted Third-Party Defendants’ cross-motions for summary 11 judgment on L M Sports’ negligence/equitable indemnity claim. 12 The Court also found that the cause of action for contribution 13 was not ripe and denied all parties’ motions/cross-motions on 14 this claim. 15 Defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment on L M Sports’ 16 express contractual indemnity claim, finding that none of the 17 Third-Party Defendants had shown they were entitled to judgment 18 as a matter of law. 19 judgment on this express contractual indemnity claim was taken 20 under submission and the Court requested the parties to file 21 supplemental briefs addressing the Third-Party Defendants’ 22 standing to raise the issue of whether gross negligence 23 invalidates an indemnity clause when Palla had only alleged 24 ordinary negligence against L M Sports. 25 O’Dea were also tasked with explaining why they should be allowed 26 to join Botwin’s argument when they failed to raise the issue of 27 gross negligence in their summary judgment opposition briefs. 28 See id. ECF No. 133. The Court denied the Third-Party See id. L M Sports’ motion for summary 3 Id. Carscadden and 1 For the following reasons, this Court finds that Third-Party 2 Defendants, as parties to the contract, have standing to 3 challenge the scope and validity of the indemnity agreement.1 4 But this Court also finds that as a matter of law, public policy 5 does not prohibit L M Sports from enforcing its indemnity clause 6 against Third-Party Defendants in this action even if L M Sports 7 is shown to have acted with gross negligence. 8 9 II. 10 A. Standing 11 1. 12 OPINION Legal Standard The “case or controversy” requirement of Article III 13 mandates that parties appearing before federal courts have 14 standing. 15 (1992). 16 that was caused by the accused, and may be redressed by the 17 court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574 To have standing, a party must claim an injury in fact Id. at 560–61. 18 An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected 19 interest which is concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or 20 imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 21 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 22 must be more than a generalized grievance. 23 2. 24 25 26 27 28 Id. at 560 The claimed injury Id. at 575. Analysis Third-Party Defendants have standing to raise the issue of The Court finds that O’Dea and Carscadden may retroactively join the gross negligence argument raised in Botwin’s summary judgment opposition to avoid inconsistent results among parties similarly situated. Star Ins. Co. v. Iron Horse Tools, Inc., No. CV 16-48 BLG-SPW-TJC, 2018 WL 3079493 at *4-5 (D. Mont. Feb. 7, 2018) 4 1 1 L M Sports’ gross negligence. 2 Carscadden, argues that L M Sports is attempting to apply an 3 indemnity clause that is void as a matter of public policy. 4 Botwin Supp. at 1, ECF No. 134. 5 is found to be enforceable, the Third-Party Defendants may be 6 responsible for paying L M Sports’ costs—a clear “wallet 7 injury.” 8 551 U.S. 587, 621 (2007). 9 is the cause of Third-Party Defendants’ claimed injury, and this 10 11 Botwin, now joined by O’Dea and If L M Sports’ indemnity clause See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., The attempt to enforce this provision Court—if appropriate—has the power to redress it. L M Sports must prove coverage. Third-Party Defendants 12 denial of coverage as well as the possibility of injury give 13 them standing to contest this indemnity clause. While Palla has 14 not specifically pled a cause of action for gross negligence 15 against L M Sports, the Court finds that the issue of Third- 16 Party Defendants’ standing to challenge the indemnity clause is 17 not dependent on Palla’s personal injury complaint. As Third- 18 Party Defendants, Botwin, O’Dea and Carscadden had no ability to 19 control Palla’s causes of action against L M Sports. Third-Party 20 Defendants have denied L M Sports claim for express contractual 21 indemnity and L M Sports has failed to present a compelling 22 reason for why this Court should deny parties to a contract an 23 opportunity to challenge that contract’s reach. 24 the Court finds that Third Party Defendants have standing to 25 challenge the scope of the indemnity contract’s coverage. 26 27 28 B. Accordingly, Express Contractual Indemnity Claim To defeat L M Sports’ motion for summary judgment on the express contractual indemnity claim, Third Party Defendants must 5 1 either raise a genuine dispute of material fact or demonstrate 2 why L M Sports is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 3 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Third-Party Defendants maintain that 4 that the question of L M Sports’ gross negligence is a triable 5 issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. 6 1. 7 alleged acts constitute ordinary or gross negligence, the Court 8 finds that the indemnity agreement at issue in this case is 9 still enforceable against Third-Party Defendants. Botwin Supp. at However, even if this Court were to assume that L M Sports’ 10 Third-Party Defendants do not cite to any authority that 11 holds that an indemnity clause covering a party’s gross 12 negligence is void as a matter of public policy. 13 points out, both Royal Insurance Co. v. Southwest Marine, 194 F. 14 3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 1999) and City of Santa Barbara v. 15 Super. Ct., 41 Cal. 4th 747, 751 (2007) were cases in which 16 exculpatory clauses or releases were invalidated for purporting 17 to cover gross negligence. 18 not involve a true indemnity agreement as in the instant case. 19 See Opp’n at 2-3. As L M Sports These cases did Exculpatory clauses serve as a complete release of 20 liability; they keep a claimant from coming to the courts, and 21 being made whole. 22 762. 23 financial responsibility, i.e. it determines which party to a 24 contract will ultimately bear the risk of injury to a third 25 party. In re Oil Spill, 841 F. Supp.2d. 988, 998 (E.D. La 26 2012). While gross negligence may invalidate contractual 27 releases, indemnity clauses can cover gross negligence for 28 compensatory damages (which are the only damages alleged in the See City of Santa Barbara, 41 Cal. 45th at In contrast, an indemnity clause merely reallocates 6 1 instant case). Id. Although In re Oil Spill is not controlling 2 authority, the case is instructive and no party has cited any 3 binding precedent which holds that indemnity clauses covering 4 gross negligence must be invalidated as a matter of public 5 policy. 6 recognizes that “this issue creates tension between two 7 policies: freedom of contract, which weighs in favor of 8 enforcing the indemnity, and a reluctance to encourage grossly 9 negligent behavior, which weighs against enforcing the Like the Court in In re Oil Spill, this Court 10 indemnity.” 11 L M Sports argument to be more persuasive. 12 concerns are of less importance here because this indemnity 13 clause does not leave the injured party without recourse, but 14 merely shifts the source of compensation. 15 Defendants should not be permitted to escape their contractual 16 liability to indemnify L M Sports for Palla’s injuries, 17 regardless of the degree of negligence. 18 Id. at 1000. In the instant case, the Court finds Public policy Third-Party Because this Court finds that, as a matter of law, the 19 indemnity clause in this case covers alleged acts of negligence 20 and gross negligence there is no genuine dispute of material 21 fact and the Court must now only determine whether L M Sports is 22 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 23 56(a). 24 See Fed. R. Civ. P. As discussed during the September 18th motions hearing, the 25 indemnity clause’s language is clear and unambiguous. 26 indemnity clause is only ambiguous if, when viewed in the light 27 of the instrument as a whole, it “is reasonably susceptible of 28 more than one application to material facts.” 7 An Best Buy Stores, 1 L.P. v. Manteca Lifestyle Center, LLC, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 2 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 39 Cal. 3 4th 384, 391 (2006)). 4 At the hearing, this Court explained that it was not 5 persuaded by any of the Third-Party Defendants’ alternative 6 interpretations of this contract. 7 unambiguous terms of the contract created a no-fault indemnity 8 clause that covered all signatories to the contract. 9 O’Dea, and Carscadden all signed the contract. That position stands. The Botwin, See Rental 10 Agreement at 1. 11 and the Court finds that L M Sports’ motion for summary judgment 12 on the express contractual indemnity claim must be granted. 13 They are therefore bound by its express terms The Court also grants L M Sports’ motion for summary 14 judgment on the declaratory relief claim to the extent L M 15 Sports seeks to include such relief in the judgment concerning 16 the express contractual indemnity claim. 17 18 19 III. ORDER For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS L M 20 Sports’ motion for summary judgment on the express contractual 21 indemnity and declaratory relief claims. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: October 18, 2018 24 25 26 27 28 8

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