Robben v. California Supreme Court et al
Filing
13
ORDER and FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 09/19/18 DENYING 8 Motion to Stay. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve plaintiff with a copy of this order and findings and recommendations at both his ad dress of record and at the California City Correctional Facility, P.O. Box 2626, California City, CA 93505. Also, RECOMMENDING that the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim. Referred to Judge Kimberly J. Mueller. Objections due within 21 days. (Plummer, M)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
TODD ROBBEN,
12
Plaintiff,
13
14
No. 2:16-cv-3023 KJM AC P
v.
ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, et al.,
15
Defendants.
16
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
17
18
state tort law. He has also filed a motion to stay. ECF No. 8. The court notes that the Inmate
19
Locator website operated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
20
(CDCR) indicates that plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California City Correctional
21
Facility and a copy of this order and findings and recommendations will be served on him at that
22
location as well as at his address of record. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local
23
Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
24
25
I.
Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
26
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
27
court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are
28
“frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[]
1
1
2
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
3
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
4
Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal
5
theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639,
6
640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as
7
stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a
8
constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis.
9
Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted).
10
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
11
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
12
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
13
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
14
“Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context
15
of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman,
16
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In order to survive dismissal for failure
17
to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
18
cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the
19
speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted). “‘[T]he pleading must contain something more . . .
20
than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of
21
action.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
22
Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)).
23
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
24
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
25
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
26
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
27
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this
28
standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg.
2
1
Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading in the
2
light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v.
3
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted).
4
II.
5
Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that various state courts and state court clerks violated his rights under the
6
Fourteenth and First Amendments when they did not file documents in his court cases and in
7
some instances mailed them back to him. ECF No. 1 at 2. He further alleges that this same
8
conduct constituted conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
9
(RICO) and fraud. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and
10
injunctive relief in the form of an order vacating various judgements and implementing new
11
policies and procedures. Id. at 6.
12
III.
Failure to State a Claim
13
Plaintiff’s claims against the state courts are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity
14
and must therefore be dismissed. Simmons v. Sacramento Cty. Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156,
15
1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (claims against state courts under § 1983 are barred by
16
the Eleventh Amendment); Greenlaw v. County of Santa Clara, 125 F. App’x 809, 810 (9th Cir.
17
2005) (citation omitted) (claims against state court under § 1983, RICO, and state tort law are
18
barred by Eleventh Amendment).
19
His claims against the court clerks are also barred because “[c]ourt clerks have absolute
20
quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are
21
an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th
22
Cir. 1987) (citing Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Shipp v. Todd, 568
23
F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1978); Stewart v. Minnick, 409 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969); Sharma v.
24
Stevas, 790 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1986)). “The commencement of an action by filing a complaint
25
or petition is a basic and integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390 (citations
26
omitted). As the individuals through whom filing is done, court clerks have quasi-judicial
27
immunity for refusing to file documents. Id. (clerks entitled to quasi-judicial immunity where
28
they refused to accept amended petition); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979)
3
1
(superior court clerk’s “failure, if any, to perform a ministerial duty which was a part of judicial
2
process is also clothed with quasi-judicial immunity” (citations omitted)); In re Castillo, 297 F.3d
3
940, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (quasi-judicial immunity can extend to court clerks “for purely
4
administrative acts—acts which taken out of context would appear ministerial, but when viewed
5
in context are actually a part of the judicial function” (citing Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240
6
(9th Cir. 1996))); Haile v. Sawyer, 76 F. App’x 129, 130 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (state
7
court clerk entitled to quasi-judicial immunity where claims were based on clerk’s filing of court
8
papers). This immunity extends to civil RICO and fraud claims. See Van Beek v. AG-Credit
9
Bonus Partners, 316 F. App’x 554, 555 (9th Cir. 2008) (RICO claim barred by judicial
10
immunity); Scheidler v. Avery, No. C12-5996 RBL, 2015 WL 7294544, at *11, 2015 U.S. Dist.
11
LEXIS 155494, at *30 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 17, 2015) (court clerks entitled to quasi-judicial
12
immunity from claims under § 1983 and RICO); Brumbaugh v. Comerica Bank, No. 07-CV-0786
13
JAH (POR), 2008 WL 11337490, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2008) (court clerk entitled to quasi-
14
judicial immunity from RICO claims based on the filing of documents); Moore, 96 F.3d at 1244
15
(clerk of the court entitled to quasi-judicial immunity even if he deceived plaintiff regarding
16
status of bond); Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F.2d 1486, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) (clerk of
17
the court had absolute quasi-judicial immunity from claims under Federal Tort Claims Act for
18
activities that “were an integral part of the judicial process”).
19
To the extent plaintiff is attempting to bring claims under state law, because he has failed
20
to state a cognizable claim for relief under federal law, this court should decline to exercise
21
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s putative state law claims.1 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
22
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (when federal claims are eliminated before trial, district courts
23
should usually decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction).
24
IV.
25
26
27
28
No Leave to Amend
Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint
could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31
1
The court takes no position on whether plaintiff would be able to successfully pursue his claims
in state court.
4
1
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se
2
litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies,
3
unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
4
amendment.” (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987))). However, if, after
5
careful consideration, it is clear that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the court may
6
dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1005-06.
7
The undersigned finds that, as set forth above, the complaint fails to state a claim upon
8
which relief may be granted and that amendment would be futile. The complaint should therefore
9
be dismissed without leave to amend.
10
V.
11
12
In light of the recommendation that the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend,
plaintiff’s motion to stay the proceedings will be denied as moot.
13
VI.
14
15
Motion to Stay
Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant
Your complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend because even if your claims
are true, the state courts and clerks of court are immune from a civil suit.
16
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
17
1. Plaintiff’s motion to stay (ECF No. 8) is denied as moot.
18
2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve plaintiff with a copy of this order and
19
findings and recommendations at both his address of record and at the California City
20
Correctional Facility, P.O. Box 2626, California City, CA 93505.
21
22
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed without leave to
amend for failure to state a claim.
23
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
24
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days
25
after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections
26
with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings
27
////
28
////
5
1
and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified
2
time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153
3
(9th Cir. 1991).
4
DATED: September 19, 2018
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?