Sprague v Brown

Filing 20

ORDER signed by District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 3/29/19 DENYING 19 Motion for Reconsideration. (Coll, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JEROME H. SPRAGUE, et al.,

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No. 2:17-cv-02434-KJM-CKD (PS)

Plaintiffs,
v.

ORDER

DAVID I. BROWN,
Defendant.

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Plaintiffs move for reconsideration of the court’s adoption of the magistrate

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judge’s findings and recommendations. Mot., ECF No. 19. Plaintiffs appear to provide two

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bases for their motion: (1) res judicata is inapplicable here because the claims in the prior case,

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Sprague v. Brown, 2:17-cv-00938-KJM-GGH (“prior case”), and the claims in this matter are

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distinct; and (2) judicial immunity is inapplicable because the complaint alleges a “loss of

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Personal thus Subject Matter jurisdiction,” which plaintiffs argue is a characteristic of judicial

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behavior exceeding the scope of judicial immunity. Id. at 2–4.

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Local Rule 230(j) governs motions for reconsideration. In pertinent part, a party

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seeking reconsideration must: “set[] forth the material facts and circumstances surrounding [the]

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motion . . . including: what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did

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not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.”

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E.D. Cal. R. 230(j)(3). “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly
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unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence,

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committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn

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Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

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quotation marks omitted and alteration in original).

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It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration where the

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underlying order is merely “erroneous,” rather than “clearly erroneous.” McDowell v. Calderon,

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197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999). “Mere doubts or disagreement about the wisdom of a

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prior decision . . . will not suffice . . . . To be clearly erroneous, a decision must . . . [be] more

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than just maybe or probably wrong; it must be dead wrong.” Campion v. Old Repub. Home Prot.

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Co., Inc., No. 09-748, 2011 WL 1935967, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2011) (quoting Hopwood v.

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State of Tex., 236 F.3d 256, 273 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d

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601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (movant must demonstrate a “wholesale disregard, misapplication, or

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failure to recognize controlling precedent”).

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In other words, the hurdle to justify granting a motion for reconsideration is high,

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and plaintiffs fail to clear that hurdle here. First, plaintiffs’ assertion that res judicata is

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inapplicable because the complaint in this case presents new claims not raised in the prior case is

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unavailing. It is true that an identity of claims between the two cases is an essential element of a

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res judicata defense. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d

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1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Res judicata is applicable whenever there is (1) an identity of

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claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between parties.”). In the Ninth Circuit,

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courts do not simply look to the title of a claim to determine if identity exists; rather, courts

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consider several factors:

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(1) [W]hether rights or interests established in the prior judgment
would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action;
(2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two
actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same
right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of facts. The last of these criteria is the most important.

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Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original).

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Here, Headwaters factors three and four are satisfied such that res judicata applies.

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As defendant highlighted in his original motion to dismiss, the prior case and the present case

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both involve alleged infringement of the same right, loss of real and personal property caused by

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Judge Brown’s ruling; and both cases arise from the same nucleus of facts, Judge Brown’s

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decisions in the judgment-debtor proceedings in Sacramento County Superior Court. See ECF

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No. 5-1 at 3–4. The underlying events and the harm alleged in the two suits are substantially

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similar, and plaintiffs provide no justification for the court to depart from its prior ruling.

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Even if res judicata were inapplicable, plaintiffs fail to establish how “[t]he issue

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of [] Judge Brown’s loss of Personal thus Subject Matter Jurisdiction” means his actions exceed

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the bounds of judicial immunity. Mot. at 3–4. As the court explained in its prior order, judicial

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immunity can be circumvented only if a judge’s actions are either (1) entirely nonjudicial, or

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(2) performed without any jurisdictional basis. ECF No. 17 (citations omitted). To the extent

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plaintiffs are alleging that Judge Brown acted without any jurisdictional basis, they provide no

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meaningful explanation of their position. “To determine if the judge acted with jurisdiction,

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courts focus on whether the judge was acting clearly beyond the scope of subject matter

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jurisdiction in contrast to personal jurisdiction. Where not clearly lacking subject matter

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jurisdiction, a judge is entitled to immunity even if there was no personal jurisdiction over the

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complaining party.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations

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omitted).

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The underlying complaint stems from Judge Brown’s rulings in a probate

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proceeding in Sacramento County Superior Court, a forum exclusively reserved for matters of

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probate. See Goncalves By & Through Goncalves v. Rady Children's Hosp. San Diego, 865 F.3d

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1237, 1251 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006)) (“The probate

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exception to federal jurisdiction reserves probate matters to state probate courts and precludes

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federal courts from disposing of property in the custody of a state court.”). In support of their

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assertion, plaintiffs point to Exhibit H, attached to their complaint, which provides a “summary of

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court’s loss of personal & subject matter jurisdiction.” ECF No. 1 at 187.1 This exhibit lists

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various Superior Court Local Rules and codes of procedure, and plaintiffs’ corresponding

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objections to Judge Brown’s actions under each applicable rule. Id. These objections, however,

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address only actions patently judicial in nature and fail to identify any manner in which Judge

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Brown acted beyond his jurisdictional authority in matters of probate.

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For each of the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs fail to provide any justification

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why the court should depart from its prior order. The motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 19, is

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DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 29, 2019.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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The page number refers to ECF pagination, not internal document pagination.
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