Williams Sports Rentals Inc.

Filing 158

ORDER signed by Chief District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 4/12/2023 DENYING 132 Motion to Stay this action pending appeal. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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IN RE: COMPLAINT AND PETITION OF
WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS, INC., AS
OWNER OF A CERTAIN 2004 YAMAHA
WAVERUNNER FX 140 FOR
EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION
OF LIABILITY,

ORDER

MARIAN LATASHA WILLIS, on behalf of
the Estate of RAESHON WILLIAMS,
Respondent/Counter Claimant,
v.
WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS, INC.
Petitioner/Counter Defendant
WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS, INC.
Petitioner, Counter Defendant, and Third-party
Plaintiff,
v.

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THOMAS SMITH, KAI PETRICH,
BERKELY EXECUTIVES, INC., ZIP, INC.,
and DOES 1-10

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Third-party Defendants.

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No. 2:17-cv-00653-KJM-JDP

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Respondent Willis moves this court to stay all further proceedings pending an appeal of

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this court’s prior order. For the reasons below, the court denies the motion to stay.

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I.

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BACKGROUND
The previously assigned district judge detailed the facts and procedural history of this

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case in a prior order. See Prior Order (July 27, 2020), ECF No. 113. There, the court found the

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single claimant exception of the Limitation Act applied, lifted the initial stay on state court

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proceedings and stayed the federal court proceeding pending resolution of the question of liability

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in state court. Id. at 9. Then, in 2022, this court found the single claimant exception no longer

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applied, lifted the federal stay and enjoined all other proceedings related to this action. Prior

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Order (Dec. 9, 2022), ECF No. 127. Willis appealed this order. See ECF No. 129. Willis

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appealed two issues in particular: the court’s application of the single claimant exception and its

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authority to issue an injunction. See Mot. at 6–7, ECF No. 132-1. Willis now moves this court to

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stay its proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. Id. Petitioner Williams Sports Rental

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(WSR) opposes, Opp’n, ECF No. 143, and Willis has replied, Reply, ECF No. 148. The court

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took the matter under submission without hearing oral arguments. ECF No. 156.

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II.

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LEGAL STANDARD
“A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result” to the

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appellant. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States,

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272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)). Rather, “[a] request for a stay pending appeal is committed to the

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exercise of judicial discretion.” Doe #1 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2020). The

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moving party “bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that

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discretion.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34. “The standard for evaluating stays pending appeal is

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similar to that employed by district courts in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction.”

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Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983). Four considerations govern judicial

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discretion in ruling on a motion to stay: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong

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showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably

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injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties

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interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill,
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481 U.S. 770, 770–71 (1987); Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34. “The first two factors . . . are the most

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critical”; the last two are reached only “[o]nce an applicant satisfies the first two factors.” Nken,

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556 U.S. at 434, 435.

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Courts can apply a “sliding scale” when weighing these factors, wherein “a stronger

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showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies

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v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011); Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th

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Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (applying the sliding scale).

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III.

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ANALYSIS
While Willis does not explicitly discuss the four considerations outlined above, the court

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construes Willis’s motion as arguing: (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits in challenging this

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court’s finding of the inapplicability of the single claimant exception and the scope of the related

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injunction and (2) she will be irreparably harmed absent a stay. See generally Mot.

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A.

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To show a likelihood of success, “petitioners need not demonstrate that it is more likely

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than not that they will win,” but must show there is a “substantial case for relief on the merits.”

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Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 966, 968. The court finds Willis is unlikely to succeed on the merits

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because the single claimant exception no longer applies and the court has discretion to impose an

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injunction.

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Likelihood of Success

When a petitioner first invokes the protection of the Limitation Act, as WSR did here,

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ECF No. 1, the court must “issue[] an injunction that prevents the filing of any other actions

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against the owner if it involves related claims” In re Complaint of Ross Island Sand & Gravel,

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226 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 2000). The “court as a general rule has broad discretion in

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deciding whether to dissolve an injunction under the Limitation of Liability Act.” Newton v.

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Shipman, 718 F.2d 959, 961 (9th Cir. 1983). This broad discretion is “narrowly circumscribed”

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when the single claimant exception applies, wherein the court must dissolve the injunction. Id.

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In its prior order, this court found the cross complaints against WSR filed in state court by

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Kai Petrich and Sentinel constituted multiple separate claims for damages, removing this action

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from the single claim exception. See Prior Order (Dec. 9, 2022) at 5–7. Willis now argues these
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“cross-complaints are manifest shams and do not threaten WSR’s right to limitation in any real

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way.” Mot. at 10. However, Willis has not explained why these cross-complaints are “shams” in

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prior briefing or in the present motion. See, e.g., Prior Mot.; ECF No 117. The court affirms its

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finding the single claimant exception no longer applies in this action.

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Willis next argues this court’s injunction is “overbroad” because it enjoined “not just the

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state-court proceedings against WSR but also ‘the continued prosecution of any legal proceedings

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of any nature.’” Mot. at 6–7. There is no indication of any other proceedings besides those in the

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Alameda County Superior Court and this court at this time. Because this court had jurisdiction to

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impose the injunction at the outset of this case, In re Complaint of Ross Island Sand & Gravel,

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226 F.3d at 1017, and the discretion to dissolve the injunction when it found the single claimant

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exception applied, Newton, 718 F.2d at 961, it also had the discretion to reinstate the injunction

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upon finding the action no longer fell under the exception, Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437, 439

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(1932) (holding district courts should “retain the petition for a limitation of liability . . . [in] the

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unlikely event that the right of petitioner to a limited liability might be brought into question in

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the state court,. . . or the case otherwise assumes such form . . . as to bring it within the exclusive

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power of a court of admiralty.”). Willis has not shown she has a substantial likelihood of success

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on the merits. Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 968.

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B.

Irreparable Harm

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A petitioner moving for a stay pending appeal must show irreparable harm is “likely to

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occur during the period before the appeal is decided.” Doe #1, 957 F.3d at 1059. Here, Willis

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argues “the surprising breadth” of this court’s injunction will cause “disorder.” Mot. at 11.

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Specifically, Willis argues if this court does not grant a stay, the “Ninth Circuit may not have the

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opportunity to decide whether [this court’s prior order] violates the Anti-Injunction Statute before

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[Willis] loses” her June 2023 state court trial date. Mot. at 10; see Req. Judicial Notice, ECF No.

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126. At the same time, Willis also states “the decision to reinstate the anti-suit injunction as to

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WSR is not particularly pressing” because Willis’s deadline to try her state court claims does not

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expire until 2026. Mot. at 11. Willis misunderstands the posture of the matter at this point. The

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court has already enjoined the state court proceedings. An issuance of a formal stay pending
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appeal would not affect the preexisting injunction, nor would it affect the Ninth Circuit’s

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consideration of Willis’s appeal. Because Willis makes no other showing of irreparable harm,

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she has not satisfied this factor.

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Willis has not shown either a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. She

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also has not discussed whether a stay would injure other parties in this matter or where the public

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interest lies. She has not met her burden. The court denies the motion to stay pending appeal.

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Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the court denies Willis’s motion to stay this action pending

appeal.

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This order resolves ECF No. 132.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: April 12, 2023.

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