Khouanmany v. United States Marshals et al

Filing 73

ORDER and FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 3/28/2019 VACATING 64 Findings and Recommendations; GRANTING in PART 68 Motion - granting request to file proposed amended complaint and denying the motion in all other respects; DIRECTING Clerk of Court to separately docket 68 Motion as "Second Amended Complaint"; DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT SERVICE DOCUMENTS and USM-285 Forms with Notice of Submission of Documents within 30 days of service of this order; and RECOMMENDING defendants Jones, Gaskin-Bailey, Yao, and Deppe be dismissed without prejudice for the reasons identified in this order. Service is appropriate for Alencastre. Clerk to send plaintiff: 1 Summons, 1 USM-285 Form with instruction sheet, and 1 copies of the Amended Complaint filed on 11/26/2018. Referred to Judge Troy L. Nunley. Objections due within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations. (Henshaw, R)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 VILAYCHITH KHOUANMANY, 11 12 13 No. 2:17-cv-1326-TLN-EFB P Plaintiff, v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS UNITED STATES MARSHALS, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with claims arising under Bivens v. Six 17 Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). She alleges that she was sexually assaulted by 18 male members of the United Marshal Service during transport from the Sacramento County Jail 19 to federal court. 20 21 Background On September 19, 2017, the court screened plaintiff’s complaint and found that, although 22 she had stated a potentially cognizable claim against unnamed members of the Marshal Service, 23 these defendants could only be served if they were identified. ECF No. 31 at 3. On November 24 30, 2017, the court granted plaintiff’s request for a subpoena duces tecum in order to assist in 25 discovery of the identities of the Doe defendants. ECF No. 38 at 1-2. On February 14, 2018, the 26 court amended the subpoena submitted by plaintiff (having found it to be overbroad) and directed 27 service of the subpoena on the custodian of records for the Marshal Service in the Eastern District 28 of California and the custodian of records for the Sheriff of Sacramento County. ECF No. 42. 1 1 Although no defendant has been served, counsel representing both the United States 2 Marshal and the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department have filed responses indicating 3 compliance with subpoenas served upon them and production of documents to plaintiff in 4 conjunction therewith. ECF Nos. 54, 55, & 56. 5 On October 19, 2018 – more than a year after the initial complaint in this action was filed 6 - the court recommended dismissal of this action for failure to identify any defendant against 7 whom a cognizable claim could be stated. ECF No. 64. On November 26, 2018, plaintiff filed a 8 lengthy filing wherein she offered objections to the court’s recommendations, asked to amend her 9 complaint, requested appointment of counsel, and made a vague request to extend time. ECF No. 10 68. As discussed below, that filing included a proposed amended complaint which, although 11 difficult to follow, names one defendant against whom this action may proceed. Accordingly, the 12 court vacates its previous findings and recommendations. 13 Amended Complaint 14 As an initial matter, the proposed amended complaint is poorly organized and often 15 difficult to follow. Plaintiff weaves new allegations with legal objections and often repeats 16 herself. Nevertheless, it is apparent that plaintiff has staked a sufficient Eighth Amendment claim 17 against defendant Alencastre. She alleges that Alencastre sexually assaulted her during two 18 searches – once on February 26, 2016 at the federal courthouse and again on March 1, 2016 at the 19 Sacramento County Jail. ECF No. 68 at 7, 13. The court will recommend that all remaining 20 defendants and claims be dismissed. 21 I. 22 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a Screening Requirements 23 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 24 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 25 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 26 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 27 28 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 2 1 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 2 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Jackson v. Arizona, 3 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted), superseded by statute 4 on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Neitzke, 490 5 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, 6 has an arguable legal and factual basis. Id. 7 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 8 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 9 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 10 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 11 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more 12 than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 13 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations 14 omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that 15 merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) 16 (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 1216 (3d 17 ed. 2004)). 18 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 19 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 20 Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 21 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 22 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint 23 under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, 24 Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading 25 in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 26 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 27 ///// 28 ///// 3 1 II. 2 Other than defendant Alencastre, plaintiff has sued: (1) Sacramento County Sheriff Scott Analysis 3 Jones; (2) Anne Gaskin-Bailey, Supervising Deputy United States Marshal; (3) United States 4 Marshal Alan Yao; and (4) United States Marshal Sara Deppe. The claims against these 5 individuals are not suitable to proceed in this action. 6 7 A. Sheriff Jones As the court explained in its previous findings and recommendations, Sheriff Jones cannot 8 be held responsible for plaintiff’s sexual assault merely because he allowed law enforcement 9 officers of the opposite sex to transport her. There is no legal precedent which demands that a 10 supervisor automatically suspect or assume – absent some specific knowledge that he has or has 11 reason to have – that his subordinates will sexually abuse inmates of the opposite sex. And, in 12 any event, there is no indication that Jones had any control over the United States Marshals 13 accused of wrongdoing in this case. 14 Plaintiff appears to concede as much, but now argues that Jones had control over who 15 entered the county jail and “if he had trained and supervised who goes in and out of his County 16 [jail] . . . the males (sic) Marshals would not [have been] allowed inside Sacramento Jail.” ECF 17 No. 68 at 8. This argument is unconvincing. Nothing in plaintiff’s complaint indicates that Jones 18 had reason to know that any marshal would sexually assault her. Thus, he would have had no 19 reason to interfere with federal law enforcement agents who were, by all appearances, discharging 20 their duty to transport inmates to federal court. 21 Plaintiff alleges that Jones is in violation of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) 22 insofar as sexual assault against inmates is prohibited. Id. It is undeniably true that it is unlawful 23 for law enforcement to sexually assault inmates in their custody. But, again, nothing in the 24 complaint indicates that Jones had any reason to know that plaintiff would be sexually assaulted. 25 The PREA does not provide for automatic liability for prison supervisors whenever an inmate is 26 sexually mistreated. In fact, the majority of courts to consider the issue have determined that the 27 PREA does not actually provide for a private cause of action. See, e.g., Hatcher v. Harrington, 28 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13799, 2015 WL 474313, at *4-*5 (D. Haw. Feb. 5, 2015) (finding the 4 1 plaintiff's claims under PREA failed, because “[n]othing in the PREA explicitly or implicitly 2 suggests that Congress intended to create a private right of action for inmates to sue prison 3 officials for noncompliance with the Act,” and although there appears to be no federal appellate 4 decision addressing this issue, “district courts nationwide have found that PREA does not create a 5 private cause of action that can be brought by an individual plaintiff”). 6 B. Defendant Gaskin-Bailey 7 Similar to her allegations against Sheriff Jones, plaintiff claims that Gaskin-Bailey should 8 have ensured that there was at least one female marshal engaged in plaintiff’s transport. ECF No. 9 68 at 5. The court is unaware of any case or statutory law requiring as much.1 10 Next, plaintiff alleges that Gaskin-Bailey should have trained marshals under her 11 supervision to avoid sexually assaulting inmates in their custody. Id. This vague claim is 12 insufficient to implicate wrongdoing. In a Bivens action, a supervisor is only liable if she 13 personally participated in the alleged violations or knew of the violations and failed to act to 14 prevent them. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, it is wholly 15 insufficient for a claimant to offer an unadorned allegation that a supervisor should have trained 16 her subordinates not to act unlawfully. 17 18 Finally, plaintiff appears to allege that Gaskin-Bailey violated the PREA. As described above, there is no private action under that act. 19 C. Defendants Yao and Deppe 20 Plaintiff claims that these defendants failed to prevent another inmate who was 21 transported alongside her – Caesar – from sexually assaulting her on the drive from the county 22 jail to the federal courthouse.2 ECF No. 68 at 15, 17. These claims are potentially cognizable, 23 but are legally and factually separate from her claims against defendant Alencastre. Pursuant to 24 1 25 26 27 28 In a perplexing objection, plaintiff disputes this conclusion by stating that sexual abuse has no penological justification. ECF No. 68 at 5. This statement is correct, plaintiff’s conclusion from it is a non-sequitur. The transport of an inmate by opposite-sex correctional officers is not, standing alone, sexual abuse. 2 The court is unable to discern any allegation that either Yao or Deppe was positioned to intervene during the alleged assaults by Alencastre. 5 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), individuals may be joined in one action as defendants if 2 any right to relief asserted against them arises out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of 3 transactions and occurrences and any question of law or fact common to all defendants arises in 4 the action. See also George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated claims 5 against unrelated defendants belong in different suits”). Whether Alencastre sexually assaulted 6 her during two abusive searches is a question that bears no relation to whether Yao and Deppe 7 took sufficient steps to protect her from a male inmate. Accordingly, the court recommends that 8 these defendants and the claims against them be dismissed. 9 D. Leave to Amend 10 Given how long this case has persisted without any defendant being served, the court 11 declines to grant plaintiff further leave to amend. Instead, it will direct her to submit service 12 documents for defendant Alencastre and recommend dismissal of all other defendants and claims. 13 Miscellaneous Relief 14 Plaintiff’s request to file her proposed amend complaint is granted. Her request for 15 appointment of counsel is denied for the same reasons identified in the court’s previous order. 16 See ECF No. 67. It is unclear what plaintiff’s request for extension of time relates to and, 17 consequently, that request is denied. 18 Conclusion 19 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 20 1. The findings and recommendations filed on October 19, 2018 (ECF No. 64) are 21 vacated; 22 2. Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 68) is GRANTED in part – her request to file her 23 proposed amended complaint is granted and the motion is denied in all other respects; 24 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to separately docket plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 68) as 25 “Second Amended Complaint”; 26 4. The operative complaint contains allegations sufficient to state a potentially 27 28 cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Alencastre; ///// 6 1 5. With this order the Clerk of the Court shall provide to plaintiff a blank summons, a 2 copy of the November 26, 2018 complaint, a USM-285 form and instructions for 3 service of process on defendant Ben Alencastre. Within 30 days of service of this 4 order plaintiff may return the attached Notice of Submission of Documents with the 5 completed summons, the completed USM-285 form, and two copies of the endorsed 6 complaint. The court will transmit them to the United States Marshal for service of 7 process pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant 8 Alencastre will be required to respond to plaintiff’s allegations within the deadlines 9 stated in Rule 12(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 10 6. Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal of this action. 11 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants Jones, Gaskin-Bailey, Yao, 12 13 and Deppe be DISMISSED without prejudice for the reasons identified above. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 14 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 15 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 16 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 17 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 18 within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 19 Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 DATED: March 28, 2019. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VILAYCHITH KHOUANMANY, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 No. 2:17-cv-1326 TLN EFB P v. NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF DOCUMENTS UNITED STATES MARSHALS, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 In accordance with the court’s Screening Order, plaintiff hereby submits the following forms: 19 1 completed summons form 20 1 completed forms USM-285 21 2 copies of the November 26, 2018 complaint 22 23 24 _________________________________ 25 26 Plaintiff Dated: 27 28 8

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