Johnson v. Compton et al

Filing 22

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 04/07/17 ORDERING that defendant El Monte's 8 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. (Benson, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SCOTT JOHNSON,

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2:16-cv-02961-JAM-CKD

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.
LARRY D. COMPTON; EL MONTE
RENTS, INC., a California
Corporation; and Does 1-10,

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT EL
MONTE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

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Plaintiff Scott Johnson (“Johnson”) brings this action against

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Defendants Larry Compton (“Compton”) and El Monte Rents, Inc.

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(“El Monte”), alleging violations of the ADA and California law.

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ECF No. 1.

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which Johnson opposes, ECF No. 18. 1

El Monte now moves for summary judgment, ECF No. 8,

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I.

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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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Johnson, a quadriplegic, visited or attempted to visit

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property located at 4100 Florin-Perkins Road in Sacramento (the

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“Property”) multiple times from June to November 2016.

Compl.

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled
for March 21, 2017.
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¶ 20. 2

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El Monte’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“UF”) # 1, ECF No. 18-

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1.

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In 2008, Compton leased (and still leases) the Property to his

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own company, Lucky Ventures.

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Compton has owned the Property since 1997.

Pl.’s Resp.to

El Monte has never owned or leased the Property.

UF ## 2, 4.

UF # 3.

El Monte rents RVs through “dealer agents” such as Lucky

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Ventures.

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entered into a contract (“the Agreement”), in which Lucky

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Ventures agreed to make El Monte’s RVs available at the Property.

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UF ## 5, 6.

In 2008, El Monte and Lucky Ventures

Compton Decl., Exh. 1, ECF No. 10; UF ##6, 8.

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The Agreement requires, among other things, that Lucky

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Ventures conduct business for at least six days per week, allow

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El Monte to install signs and advertising materials on the

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Property, comply with governmental laws and regulations, and

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defend and indemnify El Monte “from any and all claims . . .

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caused by or arising directly or indirectly out of any condition

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of the premises.”

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states: “El Monte RV hereby appoints [Lucky Ventures] its agent

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for the sole purpose of operating a non-exclusive rental agency

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at the aforesaid location in accordance with this Agreement and

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[Lucky Ventures] hereby accepts said appointment.”

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1.

Agreement at 2, 4, 5, 7.

The Agreement also

Agreement at

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El Monte argues it does not own, lease, or operate a

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business on the Property, and therefore Johnson cannot hold El

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Johnson alleges, but does not provide any evidence to show, he
visited El Monte Rentals on several occasions and encountered
barriers that violated the ADA. The Court nevertheless accepts
these facts as true for purposes of this motion because El Monte
does not contest that Johnson visited the property and
encountered barriers.
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Monte liable for any of the Property’s ADA violations.

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II.

Mot. at

OPINION

The ADA states: “[n]o individual shall be discriminated

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against on the basis of disability in the full and equal

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enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

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advantages, or accommodations of any place of public

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accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or

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operates a place of public accommodation.”

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42 U.S.C. § 12182.

Johnson concedes that El Monte never owned or leased the

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Property.

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motion, therefore, is whether El Monte “operates a place of

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public accommodation” so as to give rise to liability for ADA

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violations.

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UF #2, 4.

The sole question presented by El Monte’s

The ADA does not define “operates.”

The Ninth Circuit has

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stated “to operate means to put or keep in operation, to control

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or direct the functioning of, or to conduct the affairs of;

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manage.”

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(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d

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1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Put simply, courts must ask whether the defendant “had the power

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to facilitate any necessary accommodation.”

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Lentini v. Cal. Cent. for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837, 849

Id.

El Monte argues Johnson cannot hold El Monte liable for ADA

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violations because El Monte “has no control over the alleged

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discriminatory conditions at the Property.”

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Monte analogizes its relationship with Lucky Ventures and the

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Property to the franchisee/franchisor relationships in Neff,

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Lemmons v. Ace Hardware Corp., 2014 WL 3107842, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
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Mot. at 11.

El

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Jul. 3, 2014), and U.S. v. Days Inn of Am., 1998 WL 461203, at *1

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(E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1998), where the courts found the plaintiffs

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could not hold the franchisors liable for ADA violations at the

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franchisees’ places of business.

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Mot. at 9-10.

The Fifth Circuit decided Neff, but the Ninth Circuit relied

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on it in Lentini for the definition of “operates” under the ADA,

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so it is relevant here.

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court concluded Dairy Queen was not an operator under the ADA

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even though the franchising agreement gave Dairy Queen the right

See Lentini, 370 F.3d at 849.

The Neff

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to set standards for building and equipment maintenance and to

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veto proposed structural changes at the franchise.

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at 1068.

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Neff, 58 F.3d

Similarly, in Lemmons, the agreement between Ace Hardware

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and its franchisee Berkeley Hardware required Berkeley Hardware

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“to abide by all federal and state laws, including those

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pertaining to disability access.”

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*7.

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not comply with this requirement.

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“while these contractual terms might provide an additional

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incentive to Berkeley Hardware to comply with federal and state

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laws, they do not grant Ace the ‘specific control’ necessary to

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impose liability on it.”

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show that Ace retained the authority under the agreement to

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dictate the physical layout of the store, or that otherwise

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participated in the alleged acts of discrimination against

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Plaintiff.”

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evidence,” the plaintiff could not prove Ace “had control over

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the store such that it could ensure nondiscrimination against the

Lemmons, 2014 WL 3107842, at

Ace could terminate the agreement if Berkeley Hardware did

Id.

Id.

Id.

The Lemmons court held

The Court found “no evidence to

The court concluded, “[i]n the absence of such

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disabled.”

Id.

Lastly, in Days Inn, the agreement required the franchisee

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to “be built and operated in compliance with all local, state and

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federal laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations.”

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1998 WL 461203, at *5.

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“control over the discriminatory conditions” and therefore was

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not an operator under the ADA.

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Days Inn,

The Court found Days Inn did not have

Id. at *6.

Johnson argues these cases do not apply because they
considered a franchisor/franchisee relationship, not a

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principal/agent relationship.

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“unlike a franchisee [that] is financially independent from a

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franchisor . . . Lucky Ventures has to meet performance

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benchmarks and is paid with employee-like commissions and

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bonuses, and all the monies collected at the facility are El

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Monte’s monies.”

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argues “unlike the mere veto-power that Dairy Queen had over

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building modifications contemplated by its franchisee in Neff,

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here El Monte RV has the express right to instruct its agent to

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make ‘capital improvements’ that it deems necessary for the

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suitability and appearance of the property.”

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Opp’n at 6.

Johnson contends

Id. (emphasis in original).

Johnson also

Id. at 6-7.

Johnson’s attempt to distinguish Neff, Lemmons, and Days Inn

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fails.

The Agreement here requires Lucky Ventures to comply with

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state and federal laws, just like the agreements in Lemmons and

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Days Inn, which the courts found insufficient to impose ADA

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liability on the non-owner franchisors.

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Days Inn agreements, nothing in the Agreement gives El Monte the

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power to dictate the “physical layout” or control any of the

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discriminatory conditions of the parking lot.
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Like the Lemmons and

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Additionally, Johnson has not provided any case law

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indicating that a court should treat principal/agent and

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franchisee/franchisor relationships differently under the ADA.

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Johnson also fails to provide any case law to support his

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contention that a principal can be liable for its agent’s ADA

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violations.

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no reason to depart from the rulings in Neff, Lemmons, and Days

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Inn.

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Given the absence of such authority, the Court finds

Johnson also argues this case more closely resembles

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Lentini.

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district court's imposition of liability under the ADA against an

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individual defendant who was the Director of Center Sales and

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Event Services, was in a position of authority to dictate who

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could or could not be admitted to the theater in question, and

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who actively participated in the discriminatory acts by directing

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the disabled individual to leave the theater with her service

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dog.

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defendant in Lentini, “El Monte is . . . in a position of

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authority and has the ability to instruct its agent, Lucky

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Ventures, to make any physical changes at the facility to comply

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with the ADA.”

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in at least one major way: Johnson has not submitted any evidence

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that El Monte “actively participated in the discriminatory acts”

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against the disabled plaintiff.

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cite to any portion of the Agreement to support his contention

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that El Monte has the power to instruct Lucky Ventures to make

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physical changes to the Property to comply with the ADA.

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Accordingly, Lentini does not support liability against El Monte.

Opp’n at 8.

In Lentini, the Ninth Circuit upheld the

Lentini, 370 F.3d at 849.

Opp’n at 8.

Johnson argues like the

But Lentini differs from this case

Additionally, Johnson does not

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Johnson also argues a defendant “cannot contract away

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responsibility under the ADA.”

Opp’n at 4 (citing Botosan v.

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Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827 (2000)).

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whether an owner of property could “contract away” its

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responsibility under the ADA to the lessee of the property.

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Botosan, 216 F.3d at 834.

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of the property was still liable for ADA violations because the

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ADA explicitly applies to “any person who owns . . . or leases to

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. . . a place of public accommodation.”

But Botosan concerned

The Botosan court held that the owner

Id. at 832 (citing 42

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U.S.C. § 12182).

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not own the property or lease it to Lucky Ventures.

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Botosan does not apply.

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Unlike the defendant in Botosan, El Monte does
Thus,

Lastly, Johnson argues the Court would serve the purposes of

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the ADA by “holding principals responsible for the acts and

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omissions of their agents.”

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not persuasive because the Court need not engage in a policy

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analysis.

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principals are not liable for omissions of their agents in ADA

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cases.

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Agreement resembles agreements where other courts held the non-

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owner defendant could not be liable for ADA violations on the

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subject property.

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Ventures does not give El Monte the “power to facilitate any

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necessary accommodation.”

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Agreement requires Lucky Ventures, not El Monte, to ensure

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compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

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The Court therefore declines to hold El Monte responsible for ADA

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violations on the Property.

Opp’n at 9.

This policy argument is

With its ruling, this Court does not broadly hold that

Rather, the Court holds that in this particular case, the

The Agreement between El Monte and Lucky

Lentini, 370 F.3d at 849.

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The

Agreement at 7.

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III.

ORDER

The Court finds as a matter of law 3 El Monte does not

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“operate” the place of business at issue and therefore grants El

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Monte’s motion for summary judgment.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 7, 2017

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Whether a franchisor’s contractual rights under a franchise
agreement demonstrate that the franchisor “operates” a place of
public accommodation is a “purely legal” question and therefore
“appropriately resolved through summary judgment.” Neff, 58 F.3d
at 1065.
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