Taylor v. Lewis et al
Filing
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ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 08/16/19 ORDERING that plaintiff may file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. (Plummer, M)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JOE TAYLOR,
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No. 2:18-CV-0149-DMC-P
Plaintiff,
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v.
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J. LEWIS, et al.,
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ORDER
Defendants.
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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No. 12).
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Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
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punishment by denying him proper medical treatment and by failing to provide him adequate pain
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management medication.
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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD
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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “…short and
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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v.
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Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual
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allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
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(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s
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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.
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Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
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omitted).
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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their
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pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
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338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be
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facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer
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that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation
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marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The
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sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with
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liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks
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omitted); Moss, 572F.3d at 969.
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II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff names ten Defendants including Does 1-5. The named Defendants are:
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(1) J. Lewis, (2) J. Ma, (3) M. Bobbala, (4) P. Sahota (5) S. Chaiken. Plaintiff alleges Defendants
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violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by denying him
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proper medical treatment and failing to provide him adequate pain medication. Plaintiff asserts
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he underwent arthroscopic knee surgery. Plaintiff takes issue with the treatment plan implemented
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by certain Defendants, questioning their “ability to provide serious relief to Plaintiff’s pain and
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deteriorating condition.” Plaintiff also takes issue with the use of ibuprofen to control his pain—
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Plaintiff asserts it is ineffective and causes him stomach problems. Plaintiff’s allegations as to
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each Defendant are less than clear.
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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant J. Lewis was deliberately indifferent when he
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denied Plaintiff’s grievance related to his knee pain. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant J. Ma was
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deliberately indifferent by failing to provide proper medical treatment. Plaintiff seems to indicate
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J. Ma did not treat his knee issues, requiring another physician to drain Plaintiff’s knee of fluid
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and provide him steroid injections. Plaintiff asserts he is receiving no treatment from J. Ma other
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than receiving ibuprofen. Plaintiff alleges M. Bobbala was deliberately indifferent in denying
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Plaintiff’s second level HC Appeal requesting the use of Tramadol. Plaintiff alleges P. Sahota
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was deliberately indifferent in denying Plaintiff’s request for pain relief despite knowing the pain
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was “quite worse”. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Chaiken was deliberately indifferent by denying
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Plaintiff’s request to be removed from Dr. J. Ma’s case load and failing to address Plaintiff’s plea
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for pain relief. Finally, Plaintiff makes no allegations in the first amended complaint as to Does
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1-5.
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III. ANALYSIS
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the
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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel
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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,
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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts
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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.
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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with
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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,
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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when
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two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such
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that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)
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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of
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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison
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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious
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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105;
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see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health
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needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is
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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant
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injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
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1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition
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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily
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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See
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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases
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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with
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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,
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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to
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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.
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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See
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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical
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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See
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Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate
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that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give
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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a
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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate
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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,
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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts against J. Ma to proceed past screening. However,
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Plaintiff’s allegations against J. Lewis, M. Bobbala, P. Sahota, S. Chaiken, and Does 1-5 cannot
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pass screening. These allegations are all based on Plaintiff’s belief that the modification to his
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pain regime are ineffective at managing his pain despite several doctors and the Pain
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Management Committee’s determination that the modification is proper based on Plaintiff’s
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condition. This amounts to a difference of opinion between Plaintiff and these Defendants. Such
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a difference of opinion, based on the facts alleged, does not state a claim sufficient to establish a
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constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d at 332.
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For that reason, Plaintiff’s complaint cannot pass the screening stage.
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IV. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT
Because it may be possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order
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may be cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal
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of the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original
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complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following
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dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged
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in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order
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to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint
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must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. This means, in
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practical terms, if Plaintiff files an amended complaint he must not only cure the deficiencies
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identified in this order, but also reallege the cognizable claim(s) discussed in this Court’s order.
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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the
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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claim, specifically
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plaintiff’s claim against J. Ma, if no amended complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor,
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the court will issue findings and recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be
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dismissed, as well as such further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the
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cognizable claim against J. Ma.
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V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a first amended
complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.
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Dated: August 16, 2019
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DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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