Williams Sports Rentals Inc.

Filing 56

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 10/31/2017; DENYING 47 Motion to Stay and 50 Motion to Stay. (Hunt, G)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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IN RE: COMPLAINT AND PETITION OF
WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS, INC. AS
OWNER OF A CERTAIN 2004 YAMAHA
WAVERUNNER FX 140 FOR
EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION
OF LIABILITY

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MARIAN LATASHA WILLIS, on behalf )
of the Estate of RAESHON
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WILLIAMS,
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Respondent/Counter
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Claimant,
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v.
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WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS, INC.,
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Petitioner/Counter
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Defendant.
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Case No. 2:17-CV-00653 JAM-EFB
ORDER DENYING
RESPONDENT/COUNTER CLAIMANT’S
MOTION TO STAY FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS

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Marian Latasha Willis, the respondent and counter claimant,

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seeks to stay further proceedings in this matter until her appeal

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of this Court’s prior order is resolved in the Ninth Circuit.

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the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES her motion to stay. 1

For

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled
for October 17, 2017.
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I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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Williams Sports Rentals Inc. (“WSR”) filed a Complaint for

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Exoneration From or Limitation of Liability in this Court, invoking

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the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333.

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1.

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the subject vessel, ordered all persons having claims related to

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the complaint to file them in this action, and stayed all related

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suits, actions or legal proceeding in connection with the incident

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alleged in the complaint.

ECF No.

The Court approved the stipulation of value and security for

Order, ECF No. 11.

Marian Latasha

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Willis (“Willis”), Personal Representative of the Estate of Raeshon

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Williams, filed an answer and counterclaim.

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Second Amended Claim, ECF No. 46 (operative pleading asserting two

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counterclaims).

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Motion to Lift the Stay, invoking the Lagnes rule of abstention and

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seeking abatement of proceedings in admiralty until Willis has an

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opportunity to try her claims at law in state court. ECF No. 25.

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The Court denied the motion at the hearing held on August 29, 2017.

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ECF No. 41.

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ECF Nos. 16 & 17; see

No other claimants have appeared.

Willis filed a

Willis filed a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal on September

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7th.

ECF No. 43.

A review of the Ninth Circuit’s docket reveals

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the Circuit is considering the appeal to be an appeal of a

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preliminary injunction and has ordered briefing under Ninth Circuit

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Rule 3-3. Filed clerk order, Williams Sports Rentals Inc. v. Marian

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Willis, No. 17-16981 (9th Cir. 2017), ECF No. 2.

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opening brief on October 19, 2017, which appeals the Court’s

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decisions not to lift the stay or to abate further proceedings in

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admiralty until she has the opportunity to litigate in state court.

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Opening Brief, Williams Sports Rentals Inc. v. Marian Willis, No.
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Willis filed her

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17-16981 (9th Cir. 2017), ECF Nos. 5 & 7.

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II.

OPINION

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Willis moves to stay all further proceedings before this Court

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pending her interlocutory appeal in the Ninth Circuit. Mot. at 2–3.

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She contends her interlocutory appeal “divests the district court

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of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the

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appeal.”

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Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982)).

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Mot. at 6 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount

WSR opposes the stay, arguing that such action will obstruct

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judicial efficiency.

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in this case “permanently enjoining [Willis] from proceeding in

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this forum.”

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Opp’n at 1.

WSR argues there is no “order”

Id. at 2.

If the Court’s rulings on Willis’s motions were inextricably

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bound up with the merits of the limitation issues, then this Court

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would be divested of jurisdiction.

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Grp., 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A]n appeal of an

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interlocutory order does not ordinarily deprive the district court

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of jurisdiction except with regard to the matters that are the

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subject of the appeal.”); Paige v. State of Cal., 102 F.3d 1035,

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1039 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Accordingly, we have held our jurisdiction

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under § 1292(a)(1) extends only to the ‘matters inextricably bound

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up with the injunctive order from which the appeal is taken.’”).

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That is not the case here; the merits of the limitation action and

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counterclaims do not involve the same question as Willis’s appeal,

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which concerns the Lagnes rule of abstention.

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F.2d at 1411 (“Where an appeal is taken from a judgment which does

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not finally determine the entire action, the appeal does not
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See Britton v. Co-op Banking

See Britton, 916

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prevent the district court from proceeding with matters not

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involved in the appeal.”) (quoting 9 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal

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Practice ¶ 203.11); City of L. A., Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica

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Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he filing of a

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notice of interlocutory appeal divests the district court of

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jurisdiction over the particular issues involved in that appeal.”)

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(emphasis added).

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goal of “avoid[ing] the confusion that would ensue from having the

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same issues before two courts simultaneously.”

Proceeding with the merits would not thwart the

Natural Res. Def.

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Council, Inc. v. Southwest Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th

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Cir. 2001).

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Willis has not shown that the divestment rule extends to

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situations where the matter on appeal could prevent the Court from

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adjudicating the merits of the action or delay adjudication until a

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later date.

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contrary is correct.

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defendant’s appeal of the district court’s order denying his motion

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to compel arbitration did not divest the district court of

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jurisdiction to proceed with the case on the merits.

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1412.

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the Case in Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC v. Couch—discussed by both

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parties—does not support Willis’s position either. 2

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1291-LJO-JLT, 2015 WL 7271717 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2015).

The cases cited by the parties indicate that the
In Britton, the Ninth Circuit found that the

916 F.2d at

The Order Granting Defendant’s Ex Parte Application to Stay

No. 1:15-cvIn that

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The appeals in Britton and Couch stemmed from injunctions related
to arbitration proceedings. Britton was before the Ninth Circuit
under 9 U.S.C. § 16 and Judge O’Neil anticipated the Circuit would
review the Couch preliminary injunction under the same statute.
Both courts applied the “divestment” rule developed in the 28
U.S.C. § 1292 context. The Couch court explicitly “concluded that
the precedent concerning [28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1)] should apply to
cases concerning [9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(2)].” 2015 WL 7271717, at *3,
n. 4.
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case, the Court issued the stay because the issues to be decided in

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the appeal of the preliminary injunction were the same core issues

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presented in the motion for summary judgment before the court.

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at *3 (“The heart of this case—whether the FINRA Arbitration can

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and should be enjoined and, if so, who should decide that issue—is

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currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.”). That circumstance

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is not present here, where the issues on appeal and the merits are

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distinct.

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The Court, therefore, is not persuaded the pending appeal divests

Willis cites no other analogous cases in her motion.

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it of jurisdiction to proceed with the merits of this case and

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denies Willis’s motion to stay.

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III.

ORDER

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES

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Respondent/Counter Claimant’s Motion to Stay.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

Id.

October 31, 2017

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