United States of America v. State of California et al

Filing 164

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 6/4/2018 DENYING 73 Motion to Intervene by Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights, California Partnership to End Domestic Violence. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights and California Partnership to End Domestic Violence may file an amici curiae brief by 6/12/2018. (Donati, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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2:18-cv-490-JAM-KJN

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

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Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO INTERVENE BY CALIFORNIA
PARTNERSHIP TO END DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND THE COALITION FOR
HUMANE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS

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The California Partnership to End Domestic Violence and the

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Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (collectively “Intervenor-

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Defendants”) filed a Motion to Intervene as Defendants in this

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pending case between the United States and the State of

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California.

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in order to defend the California Values Act (“Senate Bill 54” or

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“SB 54”) on behalf of their members and clients.

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States and California oppose intervention.

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For the reasons set forth below, Intervenor-Defendants’ motion is

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DENIED. 1

ECF No. 73.

Intervenor-Defendants seek to intervene

Both the United

ECF Nos. 149 & 151.

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled
for June 5, 2018.
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I.

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BACKGROUND

The United States filed suit against the State of

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California, Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., and Attorney General

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Xavier Becerra (collectively “California”) on March 6, 2018,

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seeking a declaration invalidating, and a preliminary and

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permanent injunction enjoining, certain parts of SB 54, Assembly

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Bill 450, and Assembly Bill 103.

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concurrently filed a motion for preliminary injunction.

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2.

Compl., ECF No. 1.

It
ECF No.

California filed its opposition to that motion and a motion

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to dismiss on May 4, 2018.

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States filed suit, the parties have litigated discovery matters,

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undertaken expedited discovery, and participated in multiple

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discovery conferences.

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118, & 157.

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Northern District of California, which the Court denied on March

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29, 2018.

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Court’s permission, twenty-two amicus and amici curiae briefs

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have been filed.

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140.

ECF Nos. 74 & 77.

Since the United

ECF Nos. 20, 21, 22, 26, 28, 84, 95, 100,

California filed a motion to transfer venue to the

ECF Nos. 18 & 39.

By consent of the parties or the

ECF Nos. 43, 44, 48, 55–57, 104, 112, & 126–

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Intervenor-Defendants are nonprofit organizations that

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contend their members and clients will be impacted if provisions

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of SB 54 are enjoined.

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Domestic Violence (“the Partnership”) is a statewide organization

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comprised of organizations—including direct services providers—

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and individuals that work to address domestic violence and

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provide support for victims.

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The Partnership’s direct service provider members serve immigrant

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populations and the Partnership provides training and programming

The California Partnership to End

Moore Decl., ECF No. 73-4, ¶¶ 2–3.

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related to issues affecting immigrant survivors, witnesses, and

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their families.

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Rights (“the Coalition”) is a statewide membership organization

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whose mission is to advance human and civil rights of immigrants

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and refugees, promote multi-ethnic and multi-racial human

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relations, and empower immigrants and their allies.

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ECF No. 73-5, ¶¶ 2–3.

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meetings, educates the community through trainings, workshops,

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and literature, provides direct legal services, engages in direct

Id. ¶¶ 6–7.

The Coalition for Humane Immigrant

Salas Decl.,

The Coalition organizes regional member

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political advocacy, and runs a hotline that provides information

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and referrals.

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passage and believe the laws enacted are important to their

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members’ interests.

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ensure the challenged provisions of SB 54 are not struck down or

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enjoined.

Id. ¶¶ 4–5.

Both organizations supported SB 54’s

Mot. at 3–4.

They seek to intervene to

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II.

INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT

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A.

Legal Standard

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Intervenor-Defendants contend that they are entitled to

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intervene in this lawsuit as of right.

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court must permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims an

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interest relating to the property or transaction that is the

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subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the

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action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s

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ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties

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adequately represent that interest.”

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Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a four part test to determine

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“On timely motion, the

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).

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whether such a motion should be granted:
(1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must
claim a “significantly protectable” interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede its ability to protect that
interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be
inadequately represented by the parties to the action.

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Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th

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Cir. 2011) (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 995 F.2d 1478,

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1481 (9th Cir. 1993)).

“Failure to satisfy any one of the

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requirements is fatal to the application, and [the Court] need

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not reach the remaining elements if one of the elements is not

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satisfied.”

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947, 950 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d

Both the United States and California (collectively “the

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Parties”) oppose intervention, primarily arguing that California

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will adequately represent Intervenor-Defendants’ interests.

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In determining the adequacy of representation, district

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courts consider “whether the interest of a present party is such

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that it will undoubtedly make all the intervenor’s arguments;

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whether the present party is capable and willing to make such

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arguments; and whether the intervenor would offer any necessary

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elements to the proceedings that other parties would neglect.”

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People of State of Cal. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 792 F.2d

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775, 778 (9th Cir. 1986).

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determine whether a proposed intervenor is adequately represented

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by a present party to the action is ‘how the [intervenor’s]

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interest compares with the interests of existing parties.’”

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Perry, 587 F.3d at 950–51 (quoting Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d

“The ‘most important factor’ to

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1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003)).

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when the applicant and an existing party have the same ultimate

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objective.

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Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1997)

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(“Under well-settled precedent in this circuit, where an

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applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same

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ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation

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arises.”).

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representation when the existing party is a government body

A presumption of adequacy arises

Perry, 587 F.3d at 951; see also League of United

Additionally, courts presume adequacy of

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acting on behalf of its constituency.

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(“There is also an assumption of adequacy when the government is

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acting on behalf of a constituency that it represents.”).

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each presumption, the applicant must make a compelling showing—

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and in the case of government representation, a very compelling

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showing—that its interests are not adequately represented.

Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086

With

Id.

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B.

Application

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At the outset, the Parties assert that California adequately

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represents Intervenor-Defendants’ interests in this litigation.

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They argue that the heightened standard applies to Intervenor-

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Defendants’ motion because Intervenor-Defendants share the “same

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ultimate objective” as California.

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4–5.

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“government body acting on behalf of its constituency” reinforces

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this presumption.

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Pl. Opp. at 5–7; Def. Opp. at

They further argue that California’s status as a

Pl. Opp. at 8–11; Def. Opp. at 5–6.

Intervenor-Defendants argue that adequate representation

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cannot be presumed unless their interests and California’s

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interests “align precisely.”

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Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Although both the state

Mot. at 11 (citing Brumfield v.

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and the parents vigorously oppose dismantling the voucher

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program, their interests may not align precisely.”)).

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not the case here, they argue, because (1) California has broader

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interests to protect than Intervenor-Defendants, (2) California

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has an interest in maintaining relationships with entities—the

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Federal Government and certain localities—that oppose SB 54, and

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(3) California seeks to defend each law subject to this lawsuit

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and not just SB 54.

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That is

Id. at 11–12.

Precise alignment of interests is not the legal standard in

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the Ninth Circuit.

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adequate representation if Intervenor-Defendants and California

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share the same “ultimate objective.”

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Rather, the Court is bound to presume

See Perry, 587 F.3d at 951.

Intervenor-Defendants have not shown that they have an

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objective distinct from that of California.

Both seek to defend

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the constitutionality of SB 54 and ensure that the law is upheld.

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See Perry, 587 F.3d at 951 (“[I]t is apparent to us that the

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ultimate objective of the Campaign [(proposed intervenor)] and

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the Proponents is identical—defending the constitutionality of

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Prop. 8 and the principle that the traditional definition of

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marriage is the union of a man and a woman.”); Prete v. Bradbury,

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438 F.3d 949, 957 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Here, the ultimate objective

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for both defendant and intervenor-defendants is upholding the

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validity of Measure 26.

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defendant is adequately representing intervenor-defendants’

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interests.”).

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objective is identical to California’s and therefore a

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presumption of adequacy applies.

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presumption” applies because California is a government entity

Thus, a presumption arises that

The Court finds Intervenor-Defendants’ ultimate

Additionally, a “second

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representing a constituency that includes Intervenor-Defendants.

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See Prete, 438 F.3d at 957 (“While it is unclear whether this

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‘assumption’ rises to the level of a second presumption, or

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rather is a circumstance that strengthens the first presumption,

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it is clear that ‘[i]n the absence of a “very compelling showing

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to the contrary,” it will be presumed that’ the Oregon government

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adequately represents the interests of the intervenor-

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defendants.”) (citations omitted).

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California’s responsibility to protect the “broader public

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interest” does not, by itself, thwart the applicable

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presumptions.

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necessarily charged with representing interests beyond those

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attributable to individual members or groups of its constituency.

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If this breadth alone were sufficient to show inadequate

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representation, the presumption applied to government entities

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would be hollow.

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found, adequate representation in similar circumstances.

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e.g., Prete, 438 F.3d at 957 (presuming, and finding, adequate

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representation where the Oregon government and Intervenor-

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Defendants shared the same ultimate objective in upholding the

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validity of a ballot measure); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc.

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v. Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 2011) (presuming, and

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finding, adequate representation where the federal defendants

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shared Intervenor-Defendants ultimate objective of upholding the

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constitutionality of the challenged statues).

See Mot. at 11.

A government entity is

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has presumed, and
See,

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For similar reasons, the Court does not find inadequate

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representation based on California’s interest in maintaining its

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relationship with the federal government and its own localities.
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All government entities have a variety of relationships to

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maintain and this attribute alone does not establish inadequacy.

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See League of United Latin American Citizens, 131 F.3d 1297

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(finding adequate representation where California’s governor had

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shown unwavering support for the challenged law).

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representation inadequate just because California will defend

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each law subject to this litigation and not only SB 54.

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Intervenor-Defendants have not demonstrated how defending the

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entire action might constrain or impede California’s defense of

Nor is

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SB 54.

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defend SB 54 in pursuit of their shared goals.

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State of Ariz., 939 F.2d 727, 737 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding

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inadequate representation where the defendant-Governor had

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decided not to appeal the district court’s adverse decision and

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had adopted a narrower construction of a ballot initiative than

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the supporters of the initiative who sought to intervene);

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Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983)

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(finding possibility of inadequate representation where the

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defendant Secretary of the Interior was previously the head of

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the organization representing the plaintiffs in the action).

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Without more, the traits cited in Intervenor-Defendants’ motion

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are inconsequential.

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It is uncontroverted that California will vigorously
Cf. Yniguez v.

In their Reply brief, Intervenor-Defendants argue they

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should be allowed to intervene because they raise arguments in

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their Proposed Opposition to the Preliminary Injunction that

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California failed to make.

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PI, ECF No. 73-2, with Def. Opp. to PI, ECF No. 74.

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courts consider, inter alia, “whether the interest of a present

Rep. at 3; compare Proposed Opp. to

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Although

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party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed

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intervenor’s arguments,” “the most important factor in

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determining the adequacy of representation is how the interest

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compares with the interests of existing parties.”

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F.3d at 1086.

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showing is required.

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might have authored California’s Opposition differently, the

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thrust of their arguments are substantially the same as is the

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ultimate relief that they seek.

Arakaki, 324

Once the presumptions apply, a very compelling
Id.

Here, while Intervenor-Defendants

See Def. Opp. to PI at 10–22;

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Proposed Opp. to PI at 4–23.

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adequately demonstrated that their distinct arguments—or case

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citations—are tied to interests unique to their members and

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divergent from those of California.

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and cannot show, that California is unwilling or incapable of

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making any arguments that would advance their shared interest.

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Intervenor-Defendants have not

They also have not shown,

Finally, Intervenor-Defendants argue that their

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interpretation of SB 54 differs from California’s in two ways.

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First, they “do not share the State’s view that the SB 54 allows

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localities to share release dates and addresses with DHS simply

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by making them public.”

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that localities can share addresses with DHS through the CLETS

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database.”

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“to allow [them] to defend [SB 54] without relying on legal

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interpretations that, if accepted, would reduce the protection

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[SB 54] provides to their members and clients.

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Id.

Rep. at 3.

Second, they do not “agree

Thus, they contend, intervention is necessary

Rep. at 3.

This argument, too, falls short of compelling.

Although

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Intervenor-Defendants cite pages of California’s brief that

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contain the contested interpretations of California Government
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Code § 7284.6, Rep. at 3, they have not shown that their

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allegedly distinct interpretations of the statute have merit.

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See California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436,

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444 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In order to make a ‘very compelling

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showing’ of the government’s inadequacy, the proposed intervenor

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must demonstrate a likelihood that the government will abandon or

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concede a potentially meritorious reading of the statute.”).

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does such support appear in their Proposed Opposition.

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Proposed Opp. to PI, ECF No. 73-2.

Nor

See

Furthermore, the Court finds

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that these alleged distinctions are not material to the outcome

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that both California and Intervenor-Defendants seek.

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Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 445 (finding inadequate representation where

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differences in construction of a statute “go to the heart of the

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defense”).

Cf.

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Given the absence of a compelling argument to the contrary,

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the Court finds California will adequately represent Intervenor-

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Defendants’ interests in this litigation.

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to satisfy any one of the requirements is fatal to the

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application,” the Court need not, and does not, address the

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remaining elements.

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Defendants’ motion to intervene as of right is denied.

Because the “failure

Perry, 587 F.3d at 950.

Intervenor-

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III.

PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION

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A.

Legal Standard

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Alternatively, Intervenor-Defendants request permissive

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intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).

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timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who is

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given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
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“On

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has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common

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question of law or fact.”

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grant permissive intervention where the applicant for

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intervention shows (1) independent grounds for jurisdiction; (2)

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the motion is timely; and (3) the applicant’s claim or defense,

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and the main action, have a question of law or a question of fact

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in common.”

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(9th Cir. 1996).

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

“[A] court may

Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825,839

“Even if an applicant satisfies those threshold

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requirements, the district court has discretion to deny

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permissive intervention.”

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412 (9th Cir. 1998).

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whether the movant’s ‘interests are adequately represented by

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existing parties.’”

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Cir. 1989) aff’d sub nom. Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82

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(1990).

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B.

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The Court is compelled to deny Intervenor-Defendants’ motion

Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405,

In doing so, the Court may again “evaluate

Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530 (9th

Application

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for permissive intervention for the same reasons they may not

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intervene as of right, i.e., there is no reason to doubt that

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California will not fully, vigorously and adequately represent

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their interests in this litigation.

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Furthermore, the Court finds the addition of Intervenor-

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Defendants to this lawsuit will contribute little to resolution

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of the claims.

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relationship between two sovereign entities: the United States

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and the State of California.

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See Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., 783 F.3d 753, 757 (9th Cir.

This lawsuit fundamentally concerns the

The claims turn on legal questions.

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2015) (describing preemption as a “purely legal question”).

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litigation presents complex constitutional issues that are more

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likely to be complicated by the introduction of litigants such as

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Intervenor-Defendants who seek to advance interests that are not

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necessary to the determination of whether SB 54 is facially

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lawful.

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United States and the State of California that the proper role

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for Intervenor-Defendants is as amici.

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F.2d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 1977) (while litigation might benefit

This

Under these circumstances, the Court agrees with the

See Blake v. Pallan, 554

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from proposed intervenor’s knowledge of law and facts, “such

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benefits might be obtained by an amicus brief rather than bought

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with the price of intervention”).

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IV.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Intervenor-Defendants’

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Motion to Intervene is DENIED.

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amici curiae brief by Tuesday, June 12, 2018.

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Intervenor-Defendants may file

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 4, 2018

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