Lee v. City of Sacramento

Filing 29

ORDER denying the City's 23 Motion to Strike, signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 8/3/17. The City shall file its Answer to the SAC within 20 days of this Order. (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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IVAN S. LEE,

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2:17-cv-00118-JAM-EFB

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO STRIKE

CITY OF SACRAMENTO,

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Defendant.

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Plaintiff Ivan S. Lee sues the City of Sacramento (“City”)

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for several violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

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1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and California’s Fair Employment and

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Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940.

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(“SAC”), ECF No. 22.

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statement or, alternatively, to strike several allegations in the

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SAC.

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explained below, the Court denies Defendant’s motion. 1

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ECF No. 23.

Second Am. Compl.

The City now moves for a more definite

Plaintiff opposes.

ECF No. 26.

For reasons

This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for July 25, 2017. In deciding this motion, the Court
takes as true all well-pleaded facts in the operative complaint.
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I.

BACKGROUND

Lee filed his original complaint and first amended complaint

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pro se in Sacramento County Superior Court.

ECF No. 1, Notice of

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Removal, at 2.

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which Lee retained counsel.

See generally id.

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moved to dismiss Lee’s FAC.

ECF No. 8.

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City’s motion with leave to amend.

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timely SAC, alleging race discrimination violations under Title

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VII (claim one) and FEHA (claim two), failure to prevent

The City removed the case to this Court, after
The City then

This Court granted the

ECF No. 18.

Lee filed a

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discrimination (claim three), and retaliation (claim four).

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at 4-7.

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alternatively, motion for a more definite statement.

SAC

Now before the Court is the City’s motion to strike or,
ECF No. 23.

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II.

OPINION

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A.

Rule 12(f)

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The City moves to strike paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of the SAC,

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arguing that these allegations say nothing about Lee having

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timely exhausted his administrative rights.

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Rule 12(f) allows a district court to “strike from a pleading

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. . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

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matter.”

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comprised ‘of allegations that constitute a needless repetition

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of other averments or which are foreign to the issue to be

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denied.’”

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LLC, No. 1:14-cv-01445-JLT, 2015 WL 4496349, at *1 (E.D. Cal.

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July 23, 2015) (citation omitted).

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no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief

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or the defenses being pleaded,’ while an ‘[i]mpertinent matter

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

See Mot. at 2-4.

“A ‘redundant’ matter is

Bakersfield Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Cornerstone Valve,

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“An immaterial matter ‘has

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consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not

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necessary, to the issues in question.’”

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omitted).

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Id. (citations

Yet, here, in moving to strike paragraphs 6-8, the City

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cites not one of Rule 12(f)’s textual bases.

Instead, the City

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contends merely that this Court should strike paragraph 6

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because Lee “did not file the required claim within 180 days of

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the allegedly discriminatory bid process”; should strike

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paragraph 7 because it “is silent as to when [Lee] was assigned

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unpopular tasks”; and should strike paragraph 8 because Lee took

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too long to file his complaint with the Department of Fair

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Employment and Housing (“DFEH”).

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disagrees, arguing he timely exhausted his administrative

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remedies and that, at the very least, paragraphs 6-8 provide the

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Court relevant background information.

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The City’s

See Mot. at 3-4.

Lee

See Opp’n at 2-3.

motion to strike is not well taken.

A Rule

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12(f) motion’s purpose “is to avoid the expenditure of time and

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money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by

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dispensing with those issues prior to trial.”

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& Supply, Inc., 2015 WL 4496349 at *1 (citation omitted).

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Yet, here, paragraphs 6-8 do not raise “spurious issues” because

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Lee has, in fact, timely exhausted his administrative remedies.

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Lee filed his first administrative complaint with the Equal

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Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on February 12, 2010,

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Notice of Removal at 27-29 (attached as Ex. 1), and this was

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constructively filed with the DFEH.

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Stanislaus, No. 1:13-cv-1897-AWI-SAB, 2014 WL 1922560, at *7

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(E.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (“The California DFEH and the EEOC have
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Bakersfield Pipe

Fresquez v. Cty. of

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a work share agreement whereby charges filed with either the

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EEOC or the DFEH are deemed ‘constructively filed’ with the

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other.”) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1626.10(c)).

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complaint, Lee cited the same discriminatory acts the City wants

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this Court to strike from the SAC.

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bid process; completing tasks other non-black employees need not

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complete; September 16, 2009 emergency task; and noting that the

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latest discriminatory act occurred 10 days before he filed the

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charge).

In his first EEOC

See Ex. 1 (citing July 2009

Because this EEOC complaint triggered the constructive

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filing of Lee’s DFEH complaint, Lee had a claim pending in a

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state agency and, so, had 300 days to file this EEOC complaint.

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See Parks v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., No. 1:09-cv-1314

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AWI GSA, 2010 WL 455394, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010)

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(explaining plaintiff must “file a complaint with the EEOC

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within 180 days of the discriminatory act, or 300 days if a

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claim is pending in a state agency”).

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complaint was timely.

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Lee’s first EEOC

Lee also filed a second EEOC complaint on June 13, 2011.

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See Ex. 1.

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discriminatory acts that occurred through April 28, 2011.

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The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on February 25, 2016.

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Notice of Removal, at 34-35 (attached as Ex. 3).

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filed his original pro se complaint on May 24, 2016, see Notice

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of Removal at 4-7 (attached as Ex. 1), satisfying the Ninth

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Circuit’s 90-day rule, see Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 624 F.3d

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1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010) (a plaintiff generally has 90 days to

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file suit after receiving a right-to-sue letter).

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He cited his 2010 EEOC complaint and listed more
Id.
See

Lee timely

In sum, because paragraphs 6-8 lack allegations involving
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“redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” the

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Court denies the City’s motion to strike these paragraphs.

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courts “read Rule 12(f) in a manner that allowed litigants to

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use it as a means to dismiss some or all of a pleading . . . we

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would be creating redundancies within the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure, because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion (or a motion for

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summary judgment at a later stage in the proceedings) already

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serves such a purpose.”

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618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2010).

If

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co.,

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B.

Rule 12(e)

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The City also asks this Court to order Lee to provide a more

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definite statement to specify “how his work was scrutinized, how

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he was punished, ‘discriminated against,’ when these events

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occurred, and whether he filed a timely claim with either the

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EEOC or the DFEH.”

Mot. at 4-5.

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This too is without merit.

Rule 8(a)’s notice pleading

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standard applies to Title VII suits.

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discrimination complaint need not contain specific facts

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establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the

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McDonnell-Douglas framework; instead, it “must contain only ‘a

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short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

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is entitled to relief.’”

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508 (2002) (citing Rule 8(a)(2)).

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good law after Twombly and Iqbal, see Cormier v. All Am. Asphalt,

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458 F. App’x 620 (9th Cir. 2011), a Title VII complaint “easily

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satisfies” Rule 8(a)’s requirements when “it gives respondent

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fair notice of the basis for petitioner’s claims.”

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534 U.S. at 508.

An employment

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506,

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Because Swierkiewicz is still

Swierkiewicz,

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This is precisely what Lee has done here.

As to his race

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discrimination claims, Lee alleges the City demoted him because

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of his race.

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to his demotion and provides relevant dates.

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and, assumed true, more than plausibly suggest Lee is entitled to

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relief.

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See SAC ¶¶ 15, 19.

Lee details the events leading
See SAC ¶¶ 6-8, 15-

These allegations are neither bare nor conclusory

As to his retaliation claim, Lee alleges sufficient non-

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conclusory facts to plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief

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because his SAC alleges everything needed to establish a prima

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facie case of retaliation.

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2010 and 2011 when he filed his discrimination charges with the

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DFEH and EEOC.

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demoted him, see SAC ¶ 13 (demoted on April 7, 2011); after

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filing his second EEOC complaint, the City “stacked infractions”

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against him “to cover its anger against [Lee] for filing

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[administrative claims]”, see SAC ¶¶ 26-27.

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state a retaliation claim.

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No. CIV. S-13-1283 LKK/DAD, 2013 WL 6844493, at *6 (E.D. Cal.

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Dec. 23, 2013) (prima facie case of retaliation: (1) involvement

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in protected activity; (2) employer committed adverse employment

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action; and (3) causal link between the two).

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Lee engaged in protected activity in

After filing his first EEOC complaint, the City

This suffices to

See Burch v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,

And, finally, as to Lee’s failure-to-prevent-discrimination

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claim, because he has stated Title VII and FEHA discrimination

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claims, he has sufficiently stated a failure-to-prevent-

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discrimination claim.

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No. 1:15-cv-01104-MJS, 2015 WL 5604394 at *17 (E.D. Cal. Sept.

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23, 2015).

See Mock v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab.,

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Simply put, the City has fair notice of Lee’s claims and the

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grounds upon which they rest.

That is all Rule 8(a) requires.

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See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515 (holding a complaint detailing

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events leading to adverse employment action and providing

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relevant dates easily satisfies Rule 8(a)’s pleading

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requirements).

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III.

ORDER

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES the City’s

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Motion in its entirety. The City shall file its Answer to the SAC

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within twenty days of this Order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 3, 2017

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