Randle v. Illa
Filing
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FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 11/1/18 RECOMMENDING that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Referred to Judge John A. Mendez. Objections due within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations.(Coll, A)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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WILLIE D. RANDLE,
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No. 2:18-CV-0411-JAM-DMC-P
Plaintiff,
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v.
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ROBERT ILLA,
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Defendant.
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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
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means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
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1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the
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complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
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rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege
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with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the
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claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
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and conclusory.
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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff names Robert Illa, a doctor at California State Prison – Sacramento, as
defendant. Plaintiff alleges he suffers from rheumatoid arthritis and has been prescribed
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methotrexate, Enbrel, sulfasalazine, and plaquenil for the condition. According to plaintiff, on
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April 24, 2017, he informed a nurse he was experiencing pain in his joints, legs, and lower back.
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See Doc. 1, p. 5. Plaintiff states he was told by the nurse she would “get me seen by the doctor.”
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Id. Plaintiff was later seen by defendant Illa who, according to plaintiff, conducted a brief
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examination and said: “I don’t see rheumatoid arthritis. . . .” Id. When plaintiff told defendant
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Illa that he was experiencing pain in his joints, legs, and lower back and that the pain was making
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it difficult for him to move around, defendant Illa allegedly told plaintiff he would have to ask his
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primary care doctor. See id. Plaintiff next states he noticed his rheumatoid arthritis medications
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were missing from his “morning medication.” Id. According to plaintiff, he was told by the
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nurse the medications had been discontinued. See id.
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II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff claims defendant Illa was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
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needs by discontinuing his rheumatoid arthritis pain medications. The treatment a prisoner
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receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny
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under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v.
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McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth
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Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
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humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement
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may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
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Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,
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medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986).
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A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1)
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objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the
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minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have
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acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at
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834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable
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mind.” See id.
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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious
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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105;
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see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health
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needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is
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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant
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injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
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1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition
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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily
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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See
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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases
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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with
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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,
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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to
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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.
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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See
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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical
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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See
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Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate
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that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give
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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a
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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate
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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,
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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
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In this case, plaintiff does not directly allege defendant Illa is responsible for
discontinuation of his rheumatoid arthritis pain medications. Assuming, however, it is reasonable
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to infer defendant is responsible for discontinuation of plaintiff’s medications, the court finds
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plaintiff’s complaint states, at most, a difference of opinion regarding appropriate medications or
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a claim based on professional negligence. According to plaintiff, while defendant’s examination
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of him was brief, he was nonetheless examined. Thus, the facts alleged by plaintiff do not show
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defendant Illa was indifferent to plaintiff’s complaints of pain. Rather, the facts alleged show that
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defendant Illa responded to plaintiff’s complaints, examined him, and advised him to consult his
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primary care physician for further treatment. To the extent plaintiff disagrees with this decision,
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he cannot state a cognizable civil rights claim. Nor can plaintiff state a cognizable claim to the
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extent plaintiff asserts defendant Illa was negligent in providing treatment.
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III. CONCLUSION
Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be
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cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of
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the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.
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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days
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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
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objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of
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objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See
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Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Dated: November 1, 2018
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DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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