Price v. Child Protective Services et al
Filing
43
ORDER and FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 5/20/19 RECOMMENDING that Defendants' 17 , 20 motions to dismiss be GRANTED, Plaintiff's first amended complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, Plai ntiff's 31 motion to substitute parties be DENIED AS MOOT and this case be closed. It is ORDERED that 16 the initial scheduling conference set for 6/13/2019 is VACATED. The Clerk shall serve a copy of this order and findings and recomm endations on plaintiff at 1215 Lincoln Street, Oroville, CA 95966, in addition to his current address of record. All pleading, discovery, and motion practice in this action are STAYED pending resolution of the findings and recommendations. Matter REFERRED to District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller. Within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. (Kastilahn, A)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
WILLIAM HENRY PRICE,
12
No. 2:17-cv-01031-KJM-KJN PS
Plaintiff,
13
v.
14
ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES OF
BUTTE COUNTY, et al.,
15
Defendants.
16
17
Plaintiff William Henry Price, who proceeds without counsel, commenced this action on
18
19
May 16, 2017.1 (ECF No. 1.) Presently pending before the court are defendants’ motions to
20
dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint, and plaintiff’s motion to substitute parties. (ECF
21
Nos. 17, 20, 31.) Plaintiff opposed defendants’ motions and defendants replied. (ECF Nos. 35-
22
39.) This matter came on for hearing on May 16, 2019, at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff failed to appear.
23
Gregory P. Einhorn appeared on behalf of defendants Child Protective Services of Butte County
24
and Sharon Stone. Mark A. Habib appeared on behalf of defendant the City of Oroville Police
25
Department.
26
////
27
28
1
This case proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
1
After carefully considering the parties’ briefing, the oral argument at the hearing, and the
1
2
applicable law, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motions to dismiss be GRANTED;
3
plaintiff’s first amended complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and plaintiff’s motion to
4
substitute parties be DENIED AS MOOT.
5
I.
BACKGROUND
6
Plaintiff initiated this matter when he was incarcerated in the Butte County Jail. (ECF No.
7
1.) Plaintiff was later transferred to Folsom State Prison, and subsequently filed the first amended
8
complaint on February 7, 2018. (ECF Nos. 5, 6.) Thereafter, plaintiff was released from custody,
9
and lists his address in Oroville, California. (See ECF Nos. 7, 21, 39.)
10
The first amended complaint brings three causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
11
for alleged violations of plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See generally, ECF
12
No. 6.) The claims center around events that took place on July 11, 2012, when Child Protective
13
Services allegedly “snatched up” plaintiff’s daughter after she was released from the Oroville
14
Hospital “without injuries or any other aggravating reports by the” hospital. (ECF No. 6 at 3.)
15
The Oroville Police Department purportedly facilitated the activities of Child Protective Services.
16
(Id. at 4.) Plaintiff asserts that his daughter was not in any danger and that defendants used
17
“unexplained rules and vague polices,” coupled with plaintiff’s prior convictions as pretext to
18
take plaintiff’s daughter away without due process. (Id. at 5-7.)
Defendants move to dismiss based upon the same argument—that plaintiff’s claims are
19
20
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (See ECF Nos. 17, 20, 27, 28.)
21
Plaintiff’s opposition in this matter was untimely. (See ECF Nos. 33, 35, 36, 39.)
22
Moreover, plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing, even though plaintiff is no longer incarcerated.
23
Nevertheless, due to plaintiff’s pro se status and the court’s strong desire to resolve this matter on
24
the merits, the court considers plaintiff’s arguments in opposition.
25
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
26
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
27
challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. Vega v. JPMorgan Chase
28
Bank, N.A., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Under the “notice pleading” standard
2
1
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff’s complaint must provide, in part, a “short and
2
plain statement” of plaintiff’s claims showing entitlement to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see
3
also Paulsen v. CNF, Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss,
4
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
5
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
6
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
7
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
8
for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
9
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts all of the
10
facts alleged in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the
11
plaintiff. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007). The court is “not,
12
however, required to accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents
13
referred to in the complaint, and [the court does] not necessarily assume the truth of legal
14
conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Paulsen, 559 F.3d at
15
1071. The court must construe a pro se pleading liberally to determine if it states a claim and,
16
prior to dismissal, tell a plaintiff of deficiencies in his complaint and give plaintiff an opportunity
17
to cure them if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect. See Lopez v.
18
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); accord Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
19
Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that “pro se pleadings are liberally construed,
20
particularly where civil rights claims are involved”); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342
21
& n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that courts continue to construe pro se filings liberally even when
22
evaluating them under the standard announced in Iqbal).
23
In ruling on a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court “may generally
24
consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and
25
matters properly subject to judicial notice.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506
26
F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Although the court may not
27
consider a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss to determine the
28
propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194,
3
1
1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), it may consider allegations raised in opposition papers in deciding
2
whether to grant leave to amend, see, e.g., Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir.
3
2003).
4
III.
DISCUSSION
5
“Parents and children have a well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without
6
governmental interference. That right is an essential liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
7
Amendment’s guarantee that parents and children will not be separated by the state without due
8
process of law except in an emergency.” Hardwick v. Cty. of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th
9
Cir. 2017). A parent may bring a claim under 42. U.S.C. § 1983 based upon a violation of this
10
right. See Id.
11
However, such a claim is subject to certain limitations. For claims under 42 U.S.C. §
12
1983, which “does not include its own statute of limitations, federal courts borrow the forum
13
state’s limitations period for personal injury torts.” See Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of San
14
Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). The applicable California law establishes a two
15
year statute of limitations for such claims. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §335.1.
“Although California law determines the length of the limitations period, federal law
16
17
determines when a civil rights claim accrues. . . . [U]nder federal law, a claim accrues ‘when the
18
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’” Lukovsky
19
535 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2004))
20
(emphasis in original).
Here, plaintiff’s first amended complaint is based upon events that occurred on July 11,
21
22
2012, when defendants allegedly took plaintiff’s daughter away from plaintiff and his family.
23
(ECF No. 6 at 3.) Yet, plaintiff did not file this action until May 16, 2017, nearly five years after
24
the events in question. (ECF No 1.) The first amended complaint indicates that plaintiff knew
25
that there was no appropriate reason to remove his daughter, when she was taken. Accordingly,
26
plaintiff knew—or at the very least had reason to know—of the injury that is the basis of this
27
action on July 11, 2012, well over two years prior to the date he initiated this case.
28
////
4
1
Nevertheless, plaintiff asserts that his complaint in this court is timely because Child
2
Protective Services held his complaint to that agency “over their period of time to answer.” (ECF
3
No. 36 at 1.) This argument is unavailing.
4
Plaintiff was not required to wait for Child Protective Services to answer his
5
administrative complaint prior to filing this action, because there is no administrative exhaustion
6
requirement for the type of claims that plaintiff brings. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of
7
Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516,(1982) (concluding that based upon the legislative histories of both the
8
Civil Rights Act and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act “exhaustion of state
9
administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to
10
§ 1983”). Rather, plaintiff was required to bring his claims within two years of the date that he
11
knew or had reason to know of the injury at issue, which he failed to do. See Lukovsky 535 F.3d
12
at 1048; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §335.1.
13
IV.
14
CONCLUSION
Therefore, plaintiff’s first amended complaint is subject to dismissal and further leave to
15
amend would be futile, as his claims are clearly time-barred. Allowing plaintiff to substitute
16
parties would not cure this fundamental deficiency.
17
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
18
1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 17, 20) be GRANTED.
19
2. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
20
3. Plaintiff’s motion to substitute parties (ECF No. 31) be DENIED AS MOOT.
21
4. The Clerk of Court be ordered to close this case.
22
In light of these recommendations, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that:
23
1. The initial scheduling conference set for June 13, 2019 (ECF No. 16) is VACATED.
24
2. The Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this order and findings and recommendations
25
on plaintiff at 1215 Lincoln Street, Oroville, CA 95966, in addition to his current
26
address of record.
27
28
3. All pleading, discovery, and motion practice in this action are STAYED pending
resolution of the findings and recommendations. With the exception of objections to
5
1
the findings and recommendations and any non-frivolous motions for emergency
2
relief, the court will not entertain or respond to any motions and other filings until the
3
findings and recommendations are resolved.
4
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
5
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14)
6
days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
7
objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
8
“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections
9
shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the
10
objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may
11
waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th
12
Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).
13
14
IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.
Dated: May 20, 2019
15
16
17
18
19
/Price.01031.F&R MTD
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?