Belyew v. Hornea et al

Filing 91

ORDER and AMENDED FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 9/12/2023 WITHDRAWING 85 Findings and Recommendations, and RECOMMENDING that 65 Motion for Summary Judgment be granted as to Claim One on the ground that Moreland did not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights or, alternatively, that Moreland is entitled to qualified immunity; that this case be dismissed; and that Judgment be entered in defendants' favor. Referred to Chief District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller. Objections due within 21 days after being served with these findings and recommendations. (Huang, H)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

LISA MARIE BELYEW,

12

Plaintiff,

13
14

No. 2:17-cv-0508 KJM AC P

v.
KORY L. HONEA, et al.,

15

ORDER AND AMENDED FINDINGS &
RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

16
Plaintiff is a former county and current state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights

17
18

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 28, 2023, the undersigned issued findings and

19

recommendations (ECF No. 85), to which plaintiff has filed objections (ECF Nos. 87, 89, 90).

20

Plaintiff’s objections include a statement that “a male officer was there the whole time watching

21

outside the door.” ECF No. 89 at 3. The previously issued findings and recommendations are

22

therefore amended to add subsections VI.A.vi and VI.B.iv, which address the claim made in

23

plaintiff’s objections. The following findings and recommendations are otherwise unchanged

24

from those at ECF No. 85, which are hereby withdrawn.

25
26

I.

Procedural History
In findings and recommendations filed September 30, 2022, the undersigned

27

recommended that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in

28

part. ECF No. 73. The assigned district judge adopted the findings and recommendations in part,
1

1

granting summary judgment with respect to Claims Two and Three on the ground that plaintiff

2

did not exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit, and denying the motion as to

3

Claim One insofar as defendants relied on a non-exhaustion theory. ECF No. 79. The district

4

judge declined to adopt the recommendation that the motion be granted as to Claim One on the

5

alternative ground that defendant Moreland did not violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

6

Id. Specifically, the district judge found that plaintiff’s allegations in the first amended complaint

7

called into question the “findings that defendants have established as undisputed that ‘the search

8

was conducted in a private area and in a professional manner’ and that defendant Moreland did

9

not require plaintiff to go through search procedures ‘more times than was necessary to properly

10

complete the search.’” Id. at 2. The matter was referred back to the undersigned for further

11

findings and recommendations on the merits of Claim One and, as appropriate, on defendant

12

Moreland’s qualified immunity defense. Id.

13

II.

14

Plaintiff’s Allegations
In Claim One, plaintiff alleged as follows:

15

On or about December 24, 2016, I was strip-searched and forced to
squat and cough multiple times by Officer MORELAND. I informed
MORELAND that I had severe back and knee problems that
prevented me from bending at my knees. MORELAND then told me
to place my face on the floor of the shower. I told her I did not want
to do this because it could put me in danger of contracting Hepatitis
A, B, C, HIV and/or Herpes. MORELAND threatened that if I did
not do it she would get some other officers and “make me” do it.
MORELAND made me cough and spread my anus and vagina until
she could “see inside.” Then I heard MORELAND tell a male officer
who was standing outside the door while this process was going on,
the door was kept open, and she told him “I don’t trust her because
she ‘leaked’ on herself.[”] Because of my extensive history of
sexual/physical abuse and rape this cause me extreme psychological
trauma and physical pain because my knees gave out on me. I filed
a grievance on MORELAND for this. I filed a grievance for this
incident on or about December 30, 2019 and it was denied.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

ECF No. 23 at 3.
III.

Motion for Summary Judgment
A.

Defendant’s Arguments

Defendant Moreland argues that the December 24, 2016, strip search was not conducted in
an unreasonable manner and therefore did not violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. ECF
2

1

No. 65-2 at 12-14. She alternatively argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 21-

2

23.

3

B.

4

Plaintiff’s Response

As noted in the previous findings and recommendations, plaintiff has failed to comply

5

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A), which requires that “[a] party asserting that a

6

fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of

7

materials in the record.” Plaintiff has also failed to file a separate document in response to

8

defendants’ statement of undisputed facts that identifies which facts are admitted and which are

9

disputed, as required by Local Rule 260(b).

10

“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”

11

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds,

12

Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). However, it is well-

13

established that district courts are to “construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro

14

se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” Thomas v. Ponder,

15

611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). The unrepresented prisoner’s choice to proceed without

16

counsel “is less than voluntary” and they are subject to “the handicaps . . . detention necessarily

17

imposes upon a litigant,” such as “limited access to legal materials” as well as “sources of proof.”

18

Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (alteration in original) (citations and

19

internal quotation marks omitted). Inmate litigants, therefore, should not be held to a standard of

20

“strict literalness” with respect to the requirements of the summary judgment rule. Id. (citation

21

omitted).

22

Accordingly, the court considers the record before it in its entirety despite plaintiff’s

23

failure to be in strict compliance with the applicable rules. However, only those assertions in the

24

opposition which have evidentiary support in the record will be considered. In her opposition,

25

plaintiff asserts that defendant Moreland conducted the December 24, 2016 strip search in an

26

unreasonable manner and is therefore not entitled to summary judgment. ECF No. 70 at 3-4.

27

///

28

///
3

1

IV.

Legal Standards for Summary Judgment

2

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine

3

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

4

Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, “[t]he moving party initially bears the burden

5

of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.,

6

627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

7

The moving party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,

8

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

9

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory

10

answers, or other materials” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or

11

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to

12

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

13

“Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need

14

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle

15

Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).

16

Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, “after adequate time for discovery and upon

17

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

18

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

19

trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element

20

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. In such

21

a circumstance, summary judgment should “be granted so long as whatever is before the district

22

court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

23

56(c), is satisfied.” Id.

24

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

25

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

26

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In attempting to establish the

27

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials

28

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or
4

1

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R.

2

Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a

3

fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and that the dispute is

4

genuine, i.e., “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

5

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

6

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

7

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

8

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

9

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)

10

(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). Thus, the

11

“purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

12

whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation and internal

13

quotation marks omitted).

14

“In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, [the

15

court] draw[s] all inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” Walls

16

v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). It is the

17

opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

18

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to

19

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is

20

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations

21

omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

22

non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank,

23

391 U.S. at 289).

24

Defendants simultaneously served plaintiff with notice of the requirements for opposing a

25

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure along with their motion for

26

summary judgment. ECF No. 65-1; see Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir.

27

1988) (pro se prisoners must be provided with notice of the requirements for summary judgment);

28

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (movant may provide notice).
5

1

V.

2
3

Undisputed Material Facts
Plaintiff did not separately respond to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts

(DSUF), and the facts are therefore deemed undisputed except as otherwise discussed.

4

On December 24, 2016, plaintiff was taken to Butte County Jail after she was arrested for

5

assault with a deadly weapon and corporal injury on a spouse. DSUF (ECF No. 65-3) ¶ 1; PL’s

6

Depo. at 15:5-14 (ECF No. 65-4 at 19). This was her first time at Butte County Jail. DSUF ¶ 2;

7

PL’s Depo. at 13:15-17 (ECF No. 65-4 at 17). Based on the charge for assault with a deadly

8

weapon, policy required that she undergo a visual strip search prior to being placed in a housing

9

unit at the jail. DSUF ¶ 3; PL’s Response to Admission No. 7 (ECF No. 65-4 at 124). During the

10

booking process, plaintiff was asked medical and psychological questions, including whether she

11

had any injuries. DSUF ¶ 5; PL’s Depo. at 16:16-25, 18:18-22 (ECF No. 65-4 at 20, 22). At the

12

time, she also completed a classification questionnaire in which she identified defensive wounds

13

but did not identify prior knee or back issues. DSUF ¶ 6; PL’s Depo. at 17:5-24, 18:18-22;

14

67:10-13 (ECF No. 65-4 at 21-22, 71). Plaintiff was then taken to the booking showers to be

15

visually strip searched. DSUF ¶ 7; PL’s Depo. at 24:10-12 (ECF No. 65-4 at 28). The booking

16

shower was a room with “a toilet, a sink, and a little shower stall” and a little window through

17

which inmates were given their clothes. PL’s Depo. at 24:13-17 (ECF No. 65-4 at 28). Plaintiff

18

entered the room by herself, and Moreland stood outside holding the door open. PL’s Depo. at

19

26:18-21 (ECF No. 65-4 at 30).

20

Defendant Moreland, who is female, supervised plaintiff’s visual strip search, which was

21

their first interaction that plaintiff could recall.1 DSUF ¶ 8; ECF No. 23 at 3; PL’s Depo. at

22

24:18-20; 35:19-23 (ECF No. 65-4 at 28, 39). Moreland explained the strip search process to

23

plaintiff and ordered plaintiff to submit to a strip search. DSUF ¶ 9; PL’s Depo. at 24:22-24

24

(ECF No. 65-4 at 28). The strip search process was comprised of seven steps, the last of which

25

required plaintiff to turn around, bend forward and spread her buttocks if necessary to view the

26

///

27
28

1

Plaintiff testified during her deposition that she may have spoken to Moreland in booking, but
she did not recall. PL’s Depo. at 35:19-23 (ECF No. 65-4 at 39).
6

1

anus and vagina for a visual cavity search. DSUF ¶ 9; Moreland Decl. ¶ 4 (ECF No. 65-4 at 132);

2

ECF No. 23 at 3; PL’s Depo. at 31:21-32:3 (ECF No. 65-4 at 35-36).

3

Plaintiff completed the first six steps and Moreland instructed plaintiff to squat and cough

4

to complete step seven. DSUF ¶ 10; ECF No. 23 at 3. Plaintiff responded that she could not

5

squat and cough because she had a bad back and knees that prevented her from bending at the

6

knees. DSUF ¶ 11; ECF No. 23 at 3; PL’s Depo. at 26:14-17, 27:4-17 (ECF No. 65-4 at 30-31).

7

Because plaintiff informed Moreland that she had bad knees and could not bend her knees,

8

Moreland used a modified method and instructed plaintiff to bend at the waist and place her head

9

near her feet, grab her buttocks, and cough. DSUF ¶¶ 15, 66-67. This procedure did not require

10

plaintiff to bend her knees. DSUF ¶ 16. Plaintiff asserts that after she told Moreland she could

11

not bend her knees, Moreland told her to place her face on the floor of the shower. ECF No. 23 at

12

3; PL’s Depo. at 26:12-27:22 (ECF No. 65-4 at 30-31). When plaintiff stated that she would not

13

place her face on the floor, Moreland responded that she would get additional correctional

14

deputies to “make [her] do it if [she] wouldn’t comply.”2 PL’s Depo. at 27:16-24 (ECF No. 65-4

15

at 31); ECF No. 23 at 3.

16

To complete the search, plaintiff bent forward at the waist without bending her knees, and

17

tried to complete the process as quickly as possible. PL’s Depo. at 28:1-2, 29:7-10, 32:5-17 (ECF

18

No. 65-4 at 32-33, 36). She spent a few seconds in this position, during which she was required

19

to grab her buttocks and cough three times. DSUF ¶¶ 15, 17; PL’s Depo. at 29:7-14, 31:14-32:4

20

(ECF No. 65-4 at 33, 35-36). While bent over, her face was about a foot from the floor but did

21

not ever touch the floor. PL’s Depo. at 26:7-11, 29:14-16 (ECF No. 65-4 at 30, 33). Plaintiff

22

claims that she was required to complete the bend and cough procedure three times, that her knee

23

almost went out, and that during the coughing some urine released and ran down her leg. DSUF

24

¶¶ 18, 20, 22; PL’s Depo. at 31:11-13, 75:2-14, 81:23 (ECF No. 65-4 at 35, 79, 85). Moreland

25
26
27
28

2

Defendants’ statement of facts does not explicitly address whether Moreland directed plaintiff
to put her face on the floor, but does state that Moreland told plaintiff she would request
additional correctional deputies if plaintiff refused to complete the last step (bend and cough).
DSUF ¶ 14. For purposes of this motion, the court will assume that plaintiff’s allegation that
Moreland told her to put her face on the floor is true.
7

1

did not tell plaintiff why she was required to complete the procedure three times. PL’s Depo. at

2

75:20-76:23 (ECF No. 65-4 at 79-80). After the search, plaintiff overheard Moreland tell a male

3

deputy outside the door that she did not trust plaintiff because “she was leaking.” DSUF ¶ 21;

4

ECF No. 23 at 3; PL’s Depo. at 28:13-16, 30:21-31:5 (ECF No. 65-4 at 32, 34-35).

5
6
7
8
9

VI.

Discussion
A.

Fourth Amendment
i. Legal Standard

A detention facility’s strip-search policy is analyzed using the test for reasonableness
outlined in Bell v. Wolfish, as “[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches.”

10

Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration in

11

original) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979)). Under Bell, the court must balance

12

“the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.”

13

Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. In order to do so, “[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular

14

intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in

15

which it is conducted.” Id. (citations omitted).

16

“Correctional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a

17

standard part of the intake process.” Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 330

18

(2012). The Supreme Court has accordingly held that all arrestees, when joining the general

19

population of a jail, can be subject to strip searches even without reasonable suspicion that a

20

specific individual is concealing weapons or other contraband. Id. at 330-39. Those strip

21

searches that are limited to “visual inspection,” even if “invasive and embarrassing,” are

22

permissible. Bull, 595 F.3d at 975 (holding that visual strip searches that are held in a

23

“professional manner and in a place that afforded privacy” and conducted to prevent the

24

smuggling of contraband did not violate Fourth Amendment). However, any searches done for

25

the purpose of harassment are not constitutionally valid—the Supreme Court has held that

26

“intentional harassment of even the most hardened criminals cannot be tolerated” by the Fourth

27

Amendment’s protections. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984). Accordingly, strip

28

searches that are excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological
8

1

interest may violate the Fourth Amendment. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th

2

Cir. 1988).

3

ii. Scope of Intrusion and Justification for Search

4

In this case, the intrusion was limited in scope to a visual body cavity inspection and

5

“bend and cough” procedure conducted by a same-gender officer. 3 Such a search was required

6

by jail policy, and defendants justify that policy on institutional security grounds. The Supreme

7

Court has squarely held that general institutional security concerns render intrusions of this scope

8

(routine visual inspection of genitals and anus, and “squat and cough” procedure) reasonable

9

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-560; Florence, 566 U.S. at

10

324, 339. Accordingly, these two factors weigh in favor of finding the search reasonable. See

11

Bull, 595 F.3d at 975, 982.

12

iii. Manner of the Search

13

Plaintiff argues that the manner in which the search was conducted rendered the search

14

unconstitutional. In this context, the detainee “bears the burden of showing that [jail] officials

15

intentionally used exaggerated or excessive means to enforce security.” Michenfelder, 860 F.2d

16

at 333. Here, plaintiff asserts that the search was unreasonable because Moreland required her to

17

repeat the search—causing her emotional distress and physical pain—and “threatened [plaintiff]

18

with physical violence if [she] did not comply.” ECF No. 70 at 3. She also argues that the search

19

was unreasonable because upon completion, Moreland commented to a male officer who was

20

behind the door that she did not trust plaintiff because she “leaked.” Id.

21

Plaintiff was required to bend over and cough three times, which is not an objectively

22

excessive number of repetitions and does not support an inference of vindictiveness or

23

harassment. See Crockett v. Jensen, No. 16-cv-0959 PHX JJT (JZB), 2018 WL 10809993, at *7,

24

2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237066, at *19 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2018) (direction to repeat the “squat and

25

cough” portion of search five times, without more, was not “excessive, vindictive, harassing, or

26

unrelated to any legitimate penological interest” (citation omitted)); Johnson v. Carroll, No. 2:08-

27
28

3

Cf. Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1146 (9th Cir. 2011) (cross-gender
searches unconstitutional outside of emergency situation).
9

1

cv-1494 KJN, 2012 WL 2069561, at *30, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79380, at *92 (E.D. Cal. June 7,

2

2012) (requiring prisoner to complete “squat and cough” portion of the strip search three times

3

was within constitutional limits). Plaintiff has acknowledged that each instance of “bend and

4

cough” was very brief, which further weighs against a finding of excessiveness.

5

Moreland has provided a credible and penologically justified explanation for repeating the

6

procedure. In support of her motion, Moreland declares under penalty of perjury that, “[i]f an

7

inmate does not spread their buttocks wide enough or cough enough to verify there is no

8

contraband in that person’s anus or vagina, our training requires that the inmate complete this

9

portion of the visual strip search again” and that those are the only two reasons she would require

10

an inmate to repeat the procedure. Moreland Decl. at 3, ¶ 5 (ECF No. 65-4 at 133). In response,

11

plaintiff makes only conclusory assertions that the search was intended to harass her because she

12

was made to repeat the process, and her deposition testimony reflects that this belief was based on

13

speculation due to her interactions with sheriff’s department patrol units and the fact that the

14

process itself is humiliating, rather than any conduct by Moreland. PL’s Depo. at 24:2-4, 55:18-

15

56:15 (ECF No. 65-4 at 28, 59-60). This does not create a triable issue as to the credibility of

16

Moreland’s explanation. See Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1028

17

(9th Cir. 2001) (“A plaintiff’s belief that a defendant acted from an unlawful motive, without

18

evidence supporting that belief, is no more than speculation or unfounded accusation about

19

whether the defendant really did act from an unlawful motive.”). Plaintiff’s testimony that she

20

attempted to complete the process as quickly as possible is, to the contrary, consistent with

21

defendant’s theory that plaintiff did not spread her buttocks wide enough or cough hard enough

22

the first two times to verify that there was no contraband in her body cavities.

23

With respect to plaintiff’s claim that the strip search caused her physical pain, it is

24

undisputed that after plaintiff advised Moreland that she was unable to bend at the knees, she was

25

instructed to use a modified method that did not require her to bend her knees. PL’s Depo. at

26

32:5-17 (ECF No. 65-4 at 36). Although plaintiff alleges that it hurt her back to complete the

27

search by bending at her waist, PL’s Depo. at 32:9-10 (ECF No. 65-4 at 36), there is no evidence

28

that the discomfort she felt was so significant that it rendered the search unreasonable. Nothing in
10

1

the record indicates that plaintiff told Moreland she was unable to bend over due to back pain.

2

Plaintiff’s testimony that she spent only a few seconds in the bent position weighs against an

3

inference that the pain was so severe as to render an otherwise permissible search objectively

4

unreasonable.

5

Plaintiff similarly fails to demonstrate that her emotional pain rendered the search

6

unreasonable. While the courts have “consistently recognized the frightening and humiliating

7

invasion occasioned by a strip search, even when conducted with all due courtesy,” Byrd v.

8

Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal

9

quotation marks omitted), they have nonetheless found visual body cavity searches reasonable

10

when balanced against correctional facilities’ “significant interest in conducting a thorough search

11

as a standard part of the intake process,” Florence, 566 U.S. at 330; see also Bull, 595 F.3d at

12

975. In other words, the emotional distress inevitably caused by visual body cavity searches is

13

accounted for in the balancing of intrusion against penological justification that led to the binding

14

holdings in Bell, Florence and Bull. In any event, any additional distress caused by the manner in

15

which the search was conducted would not affect the Fourth Amendment analysis. Plaintiff’s

16

subjective experience might be relevant to damages had there been a violation of her rights, but

17

the Fourth Amendment analysis of reasonableness is an objective one. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

18

563 U.S. 731, 737 (2011) (Fourth Amendment reasonableness is predominantly an objective

19

inquiry).

20

With respect to plaintiff’s claim that she was threatened with violence if she did not

21

complete the search, the only statement plaintiff identifies is Moreland’s warning that additional

22

officers would be called and force could be used if plaintiff did not comply with the strip search

23

as directed. ECF No. 23 at 3; PL’s Depo. at 26:8-11, 27:19-24, 30:7-17 (ECF No. 65-4 at 30-31,

24

34). It is undisputed that no force was actually used and that no actions predicate to a use of

25

force, such as the summoning of additional officers or even a physical approach by Moreland,

26

were taken. Moreover, both the complaint and plaintiff’s deposition make clear that at the time

27

Moreland told her that other officers would be called to make her complete the search, plaintiff

28

had not yet complied with Moreland’s instructions to complete the last step. ECF No. 23 at 3;
11

1

PL’s Depo. at 27:16-24, 30:18-20 (ECF No. 65-4 at 31, 34). Had plaintiff continued to refuse to

2

complete the procedure, the use of reasonable force would have been constitutionally permissible.

3

See Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 336 (“the legitimate penological purpose of strip searches—to

4

discover hidden weapons and contraband—justifies using force necessary to induce compliance

5

by difficult inmates”). Moreland’s “threat” to use force where force was permissible does not

6

render the search excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological

7

interest.

8

Plaintiff’s claim that Moreland ordered her to put her face on the floor, accepted as true,

9

does not change the analysis because there is no evidence that this was more than a fleeting

10

comment with no follow-through. The bend and cough procedure was completed without

11

plaintiff touching her face to the floor or Moreland saying anything further about it. A single

12

such statement, even if offensive, does not rise to the level of “exaggerated or excessive means”

13

within the meaning of Michenfelder. See Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 1997)

14

(no Fourth Amendment violation under Michenfelder standard where officer directed a prisoner

15

to manipulate his own genitals for visual inspection and then to “run his finger around his gums”).

16

Finally, assuming Moreland did in fact tell another officer that she did not trust plaintiff

17

because plaintiff leaked, she did so after the search was completed and therefore the comment

18

does not render the search unreasonable. There is also no evidence that Moreland intended

19

plaintiff to overhear the comment; to the contrary, plaintiff testified she had to put her hear to the

20

door to hear. Accordingly, the comment cannot establish that the manner of the search was

21

abusive. Finally, even if Moreland made the comment during the search, and assuming the

22

statement to have been both embarrassing and unprofessional, it did not violate plaintiff’s

23

constitutional rights. See Burton v. City of Spokane (Burton I), No. 06-cv-0322 RHW, 2009 WL

24

772929, at *4-5, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23185, at *12, 15 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 18, 2009) (officers

25

executing search warrant entitled to qualified immunity because alleged comments that “[t]here is

26

no crack in this crack” and “I wonder if he has ever been molested” made during strip search of

27

arrestee did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation), aff’d sub nom. Burton v. Spokane

28

Police Dep’t (Burton II), 383 F. App’x 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2010).
12

1

In sum, plaintiff has not identified evidence that could support a finding that the manner in

2

which Moreland conducted an otherwise permissible search was excessive, vindictive, harassing,

3

or unrelated to any legitimate penological interest. See Thompson, 111 F.3d at 700 (plaintiff

4

“bears the burden of showing that [prison] officials intentionally used exaggerated or excessive

5

means to enforce security.” (alteration in original) (quoting Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 333).

6
7

iv. Place Where Search Was Conducted
It is undisputed that the search was conducted in the booking shower and that plaintiff was

8

in the room by herself with Moreland outside the door. Plaintiff further alleges, and defendants

9

have not disputed, that there was also a male officer outside the door of the shower. ECF No. 23

10

at 3. The question, therefore, is whether the presence of a male officer outside the door of the

11

booking shower resulted in insufficient privacy and rendered the search unreasonable.

12

While “cross-gender strip searches in the absence of an emergency violate an inmate’s

13

right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches,” Byrd, 629 F.3d at

14

1146, there is no evidence that such a search occurred in this case. Plaintiff alleges that after the

15

completion of the strip search Moreland made comments to a male officer who was present

16

behind the door. However, there are no allegations and plaintiff has identified no evidence that

17

the male officer participated in the search or was able to view plaintiff during the search.

18

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony indicates that the male officer would not have been able to see

19

her, as she testified that she heard but did not see Moreland talking to the officer because they

20

were standing outside the door and that she heard Moreland talking to the other officer when she

21

put her ear to the door. PL’s Depo. at 30:21-31:8, 79:2-5 (ECF No. 65-4 at 34-35, 83). That a

22

male officer was merely present outside the booking shower does not render the search

23

unconstitutional, even if he had an occasional or obstructed view of plaintiff during the search.

24

See Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 333-34 (no violation where visual body cavity searches of male

25

inmates were conducted within view of female guards from video monitors which provided

26

“indistinct, limited view”); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1985)

27

(occasional viewing of unclothed male inmates by female prison guards did not violate the Fourth

28

Amendment).
13

1

v. Conclusion

2

For the reasons explained above, construing the undisputed facts in plaintiff’s favor and

3

crediting her testimony as to Moreland’s statements, the evidence does not support a conclusion

4

that the December 24, 2016, strip search exceeded constitutional limits. Summary judgment

5

should therefore be granted as to Claim One.

6
7

vi. Plaintiff’s Objections
Plaintiff’s newly raised allegation that a male officer was watching (ECF No. 89 at 3)

8

does not alter the finding that the search was reasonable. Although plaintiff’s new statement was

9

not made under penalty of perjury, the court will assume that plaintiff would testify accordingly.

10

Even so, the allegations in the verified complaint and plaintiff’s own deposition testimony both

11

make clear that the male officer was outside the door, that Moreland was standing in the doorway

12

to the booking shower during the search, and that Moreland was the officer conducting the strip

13

search. See ECF No. 23 at 3; PL’s Depo. at 26:20-21, 30:25-31:5, 79:4-5 (ECF No. 65-4 at 30,

14

34-35, 83). Plaintiff offers no new details regarding the male officer’s observation of the search.

15

The unelaborated assertion that he “was there the whole time watching outside the door,”

16

particularly in light of the fact that Moreland was standing in the doorway, does not support an

17

inference that the male officer had more than an occasional or obstructed view of plaintiff during

18

the search. For this reason, plaintiff has not identified a disputed factual issue material to the

19

constitutionality of the search as conducted by Moreland.

20
21

B.

Qualified Immunity
i. Legal Standard

22

“Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct

23

violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

24

have known.’” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow v.

25

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In analyzing a qualified immunity defense, the court must

26

consider the following: (1) whether the alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to the

27

plaintiff, demonstrate that defendant’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right; and

28

(2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident. Saucier v. Katz,
14

1

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)

2

(overruling Saucier’s requirement that the two prongs be decided sequentially). These questions

3

may be addressed in the order most appropriate to “the circumstances in the particular case at

4

hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. If a court decides that plaintiff’s allegations do not support a

5

statutory or constitutional violation, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning

6

qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. On the other hand, if a court determines that the

7

right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct, the

8

court need not determine whether plaintiff’s allegations support a statutory or constitutional

9

violation. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-42.

10

Having already concluded that there was no constitutional violation, the undersigned now

11

considers in the alternative whether—even if the search exceeded permissible bounds in the

12

opinion of this court—Moreland’s conduct violated clearly established law. The inquiry turns on

13

the state of legal authority in December 2016 regarding the application and balancing of the Bell

14

factors: the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which the search is conducted, the

15

justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.

16

ii. Defendant’s Conduct Did Not Violate Clearly Established Law

17

a. Scope of Intrusion and Justification for Search

18

At the time of the search, both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit had squarely held

19

that the routine strip searching of a detainee by a same-sex officer, including visual body cavity

20

inspection and use of a “squat and cough” procedure, is an intrusion into privacy the scope of

21

which is categorically justified by the need for institutional security. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-560

22

(1979 decision); Florence, 566 U.S. at 330-39 (2012 decision); Bull, 595 F.3d at 971-72 (2010

23

decision).

24

b. Manner of the Search

25

At the time in question, it was clearly established that the execution of an otherwise

26

authorized strip search must be reasonable. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 872

27

(9th Cir. 1993) (“clearly established that the Fourth Amendment requires that any strip search be

28

///
15

1

conducted in a reasonable manner”).4 The Ninth Circuit held in 1988 that the manner in which a

2

custodial strip search is conducted may violate the Fourth Amendment if it is “excessive,

3

vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological interest.” Michenfelder, 860 F.2d

4

at 332. While this general standard was clearly established at the time of the 2016 search, the

5

undersigned has identified no authority that would have informed a reasonable officer that

6

requiring a detainee to repeat a “cough and squat” procedure three times was so excessive as to be

7

constitutionally impermissible. Indeed, lower courts have identified no such limitation on the

8

practice. See, e.g., Crockett, No. 16-cv-0959 PHX JJT (JZB), 2018 WL 10809993, at *7, 2018

9

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237066, at *19; Johnson, No. 2:08-cv-1494 KJN, 2012 WL 2069561, at *30,

10

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79380, at *92.

11

Thompson v. Souza, supra, decided in 1977, is the only Ninth Circuit opinion to evaluate

12

whether an otherwise permissible strip search was carried out in an impermissible manner. The

13

court found in that case that an officer directing a prisoner to manipulate his own genitals for

14

visual inspection and then to “run his finger around his gums” did not constitute “exaggerated or

15

excessive means” within the meaning of Michenfelder. Thompson, 111 F.3d at 700. The

16

instructions given to plaintiff in this case, and the comments made by Moreland, are no more

17

excessive or offensive than the directions given in Thompson.5 As to the alleged “threat,” it was

18

clearly established that reasonable force could be used if plaintiff persisted in refusing to

19

cooperate. Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 336. Under Michenfelder and Thompson, a reasonable

20
4

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

The qualified immunity analysis in Act Up!/Portland is otherwise inapplicable here, as it
predated Bull and Florence, supra. Prior to those decisions, the law of the circuit was that strip
searches of arrestees facing only minor charges had to be supported by reasonable suspicion that
the individual was carrying or concealing contraband. See Act Up!/Portland, 988 F.2d at 871-72.
5
The undersigned has undertaken a thorough review of district court opinions from within the
Ninth Circuit that apply the Michenfelder/Thompson standard, and has identified no case before
or after 2016 finding that a purely visual body cavity search exceeded permissible limits on facts
similar to those presented here. In Bealer v. Sec’y of Cal. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:16-cv-00671 LJO
MJS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61958 at *11 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017), the court found on
screening that plaintiff had presented a cognizable claim based on an allegedly lewd comment
made by the officer conducting the strip search. The case at bar does not involve such
allegations. The undersigned is unaware of any authority finding that comments not arguably
amounting to sexual harassment, without more, rendered abusive a purely visual body cavity
search that was otherwise permissible under Florence and Bull.
16

1

officer in Moreland’s position would not have had reason to think that any of her comments

2

crossed a constitutionally mandated line.

3
4

iii. Place Where Search Was Conducted
While it was clearly established in 2016 that non-emergency cross-gender strip searches

5

violate the Fourth Amendment, Byrd, 629 F.3d at 1146, there was no such prohibition on the

6

presence of a male officer outside the area in which the search took place —even if the

7

circumstances permitted an occasional or obstructed view of the search. See Michenfelder,

8

860 F.2d at 333-34 (no violation where visual body cavity searches of male inmates were

9

conducted within view of female guards from video monitors which provided “indistinct, limited

10

view”); Grummett, 779 F.2d at 495-96 (occasional viewing of unclothed male inmates by female

11

prison guards did not violate the Fourth Amendment); see also Burton II, 383 F. App’x at 673 (no

12

clearly established law that brief presence of female officers during strip search violated Fourth

13

Amendment).

14

For all the reasons discussed above, it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer at

15

the time of the search in question that Moreland’s actions exceeded constitutional limits.

16

Accordingly, Moreland is entitled to qualified immunity.

17
18

iv. Plaintiff’s Objections
Taking into consideration plaintiff’s allegation that a male officer was outside the door

19

watching (ECF No. 89 at 3), defendant Moreland is still entitled to qualified immunity. As

20

already discussed above, plaintiff’s bare statement does not demonstrate that the male officer had

21

more than an occasional or obstructed view of plaintiff during the search, and it is not clearly

22

established that such presence violates the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, even if the court

23

assumes that the male officer was observing plaintiff in a manner that was unreasonable, he is not

24

a defendant in this case, and there are no allegations or evidence suggesting that Moreland, who

25

was standing in the doorway and observing plaintiff as she completed her strip search, was or

26

should have been aware that the male officer was able to observe and was in fact observing

27

plaintiff in an inappropriate manner. It therefore would not have been clear to a reasonable

28

officer in Moreland’s position that the strip search violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.
17

1
2

VII.

Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant

It is being recommended that the motion for summary judgment be granted as to your

3

claim against Moreland based on the December 24, 2016, strip search because the evidence

4

shows that the search was did not violate the constitution. Alternatively, Officer Moreland is

5

entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clear at the time of the search that her

6

actions were unconstitutional.

7
8
9

CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Findings and
Recommendations at ECF No. 85 are WITHDRAWN.

10

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that:

11

1. The motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 65) be GRANTED as to Claim One on

12

the ground that Moreland did not violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights or, alternatively,

13

that Moreland is entitled to qualified immunity;

14

2. This case be dismissed; and

15

3. Judgment entered in defendants’ favor.

16

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

17

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days

18

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

19

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

20

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

21

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The

22

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

23

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

24

DATED: September 12, 2023.

25
26
27
28
18