Alexander v. Yuba City

Filing 22

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 10/11/2017 re 14 Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Defaults and 16 Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer: IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Defaults be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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----oo0oo---MICHAEL PATRICK ALEXANDER,
CIV. NO. 2:17-1622 WBS CKD
Plaintiff,

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v.
YUBA CITY; NICOLAS
MORAWCZNSKI; JASON PARKER;
COUNTY OF SUTTER; and DOES 150, inclusive,

ORDER

Defendants.

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On August 4, 2017, plaintiff filed this civil rights

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action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth,

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Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

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Defendants’ Yuba City and Morawcznski’s responsive pleadings were

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due by Friday, August 25, 2017, and defendant Parker’s responsive

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pleading was due by September 12, 2017, pursuant to Federal Rule

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of Civil Procedure 12(a).

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(Compl. ¶ 21-26.)

On Monday, August 28, 2017, the first business day
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after Yuba City and Morawcznski’s answer was due, plaintiff filed

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requests for entry of default against Yuba City and Morawcznski.

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The next day, on August 29, 2017, the clerk entered the defaults

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of defendants Yuba City and Morawcznski.

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Yuba City and Morawcznski filed their Answer to plaintiff’s

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Complaint.

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That very same day,

On August 31, 2017, after becoming aware that the clerk

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had entered the defaults of Morawczinski and Yuba City, defense

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counsel contacted plaintiff’s counsel and asked for a stipulation

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to set aside the default.

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6 (Docket No. 14-3).)

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that he planned to file a request for default judgments.

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(Derick E. Konz Decl. (“Konz Decl.”) ¶

Plaintiff’s counsel refused and stated
Id.

Morawcznski and Yuba City now move to set aside the

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defaults and have their Answer be allowed to stand.

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requests that the court strike Yuba City and Morawcznski’s Answer

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and enter a Default Judgment against them.

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Plaintiff

A court may set aside an entry of default for good

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cause.

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exists, the court will examine: (1) whether the defendant’s

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culpable conduct led to the default; (2) whether the defendant

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has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether reopening the default

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would prejudice the plaintiff.

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Knoebber, 244 F. 3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001).

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to vacate an entry of default bears the burden of demonstrating

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that these factors favor vacating the default.

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A.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).

In determining whether good cause

TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v.
The party seeking

Id.

Culpable Conduct
A defendant’s conduct is deemed culpable “if he has

received actual or constructive notice of the filing of the
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action and intentionally failed to answer.”

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at 697.

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more commonly, omissions caused by carelessness” do not equate to

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“an intentional failure to answer.”

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“Credible, good faith explanation negating any intention to take

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advantage of the opposing party, interfere with judicial

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decision-making, or otherwise manipulate the legal process is not

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intentional.”

Knoebber, 244 F. 3d

“Neglect [or] simple, faultless omissions to act and,

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Id.

(citations omitted).

Id. at 698.

Here, defendants’ failure to file a timely answer does

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not appear to have been intentional.

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Kilday acknowledges that he received a letter dated August 14,

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2017, that mentioned that Yuba City had been served on August 4,

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2017, but represents that this detail was inadvertently missed.

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(Decl. of Bruce A. Kilday ¶ 9 (Docket No. 14-2).)

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counsel was never told that service had been accomplished, and

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argues that had he known that the Complaint had been served, he

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would have arranged for a timely response.

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Defense counsel Bruce

Defense

Id.

There is no evidence suggesting that defendants were

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attempting to take advantage of plaintiff or otherwise manipulate

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the legal system.

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business days after the responsive pleading had been due, seeming

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to negate any inference that defendants were trying to

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unnecessarily delay the process or take advantage of plaintiff.

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The court finds that defendants have articulated a credible, good

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faith explanation for filing the Answer on August 29 rather than

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on August 25.

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defaults.

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B.

Defendants filed their Answer just two

This factor weighs in favor of setting aside the

Meritorious Defense
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To satisfy this element, defendants must present

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specific facts that would constitute a defense.

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3d at 700.

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insufficient, the burden “is not extraordinarily heavy.”

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Knoebber, 244 F.

While a mere general denial without fact is
Id.

Here, plaintiff alleges that he was forced into a

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coerced confession and unlawfully held in custody without

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sufficient evidence of his involvement in his neighbor’s murder.

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(Compl. ¶¶ 13, 20.)

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preliminary hearing was held in the criminal case and the

In response, defendants state that a

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Superior Court determined that the evidence was sufficient to

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order plaintiff to remain in custody and to file a criminal

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Information.

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defendants have met their burden of submitting a meritorious

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defense.

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C.

(Konz Decl. ¶ 7.)

By presenting these facts,

Prejudice to Plaintiff

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In order to be found prejudicial, the court must

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determine that setting aside the default would “result in greater

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harm than simply delaying resolution of the case.”

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F. 3d at 701.

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ability to pursue his claim will be hindered.”

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omitted.)

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of evidence, increased difficulties of discovery, or greater

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opportunity for fraud or collusion.”

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Knoebber, 244

The applicable “standard is whether [plaintiff’s]
Id.

(citations

“The delay must result in tangible harm such as loss

Id.

Here, Morawcznski and Yuba City filed their Answer four

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calendar days--just two business days--after it was due, nearly

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two weeks before co-defendant Parker’s responsive pleading was

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due, and only twenty-five days after the Complaint was filed.

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is hard to imagine how setting aside the default would cause
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It

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plaintiff any harm.

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Plaintiff argues that his safety is jeopardized and he

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will remain “under virtual house arrest” until this case is

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resolved.

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6:26-7:5 (Docket No. 15).)

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any evidence that he has been harmed, or that he has been

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threatened with future harm, by virtue of the pendency of this

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action.

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(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Set Aside Defaults
However, plaintiff does not present

As discussed above, the three required elements all

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weigh in favor of setting aside the defaults.

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Ninth Circuit has emphasized that default judgments are

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“appropriate only in extreme circumstance; a case should,

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whenever possible, be decided on the merits.”

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F. 2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984).

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to set aside the defaults must be granted.

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Additionally, the

Falk v. Allen, 739

Accordingly, defendants’ Motion

Because the court grants defendants’ motion to set

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aside the defaults, plaintiff’s motions for default judgment and

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to strike defendants’ answer will be denied.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ Motion to Set

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Aside Defaults (Docket No. 14) be, and the same hereby is,

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GRANTED;

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AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion for

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Default Judgment and Motion to Strike Defendants’ Answer (Docket

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No. 16) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

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Dated:

October 11, 2017

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