Bruno v. Equifax Credit Information Services, LLC, et al.

Filing 167

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 4/26/18, GRANTING defendant Geneva Inc.'s #127 Motion for Reconsideration, and those portions of the Magistrate Judge's #122 Order deeming Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Admissions admitted, and requiring Geneva Financial Services, Inc., to reimburse plaintiff for expenses, are VACATED and set aside. Plaintiff's #131 Request to Seal is DENIED without prejudice. (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DANIEL BRUNO, Individually
and on behalf of others
similarly situated,

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Plaintiff,

Civ. No. 2:17-327 WBS EFB

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO
SEAL

v.
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
LLC, et al.,
Defendant.

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Plaintiff Daniel Bruno, individually and on behalf of

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others similarly situated, originally filed this action against

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Geneva Financial Services, LLC (“Geneva LLC”); Equifax

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Information Services, LLC (“Equifax”); John McGinley; Andy

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Mitchell; and REBS Supply Inc., d/b/a REBS Marketing, Inc.

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(“REBS”), for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15

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U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.

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Financial Services, Inc.’s (“Geneva Inc.”) Request for

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Reconsideration (Docket No. 127) and plaintiff’s Request to Seal

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Documents (Docket No. 131).

Presently before the court is Geneva

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I.

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Motion for Reconsideration
This case is a procedural mess.

This court’s Order of

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February 6, 2018, allowing plaintiff to file and serve an Amended

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Complaint (Docket No. 119) was intended, at least in part, to

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allow the parties to clean up that mess.

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hearing on January 10, 2018, Magistrate Judge Brennan had no way

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of knowing of that Order, and his subsequent Order After Hearing,

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on February 8, 2018 (Docket No. 122), made no mention of it.

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would be unfair in light of this court’s February 6, 2018 Order

At the time of his

It

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to deem defendant Geneva, Inc. to have admitted plaintiff’s First

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Set of Requests for Admissions, which were served before Geneva,

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Inc. was a party to this case.

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prejudice any party simply because of a procedural

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misunderstanding or technicality.

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grant Geneva Inc.’s Motion for Reconsideration and vacate the

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relevant portions of Magistrate Judge Brennan’s Order After

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Hearing (Docket No. 122.)

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II.

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The court does not want to

Accordingly, the court will

Motion to Seal
Plaintiff has also submitted a Request to Seal

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Documents.

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seal portions of its Second Amended Complaint as well as Exhibits

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A, G, H, I, and J in their entirety.

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(Docket No. 131.)

In this motion, plaintiff moves to

Pursuant to Local Rule 141(a), “[d]ocuments may be

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sealed only by written order of the Court, upon the showing

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required by applicable law.”

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standards generally govern motions to seal documents.”

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Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 2010).

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context of requests to seal “dispositive pleadings . . . and

E.D. Cal. L.R. 141(a).

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“Two
Pintos v.
In the

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[their] related attachments,” the court is directed to apply a

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“‘compelling reasons’ standard.”

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Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2006).

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of nondispositive motions and records attached to such motions,

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by contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that the requesting party

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need only meet a “‘good cause’ standard [because] the public’s

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interest in accessing dispositive materials does not apply with

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equal force to non-dispositive materials.”

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678; Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179–80.

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Kamakana v. City & County of
In the context

Pintos, 605 F.3d at

As the parties are not seeking to seal any dispositive

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motions, the court applies the “good cause” standard to

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plaintiff’s request.

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“good cause” standard is not as rigorous as the “compelling

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reasons” standard, a “party asserting good cause bears the

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burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of

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showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if no

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protective order is granted.”

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Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003); see Kamakana, 447

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F.3d at 1180 (“A ‘good cause’ showing will not, without more,

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satisfy a ‘compelling reasons’ test.”).

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given specific reasons why any particular information in the

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Second Amended Complaint or the specified attachments should be

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sealed, beyond merely stating that disclosure could “be a

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detriment to Equifax.”

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See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179.

While the

Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Here, plaintiff has not

(Pl.’s Req. to Seal at 2.)

In January 2018, the parties stipulated to a Protective

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Order of Confidentiality and to Protect Privileged Materials,

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which was signed by Magistrate Judge Brennan on February 7, 2018.

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(Docket No. 121.)

That order was to apply to all “Protected
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Material,” which was defined as any discovery material that was

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designated as “confidential” by any party.

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documents that plaintiff now seeks to seal have been designated

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“confidential” by Equifax.

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(Id. at 4.)

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This court recognizes that generally “when a court

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grants a protective order for information produced during

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discovery, it already has determined that ‘good cause’ exists to

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protect this information from being disclosed to the public by

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balancing the needs for discovery against the need for

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confidentiality.”

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Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002).

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“[b]ecause the parties had simply stipulated to the protective

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order, a particularized showing of ‘good cause’ to keep the

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documents under seal had never been made to the court.”

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Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1176.

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Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen.
However,

Further, the Protective Order explained that “Protected

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Material may only be filed under seal pursuant to a court order

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authorizing the sealing of the specific Protected Material at

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issue.”

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order requested that the parties obtain a court order to file

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materials under seal . . . [plaintiff] should have been on notice

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that confidential categorization . . . under the protective order

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was not a guarantee of confidentiality, especially in the event

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of a court filing.”

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although magistrate Judge Brennan “expressly approved and entered

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the protective order, the order contained no good cause findings

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as to specific documents.”

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(Pl.’s Req. to Seal at 15.)

Accordingly, because “the

See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183.

Therefore,

(Id.)

Additionally, sealing this information may prevent the
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public from understanding the basis upon which the court makes

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its decisions, and plaintiff fails to explain how public

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disclosure of the contents of its Second Amended Complaint and

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attachments would cause harm to any of the parties, much less how

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that harm outweighs public policies favoring disclosure.

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at 1178-79.

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of the protective order, plaintiff has not presented “good cause”

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to rebut the presumption in favor of public access.

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(citing Foltz, 331 F. 3d at 1128).

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See id.

Accordingly, the court concludes that, even in light

See id.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Geneva Inc.’s

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Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No. 127) be, and the same

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hereby is, GRANTED, and those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s

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Order of February 8, 2018 (Docket No. 122) deeming Plaintiff’s

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First Set of Requests for Admissions admitted, and requiring

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Geneva Financial Services, Inc. to reimburse plaintiff for

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expenses, are hereby vacated and set aside.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s Request to Seal

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(Docket No. 131) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED without

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prejudice to the right of either party to submit a more tailored

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request which specifically states the basis for sealing or

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redacting these documents.

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Dated:

April 26, 2018

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