L.F., et al v. City of Stockton, et al

Filing 66

ORDER signed by District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 5/1/19 DENYING 63 Request to Seal and GRANTING defendants 7 days to file the material publicly on the docket or notify the court of their intent to withdraw reliance on it for 62 Motion Summary Judgment. (Coll, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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L.F., et al.,

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Consolidated Case No. 2:17-cv-01648-KJM-DB
Plaintiffs,

v.

ORDER

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CITY OF STOCKTON, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiffs L.F. and K.F., the minor daughters of Colby T. Friday, brought this case

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Stockton, the Stockton Police Department, the

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Stockton Chief of Police, and Officer David Wells, after Mr. Friday was shot and killed by

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Officer Wells. See First Am. Compl., ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 29, 32. The case was consolidated with a

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similar case brought by M.C.F, K.S.F., and the estate of Colby Friday against the same

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defendants. ECF No. 44.

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Before the court is defendants’ Notice and Request to Seal Records, in which

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defendants seek to seal three videotaped recordings, in support of their motion for summary

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judgment, ECF No. 62. See Notice of Req. to Seal (“Notice”), ECF No. 63, at 3. The three
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videotapes at issue are (1) a post-incident security camera video, (2) footage from a body camera

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worn by defendant Officer David Wells, and (3) footage from the body camera of a third-party,

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Officer Rust. Id. Plaintiffs L.F. and K.F. have filed an opposition with the court, and plaintiffs

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M.C.F., K.S.F., and the estate of Colby Friday have joined in the opposition. Both the opposition

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and the notice of joinder were filed with the court, not on the public docket, in accordance with

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Local Rule 141(c).

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For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES defendants’ request to seal.
I.

LEGAL STANDARD
“[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public

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records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner

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Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnotes omitted). “Unless a particular court record

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is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.”

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Kamakana v. City and Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz v.

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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)).

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When a party moves to seal a record, the court looks to the underlying motion and

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determines whether it is “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Ctr. for Auto

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Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. FCA U.S.

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LLC v. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 137 S. Ct. 38 (2016). If the motion is more than tangentially related

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to the merits of the case, a party seeking to seal the record must satisfy the “stringent” compelling

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reasons standard. Id. at 1096. Applying this standard, “a court may seal records only when it

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finds ‘a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on

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hypothesis or conjecture,” and finds this reason outweighs the public’s interest and the

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presumption of public access. Id. at 1096–97 (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179).

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When a motion is unrelated or only tangentially related to the merits of the case,

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the good cause standard, which is an “exception” to the “presumptive” compelling reasons

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standard, applies. Id. at 1097–98. To establish good cause, a party must show “specific prejudice

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or harm will result” absent sealing, Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130, which may include the need “to

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protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or

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expense,” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)).

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II.

DISCUSSION

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Defendants seek to seal an exhibit to their summary judgment motion, which is a

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dispositive motion. As such, defendants must meet the compelling reasons standard for the

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request to be granted. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178.

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Defendants have not identified “a compelling reason” for sealing that extends

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beyond “hypothesis or conjecture.” See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096–97 (quoting

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Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). Examples of compelling reasons include using court records “to

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‘gratify private spite or promote public scandal,’ to circulate ‘libelous’ statements, or ‘as sources

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of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing.’” Id. (quoting Nixon,

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435 U.S. at 598–99). Ultimately, “[w]hat constitutes a ‘compelling reason’ is ‘best left to the

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sound discretion of the trial court.’” Id. (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599). In their request to seal,

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defendants offer three reasons why the videotapes at issue should be sealed; the court addresses

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each in turn.

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First, defendants allege the videotaped recordings are “graphic and potentially

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disturbing” because they depict “the actual shooting, as well as decedent at the scene immediately

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following the shooting.” Request at 3. The court recognizes the graphic nature of the footage,

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particularly with respect to the footage from Officer Wells’ body camera. However, defendants

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have not identified any authority that supports sealing material merely because its contents are

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upsetting, particularly where, as here, the footage contains evidence that is potentially crucial to

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the case, and there is no indication the publication of the material is intended merely to “gratify

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private spite or promote public scandal.” See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (citations and internal

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quotation marks omitted); cf. Mendez v. City of Gardena, 222 F. Supp. 3d 782, 792 (C.D. Cal.

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2015) (unsealing dashboard camera footage of a police shooting in part because, “while the

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videos are potentially upsetting and disturbing because of the events they depict, they are not

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overly gory or graphic in a way that would make them a vehicle for improper purposes”);

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Harmon v. City of Santa Clara, 323 F.R.D. 617, (N.D. Cal. 2018) (releasing body camera footage
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of “graphic and alarming footage of police officers hurting a citizen,” in part because of the

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“strong public interest in the video’s disclosure”); Nunez v. City of San Jose, No.

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17CV03860LHKVKD, 2019 WL 1102992, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) (finding good cause

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standard not met to designate as confidential private citizen’s footage of police shooting that took

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place in public). Accordingly, this argument in favor of sealing is unavailing.

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Second, defendants argue that, because of the graphic nature of the videos, the

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“likelihood of the videos being used improperly is exceedingly high.” Id. This conclusory

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statement does not, without more, provide support for defendants’ request to seal the recordings.

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See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1182 (when ruling on a request to seal a court must not base its

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decision on “hypothesis or conjecture”). “[T]he party [seeking to seal a judicial record] must

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‘articulate[ ] compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings.’” Id. at 1178 (quoting

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San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 1999)).

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Defendants do not identify how the video may be improperly used, except to suggest it may be

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distributed via the internet and social media. Notice at 3. Such a risk, without more, is not a

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compelling reason to seal the videotapes. See Macias v. Cleaver, No. 1:13-cv-01819-BAM, 2016

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WL 3549257, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2016) (“Based on the strong presumption of public access

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to judicial records and the public’s strong interest in the conduct of officers, this Court must

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refuse requests to engage in damage control on behalf of the Defendants.”); Kamakana, 447 F.3d

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at 1179 (“The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment,

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incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its

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records.” (citation omitted)).

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Finally, defendants allege concerns about “the effect on [the] decedent’s family

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and their privacy rights.” Id. However, plaintiffs say defendants never asked plaintiffs their

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position on filing the videotapes, under seal or not. In their opposition to the request to seal,

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plaintiffs make clear they want the videotapes to be filed on the public docket, and they do not

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invoke the privacy interest defendants claim to be protecting. See Mendez, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 792

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(denying request to seal police car camera footage in part because “[t]he only valid privacy

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interest in this case belongs to the Plaintiffs, who have made abundantly clear that they wish the
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videos to be made available to the public”). Given plaintiffs’ opposition to the request to seal,

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defendants’ concerns about plaintiffs’ privacy rights are without merit.

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Because the court finds the request to seal does not meet the compelling reasons

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standard, it need not reach the merits of plaintiffs’ waiver argument. The request to seal is

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DENIED. Under Local Rule 141(e)(1), the Clerk will return to defendants the videotapes for

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which sealing has been denied. Within seven (7) days, defendants shall either file the material

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publicly on the docket or notify the court of their intent to withdraw reliance on it for the

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summary judgment motion, ECF No. 64.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 1, 2019.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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