Carr v. AutoNation, Inc. et al

Filing 46

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 8/14/2018 GRANTING 39 AutoNation, Inc.'s Motion for Judgment on the pleadings and DISMISSES Plaintiff's sole remaining claim of breach of contract implied in fact with LEAVE TO AMEND. (Reader, L)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 JAMES CARR, 13 14 15 16 No. 2:17-cv-01539-JAM-AC Plaintiff, v. AUTONATION, INC., et al. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT AUTONATION’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Defendants. 17 18 More than twenty years ago, Plaintiff James Carr 19 (“Plaintiff” or “Carr”) claims that he came up with a business 20 plan (the “Business Plan”) to transform the automobile-wrecking 21 industry into a profitable system. 22 Business Plan to Defendant AutoNation, Inc. (“AutoNation”) during 23 face-to-face meetings and AutoNation subsequently told him that 24 it was not interested in partnering with him. 25 that AutoNation, co-defendant LKQ Corporation (“LKQ”), and others 26 then stole his ideas from the Business Plan to open a new, highly 27 profitable company. 28 company in 2015, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, alleging Plaintiff presented the Plaintiff alleges After finding out about AutoNation’s new 1 1 Misappropriation of Trade Secrets and Breach of Contract Implied 2 in Fact. Compl., ECF No. 1-2.1 3 In January 2018, this Court granted LKQ’s motion to dismiss 4 Plaintiff’s sole claim for trade secret misappropriation against 5 it. 6 AutoNation’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s trade secret 7 misappropriation claim and denied AutoNation’s motion to dismiss 8 Plaintiff’s implied contract claim on statute of limitations 9 grounds because questions of fact existed over whether Plaintiff 10 Order (the “MTD Order”), ECF No. 35. should have discovered the claim earlier. The Court also granted See MTD Order. 11 AutoNation moves for judgment on the pleadings on 12 Plaintiff’s remaining claim for breach of implied contract. 13 Mem., ECF No. 39. 14 reasons explained below, the Court grants AutoNation’s motion for 15 judgment on the pleadings and dismisses Plaintiff’s implied 16 contract claim without prejudice. Plaintiff opposes. Opp., ECF No. 41. For the 17 18 I. 19 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff owned and operated an automobile-wrecking business 20 in Placerville, California between 1985 and 1995. 21 Based on his experience and background as a college-educated 22 certified public accountant, Plaintiff created the Business Plan 23 to transform the automobile-wrecking industry into an efficient, 24 interconnected, and highly profitable national system capable of 25 synchronizing the supply of wrecked cars with the demand of 26 27 28 Compl. ¶ 2. This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for July 10, 2018. In deciding this motion, the Court takes as true all well-pleaded facts in the operative complaint. 2 1 1 recycled auto parts. 2 Plaintiff sent letters to approximately 10 companies and 3 individuals to gauge their interest in being a business partner 4 and capital source. 5 Compl. ¶¶ 2-3. Around November 1995, Compl. ¶ 4. One of two respondents asked for the Business Plan and then, 6 upon Plaintiff’s request, returned the Business Plan after 7 indicating they were not interested. 8 owned by well-known businessman Wayne Huizenga (“Huizenga”), was 9 the other company that responded. Compl. ¶ 5. Compl. ¶ 4. AutoNation, Specifically, 10 between November 1995 and January 1996, Jeff Davis (“Davis”) of 11 AutoNation called Plaintiff to ask some follow-up questions and 12 asked for the Business Plan. 13 Davis the Business Plan, but without any confidentiality 14 agreement or non-disclosure agreement. 15 then traveled to California to meet with Plaintiff in person and 16 tour approximately five automobile wrecking yards throughout 17 Northern California. 18 spoke to Davis about general next steps, including what the 19 nature of his future involvement would be if they decided to move 20 forward. 21 that he “contemplated being compensated or otherwise involved 22 should Huizenga, AutoNation, or any affiliates choose to move 23 forward with the idea.” 24 Id. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 8. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff sent Compl. ¶¶ 8, 42. Davis During the visit, Plaintiff Plaintiff claims that he also made clear to Davis Id. After their visit, Davis called Plaintiff and told him that 25 Huizenga and AutoNation were not interested in pursuing the 26 Business Plan. 27 Business Plan and he did. 28 automobile-wrecking industry and moved on to other ventures. Compl. ¶ 10. Id. Plaintiff asked Davis to return the Then Plaintiff left the 3 Id. 1 He did not follow developments in the automobile-wrecking 2 industry and did not keep in touch with people in the industry. 3 Id. 4 At a barbeque almost ten years later, Plaintiff told a new 5 acquaintance who owned a Northern California auto parts recycler 6 that Plaintiff once had a billion dollar business idea involving 7 the automobile-wrecking industry. 8 pitched it to Huizenga and AutoNation. 9 expressed shock and told Plaintiff that a company called LKQ had Compl. ¶ 11. Id. He added that he The new acquaintance 10 been formed with Huizenga’s involvement and that it was 11 tremendously successful. 12 Id. Plaintiff did further research on the internet to learn that 13 Huizenga’s business associate founded LKQ and that Huizenga and 14 AutoNation were founding backers. 15 discovered that AutoNation owned significant shares of LKQ until 16 2003. 17 Compl. ¶ 12. And Plaintiff Compl. ¶ 17. After completing his initial research, Plaintiff filed suit 18 against Defendants AutoNation, Huizenga, Davis, and LKQ in El 19 Dorado County Superior Court, alleging misappropriation of trade 20 secrets against all Defendants and breach of contract implied in 21 fact against AutoNation and Huizenga, seeking damages in excess 22 of $87,000,000. 23 the case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 24 ECF No. 1. 25 parties’ stipulation to dismiss Defendants Huizenga and Davis 26 without prejudice. 27 /// 28 /// Compl. ¶ 53. Defendants collectively removed Not. of Removal, On September 19, 2017, the Court approved the ECF No. 22. 4 1 II. OPINION 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), after the 4 pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial, a 5 party may move for judgment on the pleadings. 6 Proc. 12(c). 7 when, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as 8 true, there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the 9 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted Chavez 10 v. U.S., 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citation 11 and quotation marks omitted). 12 The analysis under Rule 12(c) is substantially similar to 13 the analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, a 14 court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, 15 taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy. 16 683 F.3d at 1108 (internal citation and quotation marks 17 omitted). 18 court must decide if a complaint contains sufficient factual 19 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 20 plausible on its face. 21 marks omitted). 22 formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action are 23 not sufficient. 24 570 (2007). 25 are not entitled to the presumption of truth, before determining 26 whether a claim is plausible. 27 678, 682 (2009). 28 /// Chavez, As on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a Id. (internal citation and quotation Mere conclusory statements in a complaint and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, The Court discounts conclusory statements, which Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 5 1 B. Pleading Of Breach Of Contract Implied In Fact 2 In its moving papers, AutoNation first argues that 3 Plaintiff’s breach of contract implied in fact claim should be 4 dismissed because it is preempted by the California Uniform 5 Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”). 6 argues that Plaintiff’s implied in fact contract claim is really 7 a preempted equitable claim for breach of contract implied in 8 law because he fails to allege an actual agreement between 9 himself and Davis. Mem. at 1-2. Mem. at 10-11. AutoNation also Plaintiff counters by 10 applying the pleading standard under Rule 12(b)(6) and argues 11 that CUTSA does not preempt his adequately pleaded breach of 12 contract implied in fact. 13 Wahl Prods. Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 104 Cal. App. 4th 27, 29 14 (2002) in support of his contention that his allegations suffice 15 to adequately plead an implied in fact contract claim. 16 Opp. at 8. Plaintiff cites Gunther- In Gunther-Wahl, plaintiff Mr. Wahl gave a presentation to 17 Mattel about his ideas for a television show and accompanying 18 toy line that Mattel could license for compensation. 19 App. 4th at 29-30. 20 presentation materials with Mattel for further circulation and 21 review. 22 or other limitations in place before making his presentation and 23 leaving his materials with Mattel. 24 not have an express understanding about whether and to what 25 extent he would be compensated if Mattel used his idea. 26 After Mattel told Mr. Wahl that it was not interested in 27 pursuing his idea, Mattel nonetheless developed toys that Mr. 28 Wahl thought were based on his concepts. 104 Cal. Mr. Wahl, at Mattel’s request, left his Id. at 30-31. Mr. Wahl had no non-disclosure agreement 6 Id. Mattel and Mr. Wahl did Id. at 32-33. Id. At 1 trial, the jury was instructed that Mr. Wahl needed to have 2 expressly conditioned the disclosure of his ideas on 3 compensation for them. 4 Appeal reversed and found this instruction to be a misstatement 5 of the law on implied in fact contract. 6 Id. at 34. The California Court of Id. at 42-43. Plaintiff claims that, like Mr. Wahl, he gave clear 7 expressions to AutoNation that he was offering to share his work 8 product and expertise with AutoNation on the condition that he 9 would be compensated “if AutoNation chose to develop a business 10 based on Plaintiff’s inputs.” 11 that in his initial communication to Huizenga, he “contemplated 12 he would be the one building the company he envisioned.” 13 (emphasis bolded and italicized in original). 14 visited Plaintiff after receiving Plaintiff’s business plan, 15 Plaintiff “discussed his further involvement in the project with 16 Mr. Davis.” 17 conduct in requesting the Business Plan and soliciting 18 substantial further assistance from Mr. Carr and the surrounding 19 context implied a contractual obligation to compensate Mr. Carr 20 for any use AutoNation made of his assistance” that it breached 21 by forming LKQ without Plaintiff. 22 Id. Opp. at 10. Plaintiff contends Id. When Davis Plaintiff further explains that “AutoNation’s Opp. at 11. In its reply, AutoNation contends that Plaintiff’s breach 23 of contract claim fails because an unconsummated business 24 relationship does not form a contract to pay for an idea. 25 Reply, ECF No. 44, at 2. 26 Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987) to support its 27 argument that an unconsummated business relationship does not 28 form an implied-in-fact contract for the sale of an idea upon AutoNation relies on Aliotti v. R 7 1 which that relationship would have been premised. 2 plaintiff Ms. Aliotti showed the defendant many of her toy 3 designs at a meeting to discuss defendant’s acquisition of Ms. 4 Aliotti’s employer. 5 discuss the defendant purchasing any specific designs. 6 After the defendant decided not to pursue a relationship with 7 Ms. Aliotti’s employer, it designed toys that resembled those 8 Ms. Aliotti designed. 831 F.2d at 899. In Aliotti, The parties did not Id. Id. at 899-900. 9 The Ninth Circuit rejected Ms. Aliotti’s argument that she 10 had a viable claim for breach of implied in fact contract based 11 on the defendant designing toys similar to hers after she 12 disclosed her ideas to pursue a future relationship with the 13 defendant that did not come to fruition. 14 902-03. 15 grant of summary judgment for the defendant, explained that “no 16 contract may be implied where an idea has been disclosed not to 17 gain compensation for that idea but for the sole purpose of 18 inducing the defendant to enter a future business relationship.” 19 Id. at 903. 20 Aliotti, 831 F.2d at The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the district court’s The Gunther-Wahl court distinguished Aliotti by emphasizing 21 that Ms. Aliotti, unlike Mr. Wahl, made her presentation to the 22 defendant not to sell her idea but to help persuade the 23 defendant to buy her employer before it became bankrupt. 24 Gunther-Wahl, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 42. 25 explained, Ms. Aliotti had expectation of payment for her 26 business and not just for her designs. The Gunther-Wahl court See id. 27 Here, similar to Ms. Aliotti and unlike Mr. Wahl, Plaintiff 28 solicited AutoNation’s financial support and presented his ideas 8 1 to pursue a future business relationship in which he would 2 remain intimately involved rather than to simply have AutoNation 3 purchase his ideas. 4 Plaintiff’s own allegations and arguments. 5 Specifically, Plaintiff has made the following statements 6 (either in argument or in his Complaint) indicating that he 7 wanted a business relationship with AutoNation rather than a 8 buyer for his ideas: 9 I believe I can build a company from scratch [.] (Opp. at 3 (citing Compl. Exh. B)); • Plaintiff set out in search of a partner to provide the capital needed to bring his plan to fruition. (Compl. ¶ 4); • Mr. Carr’s letter summarized his business qualifications and expressly contemplated Mr. Carr’s direct involvement in a company arising out of his concept. (Opp. at 3 (citing Compl. Exh. B)); and • Mr. Carr spoke to Mr. Davis in general terms about next steps, including what the nature of his future involvement would be should AutoNation decide to move forward. (Opp. at 3 (citing Compl., ¶ 9)). 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Reply at 2. • 10 11 As Defendant points out, this is clear from Aliotti mandates this Court dismiss claims for breach of 19 implied contract where the alleged breach arises from an 20 unconsummated business relationship rather than the failure to 21 pay for a product or idea. 22 the Court must reject Plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied 23 contract because it is based on the disclosures of Plaintiff’s 24 plans in pursuit of a business relationship with AutoNation. 25 Since the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible 26 implied in fact contract claim, it need not, and does not 27 address AutoNation’s other argument that Plaintiff’s claim is an 28 implied in law contract cause of action that is preempted by 831 F.2d at 902-03. 9 Accordingly, 1 CUTSA (an argument which Plaintiff labels as “immaterial” Opp. 2 at 2). 3 C. Leave to Amend 4 Courts have discretion to grant Rule 12(c) motions with 5 leave to amend. 6 1343, 1346 (C. D. Cal. 2014). 7 Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies of his implied contract 8 claim that are mentioned above, the Court will grant AutoNation’s 9 motion with leave to amend. 10 Crosby v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 42 F. Supp. 3d Because the Court is not convinced See Holshouser v. County of Modoc, No. 2:14-cv-2552, 2015 WL 10381707 *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2015). 11 12 13 III. ORDER For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 14 AutoNation’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismisses 15 Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim of breach of contract implied in 16 fact WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 17 claim, his First Amended Complaint shall be due within twenty 18 days of this Order. 19 twenty days thereafter. If Plaintiff elects not to file an 20 Amended Complaint, the Complaint will be dismissed and the Clerk 21 shall close this case If Plaintiff elects to amend this AutoNation’s responsive pleading is due 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: August 14, 2018 24 25 26 27 28 10

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