Goods v. Virga et al
Filing
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ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 11/19/2018 ORDERING plaintiff may file a first amended complaint within 30 days. (Yin, K)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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GREGORY GOODS,
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No. 2:17-CV-0660-JAM-DMC-P
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
TIM V. VIRGA, et al.,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges
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that Defendants are failing to keep him safe by continually placing him in a double cell with
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individuals who threaten his safety, violating his Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and
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unusual punishment.
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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD
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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “…short and
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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v.
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Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual
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allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
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(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s
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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.
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Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
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omitted).
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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their
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pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
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338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be
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facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer
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that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation
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marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The
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sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with
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liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks
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omitted); Moss, 572F.3d at 969.
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II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
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Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his eighth amendment right to safety by
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continually housing him in double cell housing units. Plaintiff contends that his “case factors”
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make him a target for physical altercations and threats to his safety and to his life. Plaintiff
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alleges that each named Defendant knew, should have known, or was involved in, Plaintiff’s
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continual housing with cellmates who posed a significant threat of harm to him.
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III. ANALYSIS
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the
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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel
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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,
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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts
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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.
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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with
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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,
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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when
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two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such
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that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)
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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of
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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison
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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.
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Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to
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protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir.
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1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists if: (1) objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated
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under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) subjectively, prison
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officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of
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the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element. See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074,
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1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable, however, if evidence is presented that they
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lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does
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not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials know for a certainty that the inmate’s
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safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v.
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Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the plaintiff must show that prison
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officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually knew of a substantial risk, they
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are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not
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averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
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Plaintiff alleges that each named defendant violated his eighth amendment right to
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safety by continually placing him in double cell housing units with incompatible cellmates.
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However, there are no factual allegations that indicate Defendants David Baughman or Jeffery
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McCumber were involved in the alleged violations. Plaintiff only states that both Baughman and
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McCumber knew or should have known of the violence caused by double celling. This is too
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vague and conclusory of an allegation to connect these two Plaintiffs to the alleged violations.
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See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). A plaintiff must plead that each
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government official defendant through the official’s own individual actions, violated the
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constitution, and Plaintiff has not done so here in relation to these two Defendants. For that
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reason, the claim related to them is dismissed. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend
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as to defendants Baughman and McCumber.
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IV. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT
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Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
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amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
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1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an
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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,
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1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the
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prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An
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amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the
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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Because the complaint appears to otherwise state a cognizable claim, if no
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amended complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the court will issue findings and
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recommendations that defendants Baughman and McCumber be dismissed, as well as such
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further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the remaining defendants.
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V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a first amended
complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.
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Dated: November 19, 2018
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DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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