Mitchell v. Shulkin
Filing
3
ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 8/23/18: Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 2 is granted. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. (Kaminski, H)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
ROBERT MITCHELL JR.,
12
Plaintiff,
13
14
15
v.
No. 2:17-cv-1239-JAM-EFB PS
ORDER
DAVID J. SHULKIN, Secretary of
Veterans Affairs,
Defendant.
16
17
Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915.1 His
18
declaration makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1) and (2). See ECF No. 2.
19
Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
20
Determining that plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis does not complete the required
21
inquiry. Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if it determines the
22
allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
23
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. As discussed
24
below, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed.
25
/////
26
27
28
1
This case, in which plaintiff is proceeding in propria persona, was referred to the
undersigned under Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
1
1
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
2
520-21 (1972), a complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
3
fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
4
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
5
(1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of
6
his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
7
a cause of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
8
relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are
9
true.” Id. (citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of cognizable
10
legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories.
11
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
12
Under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in
13
question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the
14
pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor,
15
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). A pro se plaintiff must satisfy the pleading
16
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a
17
complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
18
to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
19
which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
20
Applying these standards here, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state
21
a claim. Plaintiff filed this employment discrimination action against defendant the Secretary of
22
United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), alleging that he was subjected to racial
23
discrimination and a hostile work environment while working for the VA. ECF No. 1. The
24
“Statement of Claim” section of the complaint, rather than providing factual allegations, merely
25
states “See Attached ‘Reports of Contact,” which are appended to the complaint. The four
26
Reports of Conduct indicate that plaintiff, who worked for the VA as an addiction therapist, felt
27
he was mistreated by other VA employees. For example, in one report plaintiff describes disputes
28
between himself and other employees—including plaintiff’s supervisor, Dr. Tara Neavins—
2
1
regarding the appropriate treatment of two patients. Id. at 8. Plaintiff claims that he had a plan
2
for treating the patients, but other employees subjected plaintiff to questioning and required him
3
to explain his clinical decisions. Id. He claims that he was being singled out and that the
4
questions were the “direct result of the color of [his] skin.” Id.
5
Another report details a meeting plaintiff subsequently had with Dr. Martin Leamon, who
6
appears to be the director of plaintiff’s department, and Dr. Neavins. Id. At the meeting, plaintiff
7
expressed his frustrations regarding how others were treating him, and informed Dr. Leamon that
8
he wanted to be treated the same as his colleagues. Id. Dr. Leamon allegedly responded by
9
stating, “That’s just it, you do want to be treated different than you are being treated.” Id.
10
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Leamon’s statement confirmed that plaintiff has “been the victim of
11
discrimination, harassment, and subjected to a hostile and toxic work environment . . . based on
12
the color of [his] skin, by Dr. Tara Neavins . . . .” Id.
13
A third report describes an incident where plaintiff found Dr. Neavins accessing his
14
computer. Id. at 14. When plaintiff asked Dr. Neavins why she was accessing his computer, she
15
stated that she was turning down music that was playing through the computer. Id. Plaintiff
16
claims, however, that Dr. Neavins’ explanation was a lie because plaintiff witnessed her
17
accessing computer files. Plaintiff further states that she is in mediation with Dr. Neavins
18
regarding a prior dispute and suggests that Dr. Neavins may have been trying to access
19
documents related to the mediation. Id.
20
The last report concerns a dispute plaintiff had with other employees during a retreat. Id.
21
Dr. Neavin allegedly brought up a previous conflict plaintiff had with another employee named
22
Caren. During the prior conflict, Caren allegedly stated that plaintiff had no right to make clinical
23
decision regarding a patient since he was only an addiction therapist and not a nurse. Id. at 17.
24
During the retreat, another prior altercation, which plaintiff refers to as the “Hang Town”
25
conversation, was raised by a different employee. Plaintiff contends that raising these prior
26
disputes caused an environment that was “really hostile and racially charged.” Id. (emphasis in
27
original).
28
/////
3
1
Also appended to the complaint is an email dated October 30, 2016, from Dr. Neavins to
2
plaintiff and another African American employee. In the email, Dr. Neavins asks if plaintiff and
3
the other employee had “seen the green rag” for the “large group room (B-119). Id. at 11.
4
Plaintiff “view[s] this email as Dr. Neavins associating ‘A rag’ to the color of [his] skin (Black)”
5
because the email was sent to the only two African American clinicians working in the building.”
6
Id.
7
Although the complaint does not assert any particular cause of action, the reports
8
appended to the complaint suggests that plaintiff seeks to assert a hostile work environment claim
9
under Title VII claim. To state a Title VII claim predicate on a hostile work environment, a
10
plaintiff must allege (1) that he “was subjected to verbal or physical conduct based on race or
11
national origin; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; (3) that the conduct was ‘sufficiently severe
12
or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive work
13
environment.” Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff must
14
demonstrate that the work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile. Id. In
15
assessing whether the environment was objectively hostile, the court looks “to all of the
16
circumstances, including the frequency, severity, and nature (i.e., physically threatening or
17
humiliating as opposed to merely verbally offensive) of the conduct.” Id.
18
The documents appended to plaintiff’s complaint reflect that plaintiff was involved in
19
various work-related disputes, which plaintiff attributes to racial animus. The complaint,
20
however, is devoid of any factual allegations demonstrating that the work-related disputes were
21
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of plaintiff’s employment. Further, the
22
Reports of Conduct do not reflect that plaintiff’s work environment was objectively hostile. The
23
few incidents described in the reports, which occurred over the course of a year, do not involve
24
threatening or humiliating conduct. Instead, they largely reflect disagreements as to the
25
appropriate course of care for patients. Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for
26
failure to state a claim.
27
28
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint, if he can allege a cognizable legal
theory against a proper defendant and sufficient facts in support of that cognizable legal theory.
4
1
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (district courts must afford pro
2
se litigants an opportunity to amend to correct any deficiency in their complaints). Should
3
plaintiff choose to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint shall clearly set forth the
4
allegations against defendant and shall specify a basis for this court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
5
Any amended complaint shall plead plaintiff’s claims in “numbered paragraphs, each limited as
6
far as practicable to a single set of circumstances,” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
7
10(b), and shall be in double-spaced text on paper that bears line numbers in the left margin, as
8
required by Eastern District of California Local Rules 130(b) and 130(c). Any amended
9
complaint shall also use clear headings to delineate each claim alleged and against which
10
defendant or defendants the claim is alleged, as required by Rule 10(b), and must plead clear facts
11
that support each claim under each header.
12
Additionally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order to
13
make an amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be
14
complete in itself. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the
15
original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Accordingly, once
16
plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original no longer serves any function in the case.
17
Therefore, “a plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not
18
alleged in the amended complaint,” London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir.
19
1981), and defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. Ferdik v.
20
Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Finally, the court cautions plaintiff that failure to
21
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court’s Local Rules, or any court order
22
may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 110.
23
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
24
1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
25
2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend, as provided herein.
26
3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended
27
complaint. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must
28
/////
5
1
be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” Failure to timely file an amended complaint in
2
accordance with this order will result in a recommendation this action be dismissed.
3
DATED: August 23, 2018.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?