Williams Sports Rentals Inc.

Filing 61

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 12/15/17 GRANTING S WSR's 57 Motion to Dismiss WITH PREJUDICE. (Becknal, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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In re: Complaint and Petition of
WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS, INC.,
as Owner of a Certain 2004
YAMAHA WAVE RUNNER FX 140 (CF
5408 LE) for Exoneration from or
Limitation of Liability

No.

2:17-cv-00653-JAM-EFB

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S
MOTION TO DISMISS

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MARIAN LATASHA WILLIS, on behalf
of the Estate of RAESHON
WILLIAMS,

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Respondent/Counter
Claimant,

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v.
WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS, INC.,
Petitioner/Counter
Defendant.

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Marian Latasha Willis, on behalf of her son’s estate, seeks

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to recover against Williams Sports Rentals for a jet-ski

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accident that resulted in her son’s drowning.

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Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, Williams Sports Rentals filed a

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limitation action that compelled Willis to file her claims

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against the company in this proceeding.

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Rentals seek dismissal of the counterclaims asserted in Willis’s
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Invoking this

Now Williams Sports

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Second Amended Claim.

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motion to dismiss is granted with prejudice. 1

For the reasons set forth below, the

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I.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Williams Sports Rentals, Inc. (“WSR”) filed its

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Complaint for Exoneration or Limitation of Liability on March

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28, 2017.

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value of the subject vessel (a 2004 Yamaha Wave Runner), ordered

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a Monition to issue against all persons with claims for losses

ECF No. 1.

The Court approved the stipulation of

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and injuries as alleged in the Complaint and stayed prosecution

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of related proceedings.

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Latasha Willis (“Willis”), acting as Personal Representative of

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the Estate of Raeshon Williams (“Decedent”) filed an answer and

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counterclaim on June 2, 2017.

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filed a First Amended Claim (“FAC”) adding an additional

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counterclaim.

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ECF Nos. 11, 12.

Claimant Marian

ECF Nos. 16, 17.

Willis then

ECF Nos. 21 & 22.

At a hearing held on August 29, 2017, the Court dismissed

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the FAC for failing to allege sufficient facts to support

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Willis’s claims and permitted Willis leave to amend.

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41.

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related proceedings, which remains in place.

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appealed that ruling and requested a stay in the present

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proceedings pending her appeal.

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declined her request.

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///

ECF No.

The Court also denied Willis’s motion to lift the stay on
Id.

ECF Nos. 43 & 50.

Willis

The Court

ECF No. 56.

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for December 5, 2017.
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Willis filed a Second Amended Claim (“SAC”).

ECF No. 46.

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She alleges the following facts: Decedent drowned in Lake Tahoe

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on August 13, 2016.

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on a work trip with some of his Zip, Inc., co-workers, including

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Thomas Smith and C.E.O. Kai Petrich.

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Petrich rented a Wave Runner from WSR in the early afternoon.

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Id. at ¶ 7.

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Wave Runner as Smith drove the two of them across part of the

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lake, from Timber Cove to El Dorado Beach.

SAC at ¶ 3.

Decedent had gone to the lake

Id. at ¶ 6.

Smith and

At around 6 p.m., Decedent rode on the back of the

Id.

Smith, in

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violation of several Inland Rules, rode into an on-coming wake

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at a speed that caused both Smith and Decedent to be thrown into

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the water.

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alleges that WSR failed to “a. Determine whether Smith and/or

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Petrich had the competence and qualifications to operate the

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accident WAVE RUNNER; b. Provide Smith and/or Petrich with

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adequate training or instruction; c. Properly equip the accident

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WAVE RUNNER; and/or d. Properly service and maintain the

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accident WAVE RUNNER.”

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Id. at ¶ 8.

Decedent then drowned.

Id.

Willis

Id. at ¶ 11.

WSR now moves to dismiss the SAC for failure to state a

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claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and

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Admiralty Rule F(8). 2

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Willis asked the Court to defer ruling on the Motion to Dismiss
until the Ninth Circuit ruled on Willis’s Urgent Motion to Stay
filed under Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2) and Ninth Circuit Rule 273(b). Opp’n at 4. The Ninth Circuit denied her motion on
November 28th. Order, Williams Sports Rentals Inc. v. Marian
Latasha Willis, No. 17-16981 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2017)
(“Appellant’s motion to stay proceedings in the district court
pending appeal is denied.”). This Court’s reasons for denying
the stay are set forth in its October 31st Order. ECF No. 56.
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II.

OPINION

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A.

Legal Standard

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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

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sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face.”

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U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

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This standard requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

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unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

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insufficient if it merely offers “labels and conclusions” or

Id.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

A pleading is

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“naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”

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(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57

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(2007)) (quotation marks omitted).

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facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability,

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it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility

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of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).

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Id.

“Where a complaint pleads

WSR submits several declarations and exhibits in support of

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its motion.

ECF Nos. 57-2–8.

On a motion to dismiss for

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failure to state a claim, however, the Court’s review is limited

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to the pleadings.

See Farr v. United States, 990 F.2d 451, 454

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(9th Cir. 1993).

The Court has not considered these additional

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materials in reaching its decision.

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B.

Analysis

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The SAC asserts two causes of action: Wrongful Death and

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Survival Damages.

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based on a negligent entrustment theory of liability.

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¶¶ 10–12, 14–15; Opp’n at 8.

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SAC at ¶¶ 9–21.

Both causes of action are
SAC

The Court granted WSR’s previous motion to dismiss the FAC
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on the grounds that Willis failed to plead facts supporting the

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existence of a duty owed by WSR to Decedent.

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explained:

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The Court

Both of your claims [] are based in negligence. And
here is the issue I have . . . with the way you’ve
attempted to plead duty. It’s really not there. . . .
[M]y reaction to the motion to dismiss is to grant it
with leave to amend to allow you an opportunity to see
if you can actually plead duty. . . . I took [your
pleading] as a concession that your client can’t claim
there was any – any type of rental agreement or
contractual relationship between [Decedent] and
Williams Sports Rentals. . . .

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[T]he Decedent, at least from [WSR’s] point of view,
was unknown, was a total stranger. And so there is
nothing in this counterclaim, at least right now, that
talks about foreseeability.

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Transcript, ECF No. 44, at 34–37.

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leave to amend in order to plead facts supporting her claims and

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to find case law supporting her theory of liability.

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41.

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The Court permitted Willis

Id. at 37,

In response, Willis made two changes to her pleading.

In

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paragraph 8 she amended her allegation “Smith departed Timber

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Cover with DECEDENT sitting behind him” to read “When Smith

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departed Timber Cove, DECEDENT was lawfully aboard the accident

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WAVE RUNNER, sitting behind Smith.”

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¶ 8.

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“Petitioner negligently and carelessly failed, among other

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things, to . . .” to read “Petitioner negligently and carelessly

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entrusted the accident WAVE RUNNER to DECEDENT’s co-workers in

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that it failed, among other things, to . . . [.]”

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¶ 11 with SAC ¶ 11.

Compare FAC ¶ 8 with SAC

Second, Willis amended paragraph 11 of her allegation

Compare FAC

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Neither change is responsive to the Court’s concerns.

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pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
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“A

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

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The SAC merely adds legal conclusions and does not contain any

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additional facts to support Willis’s claims and theories of

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relief.

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Decedent was “lawfully” aboard the vessel and there are no facts

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pled supporting the conclusion that WSR “negligently and

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carelessly entrusted” the vessel to Decedent’s co-workers.

There are no facts pled supporting the conclusion that

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Willis seeks to rely upon a negligent entrustment theory to

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establish liability but her allegations fail under her own cited

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authority.

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setting forth a standard that requires knowledge on the part of

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the vessel-owner.

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(9th Cir. 1988) (“Section 390 provides that one who supplies a

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chattel for another’s use whom the supplier ‘knows or has reason

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to know’ is likely to use the chattel in a manner ‘involving

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unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others’ is

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subject to liability for the physical harm resulting to them.

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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390.

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appellants must show that William McLinn supplied the skiff

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directly to his son, and must have known or should have known

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that Russell would be likely to use the skiff in a dangerous

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manner.”); In re Fun Time Boat Rental & Storage, LLC, 431 F.

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Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (D. Ariz. 2006) (“While maritime law

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recognizes the tort of negligent entrustment, such a tort

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requires that the boat owner knew or should have known that the

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person to whom the boat was entrusted (in this case, Osborne)

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was likely to use it in a dangerous manner.”) (citations

Both parties cite negligent entrustment cases

See Churchill v. F/V Fjord, 892 F.2d 763, 771

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To prevail on this theory,

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omitted); Joyce v. Joyce, 975 F.2d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1992)

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(“[T]he essential thrust of the tort of negligent entrustment is

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that a shipowner can be held liable for negligent entrustment

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only if he knows or has reason to know that the person being

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entrusted is incapable of operating the vessel safety.”);

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Pritchett v. Kimberling Cove, Inc., 568 F.2d 570, 575–76 (8th

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Cir. 1977) (“Four elements of proof are necessary to establish

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negligent entrustment under Missouri law: (1) entrustment of a

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chattel (directly or through a third party) to another;

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(2) likelihood that the person to whom the chattel is entrusted

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will, due to his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, use the

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chattel in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm to

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himself and others; (3) knowledge of the entrustor (actual or

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imputed) of such likelihood; and (4) proximate cause of the harm

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to the plaintiff by the conduct of the entrustee.”).

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failed to allege facts tending to show that Decedent’s co-

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workers were likely to use the vessel in a manner involving

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unreasonable risk of harm to others and that WSR knew or had

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reason to know of such likelihood.

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despite the Court’s invitation—to direct the Court to a case

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with similar facts to support her theory of recovery against a

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rental company like WSR.

Willis has

Willis has also failed—

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Because the SAC adds only conclusory allegations and lacks

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facts supporting Willis’s negligent entrustment theory, the SAC

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is dismissed.

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Willis has had three opportunities to file her

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counterclaims in this matter.

The Court held a hearing on the

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prior motion to dismiss and discussed, at length, the
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deficiencies and what Willis would need to plead in order to

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move forward with her claims.

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insufficient.

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opportunity to amend would be futile and leave to amend is

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denied.

Yet, Willis’s pleadings remain

It therefore appears to the Court that further

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III.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WSR’s
Motion to Dismiss WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 15, 2017

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