Arboleda v. O'Banion

Filing 20

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 3/14/2019 DISMISSING, with leave to amend within 30 days, plaintiff's second amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Yin, K)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

OSCAR TORRES ARBOLEDA,

12

No. 2:17-cv-0442-EFB P

Plaintiff,

13

v.

14

G. O’BANION,

15

ORDER

Defendant.

16
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this action brought under 42

17
18

U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court screened plaintiff’s initial complaint, plaintiff filed a first

19

amended complaint. ECF No. 12. The court dismissed the amended complaint and granted

20

plaintiff leave to amend. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint which the

21

court must screen. ECF No. 19.

22

I.

Screening Requirement

23

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

24

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

25

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

26

of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

27

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

28

relief.” Id. § 1915A(b).
1

1

II.

Screening Order

2

Plaintiff alleges that at 12:30 p.m. on April 9, 2016, defendant O’Banion, a correctional

3

officer, arbitrarily denied plaintiff access to the Grey Stone Chapel to attend a worship group or

4

service for the Jehovah’s Witnesses. ECF No. 19 at 3, 8. Plaintiff alleges that this single instance

5

of being denied assembly with his fellow Jehovah’s Witnesses constituted “brutality and

6

deliberate indifference” and caused “physical suffering and mental anguish” along with “mental

7

distress and anxiety.” Id. at 4-5. He claims that O’Banion violated his rights under the First

8

Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and

9

the “RLUP Act” (presumably the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, or

10

“RLUIPA”). Plaintiff seeks $10,000 in damages. Id. at 1, 8.

11

A.

12

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law

First Amendment Claim

13

. . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. CONST., amend I. Only those beliefs that are

14

sincerely held and religious in nature are entitled to constitutional protection. Shakur v. Schriro,

15

514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). An inmate’s right to exercise religious practices “may be

16

curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.”

17

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). In addition, to violate the

18

Constitution, the interference with religious practice must be more than an inconvenience; it must

19

substantially burden the exercise of religion. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir.

20

1997), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85; see also

21

Eckstrom v. Beard, 705 F. App’x 588, 588-89 (9th Cir. 2017).

22

In the first screening order, the court dismissed plaintiff’s First Amendment claim because

23

plaintiff had not alleged facts showing that the chapel service or meeting was necessary to

24

plaintiff’s sincerely held belief or religion or that O’Banion lacked a legitimate basis for denying

25

plaintiff access to the chapel. ECF No. 16 at 4. Plaintiff has again failed to allege facts showing

26

that the chapel meeting was necessary to his sincerely held religious belief.

27
28

More importantly, however, is the absence from the complaint of facts showing that the
denial of access to a single religious gathering placed a substantial burden on plaintiff’s exercise
2

1

of religion. Courts in the Ninth Circuit (and elsewhere) have routinely held that the denial of a

2

religious practice on a single, isolated occasion does not constitute a “substantial burden” and

3

thus does not violate the First Amendment. E.g., Howard v. Skolnik, 372 F. App’x 781, 782 (9th

4

Cir. 2010) (summary judgment on free exercise claim was appropriate where inmate’s allegation

5

of two incidents where prison staff interfered with his fasting did not amount to a substantial

6

burden); Cannell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (“relatively short-term and

7

sporadic” interference with religious exercise was not a substantial burden); Pouncil v. Sherman,

8

No. 1:17-cv-00547-AWI-BAM (PC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15961, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Jan 31,

9

2018) (free exercise claim dismissed at screening because allegation of denial of meals for a

10

single night of Ramadan did not present a substantial burden); Murie v. Crossroads Corr. Ctr.,

11

No. CV 17-00005-GF-BMM-JTJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85863, at *4-6 (D. Mont. Feb. 24,

12

2017) (free exercise claim dismissed at screening because allegation that plaintiff was not allowed

13

to attend a sweat lodge on a single occasion did not present a substantial burden); Stidhem v.

14

Schwartz, 2:15-cv-00379-TC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215007, at *9 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2017)

15

(summary judgment granted on plaintiff’s free exercise claim because a less-than-one-day

16

suspension of plaintiff’s kosher diet did not amount to a substantial burden); Hampton v. Ayers,

17

No. CV 07-8130-RSWL (MAN), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS69742, at *43-44 (C.D. Cal. June 2,

18

2011) (summary judgment in favor of defendant appropriate because a single incident of

19

interrupting a religious service was not a substantial burden on plaintiff’s religious exercise);

20

Glover v. Evans, No. C 07-2731 JSW (PR), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81612, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct.

21

15, 2007) (religious exercise claim dismissed at screening because allegation of not being

22

provided with religion-appropriate meal on a single occasion did not state a constitutional

23

violation). See also Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1006 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999) (unavailability of a

24

non-pork tray for 3 meals out of 810 meals did not substantially burden inmate’s exercise of

25

religion); Hankins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 0:07-CV-0408 (FJS/GHL), 2008 U.S.

26

Dist. LEXIS 68978, at *23-25 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2008) (“Courts from the Second Circuit have

27

repeatedly found that an allegation that prison officials caused a prisoner to miss one religious

28

service fails to state an actionable claim under the First Amendment.”).
3

1

Plaintiff’s complaint, as it stands, alleges a single, isolated instance in which he was

2

denied access to a religious gathering. This de minims interference with his religious practice

3

does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, and thus plaintiff’s First Amendment claim must be

4

dismissed. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend so that he may, if he chooses, attempt to state

5

facts sufficient to state a First Amendment claim.

6

B. RLUIPA Claim

7

To succeed on an RLUIPA claim, a plaintiff must also show that the challenged conduct

8

or policy placed a “substantial burden” on her religious practice. Int’l Church of the Foursquare

9

Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). A “substantial burden” is

10

present where the challenged conduct is “oppressive to a significantly great extent” and imposes

11

“a significantly great restriction or onus” on the exercise of religion. Id. Again, plaintiff’s

12

allegation that he was denied access to a single religious gathering does not, without more, state a

13

substantial burden on his religious practice. Murie v. Crossroads Corr. Ctr., No. CV 17-00005-

14

GF-BMM-JTJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85863, at *4-6 (D. Mont. Feb. 24, 2017) (free exercise

15

claim dismissed at screening because plaintiff failed to state facts showing that the denial of

16

access to a sweat lodge on a single occasion substantially burdened his religious practice);

17

DeVon v. Diaz, No. 1:07-cv-01727-GSA-PC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39393, at *12-13 (E.D. Cal.

18

Apr. 1, 2011) (plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim dismissed at screening because “[a] single allegation that

19

Plaintiff was refused Kosher foods or fellowship on one occasion does not state a claim for

20

relief.”); Furnace v. Sullivan, No. C 07-4441 MMC (PR), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93464, at *8-11

21

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008) (denial of a single religious meal did not, as a matter of law, state a

22

violation of RLUIPA). Accordingly this claim will also be dismissed with leave to amend.

23

C. Equal Protection Claim

24

“The Equal Protection Clause entitles each prisoner to a reasonable opportunity of

25

pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to

26

conventional religious precepts.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891 (internal quotation marks omitted). To

27

state an Equal Protection claim, plaintiff must state facts showing that prison officials

28

intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of religion by failing to provide him a
4

1

reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith compared to other similarly situated religious groups.

2

Id. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges only the denial of access to a single Jehovah’s Witnesses

3

gathering that other inmates were allowed to attend. He does not include any facts that would

4

show that he was denied access because of his religious beliefs. This claim will therefore also be

5

dismissed with leave to amend.

6

D. Due Process Claim

7

Plaintiff vaguely alleges that the denial of access to the gathering somehow violated his

8

due process rights. ECF No. 19 at 6-7. Plaintiff does not explain whether he believes his

9

procedural or substantive due process rights were violated when he was not allowed to attend the

10

meeting. If plaintiff alleges a violation of substantive due process, his claim must proceed not

11

under the due process clause but rather under the more specific constitutional guarantees of free

12

exercise and equal protection, and those claims fail as they are currently stated for the reasons

13

stated above. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (where another provision of the

14

Constitution provides an explicit source of protection from the conduct complained of, the more

15

generalized notion of substantive due process should not be used to analyze the claim). Plaintiff’s

16

due process claim fails for the additional reason that plaintiff has failed to allege that the denial of

17

access to the single religious meeting imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in

18

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84

19

(1995).

20

E. Eighth Amendment Claim

21

Plaintiff also vaguely alleges that the denial of access to a single religious meeting

22

constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment

23

protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions of

24

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Extreme deprivations

25

are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying

26

the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an

27

Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d

28

156 (1992). Plaintiff’s complaint lacks facts that would show that the denial of access to the
5

1

gathering on a single occasion denied him the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities and

2

thus his Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed. The court questions whether the denial of

3

access to a religious gathering on a single occasion could ever state an Eighth Amendment claim,

4

but will nevertheless grant plaintiff leave to amend to attempt to state a viable claim.

5

III.

6

Order
Accordingly, plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 19) is hereby DISMISSED

7

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This

8

dismissal is with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file an

9

amended complaint curing the deficiencies noted above.

10

DATED: March 14, 2019.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6