Barrera et al v. City of Woodland et al

Filing 108

ORDER signed by Senior Judge John A. Mendez on 6/12/2023 ORDERING 66 qualified immunity to Defendants Gray, Wright, Lal, Davis, and Krause on Plaintiffs' § 1983 Familial Association claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Summary judgment is GRANTED for Defendants on this claim. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DANIEL BARRERA, et al.,

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No.

2:18-cv-00329-JAM-KJN

Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF WOODLAND, et al.,

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
FAMILIAL ASSOCIATION CLAIM

Defendants.

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The matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for

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Summary Judgment following an appeal and remand from the Ninth

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Circuit.

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Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the Court’s order denying

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qualified immunity to Defendants Gray, Wright, Lal, Davis, and

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Krause on Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment familial association

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claim.

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parties’ supplemental briefs, the record, and applicable

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authority, the Court grants qualified immunity for Defendants

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Gray, Wright, Lal, Davis, and Krause on Plaintiffs’ familial

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association claim.

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Suppl. Brief, ECF No. 106.

See Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 66.

See USCA Mandate, ECF No. 102.

The

Having reviewed the

See Pls.’ Suppl. Brief, ECF No. 107; Defs.’

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I.

BACKGROUND

On February 8, 2017, at 12:15 p.m., Woodland Police

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Department received a report of a Hispanic man in his forties,

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walking around a residential neighborhood cursing and waving a

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weapon, later identified as a golf club.

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Undisputed Facts (SUF) 1-3, ECF No. 72-2.

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Officer Parveen Lal, Sergeant David Krause, and Sergeant Thomas

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Davis responded to the dispatch and approached in separate patrol

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units.

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Defs.’ Statement of
Woodland Police

SUF 2.

Sergeant Krause was first to find Decedent Michael Barrera

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walking on Garfield Place.

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his location and reported a bald Hispanic man carrying a golf

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club in one hand and a towel in another.

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parked his vehicle, exited his vehicle, and unholstered his

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firearm.

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continued walking.

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arrived seconds after Sergeant Krause.

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exited his vehicle without weapons in hand.

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also exited his vehicle, drew his taser, and ordered Barrera to

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drop the items he was holding and to get on the ground.

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SUF 6.

SUF 5.

Sergeant Krause broadcasted

Id.

Sergeant Krause

Sergeant Krause ordered Barrera to stop, but he
SUF 8.

Sergeant Davis and Officer Lal
SUF 9.

Sergeant Davis

SUF 12.

Officer Lal

SUF 10.

Barrera continued to walk away, telling the officers he was

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not a threat.

SUF 11.

When Barrera reached the end of

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Garfield Place, which terminated in a cul-de-sac, Barrera began

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to walk up a residential driveway, past a parked truck, and

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towards a garage door.

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and approached Sergeant Krause.

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grounds, such as the speed of the approach and whether the golf

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club was raised.)

SUF 5, 18.

Barrera then turned around

SUF 19 (disputed on other

Sergeant Krause raised his firearm but did not
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fire.

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Sergeant Krause, Barrera “fell, dropped the golf club onto the

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driveway, immediately jumped up, and ran in the opposite

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direction toward a fence on the side of [the property].”

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The three officers gave chase.

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SUF 20.

Approximately twenty feet away from

Id.

SUF 21.

Barrera attempted to scale the fence on the side of the

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property, failed, turned around, and charged at Sergeant Davis

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from approximately 10-15 feet away.

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Barrera went to the ground.

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SUF 24.

Sergeant Davis and

SUF 25.

Officer Lal fired his taser four times at Barrera, pausing

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briefly between each shot.

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of 51 seconds, Barrera was tased for 24 seconds.

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SUF 34, 42, 44, 46.

Over the course
Id.

Officers Hanna Gray and Richard Wright arrived shortly after

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Sergeant Davis and Barrera hit the ground.

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Gray straddled Barrera to hold him down.

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and Officer Lal managed to handcuff Barrera approximately two

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minutes after the parties went to the ground.

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Krause, Sergeant Davis, and Officer Lal physically disengaged

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from Barrera but remained in the vicinity.

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SUF 48-49.
SUF 51.

Officer

Officer Wright

SUF 61.

Sergeant

SUF 74-77.

Although Barrera was handcuffed and prone, Officers Gray and

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Wright continued to exert force to keep Barrera on the ground.

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SUF 78, 80, 83-84.

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on Barrera’s shoulder.

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could not breathe.

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continued to hold Barrera down.

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statement, Sergeant Krause requested a WRAP device be attached to

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Barrera’s feet.

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is secured around a suspect’s legs and ankles to restrict leg

At one point, Officer Wright placed his knee
SUF 87.

SUF 95.

SUF 103.

Barrera told the officers he

Officer Gray and Officer Wright
SUF 97-98.

After Barrera’s

A WRAP is a mesh restraint system that

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movement.

SUF 105.

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the WRAP.

SUF 107, 109.

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hold Barrera down.

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Officer McManus arrived and began attaching
Officers Gray and Wright continued to

SUF 110-111.

Shortly after the WRAP was administered, Barrera became

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unresponsive.

SUF 120-22.

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ineffective.

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where he was pronounced dead.

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1800 ng/mL of methamphetamine in Barrera’s system.

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Plaintiffs sued asserting § 1983 claims under the Fourth and

SUF 123-24.

Officers administered CPR, but it was
Barrera was transported to a hospital,
SUF 125.

Toxicology revealed
SUF 126.

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Fourteenth Amendments, against which Defendants asserted

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qualified immunity.

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II.

OPINION

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A.

Legal Standard

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Qualified immunity protects government officials from

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liability for money damages unless their conduct violates

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“clearly established” law that a reasonable public official

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would have known.

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(2009).

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assertion of qualified immunity.

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200 (2001).

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favorable to the plaintiff, must establish a constitutional

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violation.

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violated must have been “clearly established” at the time of the

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alleged violation.

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defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

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Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

There are two conditions necessary to defeat an
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

First, the facts alleged, taken in the light most

Id.

Second, the constitutional right that was

Id.

If either condition is not met,

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B.

Discussion

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Here, because the second question is clearly dispositive,

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the Court exercises its discretion to address it first.

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Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242.

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established when “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently

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clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he

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is doing violates that right.”

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744 (2002).

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conduct is clearly established” is a question to be answered

A constitutional right is clearly

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,

“[W]hether the violative nature of particular

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“not as a broad general proposition,” but with reference to the

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facts of specific cases.

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Although the Supreme Court does not require a case directly on

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point for a right to be clearly established, “existing precedent

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must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

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debate.”

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Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12.

White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 77 (2017).

“The precedent must be ‘controlling’—from the Ninth Circuit

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or the Supreme Court—or otherwise be embraced by a ‘consensus’

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of courts outside the relevant jurisdiction.”

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of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1275 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sharp v.

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Cnty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 2017)).

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decided after the alleged constitutional violation cannot create

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clearly established law for purposes qualified immunity because

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reasonable officers are “not required to foresee judicial

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decisions that do not yet exist in instances where the

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[constitutional] requirements . . . are far from obvious.”

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Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2018).

Martinez v. City

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Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated their

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constitutional right to familial association two ways.
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Cases

First,

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they claim that Officer Lal violated their Fourteenth Amendment

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right when he tased Barrera repeatedly during his arrest.

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Suppl. Brief at 9.

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Defendants Gray, Wright, Lal, Davis, and Krause violated the

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Fourteenth Amendment when they directly or integrally

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participated in holding Barrera face-down after he was

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handcuffed, despite his pleas for air.

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assert that both the tasing during the arrest and the use of

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compressive force after the arrest contributed to Barrera’s

Second, Plaintiffs claim that

Id. at 5-8.

Plaintiffs

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death in a manner that “shocks the conscience” under the

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Fourteenth Amendment.

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Pls.’

To establish that their right to familial association was

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clearly established, Plaintiffs submit three cases, arguing that

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Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011), placed beyond

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debate that excessive tasing violates the Fourteenth Amendment

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and that Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d

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1052 (9th Cir. 2003), and Garlick v. County of Kern, 167 F.

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Supp. 3d 1117, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2016), clearly establish the

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violative nature of using compressive downward force against a

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handcuffed and prone individual.

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Garlick first.

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The Court reviews Drummond and

In Drummond, the Ninth Circuit held that Anaheim police

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officers violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on

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excessive force when they used their body weight to hold

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Drummond down for over twenty minutes after he was handcuffed,

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despite his repeated insistence that he could not breathe,

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causing him to pass out and ultimately fall into a coma.

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Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1054-1055.

This case puts officers on
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notice that the prolonged use of compressive force on a detained

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individual who is prone and handcuffed is constitutionally

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excessive.

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In Garlick, the district court relied on Drummond in its

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opinion denying qualified immunity for defendants on Garlick’s

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excessive force and familial association claims, finding that

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Drummond clearly establishes the law that prolonged use of

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bodyweight on a prone suspect risked asphyxia in an

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unconstitutional manner.

Garlick, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 1171-72,

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n.33 (discussing Drummond at length before denying qualified

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immunity in a footnote).

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Garlick, however, does not address whether Drummond, a case

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about excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, clearly

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establishes law in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment

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familial association claim.

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also posed but not answered this question.

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City of Rohnert Park, No. 17-cv-05339-JST, 2019 WL 1766163, at

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*13 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2019) (“assum[ing] without deciding that

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Drummond’s Fourth Amendment excessive force holding could

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clearly establish rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Due

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Process Clause, despite the different standards for

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constitutional violations”).

Other courts in this circuit have
See, e.g., Wroth v.

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It is undisputed at this stage that Drummond clearly

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establishes the law that using bodyweight to apply compressive

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force to a prone and handcuffed suspect for a prolonged time is

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unconstitutional.

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the Court’s denial of qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth

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Amendment claim, stated that “Drummond is sufficiently similar

The Ninth Circuit mandate, when it affirmed

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to this case that the Defendants would have been on notice that,

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when Barrera was handcuffed and prone on the ground, additional

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restraint, as applied here, is unconstitutionally excessive.”

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Mandate at 4.

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However, an excessive force claim under the Fourth

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Amendment is different from a familial association claim under

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the Fourteenth Amendment.

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Graham v. Connor, an excessive force claim “should be analyzed

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under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard

As the Supreme Court established in

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rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach” under

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the Fourteenth Amendment.

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reasonableness is to be judged objectively “from the perspective

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of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20

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vision of hindsight.”

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490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

Further,

Id. at 394-97.

A familial association claim, by contrast, is evaluated

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under a “shocks the conscience” standard, which requires either

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a “purpose to harm” or “deliberate indifference” to a person’s

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constitutional rights.

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(9th Cir. 2010).

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standard for shocking the conscience is “deliberate indifference

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or reckless disregard for [an individual’s] rights,” meaning a

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“conscious or reckless disregard of the consequences of one’s

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acts or omissions.”

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deliberate, such as when an emergency evolves quickly, the

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standard for shocking the conscience is when an officer acts

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“with a purpose to harm unrelated to a legitimate law

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enforcement objective.”

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(9th Cir. 2008).

Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554

When an officer has time to deliberate, the

Id.

When an officer lacked time to

Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137

Unlike the objective reasonableness standard
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of an excessive force claim, the “shocks the conscience”

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standard requires a subjective inquiry into whether an “official

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kn[ew] of and disregarded an excessive risk.”

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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

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Farmer v.

Because the standards are different and because a familial

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association claim requires a further subjective inquiry, the

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Court holds that an excessive force case under the Fourth

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Amendment does not put an officer on notice that his conduct may

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violate a plaintiff’s right to familial association under the

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Fourteenth Amendment.

Objective reasonableness, reckless

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indifference, and purpose to harm fall on a continuum of

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culpability, with each successive standard requiring a greater

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presence of mind on behalf of the actor to be liable for his

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actions.

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objective unreasonableness, it is possible for one’s actions to

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violate the Fourth Amendment without violating the Fourteenth

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Amendment.

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Fourth Amendment does not put one on notice that one’s action

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violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

Because deliberate indifference is a higher bar than

As such, notice that one’s action violates the

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This Court’s reasoning is bolstered by the Ninth Circuit’s

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opinion in Perkins v. Edgar, No. 21-55552, 2022 WL 14476272, at

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*1-2 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022).1

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affirmed a district court’s denial of qualified immunity on a

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Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, citing Drummond, but

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In Perkins, the Ninth Circuit

Although Perkins is unpublished, U.S. Ct. of App. 9th Cir. Rule
36-3 provides that an unpublished order issued on or after
January 1, 2007 may be cited to the courts of the 9th circuit in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32.1,
permitting the citation of unpublished opinions for their
persuasive value.
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reversed the court’s denial of qualified immunity on Fourteenth

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Amendment claims for familial association and inadequate medical

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care.

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individual can assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim for loss of

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companionship and familial association in a police excessive

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force case,” it held that “there is no sufficiently analogous

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precedent for the loss of familial relations claim here” and

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thus the officers did not violate the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth

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Amendment rights.

Id.

While the Ninth Circuit “reaffirmed that an

Id.

The Ninth Circuit’s analysis, which

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discussed Drummond squarely in the context of the Fourth

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Amendment claim, but not the Fourteenth Amendment claim, implies

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that while Drummond clearly establishes the law in the excessive

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force context, it does not establish the law in a familial

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association context.

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Plaintiffs disagree, contending that “[w]hile a Fourteenth

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Amendment claim and a Fourth Amendment claim are evaluated under

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different standards, these claims relate to the same core rights

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vis-à-vis law enforcement and substantially overlap.”

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Suppl. Brief at 9 (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct.

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2466 (2015)).

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case.

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Fourth Amendment excessive force claim to analyze a pretrial

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detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim.

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that two excessive force claims share a standard even when they

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derive from different constitutional amendments does not

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necessarily mean that the Fourth Amendment’s objective

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reasonableness standard may be ported to other Fourteenth

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Amendment claims outside of claims brought by a pre-trial

Pls.’

Kingsley, however, does not apply to the present

In Kingsley, the Supreme Court invoked the standards of a

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The fact

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detainee.

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unpersuasive to the Court.

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Drummond and Garlick, which relies on Drummond, do not clearly

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establish that the prolonged use of compressive force on a prone

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and restrained suspect violates the suspect’s family’s right to

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familial association under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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As such, Plaintiffs’ citation to Kingsley is
Accordingly, the Court finds that

Similarly, the Court finds that Mattos, a Ninth Circuit

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case about a taser used in excessive force, does not put

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Officer Lal on notice that his conduct runs afoul of the

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Fourteenth Amendment.

Mattos, 661 F.3d at 452 (holding that the

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officers violated the Fourth Amendment in using their tasers but

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nevertheless granted qualified immunity because the law was not

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clearly established at the time).

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articulated above, the Court declines to extend the Fourth

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Amendment reasoning in Mattos to clearly establish law in the

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context of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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that the law was not clearly established at the time that

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Officer Lal allegedly violated Plaintiffs’ familial association

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rights when he tased the decedent.

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immunity is appropriate for Officer Lal.

For the same reasons

As such, the Court finds

For this reason, qualified

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III.

ORDER

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For the reasons stated above, the Court finds not every

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reasonable officer at the time of the incident would have known,

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beyond debate, that their conduct violates the Fourteenth

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Amendment.

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Defendants Gray, Wright, Lal, Davis, and Krause on Plaintiffs’

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§ 1983 Familial Association claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS qualified immunity to

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Summary judgment is GRANTED for Defendants on this claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 12, 2023

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