Giannini et al v. Landry

Filing 3

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes on 5/30/2017 RECOMMENDING that the 2 Motion to Proceed IFP be denied and that the 1 Complaint be dismissed without prejudice; REFERRING this matter to Judge Kimberly J. Mueller; ORDERING that any objections be filed within fourteen (14) days. (Michel, G.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ERIC GIANNINI and JIHAD
BENSEBAHIA,

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Plaintiffs,

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No. 2:16-cv-3004 KJM DB PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

v.
LANDRY, SHAWN, individually and in
his/her official capacity as Chief Executive
Officer of the Superior Court of Yolo
County,

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Defendant.

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Plaintiffs, Eric Giannini and Jihad Bensebahia, are proceeding in this action pro se. This

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matter was referred to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. §

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636(b)(1). Pending before the court is plaintiffs’ complaint and plaintiff Eric Giannini’s motion

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to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) Therein, plaintiffs

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allege that the defendant “refused and still refused to convert the limited civil action” plaintiffs

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filed in the Yolo County Superior Court “into an unlimited action . . . .” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at

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2.)

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by parties proceeding in forma
pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.
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2000) (en banc). Here, plaintiffs’ complaint is deficient. Accordingly, for the reasons stated

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below, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff Eric Giannini’s application to proceed in

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forma pauperis be denied and plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.

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I.

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Plaintiffs’ Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Filing fees must be paid unless each plaintiff applies for and is granted leave to proceed in

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forma pauperis. Here, plaintiff Jihad Bensebahia has not submitted an application to proceed in

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forma pauperis.

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Plaintiff Eric Giannini’s in forma pauperis application makes the showing required by 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma

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pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. “‘A district court may deny

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leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed

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complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d

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1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th

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Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Department of Child Support Services, 584 Fed. Appx. 638 (9th

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Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee’s request to proceed

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IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee’s action is frivolous

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or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the

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District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine

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whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit,

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the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”).

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Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of

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poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to

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state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune

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defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an

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arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v.

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Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a

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complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the

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factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
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To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to

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state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

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570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as

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true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most

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favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v.

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Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245

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(9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

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lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true

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conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western

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Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

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The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court are as follows:

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A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s
jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand
for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

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II.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint

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Plaintiffs’ “bring this suit pursuant to” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendant “in his

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capacity as a judge in the Superior Court of Yolo County.” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 1.) The

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complaint alleges that on December 19, 2016, plaintiff Giannini filed “documents at the Superior

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Court of California, County of Yolo, for YOSU CVUD 2016 1275-1 . . . .” (Id. at 2.) Defendant

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Landry “refused and still refuses to convert the limited civil action . . . into an unlimited action,”

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in violation of plaintiffs’ rights. (Id.)

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It is not clear from plaintiffs’ complaint if the defendant is in fact a judge or a nonjudicial

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officer. Nonetheless, judges are generally absolutely immune from civil liability for actions taken

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in their judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Moreover, “[a]bsolute

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judicial immunity is not reserved solely for judges, but extends to nonjudicial officers for ‘all

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claims relating to the exercise of judicial functions.’” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir.

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2002) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
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dissenting in part)). In this regard, judicial personnel “have absolute quasi-judicial immunity

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from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the

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judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th

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Cir. 1987).

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Moreover, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “a direct appeal from the final

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judgment of a state court,” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003), and “may also

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apply where the parties do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision, as the doctrine

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prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de

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facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859

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(9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A suit brought in federal district court is a

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‘de facto appeal’ forbidden by Rooker-Feldman when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong

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an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment

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based on that decision.’” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

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Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164); see also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a

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proceeding in ‘which a party losing in state court’ seeks ‘what in substance would be appellate

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review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim

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that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’”) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy,

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512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994), cert. denied 547 U .S. 1111 (2006)). “Thus, even if a plaintiff

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seeks relief from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto appeal only if the

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plaintiff also alleges a legal error by the state court.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897

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(9th Cir. 2013).

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[A] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a
forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court
must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it
must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is
‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court
in its judicial decision.

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Doe, 415 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158); see also Exxon, 544 U.S. at 286 n. 1 (“a

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district court [cannot] entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment, even if the
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state court had not passed directly on those claims, when the constitutional attack [is]

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‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.

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16)); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898, 900 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (“claims raised in the

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federal court action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the

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adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to

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interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16,

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485). Here, plaintiffs are essentially appealing the decision of the state court based on their claim

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that the state court’s determination violated their federal rights.

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Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed for

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lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

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III.

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Leave to Amend
The undersigned has carefully considered whether plaintiffs may amend the complaint to

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state a claim over which the court would have jurisdiction and upon which relief could be

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granted. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice,

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and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472

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(9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d

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1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the court

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does not have to allow futile amendments). In light of the deficiencies noted above, the

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undersigned finds that it would be futile to grant plaintiffs leave to amend in this case.

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CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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1. Plaintiff Eric Giannini’s December 23, 2016 application to proceed in forma pauperis

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(ECF No. 2) be denied;

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2. Plaintiffs’ December 23, 2016 complaint (ECF No. 1) be dismissed without prejudice;
and

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3. This action be dismissed.

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These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14)
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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiffs may file written

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objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections to

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Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiffs are advised that failure to file

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objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal

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the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Dated: May 30, 2017

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DLB:6
DB/orders/orders.pro se/giannini3004.ifp.den.f&rs

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