Williams Sports Rentals Inc.
Filing
87
RESPONSE signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 10/1/2019 to 86 USCA Order re Invitation to Comment on Claimant Marian Willis' Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. (CC: USCA, USCA No. 19-72233) (Huang, H)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS, INC.,
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USCA NO. 19-72233
Plaintiff,
No.
2:17-cv-00653-JAM-EFB
v.
MARIAN LATASHA WILLIS,
U.S. DISTRICT COURT’S RESPONSE
TO NINTH CIRCUIT’S INVITATION
TO COMMENT ON CLAIMANT MARIAN
WILLIS’S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS
Defendant.
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In August 2016, Raeshon Williams drowned in South Lake Tahoe
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after falling off the back of a jet ski.
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Williams Sports Rentals (“WSR”)—the jet ski owner—filed a
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complaint for exoneration from or limitation of liability in
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federal court.
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Pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act, this court enjoined
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all other proceedings “arising out of, consequent upon, or in
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connection with” the August 13, 2016 incident.
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Stipulation of Value, ECF No. 11.
Seven months later,
Compl. for Exoneration (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.
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Order Approving
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Williams’s mother, Marian Willis, filed (1) an answer to the
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complaint, ECF No. 16; (2) a motion to lift the Court’s anti-suit
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injunction, ECF No. 25; and (3) a counterclaim, ECF No. 17.
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Court denied Willis’s motion to lift the anti-suit injunction
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from the bench.
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No. 41.
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motion to stay the district court proceedings pending her appeal—
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the Court also denied this motion.
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(“Stay Order”), ECF No. 56.
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The
See Minutes (“Anti-suit Injunction Order”), ECF
Willis appealed that ruling, ECF No. 43, and filed a
Order Denying Motion to Stay
Subsequently, the Court dismissed Willis’s counterclaims
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with prejudice.
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ECF No. 61.
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appeals, Willis sought appellate review of three of this Court’s
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decisions: (1) the Anti-suit Injunction Order; (2) the Stay
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Order; and (3) the Dismissal Order.
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Order Granting WSR’s MTD (“Dismissal Order”),
Willis appealed.
ECF No. 62.
On April 25, 2018, the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision
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with respect to Willis’s first appeal.
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43], ECF No. 67.
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Between her two
USCA Order as to [ECF No.
The Court held:
A review of the record demonstrates that, on January
3, 2018, the district court entered final judgment
dismissing this action. The appeal of the judgment is
pending in No. 18-15006. Consequently, this
preliminary injunction appeal is dismissed as moot.
See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Mount Vernon Mem’l Park,
664 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1982). DISMISSED.
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Id. at 2-3.
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that decision.
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April 25, 2018, takes effect this date.”).
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The Ninth Circuit then issued the formal mandate on
ECF No. 78 (“The judgment of this Court, entered
One year later, the Ninth Circuit issued its order
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purportedly addressing Willis’s appeal of the Dismissal Order.
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USCA Memorandum as to [ECF No. 62], ECF No. 69.
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Willis had
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argued this Court erred in (1) denying her motion to lift the
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anti-suit injunction; (2) denying her motion for stay pending her
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interlocutory appeal of that denial; and (3) dismissing her
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wrongful death claim with prejudice.
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Appeals—despite previously dismissing Willis’s appeal of the
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Anti-suit Injunction Order—found that this Court erred in failing
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to conduct a prejudice inquiry when analyzing Willis’s motion to
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dissolve the anti-suit injunction.
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Willis’s appeal of the Stay Order was moot.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
The Court of
It also found
Id. at 2.
The Ninth
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Circuit did not, however, address the propriety of this Court’s
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dismissal of Willis’s claims.
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See generally id.
The parties returned to this Court in disagreement about the
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exact scope of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.
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for exoneration from liability (“Mot.”).
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the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the Anti-suit
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injunction Order, not the Dismissal Order that had disposed of
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Willis’s claims.
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claims before the Court, (1) the Ninth Circuit’s remand on the
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anti-suit injunction issue was moot, and (2) it was entitled to
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exoneration of liability.
Mot. at 2.
WSR filed a motion
ECF No. 71.
It argued
WSR argued that, absent any pending
Id.
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Willis, however, interpreted the Ninth Circuit’s order as a
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vacatur of both the Anti-suit Injunction Order and the Dismissal
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Order.
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argued that vacating the Dismissal Order placed her claims again
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before the Court.
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needed to revisit her motion to dissolve the anti-suit injunction
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and conduct the proper prejudice inquiry as the Ninth Circuit
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required.
Opp’n to Mot. for Exoneration (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 74.
She
And as such, Willis maintained the Court
Opp’n at 3-5, 10-12.
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The Court held a hearing on WSR’s motion. There, it posed
the same questions to Willis that it now asks the Ninth Circuit:
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Did the Ninth Circuit’s decision vacate both the
Dismissal Order and the Anti-suit Injunction Order?
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Assuming the Ninth Circuit vacated both the Dismissal
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Order and the Anti-suit Injunction Order, could this
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Court conduct the limitation action concurrently with
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the state court proceedings after dissolving the anti-
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suit injunction?
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3.
Assuming the Ninth Circuit only vacated the Anti-suit
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Injunction Order, how does Willis’s failure to state a
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claim in federal court not render the anti-suit
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injunction issue moot?
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See Transcript of Proceedings held on 7/30/19 (“Tr.”) at 12:10-
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concluded the Ninth Circuit only vacated its Anti-suit Injunction
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Order.
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the Ninth Circuit’s remand to conduct a prejudice analysis was
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moot and granted WSR’s motion for exoneration.
Unpersuaded by Willis’s response, the Court
Absent any pending claims in the suit, the Court found
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I.
DISCUSSION
The Court welcomes any guidance the Ninth Circuit can
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provide on its previous vacatur and remand.
As do the parties.
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See Tr. at 5:12-14, ECF No. 83 (“I will confess that it took me a
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while to reach an understanding of the Ninth Circuit’s decision
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as well.”).
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Ninth Circuit viewed this case as falling within the single-
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claimant exception.
Only this much is clear from the memorandum: the
See USCA Memorandum at 2.
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As the Ninth
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Circuit explained, when this exception applies, a district court
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must dissolve a LOLA injunction on state court proceedings unless
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the vessel owner can show that dissolving the injunction would
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prejudice his limitation right.
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Marine, 531 U.S. 438, 449 (2001); Newton v. Shipman, 718 F.2d
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959, 961 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
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erred when it denied Willis’s motion to dissolve the LOLA
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injunction without conducting an on-the-record prejudice
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analysis.
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See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark
This Court admittedly
See generally Transcript of Proceedings held on
8/29/17, ECF No. 44.
Notwithstanding that error, it is unclear how the Anti-suit
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Injunction Order remains a live issue following a valid dismissal
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of Willis’s claims.
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decision as vacating the both the Anti-suit Injunction Order and
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the Dismissal Order, it remains concerned about adjudicating a
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moot issue.
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motion to dissolve the LOLA injunction would give rise to three
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possible scenarios.
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inquiry and find that dissolving the anti-suit injunction would
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prejudice WSR’s limitation right.
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would remain.
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WSR would undoubtedly file the same motion to dismiss it filed in
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November 2017.
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in December 2017.
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they were before the appeal, less thousands of dollars in legal
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fees.
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Even if this Court reads the Ninth Circuit’s
In this Court’s opinion, re-litigating Willis’s
First, the Court could conduct a prejudice
In which case, the injunction
See Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437, 439-440 (1932).
This Court would issue the same order it issued
And all parties would be in the same position
Second, the Court could find that dissolving the anti-suit
injunction would not prejudice WSR’s limitation right.
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Admittedly, Willis would then be entitled to proceed with her
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claims against WSR in state court.
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959, 961-62 (9th Cir. 1983).
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with the limitation action in federal court.
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in the first scenario, WSR would file a motion to dismiss and,
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for the reasons discussed in its prior Dismissal Order, this
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Court would have to grant it.
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Alameda County Superior Court and remove itself from the state
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proceedings.
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Newton v. Shipman, 718 F.2d
But this Court could still proceed
See id. at 963.
As
WSR would take this order down to
See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-73(1938).
Again, none of the parties are made better off by this process.
Finally, the Court could find WSR would not be prejudiced by
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the state court proceedings, dissolve the anti-suit injunction,
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and stay the federal proceedings until the state litigation is
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complete.
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preferred course of action, though it makes little sense to the
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Court.
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would lie in wait for several more years while the parties
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litigated in state court.
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would then resume the federal proceedings.
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stipulated to “waiv[ing] any res judicata or collateral estoppel
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effect that an intervening jury trial might [] have on [the
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limitation issues],” the parties would have to argue the
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limitation action from scratch.
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No. 73.
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grant it.
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a purely academic exercise.
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See Newton, 718 F.2d at 963.
This is Willis’s
Using this approach, WSR’s two-year-old limitation action
Assuming Willis prevails, this Court
Given Willis
See Stipulation on Remand, ECF
WSR would file a motion to dismiss, and the Court would
The Court does not see the utility in engaging in such
At the July hearing and in its petition to the Ninth
Circuit, Willis argued this Court’s critical misstep was in
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thinking that it would retain jurisdiction to adjudicate the
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negligence prong of the limitation action if it dissolved the
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anti-suit injunction.
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) at 2-3, No. 19-
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72233.
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the question of WSR’s liability “is not before this Court, should
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have never been before this Court, and will not be before this
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Court if I come back here.”
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on Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001), Lake
Tr. at 16:11-17, 17:7-18:3; Appellant’s
Indeed, Willis’s counsel stated, in no uncertain terms,
Tr. 17:13-15.
Willis largely relies
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Tankers v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147 (1957), and In re Tidewater, 249
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F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2001) for this position.
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Petition at 2-3.
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does not read these cases the way Willis does.
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include mandatory language about dissolving a LOLA injunction
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absent a showing of prejudice when the single-claimant exception
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applies, they do not indicate that a district court divests
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itself of jurisdiction over the negligence phase of a limitation
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action upon dissolving the injunction.
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445 (“Thus, the saving to suitors clause preserves remedies and
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the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some admiralty
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and maritime claims.” (emphasis added)); Lake Tankers, 354 U.S.
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at 153 (explaining that the single claimant exception would at
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times subject a vessel owner to a “multiplicity of suits”).
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do these cases appear to “narrowly circumscribe” a district
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court’s ability to proceed with a LOLA action concurrently with
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state court proceedings.
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963–another case upon which Willis relies—squarely counsels
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against tying a district court’s hands this way.
Tr. at 15:10-20;
But as this Court has already explained, it
While these cases
See Lewis, 531 U.S. at
Nor
To the contrary, Newton, 718 F.3d at
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There, the
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Ninth Circuit explained:
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In remanding this case for further action by the
district court, we offer some general guidance on how
the case might proceed. First it may be noted that
admiralty practice incorporates the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which were drafted ‘to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
actin.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp.R.A.
advisory committee note. Useless formalities should
not inhibit the efficient administration of the
court . . . . The district court should select the
most efficient manner of proceeding.
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Id.
Each of the three scenarios discussed above ultimately lead
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to the dismissal of Willis’s claim.
That is because eventually—
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be it now or in a few years—this Court must adjudicate WSR’s
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limitation action.
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actions proceed in two phases.
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show “what acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness
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caused the accident.”
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Cir. 1989).
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negligence or unseaworthiness, the vessel owner is wholly
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exonerated—“if no liability exists there is nothing to limit.”
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Id. (quoting Northern Fishing Trading Co., Inc. v. Grabowski,
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1973 A.M.C. 1283, 1290 (9th Cir. 1973)).
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the single-claimant exception allows Willis to try her wrongful
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death and survival action claims before a jury in state court,
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she must eventually still prove WSR’s negligence by a
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preponderance of the evidence in federal court.
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Court has previously found on two occasions that Willis failed to
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set forth a negligence claim because she did not allege WSR owed
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her son a duty of care, Willis cannot successfully defend against
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WSR’s limitation action.
As the Ninth Circuit knows, limitation
First, the injured party must
In re Hechinger, 802 F.2d 202, 207 (9th
If the claimant fails to make a showing of
Accordingly, although
See ECF Nos. 41, 61.
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Given that this
Accordingly, this
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Court’s finding that the anti-suit injunction issue is moot
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should be affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.
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II.
CONCLUSION
This Court granted WSR’s motion for exoneration based on its
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finding that the anti-suit injunction issue was moot.
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stands by its ruling, but invites clarification from the Ninth
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Circuit on its May 21, 2019 Memorandum, June 10, 2010 Mandate, or
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any of its prior case law.
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Dated: October 1, 2019
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The Court
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