Baldizon et al v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation et al

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 24 MOTION TO DISMISS signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 12/18/2017: IT IS ORDERED that 32 Defendant Macomber's motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file a First Amended Complaint, if they can do so consistent with this Order.(Kirksey Smith, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JANETTE RAMIREZ, individually
and as a representative of
the Estate of ROBERTO
BALDIZON, Deceased; ANA
JUSCAMAITA, individually and
as a representative of the
Estate of ROBERTO BALDIZON,
Deceased; and THE ESTATE of
ROBERTO BALDIZON,

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CIV. NO. 2:17-00228 WBS AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
v.
JEFFREY MACOMBER,
individually and in his
official capacity as Former
Warden of California State
Prison-Sacramento and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, in
their official and
personal/individual
capacities,
Defendants.

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Plaintiffs Janette Ramirez and Ana Juscamaita,

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individually and as representatives of the Estate of Roberto

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Baldizon (collectively “plaintiffs”), brought this action against

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defendants Jeffrey Macomber and Does 1-100 (“defendants”) for
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money damages alleging violations of federal law arising out of

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the death of Roberto Baldizon (“decedent”), who was killed by his

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cellmate at California State Prison-Sacramento (“Sacramento

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Prison”).

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Jeffrey Macomber’s Motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint

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for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

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No. 24.)

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I.

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The matter is now before the court on defendant

(Docket

Procedural and Factual Background
Plaintiff Janette Ramirez is Baldizon’s sibling, and

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plaintiff Ana Juscamaita is Baldizon’s mother.

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(“TAC”) ¶ 5 (Docket No. 29).)

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employed by the California Department of Corrections and

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Rehabilitation (“Department of Corrections”), acting as Warden of

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the Sacramento Prison, a state run prison under the Department of

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Corrections.

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was responsible for the oversight, maintenance, and policy making

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decisions of the Sacramento Prison as well as the supervision,

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training, and hiring of employees.

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(TAC ¶ 6.)

(Third Am. Compl.

Defendant Jeffrey Macomber was

As Warden, plaintiffs assert defendant

(TAC ¶ 8.)

From around December 2014 to February 2015, Baldizon

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was an inmate at the Sacramento Prison.

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Baldizon suffered from severe mental health issues, including

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bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and agoraphobia.

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Sometime in January 2015, Baldizon was physically attacked by an

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unnamed cellmate.

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assigned a new cellmate, Antolin Cepeda.

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allege that Baldizon complained both to his family and defendants

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that he was unsafe and feared for his life at the Sacramento

(TAC ¶ 13.)

(See TAC ¶¶ 14, 16.)

(TAC ¶ 13.)

After the attack, Baldizon was

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(TAC ¶ 16.)

Plaintiffs

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Prison.

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complaints and the previous attack by a Sacramento Prison

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cellmate, defendants did not address his concerns.

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(TAC ¶ 17.)

Plaintiffs allege that despite his

(See id.)

On February 3, 2015, Baldizon was stabbed and killed by

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Antolin Cepeda.

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attempted to notify Doe defendants of the assault to procure

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their assistance.

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time the assault went undiscovered, Baldizon could have received

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lifesaving treatment.

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(TAC ¶ 18.)

(TAC ¶ 19)

Plaintiffs allege other inmates

Plaintiffs allege that during the

(Id.)

On September 28, 2018, plaintiffs filed a Third Amended

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Complaint against defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for:

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(1) violation of Baldizon’s constitutional rights to reasonable

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security and access to medical care and treatment under the

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Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

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punishment; (2) violation of decedent’s civil rights--a survival

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claim, alleging decedent was forced to endure great pain and

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suffering before his death; and (3) violation of the right to

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familial relationship under the Fourteenth Amendment of the

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United States Constitution.1

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defendant Macomber in both his individual and official capacities

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for his own allegedly culpable action or inaction in the

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training, supervision or control of his subordinates, or for the

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acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations alleged, or for

(TAC ¶¶ 21-36.)

Plaintiffs sue

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Plaintiff states that she does not allege any counts
under California law and that the language in the Third Amended
Complaint, namely “Article I, Section 7(a) and 17 of the
California Constitution, and under the common law of the State of
California . . .” can be struck. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 11 (Docket No.
37).) Thus, the court will strike this allegation.
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conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the

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rights of others.

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conduct, plaintiffs seek money damages, including punitive

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damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees.

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Relief at 10-11.)

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II.

(TAC ¶ 8.)

As a result of defendant’s alleged

(TAC Prayer for

Discussion

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To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead

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“only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

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on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

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(2007).

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than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,”

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and “[w]here a

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complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a

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defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between

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possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

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plaintiff has stated a claim, the court must accept the

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allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

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inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

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F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000).

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This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks for more

Id.

In deciding whether a

See Resnick v. Hayes, 213

A. Official Capacity Liability

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As an initial matter, plaintiffs seek damages against

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defendant in both his official and individual capacity.

(TAC ¶

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8.)

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the suit is against the officer in his individual capacity; if

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the plaintiff seeks an injunction, the suit is generally against

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the officer in his official capacity.

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explained “[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . generally represent

Generally when a plaintiff seeks damages against an officer,

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As the Supreme Court has

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only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

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an officer is an agent . . . .

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against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only

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against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to

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recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must

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look to the government entity itself.”

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U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

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official capacities are immune from suits for damages in federal

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court (for federal or state law claims) under the doctrine of

Thus, while an award of damages

Kentucky v. Graham, 473

Moreover, “state officers named in their

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state sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, and are not

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‘persons’ subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (in federal or

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state court).”

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2010 WL 3635780, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010) (citations

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omitted).

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dismisses the § 1983 claims against him in his official capacity.

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The court proceeds with plaintiffs’ claims against defendant in

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his individual capacity.

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Silverbrand v. Woodford, Civ. No. 06-3253-R(CW),

Therefore, defendant is not liable and the court

B. Individual Capacity Liability

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1. Supervisory Liability

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Plaintiffs purport to hold defendant liable in his

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individual capacity as a supervisor at the Sacramento Prison.

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(See TAC ¶ 9.)

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there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the

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constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection

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between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional

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violation.”

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(quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)).

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A supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 “if

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)

Furthermore, “[a] plaintiff must show the supervisor
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breached a duty to plaintiff which was the proximate cause of the

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injury.”

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does not have to be physically present when the constitutional

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injury was inflicted; rather, the supervisor’s participation

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could include his “own culpable action or inaction in the

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training, supervision, or control of his subordinates, his

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acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the

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complaint is made, or conduct that showed a reckless or callous

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indifference to the rights of others.”

Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207.

To be liable, a supervisor

Id. at 1205–06 (citing

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Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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Additionally, “[t]he sufficient causal connection may be shown by

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evidence that the supervisor implemented a policy so deficient

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that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights

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and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.”

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v. Davis, 333 F.Supp.2d 888, 892 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting

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Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646).

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against defendant in his individual capacity will be considered

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in the context of supervisory liability.

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Wesley

Whether plaintiffs state a claim

2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment under the Eighth Amendment

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a.

Right to Reasonable Security

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Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from

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violence at the hands of other inmates.

Hearns v. Terhune, 413

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F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotations

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omitted).

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from attacks by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth

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Amendment violation when: (1) the deprivation alleged is

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objectively, sufficiently serious and (2) the prison officials

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had a sufficiently culpable state of mind, acting with deliberate

“The failure of prison officials to protect inmates

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indifference.”

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(1994)).

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Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).

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liable, the official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive

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risk to inmate health or safety: the official must be aware of

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facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

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risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

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inference.”

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844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating “deliberate

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indifference” standard requires proving some degree of

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“individual culpability”).2

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Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 587.

To be

See also Leer v. Murphy,

Plaintiffs appear to have two different theories as to

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why defendant is liable for failure to protect Baldizon.

First,

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plaintiffs allege that it was against Department of Corrections

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and Sacramento Prison policy for Baldizon to be housed with

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Antolin Cepeda. (Compl. ¶ 16.)

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that under these policies prison officials are supposed to place

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the victim of an assault on single cell status, investigate the

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assault, make informed decisions about whether the victim is at

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risk for future assaults, and, if so, determine how best to

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protect the individual within the prison setting.

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at 7.)

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conduct involves his failure to ensure enforcement of policies,

Specifically, plaintiffs argue

(Pls.’ Opp’n

Thus, plaintiffs allege that defendant’s affirmative

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In plaintiffs’ opposition, plaintiffs cite Castro v.
County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016), for the
elements of a failure-to-protect claim. However, Castro sets the
standard for failure-to-protect for a pretrial detainee. Here,
defendant was not a pretrial detainee and thus the Castro
standard does not apply.
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rules, or directives that set in motion a series of acts by

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others which he knew or reasonably should have known would cause

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others to inflict constitutional injury.3

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plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient factual allegations from

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which the court may infer defendant acted either intentionally or

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with deliberate indifference.

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Plaintiffs do not plead sufficient factual allegations to

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establish that defendant was aware of previous incidents of

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violence, the need to enforce prison policies, or that prison

(TAC ¶ 8.)

However,

See Leer, 844 F.2d at 634.

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officials were endangering inmates.

See Hydrick v. Hunter, 669

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F.3d 937 (9th 2012) (citing Starr, 652 F.3d at 1206-07) (“Even

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under a ‘deliberate indifference’ theory of individual liability,

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the Plaintiffs must still allege sufficient facts to plausibly

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establish the defendant's ‘knowledge of’ and ‘acquiescence in’

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the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates.”); Henry A. v.

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Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1004 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding allegation

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of supervisory liability insufficient were complaint “does not

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allege . . . any personal knowledge of the specific

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constitutional violations that led to Plaintiffs’ injuries.”)

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Compare Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208-12 (finding complaint sufficient

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to allege supervisory liability against Sheriff, where Sheriff

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was given notice of previous incidents of violence and did not

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Furthermore, a failure to follow a state regulation or
prison policy itself does not amount to a constitutional
violation. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.
2009) (“[S]tate departmental regulations do not establish a
federal constitutional violation”) (citation omitted); Gardner v.
Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is no § 1983
liability for violating prison policy. [Plaintiff] must prove
that [defendant] violated his constitutional right . . . .”).
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take action to protect inmates despite the dangers created by the

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action of his subordinates of which he had been made aware).4

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Under plaintiffs’ alternate theory, plaintiffs state

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defendant was responsible for the “supervision, training and

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hiring of persons and employees working” within the Sacramento

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Prison.

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maintained customs or practices that posed a substantial risk of

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harm to inmates including: (a) improper classification of

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inmates; improper

(Compl. ¶ 8.)

Here, plaintiffs allege that defendant

housing of inmates; (b) inadequate staffing of

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custody positions to provide reasonable security to inmates; (c)

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failure to provide reasonable security and/or prevent the abuse

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of inmates by other inmates; (d) failure to supervise,

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investigate and take corrective actions in incidents of failure

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to provide reasonable security and/or prevent abuse resulting in

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inmate on inmate violence; (e) condoning lax supervision by

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prison officials who fail to report or investigate reports of

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inmate on inmate violence; (f) ratifying wrongful conduct of and

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by prison officials that result in serious injury or death in

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inmates, civil litigation, judgments and settlements by failing

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to implement corrective action to prevent repetition of the

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wrongful conduct.

(Compl. ¶ 25.)

These alleged policies and

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Plaintiff alleges no facts showing defendant was aware
that Baldizon was concerned for his safety. Plaintiffs allege
that decedent “complained both to his family and [d]efendants
[that] he was unsafe and feared for life” at the Sacramento
Prison. (TAC ¶ 17.) However, “[P]laintiffs may not attribute
liability to a group of defendants, but must “set forth specific
facts as to each individual defendant’s” deprivation of his
rights. Williams v. Fresno Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, No.
1:16-00734 DAD MJS, 2016 WL 5158943, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20,
2016) (Seng, J.) (citing Leer, 844 F.2d at 634).
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customs maintained by defendant are unsupported by factual

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allegations as plaintiffs do not specify how the defendant’s

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training, supervision, or hiring was deficient.

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Secret Servs., 711 F.3d 941, 968 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding

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plaintiffs’ supervisory claim conclusory where “[t]he protestors

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claim that ‘the use of overwhelming and constitutionally

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excessive force against them’ was ‘the result of inadequate and

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improper training, supervision, instruction and discipline ...

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under the personal direction . . . of the . . . Police Defendants

See Moss v. U.S.

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. . . . The protestors allege no facts whatsoever about the

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officers’ training or supervision, nor do they specify in what

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way any such training was deficient.”)

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For the above stated reasons, the court grants

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defendant’s Motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim that defendant

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violated Baldizon’s constitutional right to reasonable security

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protected under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

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and unusual punishment

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b.

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The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials

Right to Adequate Medical Care and Treatment

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to ensure inmates receive adequate medical care.

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U.S. at 832 (citations omitted).

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U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Eight Amendment based on

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inadequate medical care, “a prisoner must allege acts or

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omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate

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indifference to serious medical needs.”

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U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotations omitted).

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may show a serious medical need by demonstrating that “the

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failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further
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Farmer, 511

To state a claim under 42

Estelle v. Gamble, 429
A plaintiff

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significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

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pain”.5

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overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104

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F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation and quotations omitted).

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be deliberately indifferent, “a defendant must purposefully

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ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible

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medical need.”

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McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992),

To

Id. at 1060.

Here, plaintiffs allege that after the assault, other
inmates attempted to notify prison officials to come to the

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assistance of Baldizon.

(TAC

¶ 19.)

However, plaintiffs do not

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allege that defendant was actually notified by inmates about the

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assault or had any knowledge that Baldizon was stabbed, left in

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his cell, and awaiting medical treatment.

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Hubbard, et. al., Civ. No. 1:12-01200 LJO MJS PC, 2017 WL

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5998198, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017) (Seng, J.) (“Under §

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1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named Defendant

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personally participated in the deprivation of his rights.”);

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Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1005 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating

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“the complaint falls short in some places [] tying its factual

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allegations to particular defendants.”).

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assertion that defendant’s failure to train or supervise his

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subordinates caused the delay in response to the incident is

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conclusory and fails to allege either personal involvement or a

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sufficient causal connection between defendant’s conduct, failure

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to train or supervise, and the constitutional deprivation--

See Baldhosky v.

Moreover, plaintiffs’

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Here, the parties do not dispute that plaintiffs
sufficiently allege a serious medical need.
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inadequate medical care.

(Pls.’ Opp’n at 11.)

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Because the Third Amended Complaint relies on

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conclusory allegations and lacks sufficient factual content, the

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court grants defendant’s Motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim that

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he violated Baldizon’s constitutional right to access medical

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care and treatment protected under the Eighth Amendment’s

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prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

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Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

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1982) (“Vague and conclusory allegations of official

See Ivey v.

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participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to

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withstand a motion to dismiss.”)

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3.

Survival Action

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Plaintiffs also bring a § 1983 survival claim stating

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Baldizon “was forced to endure great conscious pain and suffering

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before his death.”

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damages pursuant to Baldizon’s right of survivorship for the pain

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and suffering he endured as a result of the defendant’s alleged

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deliberate indifference and violation of his civil rights.

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¶ 39.)

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stated a claim for an underlying constitutional violation, the

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court dismisses this cause of action.

(TAC ¶ 31.)

Plaintiffs seek to recover

(TAC

Because the court determined that plaintiffs have not

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4.

Familial Relationship

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To bring a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

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a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of

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the United States.

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(citations omitted).

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rights to the companionship of Baldizon, derive from Baldizon’s

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constitutional rights.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 58 (1988)
However, plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment

See Estate of Torres v. Terhune, Civ. No.
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98-2211 WBS GGH, 2002 WL 32107951, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9,

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2002).

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stated a claim for an underlying constitutional violation, the

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court will dismiss plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to

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familial association claim.

Because the court has determined that plaintiffs have not

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5.

Punitive Damages

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In a § 1983 case, punitive damages are permitted “when

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the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive

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or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference

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to the federally protected rights of others.”

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U.S. 30, 56 (1983).

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that defendant violated the plaintiffs’ right nor properly

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alleged that defendant acted with “evil motive or intent,” nor

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pled sufficient facts to establish “reckless or callous

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indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

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plaintiffs have not stated a claim sufficient to recover punitive

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damages.

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Smith v. Wade, 461

Here, plaintiff has neither stated a claim

Thus,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Macomber’s

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motion to dismiss be (Docket No. 24), and the same hereby is,

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GRANTED.

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Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date this Order is

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signed to file a First Amended Complaint, if they can do so

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consistent with this Order.

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Dated:

December 18, 2017

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