Tsi Akim Maidu of Taylorsville Rancheria v. United States Department of the Interior et al

Filing 52

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 7/6/2020 GRANTING 47 Ex Parte Application; STAYING all dates and deadlines set forth in the 44 Scheduling Order pending the court's ruling on 48 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney; and DIRECTING defendants to file a Motion to Dismiss, or alternatively the parties shall file a joint status report should Defendants decline to file the motion dismiss, within 14 days after the Court's order on the 48 Motion to Withdraw. (Coll, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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TSI AKIM MAIDU OF TAYLORSVILLE
RANCHERIA,
Plaintiff,

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ORDER
v.

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No. 2:17-cv-01156-TLN-CKD

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR; DAVID BERNHARDT;
TARA KATUK MAC LEAN SWEENEY;
and DOES 1–100,

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Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on Federal Defendants’ (collectively, “Defendants”) Ex

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Parte Application for Order Staying Administrative Record Deadlines and Briefing Schedule.

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(ECF No. 47.) Plaintiff Tsi Akim Maidu of Taylorsville Rancheria (“Plaintiff”) filed a response.

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(ECF No. 50.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 51.) For the reasons set forth below,

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Defendants’ Ex Parte Application is GRANTED.

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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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On April 24, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to

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dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. (ECF No. 41.) The Court granted the motion as to

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Plaintiff’s loss of tribal status claim on statute of limitations grounds and dismissed that claim

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with prejudice. (Id. at 6–7.) The Court found that Plaintiff’s claim as to the Department of the

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Interior’s June 9, 2015 decision that Plaintiff is ineligible for Part 83 acknowledgment (“June 9,

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2015 decision”) was not time-barred, noting Defendants had not challenged that claim on those

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grounds, and the Court ruled that the claim would proceed as an APA judicial review case in the

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normal course. (Id. at 6.)

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The Court ordered the parties to submit a Joint Status Report within 14 days after entry of

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its order on the motion to dismiss. (Id. at 7.) The parties filed their report on May 7, 2020. (ECF

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No. 43.) Defendants stated in the Joint Status Report that they were considering whether to

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retract the June 9, 2015 decision and that, if they decided to do so, they would seek dismissal on

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grounds that the case is moot. (Id.) Plaintiff reserved the right to oppose such relief. (Id.)

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On May 15, 2020, the Court entered its Pretrial Scheduling Order, which requires that

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Defendants must lodge the Administrative Record with the Court and serve it on Plaintiff on or

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before July 10, 2020. (ECF No. 44.) Plaintiff must file any objection to the adequacy of the

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Administrative Record and file its opening summary judgment brief by August 7, 2020. (Id.)

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On May 28, 2020, the Department of the Interior notified Plaintiff’s counsel of record

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in writing that it had retracted the June 9, 2015 decision. In light of the retraction of the only

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agency decision at issue in this APA case, Defendants subsequently asked Plaintiff to stipulate to

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dismiss this action as moot. (ECF No. 47-1 at ¶ 2.) After receiving no response to this request,

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Defendants informed Plaintiff in writing that, if it did not want to stipulate to dismissal,

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Defendants intended to file a motion to dismiss on mootness grounds and to set the hearing for

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the next available date on the Court’s calendar, which is August 6, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

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Given this timing, Defendants’ motion will not be decided before the current July 10,

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2020 Administrative Record deadline, or by the August 7, 2020 deadline for Plaintiff to object to

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the adequacy of the Administrative Record and to file its opening summary judgment brief. (ECF
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No. 44 at 2–3.) Having received no response from Plaintiff regarding a stipulation for dismissal

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of this action, Defendants filed the instant application. (ECF No. 47.)

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II.

STANDARD OF LAW

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In the instant case, the Pretrial Scheduling Order provides that, pursuant to Rule 16(b), the

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order “shall not be modified except by leave of court upon a showing of good cause.” (ECF No.

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44 at 4.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 16(b) provides that the district court must

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issue a scheduling order that limits “the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete

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discovery, and file motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A). A scheduling order “may be modified

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only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).

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The “good cause” standard “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the

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amendment,” and the court “may modify the pretrial schedule if it cannot reasonably be met

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despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,

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975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “The prejudice to

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opposing parties, if any, may provide additional grounds for denying the motion, but the focus is

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on the moving party’s reason for seeking the modification.” Atayde v. Napa State Hosp., No.

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116-CV-00398-DAD-SAB, 2020 WL 1046830, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2020), reconsideration

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denied, No. 116-CV-00398-DAD-SAB, 2020 WL 1937395 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2020).

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III.

ANALYSIS

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Defendants request the Court enter an order staying the deadlines for filing the

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administrative record and the summary judgment briefing set forth in the Pretrial Scheduling

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Order pending resolution of Defendants’ forthcoming motion to dismiss this action as moot.

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(ECF No. 47 at 1.) In its response, Plaintiff challenges the merits of Defendants’ mootness

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argument and also argues there is no need for a motion to dismiss when a motion for summary

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judgment can sufficiently address the issue. (ECF No. 50 at 2.)

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The Court finds good cause exists because Defendants were diligent in promptly filing

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this application after attempts to reach a stipulated resolution with Plaintiff failed. Within two

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weeks of the Court’s April 24, 2020 order on their motion to dismiss, Defendants stated in the

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Joint Status Report that they were reviewing the June 9, 2015 decision and considering whether to
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retract it. (ECF No. 43 at 3.) After they retracted the June 9, 2015 decision, Defendants asked

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Plaintiff to stipulate to dismissal or to modify the scheduling order to stay the Administrative

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Record and summary judgment briefing dates pending the Court’s ruling on their motion to

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dismiss. After receiving no response, Defendants promptly filed this application. Under these

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circumstances, good cause exists for the Court to modify the Pretrial Scheduling Order because

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Defendants were diligent in seeking such relief.

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Moreover, good cause exists because “[m]ootness is a threshold jurisdictional issue.” S.

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Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pub. Util. Com’n of State of Or., 9 F.3d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Sea-

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Land Serv., Inc. v. ILWU, 939 F.2d 866, 870 (9th Cir. 1991)). The Supreme Court has

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“repeatedly held that an actual controversy must exist not only at the time the complaint is filed,

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but through all stages of the litigation.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90-91 (2013)

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(internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, the Court must decide whether this action is

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now moot based on the Department’s retraction of the June 9, 2015 decision before proceeding to

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the merits of Plaintiff’s claim on cross-summary judgment briefing.

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Modification of the scheduling order also serves the interests of judicial economy and is

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consistent with the Court’s inherent power to control its docket. See United States v. W.R. Grace,

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526 F.3d 499, 509 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules Inc.,

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146 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1998)). If the scheduling order deadlines are not stayed so that the

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Court can determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide this case, its docket will be clogged with

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a potentially unnecessary Administrative Record and briefing on the adequacy of the record,

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Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the parties’ cross-summary judgment motions on the merits

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all at the same time.

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Further, Plaintiff will suffer minimal prejudice from a stay of scheduling order deadlines

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and, instead, will benefit from a stay. Modification will avoid the significant time and expense

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Defendants will incur in preparing the Administrative Record, and Plaintiff will incur in

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reviewing the Administrative Record, filing any objections to the adequacy of the record, and

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filing its summary judgment brief by August 7. All of these actions will become unnecessary if

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the Court finds the case is moot.
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Accordingly, the Court finds good cause exists to modify the scheduling order pursuant to
Rule 16. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Ex Parte Application is hereby GRANTED. (ECF

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No. 47.) All dates and deadlines set forth in the Court’s Pretrial Scheduling Order (ECF No. 44)

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are STAYED pending the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw as counsel. (ECF No.

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48.) Defendants shall file their motion to dismiss, or alternatively the parties shall file a joint

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status report should Defendants decline to file the motion dismiss, not later than fourteen (14)

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days after the electronic filing of the Court’s order on the motion to withdraw.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 6, 2020

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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