Arias et al v. FCA US LLC

Filing 53

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 11/20/2019 GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 42 Motion for Attorney Fees. The Court AWARDS Plaintiffs $49,490.00 in attorney's fees and DENIES all costs, for a total of $49,490.00. (Huang, H)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LUPE ARIAS and JAVIER ARIAS,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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FCA US LLC.,

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Defendant.

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Case No. 2:18-cv-00392-JAM-AC
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
COSTS

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Lupe Arias and Javier Arias (“Plaintiffs”) request $120,103.25

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in attorney’s fees and costs resulting from the settlement of their

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claims against FCA US LLC. (“Defendant”) for violation of statutory

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obligations.

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fees and costs pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d) and Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 54(d)(1)–(2).

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GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion.1

Mot., ECF No. 42.

Id.

Plaintiffs seek these attorney’s

For the reasons stated below, the Court

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled
for November 5, 2019.
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I.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 11, 2017, Plaintiffs sued Defendant under the Song-

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Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1790, et seq., and

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Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq., for defects

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that arose in their 2015 Jeep Cherokee.

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A, ECF No. 1.

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litigation, the parties settled.

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granted the parties 90 days to resolve all terms of the agreement,

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including the issue of attorney’s fees and costs.

See Notice of Removal Ex.

Following approximately one and a half years of
See ECF No. 37.

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38.

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move for an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

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Defendant opposes this motion.

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Order, ECF No.

Unable to reach an agreement with Defendant, Plaintiffs now

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The Court

II.
A.

Mot., ECF No. 42.

Opp’n, ECF No. 44.
OPINION

Attorney’s Fees
1.

Legal Standard

District courts follow the forum state’s law for awarding

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attorney’s fees when exercising their diversity jurisdiction over

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state-law claims.

Close v. Sotheby’s Inc., 909 F.3d 1204, 1208

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(9th Cir. 2018).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) merely

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sets the procedure for claiming attorney’s fees.

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Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Thus, section 1794(d) of the Song-Beverly Act governs here.

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provides that the prevailing party shall be allowed to recover

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attorney’s fees “based on actual time expended, determined by the

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court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection

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with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

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Code § 1794(d) (emphasis added).

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See MRO Commc’ns,

It

Cal. Civ.

The prevailing party bears the burden of demonstrating that
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the fees were: (1) allowable; (2) reasonably necessary to the

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conduct of the litigation; and (3) reasonable in amount.

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Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am., 31 Cal. App. 4th 99, 104 (Ct.

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App. 1994) (internal citations omitted).

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discretion to reduce the fee award where fees were not reasonably

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incurred.

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2001).

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The court retains

See Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 1132 (Cal.

The “lodestar method” is the primary method for determining
the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee request under the Song-

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Beverly Act.

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awards are computed in a two-step process.

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calculates the lodestar: the “the number of hours reasonably

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expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”

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Biological Diversity v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 188 Cal. App. 4th

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603, 616 (Ct. App. 2010), as modified (Oct. 18, 2010).

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the reasonable hourly rate used for the lodestar calculation is

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that prevailing in the community for similar work.”

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quotation marks omitted).

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Id. at 1135.

Pursuant to that method, attorney’s fee
First, the court

Ctr. for

“Generally,

Id. (internal

The court may then increase or decrease the lodestar

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calculation amount based on factors such as “the novelty and

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difficulty of the issues, the attorneys’ skill in presenting the

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issues, the extent to which the case precluded the attorneys from

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accepting other work, and the contingent nature of the work.”

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at 772–73.

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fair market value for the particular action.”

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App. 4th at 1132.

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burden of proving that its requested fees are reasonable.

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Biological Diversity, 188 Cal. App. 4th at 616.

Id.

“The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the
Ketchum, 24 Cal.

The party seeking attorney’s fees bears the

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Ctr. for

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2.

Analysis

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a.

Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiffs submits “Time Records,” itemizing the time spent by

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attorney Jill Harris on this case.

Pl.’s Ex. J, ECF No. 42.

The

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Court finds that not all of the hours Plaintiffs’ counsel billed

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are reasonable.

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eight hours will be spent reviewing Defendant’s opposition,

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drafting the reply, and attending a motion on the hearing.

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ECF No. 41 at 3.

Plaintiffs’ counsel “anticipates” an additional

Mem.

There was no hearing on this motion and

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Plaintiffs replied to Defendant’s opposition in seven brief

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paragraphs.

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hours billed for the cancelled hearing from the fee award. See,

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e.g., Johnson v. Yates, No. 2:14-cv-1189-TLN-EFB, 2017 WL 3438737,

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at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017) (striking hours billed for a

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hearing that was not held). The Court further reduces the eight

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estimated hours to four.

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See Reply, ECF No. 46.

Thus, the Court strikes the

Defendant objects to several of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s time

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entries as being too vague.

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agrees that some of the block billing entries do not allow for a

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proper determination of whether the time spent was reasonable.

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Defendant specifically cites to four entries from May 2019 that

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amount to 24.5 hours.

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counsel provides either “trial prep” or “work on file, trial prep;

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research” as a description.

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24.5 hours spent on trial preparation may be reasonable,

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Plaintiffs’ counsel provides too little information to allow the

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Court to credit such a significant amount of time billed over

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roughly a two-week period.

Id.

Opp’n, ECF No. 44 at 2.

The Court

For each of these entries, Plaintiffs’

See Pl.’s Ex. J, ECF No. 42.

While

The Court therefore reduces the amount
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of time billed by five hours—to 19.5 hours.

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Defendant also objects to three entries from the end of May

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2019 described as: “research; proposed jury instructions CACI;

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review Fed. Instructions”; “[d]raft jury instructions”; and

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“[d]raft voir [dire] and [t]rial [p]rep.”

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These three entries from a two-day period amount to 17.5 hours.

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The Court finds the time spent on jury instructions and voir dire

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unreasonable.

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working on consumer vehicle cases since early 2015.

Opp’n, ECF No. 44 at 2.

Plaintiffs’ counsel, by her own words, has been
Harris Decl.,

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ECF No. 42 at 2–3.

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cases” and has litigated “too many [cases] to count” against FCA US

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LLC.

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counsel experience on these types of cases, it took her 17.5 hours

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to draft jury instructions and voir dire.

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presumably prepared jury instructions and voir dire for these cases

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before, and likely has drafts of each on hand.

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reduces the amount of time billed for this work to 8.5 hours.

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Id.

She had worked on “no less than 500 lemon law

It is difficult to believe that, given Plaintiffs’

Plaintiffs’ counsel has

As such, the Court

The Court finds the rest of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s time entries

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reasonable and not subject to reduction.

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remainder of Defendant’s specific objections to Plaintiffs’

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counsel’s time entries are denied.

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Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing statement by 18 hours.

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b.

Accordingly, the

In total, the Court reduces

Reasonable Hourly Rate

Plaintiffs assert that the fee award should be based on a rate

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of $475.00 per hour.

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rate is consistent with national surveys of consumer-attorney

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hourly rates.

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Plaintiffs’ counsel charges are unreasonable and should be reduced.

Id.

Mem. ECF No. 41 at 11.

They argue counsel’s

Defendant, however, contends the hourly rates

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Opp’n, ECF No. 44 at 2.

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Plaintiffs provide evidence in the form of declarations of

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other attorneys regarding their respective billable rates.

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Rosner’s Decl. and Anderson’s Decl., ECF No. 41.

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declaration addresses the prevailing rates in the Eastern District

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of California.

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prevailing rates in the Eastern District.

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7.

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Neither

Defendant’s opposition similarly fails to present
See Opp’n, ECF No. 44 at

The Court thus examines rate determinations in other cases

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before this Court.

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$350.00 is a reasonable rate for counsel in consumer law matters

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with approximately the same number of years of legal experience.

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See N.L. by Lemos v. Credit One Bank, N.A., No. 2:17-cv-01512-JAM-

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DB, 2019 WL 1428122, at *4 (E.D. Cal. March 29, 2019).

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have not presented the Court with a compelling reason to depart

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from the rate awarded in those cases.

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Bearing those cases in mind, the Court finds

Plaintiffs

Accordingly, the lodestar in this case is as follows:
Attorney
Harris

Hours
141.4

Rate
$350.00

Total
$49,490.00
$49,490.00

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c.

Multiplier Award

Plaintiffs’ counsel requests an enhancement of a 0.5

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multiplier based on the following factors: (1) The risks posed by

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litigation; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal and factual

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issues; and (3) the results obtained on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

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Mem. ECF No. 41 at 14–15.

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additional considerations, including the results obtained. Hensley

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v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).

The lodestar may be adjusted in light of

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Nonetheless, a “strong

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presumption” exists that the lodestar figure represents a

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“reasonable fee” and should be enhanced only in “rare and

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exceptional cases.”

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Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986).

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and asserts this case calls for a negative multiplier.

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No. 44 at 5–6.

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Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’
Defendant objects
Opp’n, ECF

No upward- or downward-adjustments of the above amount is

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necessary.

Counsel did obtain a positive result for Plaintiffs.

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But that result is not “exceptional,” nor is it borne out of

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“exceptional effort[s]” by counsel.

Graham v. Daimler Chrysler

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Corp., 34 Cal.4th 553, 582 (2004).

This case similarly did not

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present any novel or difficult issues and, in this Court’s opinion,

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was not high risk.

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market value of this particular action.

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4th at 1132.

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B.

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Thus, the lodestar value represents the fair
See Ketchum, 24 Cal. App.

Costs
1.

Legal Standard

Recovery of prevailing party costs in federal district court

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is generally considered a question of procedure governed by Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), even in diversity cases.

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Champion Produce Inc., v. Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., 342 F.3d 1016,

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1022 (9th Cir. 2003).

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demonstrated a special interest in permitting prevailing Song-

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Beverly plaintiffs to recover costs and expenses under California

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Civil Code § 1794(d).

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F.3d 1184, 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Clausen v. M/V NEW

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CARISSA, 339 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2003)).

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of the Song-Beverly Act, rather than Federal Rule of Civil

But the California Legislature has

Forouzan v. BMW of North America, LLC, 390

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Thus, the cost provision

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Procedure 54(d)(1) applies here.

Id.

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Section 1794(d) of the Act defines the amount in costs and

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expenses that may be recovered as “a sum equal to the aggregate

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amount of costs and expenses . . . determined by the court to have

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been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the

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commencement and prosecution of such action.”

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section 1794(d) are such costs and expenses as expert witness fees

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and filing fees.

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112, 138 (1995).

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2.

Recoverable under

Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 4th

Analysis

Plaintiffs seek $2,815.50 in costs for “[c]ompensation of

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court-appointed experts.”

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failed to support their Bill of Costs with a memorandum as required

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by Local Rule 292(b).

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2010 WL 2035697, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2010). Plaintiffs also

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did not provide supporting documentation for the requested costs.

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The Court finds billing for expert services without attaching a

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bill to the motion unreasonable.

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(denying investigation and expert costs where no bills were

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provided).

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were reasonably incurred, the “Court will not award such an amount

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arbitrarily.”

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See Reply Ex. A, ECF No. 46.

Plaintiffs

Osei v. GMAC Mortg., No. 09-cv-2534-JAM-GGH,

See Yates, 2017 WL 3438737, at *3

With no basis upon which to judge whether these costs

Id.

Thus, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for $2,815.50 in
costs for unsupported expert fees.
III.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and

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DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

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The Court awards Plaintiffs $49,490.00 in attorney’s fees and
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denies all costs, for a total of $49,490.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 20, 2019

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