Oertell v. Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, et al.

Filing 93

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 1/18/18, DENYING Defendants' 72 Motion to Stay of Discovery Pending Adjudication of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MABLE OERTELL,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:17-cv-00267-TLN-DB

v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR STAY OF DISCOVERY

SIX FLAGS ENTERTAINMENT
CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants Six Flags Entertainment

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Corporation, Park Management Corporation dba Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, Panda Restaurant

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Group, Inc., and Kahala Restaurant Franchising, LLC’s (“Defendants”) Motion for Stay of

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Discovery Pending Adjudication of Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.1 (ECF

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No. 72.) Plaintiff Mable Oertell (“Plaintiff”) opposes Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 85.)

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Defendants filed a Reply. (ECF No. 89.) Having carefully considered the briefing filed by the

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parties, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Stay of Discovery (ECF No. 72).

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The remaining two defendants in this matter, Dippin Dots, LLC, and Cold Stone Creamery Restaurant No.
22293, are not party to this motion. (ECF No. 72 at 2.)

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I.

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Plaintiff alleges she has a physical disability and requires use of mobility aids. (ECF No.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges she visited Six Flags Discovery Kingdom (“the Park”) on multiple

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occasions and encountered numerous architectural and policy barriers that denied her “full and

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equal access” to the Park’s facilities and amenities. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 19.) Plaintiff alleges these

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barriers infringed her civil rights under both California and federal law. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.)

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Plaintiff brought suit in the Northern District of California, and the suit was transferred to

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this Court upon Defendants’ motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (ECF No. 46 at 5.)

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Plaintiff asserts causes of action for violations of the California Health & Safety Code §§ 19955

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et seq., California Civil Code §§ 51, 52, 54, and 55, and the Americans with Disabilities Act

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(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (ECF No. 1 at 1.)

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Defendants moved for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing summary judgment

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should be granted in their favor because remediation of all of the physical architectural barriers

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alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint is covered by a consent decree entered in a related matter, Carol

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Murray v. Park Management Corp. dba Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, Case No. 2:15-cv-02105-

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TLN-KJN. (ECF No. 63-1 at 2.) In Murray, the plaintiff filed suit against Park Management

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Corp. dba Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, alleging she was physically disabled, she visited the

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Park on April 9, 2015, and during that visit she encountered various barriers that denied her full

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and equal access to the Park. (ECF No. 63-1 at 4.) The Murray parties conducted “two full day

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site inspections of the Park,” the defendants received a copy of the plaintiff’s expert’s list of

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accessibility barriers, and the parties settled. (ECF No. 63-1 at 4–5.) In June 2017, the Murray

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court approved a consent decree (“Murray Consent Decree”), which Defendants in the instant

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case believe covers all physical architectural barriers identified by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 63-1 at 5.)

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Defendants move for a stay of all discovery, including a site inspection of the Park,

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pending this Court’s resolution of Defendants’ partial motion for summary judgment. (ECF No.

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72-1 at 18.) The parties later submitted a joint status report stating that the site inspection was

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held on August 22, 2017, in the presence of both parties’ experts. (ECF No. 86 at 2.)

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II.

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The Ninth Circuit has affirmed that district courts have “wide discretion in controlling

STANDARD OF LAW

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discovery.” Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). While the Ninth Circuit

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has not provided a clear standard for evaluating a motion to stay discovery pending resolution of

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a potentially dispositive motion, it has affirmed that district courts may grant such a motion for

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good cause. Id. (affirming district court’s decision to stay discovery pending resolution of motion

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for summary judgment); see Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming

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district court’s grant of protective order staying discovery pending resolution of motion to

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dismiss). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 states “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an

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order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden

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or expense,” including forbidding discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

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“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not provide for automatic or blanket stays of

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discovery when a potentially dispositive motion is pending.” Mlejnecky v. Olympus Imaging Am.

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Inc., 2011 WL 489743, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2011). District courts do not favor blanket stays of

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discovery because “delaying or prolonging discovery can create unnecessary litigation expenses

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and case management problems.” Salazar v. Honest Tea, Inc., 2015 WL 6537813, at *1 (E.D.

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Cal. 2015) (citing Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 261, 263 (M.D.N.C.

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1988)). When evaluating a motion to stay, district courts “inevitably must balance the harm

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produced by a delay in discovery against the possibility that the motion will be granted and

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entirely eliminate the need for such discovery.” Simpson, 121 F.R.D. at 263.

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District courts in the Ninth Circuit often apply a two-pronged test to decide whether to

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stay discovery. Mlejnecky, 2011 WL 4889743, at *6; Seven Springs Ltd. P’ship v. Fox Capital

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Mgmt. Corp., 2007 WL 1146607, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2007). The first prong requires that the

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pending motion “be potentially dispositive of the entire case, or at least dispositive on the issue at

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which discovery is aimed.” Id. The second prong requires the court to “determine whether the

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pending, potentially dispositive motion can be decided absent additional discovery.” Id. If either

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prong is not met, discovery should proceed. Id.

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III.

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Defendants argue their Partial Motion for Summary Judgment will resolve all Plaintiff’s

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physical architectural barrier claims, because the physical architectural barriers Plaintiff alleges

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are encompassed by the Murray Consent Decree. (ECF No. 72-1 at 4.) Defendants state “each

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and every physical remediation to the Park that is sought by the Plaintiff in the Complaint is

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covered by the [Murray] Consent Decree,” and thus the case is “ripe for summary adjudication.”

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(ECF No. 72-1 at 4.) Defendants argue their motion is dispositive and no discovery is needed to

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resolve the motion since it involves a comparison of two documents (the Murray Consent Decree

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and Plaintiffs’ complaint), thus a stay is proper. (ECF No. 72-1 at 16–17; ECF No. 89 at 7.)

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ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues a stay of discovery does not “serve any valid purpose” because

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Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is only partial and “would not dispose of any

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of Plaintiff’s causes of action, nor any of her remedies.” (ECF No. 85 at 2.) Plaintiff argues she

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alleges both physical barriers and policy barriers as to each claim she asserted, and since

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Defendants’ motion only addresses the physical architectural barriers, it will not dispose of any of

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her claims as they relate to policy barriers, and thus not dispose of any claim let alone the entire

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case. (ECF No. 85 at 5.) Plaintiff states she needs discovery regarding her claims as they relate

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to policy barriers. (ECF No. 85 at 5.)

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Plaintiff adds that even considering only the physical architectural barriers, Plaintiff needs

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discovery because Plaintiff has had limited access to the Park and does not believe the Murray

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Consent Decree will remediate every physical architectural barrier. (ECF No. 85 at 5–6.)

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Further, Plaintiff argues, even if Defendants have agreed in the Murray Consent Decree to

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remediate the physical architectural barriers in the future, Defendants do not attempt to show they

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have “ceased their injurious behavior and that there is absolutely no reasonable possibility that the

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behavior will resume.” (ECF No. 85 at 5.)

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Under the first prong of the two-prong test, “the pending motion must be potentially

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dispositive of the entire case, or at least dispositive on the issue at which discovery is aimed.”

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Mlejnecky, 2011 WL 489743 at *6. Assuming, arguendo, the Court grants Defendants’ motion

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for partial summary judgment, which relates to Plaintiff’s allegations of physical architectural
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barriers, each of Plaintiff’s claims would remain with respect to Plaintiff’s allegations of policy

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barriers. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment cannot dispose of the entire case. Id.

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Defendants argue “the only discovery Plaintiff seeks is directly related to the claims that

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would be resolved by the Summary Judgment Motion.” (ECF No. 89 at 4.) The pending

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dispositive motion may be dispositive of the issue which is the target of the discovery.

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Mlejnecky, 2011 WL 489743 at *6. “To prevail on a motion for a protective order, the party

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seeking the protection has the burden to demonstrate ‘particular and specific demonstration[s] of

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fact, as distinguished from conclusory statements....’” California Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico

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Scrap Metal, Inc., No. CIV. S-10-1207 GEB, 2011 WL 130228, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011)

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(citing Kiblen v. Retail Credit Co., 76 F.R.D. 402, 404 (E.D. Wash. 1977)). Defendants do not

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cite to the record or explain how Plaintiff’s discovery requests are limited to the physical

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architectural barriers addressed in Defendants’ dispositive motion. Rather, Defendants simply

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state Plaintiff’s requests are limited to those issues. (ECF No. 89 at 4.) Additionally,

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Defendants’ request is for a stay of all discovery pending resolution of their dispositive motion,

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not just discovery requests related to physical architectural barriers. (ECF No. 72-1 at 18.)

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Plaintiff states she requires discovery related to the physical architectural barriers even if

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they are covered in the Murray Consent Decree and Defendant has agreed to remediate them.

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(ECF No. 85 at 5.) Plaintiff argues she needs discovery to determine whether Defendant already

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remediated the alleged physical architectural barriers and the possibility Defendants’ conduct can

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or will recur. (ECF No. 85 at 5.) Plaintiff states she requires discovery of physical architectural

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barriers at the Park which are not covered by the remediation agreed to in the Murray Consent

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Decree and of conditions at the Park at the time Plaintiff visited. (ECF No. 85 at 6.)

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Finally, Plaintiff states she requires discovery related to the policy barriers she alleges,

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which would not be covered by the Murray Consent Decree. (ECF No. 85 at 6.) Plaintiff states

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she seeks discovery related to “Defendants’ policies and practices before documents are lost and

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witnesses’ memories fade.” (ECF No. 85 at 6.) Defendants, too, have described Plaintiff’s

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discovery requests beyond a physical site inspection, including review of documents and witness

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interviews or depositions. (ECF No. 89 at 3.)
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Defendants have not met their burden as to the first prong—to show their pending

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dispositive motion will dispose of the entire case or be dispositive of all issues at which discovery

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is aimed and which Defendants move to stay. If either prong of the two-prong test is not met,

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then discovery should proceed. Mlejnecky, 2011 WL 4889743, at *6. Accordingly, the Court

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DENIES Defendants motion and need not address the second prong.

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IV.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Stay of Discovery

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CONCLUSION

Pending Adjudication of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 72).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 18, 2018

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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