Davis v. Wheeler et al

Filing 14

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 11/19/2018 ORDERING plaintiff may file a first amended complaint within 30 days of service of this order. (Yin, K)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ANTHONY DAVIS,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:16-CV-2917-DMC-P

v.

ORDER

WHEELER, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges

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Defendants used excessive force against him in violation of his eighth amendment rights.

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “…short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v.

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Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual

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allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

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(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s

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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.

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Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their

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pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

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338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be

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facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer

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that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation

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marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The

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mere possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and a consistency with

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liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks

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omitted); Moss, 572F.3d at 969.

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II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

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In his complaint Plaintiff seems to allege a single underlying constitutional

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violation—excessive force. Plaintiff contends that Defendants used excessive force by throwing

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him face-first to the ground twice, twisting and jumping on his left wrist and shoulder, and

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rubbing his body into the ground, while he was handcuffed and in leg restraints. Plaintiff alleges

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that this was unprovoked and that he was not resisting while this event occurred. Plaintiff alleges

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he suffered physical and emotional injury. To the extent Plaintiff makes other allegations it is

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unclear what claims, if any, can be drawn from such allegations.

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III. ANALYSIS
A.

Excessive Force Claim
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when

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two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such

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that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial

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inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

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or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992);

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Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as

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opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims,

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is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect

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on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475

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U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following

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factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship

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between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably

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perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.
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See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force

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was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir.

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1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally,

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because the use of force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining

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security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley,

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475 U.S. at 321-22.

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Based on the complaint Plaintiff alleges he was twice thrown face-first to the

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ground, his left wrist and shoulder were twisted and jumped on, and his body was rubbed into the

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ground, while he was handcuffed and in leg restraints. Plaintiff alleges that this was unprovoked

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and that he was not resisting while this event occurred. The complaint pleads sufficient facts

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related to the excessive force claim to proceed past the screening stage.

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B.

Other Claims

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Plaintiff makes various other allegations seemingly unrelated to the underlying

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cause of action. This includes what seem to be random and unconnected statements of various

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constitutional violations that are difficult to discern as individual claims. These various

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allegations do not meet the Rule 8 requirement for a short and plain statement of the claim

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showing an entitlement to relief. For that reason, they fail to state any claim that this court can

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allow to proceed past screening. Plaintiff will, however, be provided leave to amend in order to

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clarify any claims other than the above discussed excessive force claim.

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IV. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT
Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

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amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

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1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an

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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

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1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the

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prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An

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amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended

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complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the court will issue findings and

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recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such

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further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

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V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a first amended
complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

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Dated: November 19, 2018
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DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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