Cain v. City of Sacramento et al

Filing 18

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 10/3/2017 ORDERING 10 the Court GRANTS County's Motion to Dismiss the Monell claim asserted against it. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend only the claim against the County which was the subject of the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's amended complaint must be filed within 20 days from the date of this Order. The County's responsive pleading is due within 20 days thereafter. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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NANDI CAIN JR.,

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2:17-cv-00848-JAM-DB

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.

ORDER GRANTING COUNTY OF
SACRAMENTO’S MOTION TO DISMISS

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Nandi Cain Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against

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Officer Anthony Figueroa, the City of Sacramento, the County of

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Sacramento, and a number of Doe defendants for constitutional

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violations stemming from a disturbing confrontation, arrest, and

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detention.

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of the Monell claim asserted against it.

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forth below, the Court grants the County’s Motion to Dismiss,

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with leave to amend. 1

The County of Sacramento (“County”) seeks dismissal
For the reasons set

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for August 29, 2017.
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I.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Nandi Cain (“Plaintiff”) alleges (and for purposes of this

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motion the Court takes as true) that the following events

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transpired:

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On April 10, 2017, Officer Anthony Figueroa stopped

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Plaintiff as he was walking down Cypress Street in Del Paso

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Heights.

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questioned the officer’s motives, Officer Figueroa rushed at

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Plaintiff, grabbed him by the throat, threw him to the ground,

Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 11–13.

After Plaintiff

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and began punching him in the face.

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and the other officers that arrived on scene handcuffed Plaintiff

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and put him in the back of a patrol car.

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Plaintiff was transported to the Sacramento County Jail, 2 without

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being offered or provided medical care for his injuries.

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Id. ¶ 16.

Officer Figueroa

Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.

Id.

At the jail, staff again failed to offer or provide care for

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Plaintiff’s injuries.

Id. ¶ 19.

Officers placed Plaintiff in an

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isolation cell, where he was subsequently attacked by multiple

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officers who forcibly stripped him of his clothes.

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21.

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sexually assault him.

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around 2:00 a.m. and no charges were filed against him.

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¶¶ 25, 26.

Id. ¶¶ 20,

Plaintiff was humiliated and feared that the officers would
Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.

Plaintiff was released
Id.

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Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Officer Figueroa,

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unnamed officers and jail employees, the City of Sacramento, and

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the County of Sacramento.

He asserts a Fourth Amendment

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This paragraph refers to Sacramento City Jail, but the
Complaint otherwise indicates Plaintiff was transported to the
County Jail.
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excessive force claim against Officer Figueroa and unnamed

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officers, and a Monell claim against the City, the County, and

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other unnamed officers.

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alleges the following:

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•

With respect to the County, Plaintiff

“CITY/COUNTY . . . breached their duty of care to the

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public in that they have failed to discipline

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Defendants . . . for their respective misconduct and

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involvement in the incident described herein.

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failure . . . demonstrates the existence of an

Their

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entrenched culture, policy or practice of promoting,

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tolerating, and/or ratifying with deliberate

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indifference, the use of racial profiling, excessive

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force and the fabrication of official reports to cover

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up Defendants” misconduct.

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•

Compl. ¶ 27.

“[A]s a matter of official policy—rooted in an

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entrenched posture of deliberate indifference to the

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constitutional rights of persons [in the] CITY/COUNTY

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of SACRAMENTO, SPD/SSD has allowed persons to be abused

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and racially profiled by its employees including

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Defendants[.]”

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•

Id. ¶ 29.

“SPD/SSD employees exhibit a pattern and practice of

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using racial profiling and excessive force against

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citizens and despite these incidents, none of the

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employees are ever found in violation of department

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policy, even under the most questionable of

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circumstances.

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retrain any of the involved employees is evidence of an

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official policy, entrenched culture and posture of

SPD/SSD’s failure to discipline or

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deliberate indifference toward protecting citizen’s

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rights and the resulting deaths and injuries is a

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proximate result of SPD/SSD’s failure to properly

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supervise its employees and ratify their

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unconstitutional conduct.”
•

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Id. ¶ 31.

“[H]igh ranking CITY/COUNTY officials . . . knew and/or

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reasonably should have known about the repeated acts of

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unconstitutional excessive force by SPD/SSD Officers

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. . . [and] approved, ratified, condoned, encouraged,

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sought to cover up, and/or tacitly authorized the

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continuing pattern and practice of misconduct and/or

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civil rights violations by SPD/SSD” that resulted in

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Plaintiff’s beating.

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deliberate indifference, reckless, and/or conscious

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disregard of the misconduct by Defendants . . .

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[CITY/COUNTY] ratified and encouraged these officers to

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continue their course of misconduct.”

“As a result of because of th[is]

Id. ¶¶ 40–42.

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The County seeks dismissal of the Monell claim asserted against

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it.

ECF No. 10.

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II.

OPINION

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A.

Motion to Dismiss

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A government entity, like the County, cannot be held liable

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless a plaintiff can show that the

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entity’s policy, practice, or custom was the moving force behind

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the constitutional violation.

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of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

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Monell claim, “a plaintiff must prove (1) that [she] possessed a

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constitutional right of which she was deprived; (2) that the

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services

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To establish a

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government entity had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to

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deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right;

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and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the

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constitutional violation.”

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892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

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circumstances, a failure to train, a failure to supervise, or a

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failure to respond to repeated constitutional violations of which

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an entity had notice may amount to a policy of deliberate

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indifference.

Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d
In certain

Id. (failure to train; failure to supervise);

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Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1027 (9th Cir.

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2015) (failure to discharge or reprimand).

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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

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more than just labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation

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of the elements of a cause of action.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

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plead a Monell claim in the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff need only

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plead a “bare allegation that government officials’

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[unconstitutional] conduct conformed to some unidentified” policy

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or custom.

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631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Ninth Circuit held that Monell claims must also contain

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sufficient allegations to give fair notice to the opposing party

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and “must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that

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it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to

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the expense of discovery and continued litigation.”

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Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)).

Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Historically, in order to

AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d
Following Iqbal/Twombly, however, the

Id. (quoting

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The County argues that Plaintiff’s Monell claim against it

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should be dismissed because the Complaint “recites only ‘labels
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and conclusions’ that are not entitled to the presumption of

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truth, and therefore are insufficient to state a claim.”

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Dismiss at 4.

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single incident of unconstitutional activity, which cannot, by

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itself, support a Monell claim.

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Mot. to

It further argues that Plaintiff only alleges a

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must do more

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than allege that a Monell defendant “maintained or permitted an

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official policy, custom or practice of knowingly permitting the

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occurrence of the type of wrongs” alleged elsewhere in the

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complaint.

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regarding the specific nature of the alleged policy, custom, or

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practice are required; merely stating the subject to which the

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policy relates (i.e. excessive force) is insufficient.

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Following this rule, district courts have dismissed complaints

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where a plaintiff alleged a single incident of unconstitutional

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conduct as the basis for their Monell claim.

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of Santa Rosa, No. C 12-6451 MMC, 2013 WL 4675354 (N.D. Cal. Aug.

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30, 2013) (dismissing a Monell claim rooted in allegations of an

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officer’s use of excessive force during plaintiff’s arrest,

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finding that a single incident is insufficient to support a

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Monell claim based on inadequate training or failure to

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discipline).

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content of the policies, customs, or practices giving rise to the

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alleged constitutional injuries, courts have allowed the claim to

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go forward.

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890, 899–900 (N.D. Cal. 2013).

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AE ex rel. Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637.

Facts

See id.

See Wallace v. City

In contrast, where a complaint specifies the

See Mateos-Sandoval v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 942 F. Supp.

The Complaint in this case alleges a traumatic encounter
between Plaintiff and staff at the Sacramento County Jail.
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Nevertheless, the allegations are insufficient to state a claim

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against the County.

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County is that it allowed or promoted the type of excessive force

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alleged elsewhere in the Complaint.

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These allegations lack the specificity required to state a

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plausible—not merely possible—claim for relief.

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Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637.

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his allegations against the City and the County into single

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paragraphs further demonstrates the conclusory nature of the

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The thrust of the allegations against the

See Compl. ¶¶ 27, 29, 31.

See AE ex rel.

The fact that Plaintiff collapses

pleadings.
Insofar as Plaintiff premises the Monell claim on the

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County’s failure to discipline the officers involved in the

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alleged incident, the pleadings, again, lack sufficient facts.

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Plaintiff is correct that—in certain circumstances and with

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additional facts—the failure to discipline or reprimand officers

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for unconstitutional conduct may support Monell liability.

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Velazquez, 793 F.3d at 1027 (“A custom or practice can be

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inferred from evidence of repeated constitutional violations for

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which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or

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reprimanded.”); Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512 (9th Cir.

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1997) (post-event evidence of identical incidents may show that a

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municipality had notice of its agents’ unconstitutional actions).

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However, Plaintiff merely recites the elements that would support

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such a claim without alleging any facts to cross the plausibility

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threshold.

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No. 16-CV-02250-LHK, 2017 WL 344998, at *16 (N.D Cal. Jan. 24,

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2017) (finding plaintiff’s allegation that Sunnyvale has a policy

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to cover up unconstitutional actions by failing to investigate

See

Compl. ¶¶ 31, 40–44; see Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale,

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and discipline unconstitutional enforcement activity too vague to

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support Monell liability under

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allegations, too, are insufficient.

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AE ex rel. Hernandez).

These

Furthermore, the Complaint does not plausibly allege a

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Monell claim against the County based on inadequate training.

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Plaintiff has not provided any facts or explanation as to how the

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County’s officer training is inadequate.

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Sunnyvale, No. C 08-5771 JF (PSG), 2011 WL 1743910, at *6 (N.D.

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Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (“[Plaintiffs’] Monell allegations still are

See Canas v. City of

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conclusory in nature.

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training was inadequate [to] enable them to assist the Decedent

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after he was shot, Plaintiffs do not explain in detail how the

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City’s alleged policies or customs are deficient.”).

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stating that Defendants “were on notice of the Constitutional

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defects in their training of SPD/SSD police officers, including,

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but not limited to unlawfully using excessive force to make

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detentions and/or arrests” is plainly insufficient.

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Other than alleging that the officers’ EMT

Summarily

Compl. ¶ 43.

Although Plaintiff incorporates some elements of various

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Monell theories in his allegations, Plaintiff has failed to

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allege facts supporting a plausible claim for relief.

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Accordingly, the claim must be dismissed.

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B.

Motion to Compel

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In the final section of its Opposition, Plaintiff inserts a

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request for the Court to compel the County to provide names of

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jail employees.

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and is thus denied.

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///

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This request is not properly before the Court

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III.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS County’s

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Motion to Dismiss the Monell claim asserted against it.

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Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend only the claim against the

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County which was the subject of the Motion to Dismiss.

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be filed within twenty days

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from the date of this Order.

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due within twenty days thereafter.

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amend the Complaint, the case will proceed on the remaining

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The

The County’s responsive pleading is
If Plaintiff chooses not to

claims and the County will be dismissed from this action.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: October 3, 2017

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