Laurelhurst Drive Fee Owner LLC et al v. Gram

Filing 3

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 5/26/2017 ORDERING that this case is REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. Defendant's 2 Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED. Copy of remand order sent to other court. CASE CLOSED. (Zignago, K.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LAURELHURST DRIVE FEE OWNER
LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

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ORDER REMANDING CASE
v.
VICKI GRAM,
Defendant.

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No. 2:17-cv-01096-TLN-CKD

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Vicki Gram’s (“Defendant”) Notice

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of Removal and motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1–2.) For the reasons set forth

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below, Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. The Court hereby

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REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, due to lack of

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subject matter jurisdiction.

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I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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On April 25, 2017, Plaintiffs Laurelhurst Drive Fee Owner LLC and Laurelhurst Drive

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Fee Owner II LLC (“Plaintiffs”) filed an unlawful detainer action in the Superior Court of

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California, County of Sacramento. (Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1 at 1.) On May 25, 2017,

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Defendant filed a Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
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California. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant asserts that removal is proper because (i) “[t]he complaint

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presents federal questions” and (ii) “[f]ederal question exists because Defendant’s Answer, a

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pleading that depends on the determination of Defendant’s rights and Plaintiff’s [sic] duties under

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federal law.” (ECF No. 1 at 2–3, ¶¶ 5, 8.) For the reasons stated below, this Court finds that

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subject matter jurisdiction does not exist and thus this case must be remanded.

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II.

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28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the

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district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal is

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proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been

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STANDARD OF LAW

filed in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

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Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the

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defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980

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F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time

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determines that it lacks jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the improvident

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grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy,

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Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 U.S. 974

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(2005).
The “presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

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complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

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presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.

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Removal cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim raising a

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federal question, whether filed in state court or federal court. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556

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U.S. 49, 60–61 (2009); Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009).

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III.

ANALYSIS

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Defendant removed the instant action to this Court on the basis of federal question

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jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at 2–3.) Defendant argues that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §

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1441(a) or (b).1 (ECF No. 1 at 2.) For jurisdiction to exist under § 1441(a), a federal question

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must be presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar, 482 U.S.

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at 392. Here, Defendant states without explanation that the “complaint presents federal

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questions.” (ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 5.) However, Plaintiffs’ complaint for unlawful detainer does not

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present a federal question on its face. See, e.g., DVP, LP v. Champ, No. 1:15-cv-00074-LJO-

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SKO, 2015 WL 12681672, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2015) (“[A]n unlawful detainer action, on its

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face, fails to raise a federal question.”). Defendant further claims that her Answer implicates

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federal questions because it requires a “determination of Defendant’s rights and Plaintiff’s [sic]

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duties under federal law.” (ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 8.) An answer cannot confer federal question

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jurisdiction on this Court. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60 (explaining federal jurisdiction can neither

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be “predicated on an actual or anticipated defense” nor “rest upon an actual or anticipated

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counterclaim”).
To the extent Defendant’s notice of removal seeks removal on the basis of Section

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1441(b), this too fails. Section 1441(b) allows for a case to be removed to federal court on the

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basis of diversity jurisdiction if the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) are met. Section 1332(a)

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confers diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of

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$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between — (1) citizens of different States.” In an

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unlawful detainer action, only the right to possession of the property is at issue, not the title. See

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Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Yanez, ED-15-CV-02462-VAP-DTBx, 2016 WL 591752, at *2

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(C.D. Cal. February 11, 2016) (citing Evans v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 162, 170 (1977)).

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Consequently, the amount in controversy is determined by the amount sought in the complaint.

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See id. Here, Defendant fails to meet the $75,000 threshold as Plaintiffs seek less than $10,000 in

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their complaint. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 3.)

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Thus, Defendant has failed to establish the burden of showing that jurisdiction before this
Court is proper, and it is appropriate to remand this case, sua sponte, for lack of federal

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Defendant fails to explain how or why subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). In fact,
other than Defendant’s passing mention of §1441(b), Defendant fails to discuss diversity jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
this Court discusses below why removal is improper under §1441(b).

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jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th

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Cir. 2004) (“[T]he district court ha[s] a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the

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removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.”).

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IV.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby REMANDS this action to the Superior Court

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of California, County of Sacramento. In removing this case, Defendant filed a motion to proceed

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in forma pauperis. (See ECF No. 2.) The Court has reviewed this motion and finds that

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Defendant meets the requirements of in forma pauperis status and thus GRANTS Defendant’s

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request.

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CONCLUSION

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: May 26, 2017

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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