Johnson v. Compton et al

Filing 42

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 10/9/2018 DENYING 37 Motion for Attorney Fees. (Washington, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SCOTT JOHNSON,

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2:16-cv-02961-JAM-CKD

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.
LARRY D. COMPTON and EL MONTE
RENTS, INC.,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT EL MONTE
RENTS, INC.’S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES

Defendants.

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In December 2016, Plaintiff Scott Johnson sued Defendants

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Larry Compton and El Monte Rents, Inc., alleging violations of

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the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and Unruh Civil Rights

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Act.

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judgment, ECF No. 8, which the Court granted in April 2017.

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No. 22.

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claim as moot and declined to retain jurisdiction over Johnson’s

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state law claims against Compton, closing the case.

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36.

Compl., ECF No. 1.

El Monte filed a motion for summary
ECF

Earlier this year, the Court dismissed Johnson’s ADA

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ECF Nos. 35–

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El Monte now seeks attorney fees and costs.

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No. 37; Reply, ECF No. 40.

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ECF No. 39.

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Mot. Fees, ECF

Johnson opposes the motion.

Opp’n,

Monte’s Motion for Attorney Fees.1

For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies El

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I.

DISCUSSION

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A.

Attorneys’ Fees Under the ADA

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The Americans with Disabilities Act provides, “In any action

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or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter,

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the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

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party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee,

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including litigation expenses, and costs[.]”

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42 U.S.C. § 12205.

Courts may grant attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in

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civil rights actions, including ADA actions, “only ‘upon a

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finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable,

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or without foundation.’”

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F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Christiansburg Garment

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Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421(1978)).

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if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact, though it need

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not be brought in bad faith.”

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F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1037 (E.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 151 F. App’x 549

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(9th Cir. 2005).

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temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that,

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because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must

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have been unreasonable or without foundation.”

Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127

“An action is frivolous

Peters v. Winco Foods, Inc., 320

Courts must “resist the understandable

Christiansburg,

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This motion was determined suitable for decision without oral
argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for
October 2, 2018.
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434 U.S. at 421–22.

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Assuming that Johnson’s claims against El Monte were not

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frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation at the time of

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filing, Johnson had a duty to reevaluate his claims at any point

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where it became clear the claims lacked a factual basis.

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320 F. Supp. at 1037.

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agreement El Monte provided to Johnson prior to filing its

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summary judgment motion, it was clear that El Monte did not own

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or lease the property.

Peters,

Based on the facts and principal/agent

Whether El Monte “operated” the property

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was a debatable issue and one upon which each party provided

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briefing.

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The Court found that El Monte did not own, lease, or operate

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the property in question at the time Johnson sued, and thus could

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not be held liable for any of the property’s ADA violations.

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his unsuccessful opposition to El Monte’s motion for summary

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judgment, Johnson argued that El Monte could have been liable as

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an operator due to its principal/agent agreement with Compton’s

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business.

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precedent that a court should treat principal/agent and

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franchisee/franchisor relationships differently under the ADA.

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Indeed, the precedent El Monte cited demonstrated that an

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agreement requiring compliance with state and federal laws is

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insufficient to provide control over discriminatory conditions.

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Thus, the Court found that El Monte was not an operator because

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the principal/agent agreement did not give El Monte the power to

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facilitate any necessary accommodation.

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In

Johnson made this argument without citing to any

While El Monte presented analogous precedent from the
franchisor/franchisee context, Johnson relied on an
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interpretation of the principal/agent agreement and a legal

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argument for extending liability that the Court rejected.

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However, Johnson’s lack of precedent does not mean that his

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argument was wholly without merit.

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question with little precedent weighs against a finding of

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frivolousness.

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1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Legal Servs. of N.

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California, Inc. v. Arnett, 114 F.3d 135, 141 (9th Cir. 1997)

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(finding that a position unsupported by existing precedent was

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not frivolous where there was a good faith effort to advance a

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novel legal theory).

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unique question posed, so Johnson’s theory for extending the law

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was not undisputedly frivolous.

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The presence of a novel

C.W. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 784 F.3d

No prior cases conclusively answered the

Although it is a very close call, the Court finds that this

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is not one of the “exceptional circumstances” in which attorney’s

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fees should be awarded to a prevailing defendant in a civil

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rights case.

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II.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES El Monte’s
motion.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: October 9, 2018

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