Taylor v. Lewis et al

Filing 9

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 3/18/2019 DISMISSING 1 Complaint with leave to amend within 30 days of the date of service of this order. (Henshaw, R)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOE TAYLOR,

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No. 2:18-CV-0149-DMC-P
Plaintiff,

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v.

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J. LEWIS, et al.,

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ORDER

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges

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that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by

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denying him proper medical treatment, specifically by failing to provide him adequate pain

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management medication.

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “…short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v.

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Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual

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allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

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(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s

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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.

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Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their

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pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

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338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be

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facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer

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that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation

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marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The

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sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with

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liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks

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omitted); Moss, 572F.3d at 969.

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II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and

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unusual punishment by denying him proper medical treatment when they failed to provide him

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adequate pain medication. Plaintiff asserts he underwent arthroscopic knee surgery in 2002 and

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that he suffers from spinal arthritis. Plaintiff contends that he was initially prescribed Methadone

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for pain control in 2011, until it was replaced with Tramadol in 2012. Plaintiff was later denied

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continued use of the Tramadol and instead provided ibuprofen, which Plaintiff contends is

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ineffective and has negative effects on his “gastro intestinal tract.” Plaintiff alleges that

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Defendant J. Lewis was deliberately indifferent when he denied Plaintiff’s request for Tramadol
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or medication of equal strength. Plaintiff Alleges that Defendant J. Ma was deliberately

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indifferent when he failed to provide Plaintiff with Tramadol despite knowing the serious pain

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and suffering that were affecting Plaintiff’s daily activities. Plaintiff alleges M. Bobbala was

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deliberately indifferent in denying Plaintiffs second level inmate appeal requesting the use of

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Tramadol. Plaintiff alleges P. Sahota was deliberately indifferent in denying Plaintiff’s request

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for pain relief despite knowing the pain was “quite worse.” Finally, Plaintiff alleges that all

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members of the Pain Management Committee, Does 1-5, were deliberately indifferent in denying

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Plaintiff additional pain medication based on subjective information that Plaintiff contends was

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false and misleading.

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III. ANALYSIS

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The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when

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two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such

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that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105;

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see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health

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needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is

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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

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injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

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1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition

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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate

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that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Plaintiff’s allegations against each defendant relate to the medical determination to

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modify Plaintiff’s pain medication. These allegations are all based on Plaintiff’s belief that the

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modifications are ineffective at managing his pain despite several doctors and the Pain

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Management Committee’s determination that the modification is proper based on Plaintiff’s

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condition. This amounts to a difference of opinion between Plaintiff and the named Defendants

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in this case. Such a difference of opinion, based on the facts alleged, does not state a claim

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sufficient to establish a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. See Jackson v.

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McIntosh, 90 F.3d at 332. For that reason, Plaintiff’s complaint cannot pass the screening stage

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at this time. To the extent it is possible plaintiff can allege facts showing defendants were

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deliberately indifferent with respect to plaintiff’s pain, the court will provide plaintiff an

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opportunity to amend.

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IV. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT

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Because it may be possible that the deficiencies identified in this order can be

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cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203

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F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an

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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

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1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the

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prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An

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amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

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time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

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1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

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with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

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See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

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V. CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

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Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

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service of this order.

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Dated: March 18, 2019
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DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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