Jones v. Reardon et al

Filing 5

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 7/10/2017 DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff's 2 motion to proceed IFP is DENIED as moot. The Clerk shall close this case. CASE CLOSED. (Yin, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RALPH EARL JONES,

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No. 2:17-cv-0469 AC P

Plaintiff,

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v.

ORDER

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PATRICK REARDON, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff is a state prisoner incarcerated at the California Medical Facility under the

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authority of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff proceeds pro

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se with a complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction

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of the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and E.D. Cal.

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L. R. (“Local Rule”) 305(a). See ECF No. 4.
As set forth in his three-page complaint, plaintiff seeks damages against the California

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Board of Parole Hearings, and two of its members, Patrick Reardon and Rhonda Skipper-Dotta.

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Plaintiff also seeks an order of this court directing the Board to remove from plaintiff’s central

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file “all information regarding the conviction of aggravated robbery, Texas, 1984,” for which

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plaintiff asserts he was exonerated in 1993; and to “correct records that (2 counts) assault to

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murder, Texas, 1972, as non-violent or serious offenses.” ECF No. 1 at 3.

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Plaintiff avers that on January 31, 2017, defendant Reardon, acting for the Board, denied

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plaintiff parole “based, in part, on criminal history of violence,” including all three counts. On

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February 3, 2017, plaintiff sent documents to the Board showing that he was exonerated of the

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1984 aggravated robbery and released on April 23, 1993. On February 14, 2017, defendant

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Skipper-Dotta, acting for the Board, “reconsidered parole suitability and denied parole based, in

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part, on (2 counts) assault to murder and possession of control[led] substance and stating she

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excluded the aggravated robbery charge.” Id.

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Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim over which this court has jurisdiction. The
California Board of Parole Hearings, a state agency, is immune from damages suits under the

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Eleventh Amendment. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1985)

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(Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court); Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d

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358, 364 (9th Cir. 2004) (as applied to state agencies). Moreover, Board members, who exercise

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quasi-judicial responsibilities in rendering a decision to grant, deny or revoke parole, are

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absolutely immune from damages liability. See Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302-03

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(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981); cf. Swift v California, 384 F. 3d 1184, 1186, 1191

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(9th Cir. 2004) (parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity for conduct independent of

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Board’s decision-making authority, e.g., in performing investigatory or law enforcement

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functions).

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In addition to these specific barriers to the instant suit, all claims for damages based on a

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prisoner’s underlying conviction or sentence are bound by the “favorable termination rule” set

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forth by the Supreme Court in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) and Heck v. Humphrey,

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512 U.S. 477 (1994). As explained by the Court in Heck, “in order to recover damages for

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allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

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conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

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invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a

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federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” 512 U.S. at 481, 486-87. In the instant

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case, according to plaintiff, Board member Skipper-Dotta reconsidered plaintiff’s parole

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suitability excluding the challenged aggravated robbery count, and still denied parole. Plaintiff
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offers no grounds on which to conclude that the remaining two counts on which Skipper-Dotta

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relied (assault to commit murder and possession of a controlled substance) have been invalidated.

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Absent a formal decision that the denial of plaintiff’s parole improperly rested on an invalid

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conviction or sentence, plaintiff may not pursue a damages claim.

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Finally, habeas relief is available only if success on the merits of petitioner’s claim would

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necessarily impact the fact or duration of his confinement. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d.

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922, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Absent such impact, federal courts are without authority

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to review the substance of a petitioner’s parole denial. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216,

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219 (2011). The Supreme Court has held that federal habeas relief is not available for errors of

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state law, and that the Due Process Clause does not require correct application of California’s

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“some evidence” standard for denying parole. Federal courts may not intervene in state parole

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decisions as long as minimum procedural protections were provided to the petitioner. Id. at 219–

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20.

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Pursuant to these authorities, the undersigned finds that the instant complaint fails to state

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a cognizable claim, and that amendment of the complaint would be futile. The court will deny

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plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis without imposition of a fee.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1, is dismissed without leave to amend.

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2. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is denied as moot.

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3. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

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DATED: July 10, 2017

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