Shekarlab v. County of Sacramento et al

Filing 26

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 4/25/18, GRANTING Defendant's 16 Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice. Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE as to why his claims for punitive damages against the other Defendants should not also be dismissed, as to the state claims identified above. Plaintiff's brief is due one week from the date of this order. Defendants may file a response to Plaintiff's brief no later than one week thereafter. (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RAMIN A. SHEKARLAB,

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2:18-cv-00047-JAM-EFB

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.,

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Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CHARLES
KIM’S MOTION TO DISMISS PUNITIVE
DAMAGE CLAIM;
ORDER TO PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE

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Ramin A. Shekarlab (“Plaintiff”) spent a year in the

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Sacramento County Jail, during which time, he alleges, the jail

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staff failed to appropriately respond to his serious eye

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condition.

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Padilla, Dr. Charles Kim, Manjeet Kaur, Joyce Amajor, Kathryn

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Gonzales, the County of Sacramento, and Does 1-10.

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before the Court is Dr. Charles Kim’s motion to dismiss the

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punitive damages claimed against him.

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below, Dr. Kim’s motion is granted. 1

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Dr. Robert

Presently

For the reasons set forth

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for April 10, 2018.
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I.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This Order focuses on the facts relevant to Plaintiff’s

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claims against Dr. Kim, only.

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true for the purposes of this motion:

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The following facts are taken as

Plaintiff was incarcerated from April 2016 to May 3, 2017.

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Compl. ¶ 20.

In May of 2016, Plaintiff began experiencing

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serious pain and loss of vision in his right eye.

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He subsequently submitted numerous requests for medical treatment

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for pain and loss of vision in that eye.

Id. ¶¶ 23–24.

Id. ¶ 24.

Over the

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next several months he sought consultation with an

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ophthalmologist, but did not see one until January 2017.

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¶¶ 25–33.

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surgical consult.

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Id.

That ophthalmologist, Dr. Beard, recommended a
Id. ¶ 33.

Dr. Charles Kim, another ophthalmologist, saw Plaintiff the

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following month, on February 22, 2017.

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“examined [P]laintiff and recommended that he be referred to a

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retina specialist within 1-3 weeks.”

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retinal detachment in [P]laintiff’s right eye was ‘non-urgent,’”

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“[e]ven though it was obvious that [P]laintiff needed surgery and

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obvious that his need was time-sensitive[.]”

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Id. ¶ 37.

Id.

Dr. Kim

He “indicated that the

Id.

Plaintiff remained incarcerated until May 3, 2017, and

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received surgery on his eye a month and a half later.

Id. ¶¶ 43,

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44.

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successful outcome and caused Plaintiff to suffer near-total

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retinal detachment in his right eye.

Plaintiff alleges that the delay in surgery prevented a

Id. ¶¶ 46–49.

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Plaintiff brings claims against the County of Sacramento and

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the medical personnel he interacted with at the Sacramento County

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Jail.

As to Dr. Kim, Plaintiff asserts a claim for professional
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negligence and seeks punitive damages.

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II.

Id. ¶¶ 67–72.

OPINION

Dr. Kim moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive

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damages against him.

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involves the legal question of whether California Code of Civil

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Procedure (“C.C.P.”) section 425.13 applies to Plaintiff’s state

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claim in this Court.

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Kim argues Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support

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a claim for punitive damages.

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The first stated basis for dismissal

As an alternative basis for dismissal, Dr.

Because the Court’s ruling turns

on the former, it does not address the latter.

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A.

C.C.P. § 425.13 in Federal Court

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Federal courts deciding state claims apply state substantive

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law and, generally, federal procedural law.

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380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (describing the impact of Erie R. Co. v.

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Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).

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become clear “that Erie-type problems [are] not to be solved by

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reference to any traditional or common-sense substance-procedure

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distinction[.]”

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“does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a

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federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be

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controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties

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in a State court?”

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York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).

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Id. at 465–66.

See Hanna v. Plumer,

Over the years, however, it has

Instead the crucial question is:

Id. (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v.

Federal courts embark on a two part inquiry to decide

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whether a state procedural rule should apply in a given case.

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First, the court will ask whether there is a direct conflict

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between a federal rule and the state law.

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Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–52 (1980).
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Walker v. Armco Steel

If there is a conflict and

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the Federal Rule clearly applies, then the court will follow the

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Federal Rule unless it falls outside the scope of the Rules

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Enabling Act or the constitutional grant of power.

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If there is not a conflict, the court then considers whether

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application of the state procedural rule might result in forum

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shopping or an inequitable administration of the law.

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753.

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evidentiary rule is intimately bound up with the rights and

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obligations being asserted, [Erie] mandates the application of

Id. at 748.

Id. at

The Ninth Circuit has also held that “where a state

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the state rule.”

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1995) (citations omitted).

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Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1417 (9th Cir.

The parties dispute whether C.C.P. section 425.13 applies to

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Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim in this Court.

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425.13, a plaintiff cannot seek punitive damages from a health

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care provider on a claim for professional negligence without

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leave of court.

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Under section

The section provides:

In any action for damages arising out of the
professional negligence of a health care provider, no
claim for punitive damages shall be included in a
complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an
order allowing an amended pleading that includes a
claim for punitive damages to be filed. The court may
allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming
punitive damages on a motion by the party seeking the
amended pleading and on the basis of the supporting and
opposing affidavits presented that the plaintiff has
established that there is a substantial probability
that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant
to Section 3294 of the Civil Code.
C.C.P. § 425.13.
Federal district courts in California are divided on whether

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to apply this rule.

See Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. Cnty.

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of Sutter, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1120 (2013) (collecting cases).

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Several district courts in the Eastern District of California
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have applied section 425.13 to state claims, finding the law is

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“so ‘intimately bound up’ with [the plaintiff’s] substantive

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state law claims that, under the Erie exception, it applies to

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bar these claims where there is no compliance to the rule.”

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Allen v. Woodford, No. 1:05-cv-01104-OWW-LJO, 2006 WL 1748587

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(E.D. Cal. June 26, 2006) (citing Wray, 61 F.3d at 1417); see

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Thomas v. Hickman, No. CV F 06-0215 AWI SMS, 2006 WL 2868967

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(E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2006); Rhodes v. Placer Cnty., No. 2:09-cv-

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00489 MCE KJN PS, 2011 WL 1302240 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31,

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2011)(following Allen and Thomas);

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cv-01567-LJO-GSA-PC, 2017 WL 1013122 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2017)

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(same).

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Southern District of California have declined to apply it.

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e.g., Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341, 1352 (N.D.

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Cal. 1997) (“This court [] considers section 425.13’s requirement

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to be a procedural rather than a substantive one.

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requirement is essentially a method of managing or directing a

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plaintiff’s pleadings, rather than a determination of substantive

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rights.”); George v. Sonoma Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 732 F. Supp.

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2d 922, 951–52 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (following Jackson); Ortegoza v.

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Kho, No. 12-cv-529-L KSC, 2013 WL 2147799, at *7 (S.D. Cal. May

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16, 2013) (same).

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have declined to apply section 425.13 because they find the

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statute to be in direct conflict with the plain meaning of Rule

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8(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Prasad, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 1121; Padilla v. Beard, No. 2:14-cv-

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01118-KJM-CKD, 2014 WL 6059218 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014).

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conclusion follows an Eleventh Circuit decision that found a

Elias v. Navasartian, 1:15-

In contrast, district courts in the Northern and
See,

The

Finally, two courts in the Eastern District

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See Estate of

This

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direct conflict between Rule 8(a)(3) and a Florida statute

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imposing requirements—similar to those at issue here—on

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plaintiffs seeking punitive damages.

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Inc., 184 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion vacated in part on

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reh’g, 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000) (relevant holding adhered

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to).

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See Cohen v. Office Depot,

No Direct Conflict With the Federal Rules

Rule 8(a)(3) states: “A pleading that states a claim for
relief must contain . . . a demand for the relief sought, which

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may include relief in the alternative or different types of

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relief.”

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include his prayer for punitive damages in his complaint until

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moving the court for leave to do so.

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rules directly conflict, while Dr. Kim maintains they do not.

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The parties direct the Court’s attention to two adverse decisions

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on this question: Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292

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(11th Cir. 1999), and Jones v. Krautheim, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1173

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(D. Colo. 2002).

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Under C.C.P. section 425.13, a plaintiff could not

Plaintiff contends these

The Court finds the reasoning articulated in Jones, more

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persuasive than that of Cohen.

In Cohen, the Eleventh Circuit

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read Rule 8(a)(3) to “say ‘implicitly, but with unmistakable

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clarity’ that a plaintiff is not required to wait until a later

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stage of the litigation to include a prayer for punitive damages,

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nor is she required to proffer evidence or obtain leave of court

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before doing so.”

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found in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).

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Circuit concluded, “Rule 8(a)(3) occupies the field in which the

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pleading portion of [the state statute] would otherwise operate.”

184 F.3d at 1299 (analogizing to the conflict

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“In short,” the

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Id.

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to be consistent with the federal rules.

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district court reasoned there would be an “obvious conflict”

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between the statute and Rule 8 “were it not for the fact that

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Rule 8 imposes no timing requirement.”

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practical use, Rule 8 does not and cannot operate in isolation,

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but instead must be considered in conjunction with Rule 15, which

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anticipates liberal amendment of pleadings throughout the course

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of the litigation . . . .

The Jones court disagreed, finding a similar state statute
Id. at 1179.

Id. at 1178.

The

“In

So long as a plaintiff has the

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opportunity to amend the initial complaint to comply with Rule

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8(a)(3) before the issues are ultimately tried, there is no

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practical conflict between [the state statute] and Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 8(a)(3).”

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Id.

The Court concurs with the Jones court’s analysis.

The

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federal pleading rule does not require that every type of relief

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sought be included in the complaint in its first iteration.

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Rules provide for pre-trial amendments of the complaint, which

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district courts freely permit upon a plaintiff’s motion or, at

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later stages of litigation, grant for good cause.

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Civ. P. 15 & 16.

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C.C.P. section 425.13 consistent with the Federal Rules.

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Further, unlike the Eleventh Circuit, this Court does not find

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the alleged conflict to be analogous to that at issue in Hanna.

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See Cohen, 184 F.3d at 1299.

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that Rule 4(d)(1), by providing that “service shall be made upon

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an individual by delivering a copy of the summons and of the

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complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his

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dwelling or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age

The

See Fed. R.

A plaintiff can therefore follow the mandate of

In Hanna, the Supreme Court found

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and discretion then residing therein,” implicitly said that in

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hand service is not required in federal courts.

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(quoting the former Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)).

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law requiring in hand service therefore conflicted with Rule 4.

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Id.

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amendment, the text of Rule 8(a)(3) does not imply that

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plaintiffs must be able to include all forms of relief they may

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eventually seek in the initial complaint.

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direct conflict between the California statute and Rule 8(a)(3).

380 U.S. at 462
The Massachusetts

Here, because the federal pleading rules provide for

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2.

The Court finds no

C.C.P. § 425.13 Applies

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The Court agrees with its fellow judges in the Eastern

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District of California that the state rule must apply in federal

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court.

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action for professional negligence.

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generally, the rule is expressly limited to actions for damages

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arising out of the professional negligence of a health care

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provider.

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legislative intent “to screen and assure the bona fides and

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merits of a claim against a health care provider before a case

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can be filed.”

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it was concerned that unsubstantiated claims for punitive damages

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were being included in complaints against health care providers,

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the [California] Legislature sought to provide additional

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protection by establishing a pretrial hearing mechanism by which

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the court would determine whether an action for punitive damages

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could proceed.”

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Super. Ct., 3 Cal.4th 181, 189 (1992).

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courts to examine the substance of a plaintiff’s claims and block

The rule is bound up with the state substantive cause of

See C.C.P. § 425.13(a).

Rather than applying

This limitation evinces a

Allen, 2006 WL 1748587 at *22.

Indeed, “because

Cent. Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic, Inc. v.

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The inquiry requires

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unsubstantiated pursuits of punitive damages early in litigation.
The Court is not persuaded that the federal courts’

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authority to manage their own calendars obviates the propriety of

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respecting this legislative balancing in federal court.

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Jackson, 980 F. Supp. at 1352–53 (finding that the federal

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courts’ case management procedures can accomplish the purposes

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contemplated by section 425.13).

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punitive damages that lack evidentiary support remain in a

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lawsuit until defendants move for summary judgment or

Contra

Without the rule, prayers for

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adjudication.

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and inequitable administration of the law that the Erie doctrine

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was designed to prevent.

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U.S. 740, 753 (1980).

This result could cause the sort of forum shopping

See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446

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In light of these important considerations, this Court joins

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the cohort of district courts that find section 425.13 applicable

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in federal court.

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B.

Application to Plaintiff’s Claims

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Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages against Dr. Kim

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based on the doctor’s alleged professional negligence plainly

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falls within C.C.P. section 425.13.

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moved for leave of Court to seek punitive damages on his medical

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negligence claim, Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against

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Dr. Kim is dismissed without prejudice.

Because Plaintiff has not

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The Court’s holding suggests that Plaintiff may not seek

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punitive damages against the other defendants in this case on

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Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth claims for relief.

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therefore ordered to show cause why the punitive damages he seeks

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against Defendants Padilla, Kaur, Amajor, and Gonzales for
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Plaintiff is

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professional negligence, and against Defendants Padilla and the

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County of Sacramento for negligent supervision, training, hiring,

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and retention, should not also be dismissed—at this stage—due to

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Plaintiff’s failure to adhere to C.C.P. section 425.13.

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III.

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ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice.

Plaintiff is

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ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE as to why his claims for punitive damages

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against the other Defendants should not also be dismissed, as to

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the state claims identified above.

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week from the date of this order. Defendants may file a response

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to Plaintiff’s brief no later than one week thereafter.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 25, 2018

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Plaintiff’s brief is due one