United States of America v. State of California et al

Filing 166

OPPOSITION by United States of America to 77 Motion to Dismiss. (Reuveni, Erez)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 CHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General MCGREGOR SCOTT United States Attorney AUGUST FLENTJE Special Counsel WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Director EREZ REUVENI Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division 450 5th Street NW Washington, DC 20530 Tel. (202) 307-4293 Erez.R.Reuveni@usdoj.gov DAVID SHELLEDY Civil Chief, Assistant United States Attorney LAUREN C. BINGHAM JOSEPH A. DARROW FRANCESCA GENOVA JOSHUA S. PRESS Trial Attorneys Attorneys for the United States 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 16 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 17 18 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; EDMUND GERALD BROWN JR., Governor of California, in his Official Capacity; and XAVIER BECERRA, Attorney General of California, in his Official Capacity, Defendants. 26 27 28 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 2:18-cv-490-JAM-KJN PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS Hearing Date: June 20, 2018 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom: 6 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 1 3 4 5 6 1. Immigrant Worker Protection Act (AB 450) ......................................................................1 2. Inspection and Review of Facilities Housing Federal Detainees (AB 103)....................2 3. SB 54 and the California Values Act ....................................................................................3 7 LEGAL STANDARD ................................................................................................................4 8 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................4 9 A. California has no authority to penalize employers who voluntarily cooperate with federal officials (AB 450)........................................................................................................4 B. California has no authority to mandate unique inspections of facilities holding federal immigration detainees (AB 103)...............................................................................9 C. California has no authority to prohibit cooperation with the federal government that is contemplated by federal law (SB 54) ............................................................................. 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................... 15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE............................................................................................... 17 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss -i- 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 CASE LAW 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) ....................................................................................................................................... 6 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) ...............................................................................................................................4, 5, 9 Boeing Co. v. Movassaghi, 768 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2014)....................................................................................................... 4, 7, 10, 13 City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015)................................................................................................................................. 13 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) ....................................................................................................................................... 6 Gartrell Constr. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1991)........................................................................................................................ 6 Gregg v. Hawaii, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2017)........................................................................................................................ 4 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ......................................................................................................................................... 4 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) ..................................................................................................................................... 14 I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) ....................................................................................................................................... 5 Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2018 WL 2186168 (S. Ct. May 14, 2018) ................................................................................................. 14 New El Rey Sausage Co. v. U.S. I.N.S., 925 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991)...................................................................................................................... 8 North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990) ................................................................................................................................... 4, 7 Oregon Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017)...................................................................................................................... 6 28 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - ii - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) ..................................................................................................................................... 15 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) ..................................................................................................................................... 15 Sherman v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 502 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2007)...................................................................................................................... 12 United States v. City of Arcata, 629 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2010)........................................................................................................................ 7 Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986) ....................................................................................................................................... 6 Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1983)........................................................................................................................ 5 11 12 13 14 FEDERAL STATUTES 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(11)........................................................................................................................................ 9 8 U.S.C. § 1226 ................................................................................................................................................. 11 15 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).......................................................................................................................................11, 12 16 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)..................................................................................................................................15, 16 17 8 U.S.C. § 1231 ................................................................................................................................................. 11 18 19 20 21 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii)............................................................................................................................. 11 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)........................................................................................................................................ 11 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)........................................................................................................................................ 11 22 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)(B) .................................................................................................................................. 11 23 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1).......................................................................................................................................... 9 24 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1)-(2) ................................................................................................................................... 9 25 26 27 28 8 U.S.C. § 1305 ................................................................................................................................................. 13 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) .................................................................................................................................. 5 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2).................................................................................................................................... 5, 8 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - iii - 1 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) ............................................................................................................................................ 6 2 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3) ....................................................................................................................................... 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(A).................................................................................................................................. 5 8 U.S.C. § 1373 ...........................................................................................................................................11, 13 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) .......................................................................................................................................... 15 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1)............................................................................................................................ 14 8 FEDERAL REGULATIONS 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 ............................................................................................................................................ 9, 10 FEDERAL RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 ............................................................................................................................................... 1 FEDERAL REGISTER 68 Fed. Reg. 4364............................................................................................................................................. 10 68 Fed. Reg. 4366............................................................................................................................................. 10 17 CALIFORNIA STATUTES 18 19 Assem. B. 103 ............................................................................................................................................... 9, 10 20 Assem. B. 450 ............................................................................................................................................. passim 21 CA. S.B. 54 .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 22 Cal. Gov. Code § 7282.5(a)........................................................................................................................... 3, 4 23 24 25 26 Cal. Gov. Code § 7284.4(c)............................................................................................................................. 12 Cal. Gov. Code § 7284.4(e).......................................................................................................................12, 17 Cal. Gov. Code § 7284.4(f)............................................................................................................................. 12 27 Cal. Gov. Code § 7284.5(a)............................................................................................................................... 3 28 Cal. Gov. Code § 7284.6(a)(1)(C) .............................................................................................................. 3, 12 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - iv - 1 Cal. Gov. Code § 7284.6(a)(1)(D).............................................................................................................. 3, 12 2 Cal. Gov. Code § 7284.6(a)(1)........................................................................................................................ 12 3 4 5 6 Cal. Gov. Code § 7284.6(4) ............................................................................................................................ 12 Cal. Gov. Code § 7285.1(b) .............................................................................................................................. 2 Cal. Gov. Code § 7285.2(a)(2).......................................................................................................................... 8 7 Cal. Gov. Code § 7285.2(b) .............................................................................................................................. 2 8 Cal. Gov. Code § 12532(b) .....................................................................................................................2, 9, 10 9 Cal. Labor Code § 1019.2(a)............................................................................................................................. 8 10 11 12 13 Cal. Labor Code § 90.2(a)(1) ............................................................................................................................ 2 Cal. Labor Code § 90.2(b)(1)............................................................................................................................ 2 Cal. Labor Code § 90.2(c) ................................................................................................................................. 2 14 Cal. Penal Code § 6030.................................................................................................................................... 10 15 Cal. Penal Code § 6031.1 ................................................................................................................................ 10 16 Cal. Penal Code § 6031.1(a).............................................................................................................................. 2 17 18 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 19 CA. Assem. Comm. on the Judiciary Rep., Apr. 22, 2017........................................................................... 1 20 21 22 23 24 CA S. Hearing, April 03, 2017 https://ca.digitaldemocracy.org/hearing/52288?startTime=1150&vid=910977abbea937bca7424c 93fe3caf1c (last visited on June 6, 2018).................................................................................................... 3 Hearing on S.B. 54 before the S. Standing Comm. On Public Safety (Jan. 31, 2017) (statement of Sen. Scott Wiener), https://ca.digitaldemocracy.org/hearing/10091? startTime=275&vid=381a741e4e525c9efccbbf6062c67f3c (last visited on June 6, 2018)................ 3 25 26 27 28 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss -v- 1 California has enacted several laws with the express goal of interfering with “an expected 2 increase in federal immigration enforcement activities.” California Committee on the Judiciary 3 4 5 6 7 Report (Assembly), Apr. 22, 2017, at 1. Separately and in concert, the challenged provisions have the purpose and effect of impeding enforcement of the immigration laws and impermissibly discriminating against the United States. As discussed below and in our briefing in support of our motion for a preliminary injunction, the motion to dismiss should be denied. 8 9 10 11 12 13 BACKGROUND 1. Immigrant Worker Protection Act (AB 450) The Immigration Worker Protection Act, or AB 450, was enacted to regulate employers who might be the subject of “immigration worksite enforcement actions” by federal immigration authorities. AB 450, Preamble. To that end, AB 450 restricts private (and public) employers from 14 voluntarily cooperating with federal officers who seek information relevant to federal efforts to 15 investigate the unauthorized employment of aliens. 16 17 18 19 Among other things, AB 450 adds Sections 7285.1 and 7285.2 to the California Government Code. Section 7285.1(a) provides that an employer or its agent “shall not provide voluntary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to enter any nonpublic areas of a place of labor,” unless “the 20 immigration enforcement agent provides a judicial warrant,” or consent is “otherwise required by 21 federal law.” Section 7285.2(a)(1) similarly prohibits an employer or its agent from “provid[ing] 22 voluntary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to access, review, or obtain the employer’s 23 24 25 26 employee records without a subpoena or judicial warrant.” Section 7285.2(a)(2) contains an exception for certain documents for which the Federal Government has provided a “Notice of Inspection” issued pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3). 27 AB 450 also adds provisions to the California Labor Code that establish new requirements 28 that employers must satisfy before allowing U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), a Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 1 1 component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), to conduct its inspection 2 process. New Section 90.2 requires employers to notify employees and their authorized 3 4 5 6 representatives of upcoming inspections of employment records “within 72 hours of receiving notice of the inspection,” Labor Code § 90.2(a)(1), and requires employers to provide employees and their authorized representatives, within 72 hours, with copies of written immigration agency notices 7 providing results of inspections, id. § 90.2(b)(1). New Section 1019.2(a) of the Labor Code provides 8 that an employer or its agent “shall not reverify the employment eligibility of a current employee at a 9 time or in a manner not required by Section 1324a(b) of Title 8 of the United States Code.” 10 11 12 13 All these provisions are subject to a schedule of civil penalties of $2,000 to $5,000 for a first violation and $5,000 to $10,000 for each subsequent violation. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 7285.1(b), 7285.2(b); Labor Code § 90.2(c). 14 2. Inspection and Review of Facilities Housing Federal Detainees (AB 103) 15 Under longstanding California law, all “local detention facilities” are subject to biennial 16 inspections concerning health and safety, fire suppression preplanning, compliance with training and 17 18 19 funding requirements, and the types and availability of visitation. Cal. Penal Code § 6031.1(a). The term “local detention facilities” includes facilities operated by cities, counties, or private entities that 20 contract with cities or counties (while excluding certain specialized facilities), but does not include 21 federal facilities. Id. § 6031.4. 22 23 24 25 26 AB 103, which adds § 12532(a) to the California Government Code, establishes a separate inspection and review scheme applicable only to facilities “in which noncitizens are being housed or detained for purposes of civil immigration proceedings in California.” Unlike the inspections established by Cal. Penal Code § 6031.1(a), the new scheme instructs the California Attorney General 27 to examine, among other things, the “due process provided” to civil immigration detainees, and “the 28 circumstances around their apprehension and transfer to the facility.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12532(b). Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 2 1 Section 12532(c) requires that the state “shall be provided all necessary access for the observations 2 necessary to effectuate reviews required pursuant to this section, including, but not limited to, access 3 to detainees, officials, personnel, and records.” 4 3. SB 54 and the California Values Act 5 The California Values Act is part of SB 54, which “prohibit[s] state and local law enforcement 6 7 agencies,” other than employees of the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, from 8 “cooperat[ing] with [Federal] immigration authorities” other than in very limited, circumscribed 9 circumstances. See SB 54, Preamble; Cal. Gov. Code § 7282.5(a). The Act is intended to serve as a 10 11 12 13 14 “counterbalance to this [Presidential] administration” on immigration matters, see Hearing on S.B. 54 before the S. Standing Comm. On Public Safety (Jan. 31, 2017) (statement of Sen. Scott Wiener),1 by requiring state and local actions on immigration “separate from that of the federal government.” Senate Floor Hearing on 04-03-2017.2 15 Among other things, with certain exceptions discussed below, new Section 7284.6 prohibits 16 state and local officials from “[p]roviding information regarding a person’s release date or responding 17 18 19 to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information,” Cal Gov. Code § 7284.6(a)(1)(C); providing “personal information,” including an individual’s home address or work 20 address, id. § 7284.6(a)(1)(D); and “[t]ransfer[ring] an individual to immigration authorities,” id. 21 § 7284.6(a)(4). 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Affected state and local officials may share information relating to release dates only where an individual subject to such information sharing has been convicted of a limited set of crimes, or where the information is available to the public. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 7284.5(a), 7284.6(a)(1)(C). Personal information may be shared only if it is available to the public. Id. § 7284.6(a)(1)(D). Transfers to federal immigration authorities may occur only if the United States presents a “judicial warrant or 1 2 https://ca.digitaldemocracy.org/hearing/10091?startTime=275&vid=381a741e4e525c9efccbbf6062c67f3c https://ca.digitaldemocracy.org/hearing/52288?startTime=1150&vid=910977abbea937bca7424c93fe3caf1c. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 3 1 judicial probable cause determination,” or the individual in question has committed one of a specified 2 set of crimes. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 7284.6(a)(4), 7282.5(a). 3 4 5 6 LEGAL STANDARD A motion to dismiss must be denied if, “accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” the Court concludes 7 that the complaint “plausibly suggest[s] an entitlement to relief.” Gregg v. Hawaii, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 8 870 F.3d 883, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). 9 10 11 12 13 ARGUMENT “The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012). California may not interfere with the United States’ ability to enforce the immigration laws, and its legal theories 14 here would authorize the state to impede the enforcement of any federal law based on policy 15 disagreements with the Executive Branch. 16 17 18 19 The provisions at issue here are invalid under each of two related doctrines. First, a law is preempted by federal law if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Second, under the 20 doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, “state laws are invalid if they ‘regulate the United States 21 directly or discriminate against the Federal Government or those with whom it deals.’ ” Boeing Co. v. 22 Movassaghi, 768 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435 23 24 25 26 27 28 (1990) (plurality op.) (brackets omitted)). The provisions at issue impermissibly interfere with the United States’ enforcement of the immigration laws and single out for adverse treatment those who assist with immigration enforcement efforts. A. California has no authority to penalize employers who voluntarily cooperate with federal officials (AB 450) 1. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”) creates a “comprehensive Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 4 1 framework for combating the employment of illegal aliens.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 404. IRCA makes it 2 illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized workers. 3 4 5 6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). Employers who attempt to comply in good faith with verification requirements are protected from civil and criminal penalties under federal law. Id. § 1324a(b)(6)(A). Congress established a nationally uniform inspection process whereby employers 7 are required to retain documentary evidence of authorized employment of aliens, and to permit 8 federal investigative officers to inspect that evidence. See id. § 1324a(b). 9 10 11 12 13 Federal law allows immigration officials to enter a place of employment for immigration enforcement purposes without first procuring a judicial warrant. Instead, Congress provided for a method for immigration enforcement, including in the context of worksite inspections, premised on private property owners’ ability to consent to inspections of their property and their employees. 14 It is thus established that “[i]n the course of enforcing the immigration laws, [federal 15 immigration officers may] enter[ ] employers’ worksites to determine whether any illegal aliens may be 16 17 18 19 20 present as employees.” I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 211-12 (1984). Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “Congress, in adopting [Section 1357 of the INA]” intended for immigration officers to possess enforcement authority “to the fullest extent permissible under the fourth amendment.” Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 1983). 21 2. AB 450 imposes civil penalties on private employers in California who provide voluntary 22 consent to immigration enforcement agents who seek to enter nonpublic areas of the workplace. 23 24 25 26 Cal. Gov. Code § 7285.1(a). The Constitution does not allow California to impede federal law enforcement in this fashion. It is well established that a state enactment is preempted if it “results in interference with 27 federal government functions.” Gartrell Constr. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437, 438 (9th Cir. 1991). AB 28 450 interferes with federal immigration enforcement by making it more difficult for federal officers Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 5 1 to investigate immigration violations at employment sites. California cannot plausibly assert that it is 2 vindicating a legitimate state interest in employee privacy, given that the state enactment does not 3 4 5 6 apply to other types of investigatory activity. Rather, AB 450’s clear purpose and effect is to prevent federal officials from carrying out their functions. AB 450 would not survive judicial scrutiny even if, as California asserts, it was “enacted under 7 California’s well-established police powers.” Mem. 9. The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear 8 that state enactments may be preempted even if the state is acting in an area of traditional state 9 authority. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366-67 (2000) (invalidating a 10 11 12 13 Massachusetts law that restricted the State itself from purchasing from companies doing business with Burma); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 525-26 (2003) (invalidating California regulation of insurers doing business in the state); Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. 14 Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986) (invalidating Wisconsin law that prohibited certain violators of the 15 federal law from doing business with the State). In any event, inhibiting federal immigration 16 authorities is not a matter within California’s “police power.” 17 18 19 The state fares no better in observing that “AB 450 does not . . . foreclose immigration enforcement agents’ access to the workplace altogether.” Mem. 10. Contrary to the state’s 20 understanding, a state statute need not entirely thwart the implementation of federal law in order to 21 be preempted. Thus, in Oregon Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 860 22 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017), the Ninth Circuit invalidated a state enactment that purported to require 23 24 25 26 27 28 the Drug Enforcement Administration to secure a court order before it could obtain testimony and documents with a subpoena. The court explained that the additional requirement of obtaining a court order “stands as an obstacle to the full implementation of the [Controlled Substances Act] because it interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach its goal.” Id. at 1236. For similar reasons, AB 450 violates principles of intergovernmental immunity by imposing Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 6 1 penalties on private employers only to the extent that they voluntarily deal with the United States. It 2 is established that “the States may not directly obstruct the activities of the Federal Government.” 3 4 5 6 United States v. City of Arcata, 629 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 437-38). Applying this principle in Arcata, the Ninth Circuit invalidated local ordinances that purported to regulate military recruiting. Arcata, 629 F.3d at 991. Similarly, in Boeing Co. v. Movassaghi, 7 the Ninth Circuit invalidated a state enactment that purported to create special rules for cleanup of a 8 federal nuclear site. Boeing, 768 F.3d at 840. 9 10 11 12 13 California urges that AB 450 does not regulate “federal immigration-enforcement officials,” but instead operates only against employers in the state. Mem. 10. This assertion runs headlong into the basic principle that “a regulation imposed on one who deals with the Government has as much potential to obstruct governmental functions as a regulation imposed on the Government itself.” 14 North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 438. The Supreme Court “has required that the regulation be one that is 15 imposed on some basis unrelated to the object’s status as a Government contractor or supplier, that 16 is, that it be imposed equally on other similarly situated constituents of the State.” AB 450 imposes 17 18 19 penalties based solely on the private entity’s decision to deal with the government. Just as California could not directly prohibit the Federal Government from entering private property with consent 20 from the property owner, or impose a tax only on those businesses that enter into agreements with 21 the United States, the state may not impose unique burdens on entities that cooperate with 22 immigration officers. 23 24 25 26 The other challenged provisions of AB 450 have the same purpose and effect of impermissibly regulating and discriminating against the United States. Section 7285.2(a)(1) prevents employers from voluntarily consenting to review of employee records. Although the statute contains 27 exceptions for particular categories of documents, Cal. Gov. Code § 7285.2(a)(2), when it applies, the 28 statute deliberately stands as an obstacle to the enforcement of federal laws and targets the United Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 7 1 States for adverse treatment. California’s assertion that the statute is designed to “minimize 2 disruptions and reduce[] the likelihood of indiscriminate harassment and detention of all workers,” 3 4 5 Mem. 9, is merely another way of saying that the statute is designed to prevent the United States from taking enforcement actions it has authority to take in the manner it chooses. Similarly impermissible is California’s effort to require employers to provide notice to their 6 7 employees of upcoming inspections and their results. Cal. Lab. Code § 90.2. It would be unthinkable 8 for a state to require that suspects be warned of upcoming criminal investigations by the Federal 9 Bureau of Investigation, or that suspects be kept up to date on the results of investigative work done 10 11 12 13 by the Bureau. There is no basis for a different rule for federal officers enforcing the immigration laws. Finally, AB 450 precludes employers from reverifying the employment eligibility of their 14 employees, except when such reverification is required by federal law. Cal. Labor Code 1019.2(a). 15 Under IRCA, it is unlawful not only to hire an unauthorized worker, but also “to continue to employ 16 [an] alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien with respect 17 18 19 to such employment.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2). Thus, although employers do not have an obligation to reverify employment status for any particular individual, they do have a continuing obligation avoid 20 knowingly employing unauthorized aliens. And as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, in some 21 circumstances “deliberate failure to investigate suspicious circumstances imputes knowledge.” New 22 El Rey Sausage Co. v. U.S. INS, 925 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1991). Congress thus intended that 23 24 25 26 27 28 employers, who will have superior information, would prevent unauthorized employment. Prohibiting employers from reverifying authorization when they deem it appropriate interferes with the operation of this federal scheme. B. California has no authority to mandate unique inspections of facilities holding federal immigration detainees (AB 103) 1. The INA explicitly recognizes the Federal Government’s authority to “arrange for Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 8 1 appropriate places of detention for aliens detained pending removal or a decision on removal.” 8 2 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1). Congress expressly contemplated that some of those aliens might not be housed 3 4 5 6 in federal facilities. See id. §§ 1231(g)(1)-(2), 1103(a)(11). DHS, through ICE, utilizes nonfederal detention facilities in California to house civil immigration detainees in Federal custody. Compl. ¶ 40. Although detainees may be housed in nonfederal facilities, they remain federal detainees 7 subject to the control of the Federal Government. Federal law does not contemplate any role for the 8 facility itself, or for states and localities, in determining which aliens are properly subject to detention. 9 And federal regulation prohibits state, local, or private facilities from disclosing information related 10 11 12 13 to detainees. 8 C.F.R. § 236.6. 2. AB 103 mandates inspection and review of immigration detention facilities that include the California Attorney General’s own assessment of the basis for the alien’s detention and transfer and 14 the due process afforded to the alien. See Cal. Gov. Code § 12532(b). California thus impermissibly 15 seeks through AB 103 to use the location of detention as a mechanism to mandate inspections and 16 undertake its own review of the United States’ enforcement of federal immigration law. Federal 17 18 19 20 immigration enforcement is the prerogative of the National Government, and California has no authority to second-guess the United States’ determinations regarding detention and transfer of aliens. See generally Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394-97. 21 California mistakenly suggests that singling out facilities housing federal detainees is 22 permissible because the additional burdens imposed by the inspections are not sufficiently significant 23 24 25 26 to raise constitutional concerns. The State cites no instance in which a court has upheld a law that creates a unique regime for facilities that contract with the Federal Government, regardless of the level of burden involved. In any event, the state enactment does impose burdens, requiring that state 27 officials “be provided all necessary access” to carry out AB 103. Cal. Gov. Code § 12532(c). Section 28 12532(c) thus compels facilities to participate in the inspection process, diverting scarce resources Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 from other important law enforcement tasks. In addition, although AB 103 does not itself require public disclosure of detainee information, it requires the California Attorney General to make public his report, and requires the Federal Government to release detainee information. AB 103’s required release of sensitive information cannot be reconciled with 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, which was adopted to “guarantee[] that 7 information regarding federal detainees will be released under a uniform federal scheme rather than 8 the varying laws of fifty states.” 68 Fed. Reg. 4364, 4366 (Jan. 29, 2003). 9 10 11 12 13 California’s defense of AB 103 from the intergovernmental immunity doctrine fails for similar reasons. AB 103 discriminates against facilities holding federal immigration detainees by creating a unique scheme applicable only to such facilities. Compare Cal. Gov. Code § 12532(b) with Cal. Penal Code §§ 6030, 6031.1. AB 103 thus runs afoul of the principle that a private contractor 14 “cannot be subjected to discriminatory regulations because it contracted with the federal 15 government.” Boeing, 768 F.3d at 842. 16 17 18 19 California suggests that “reviews under AB 103 are less onerous than reviews for other detention facilities.” Mem. 12. This subjective factual assertion could not be proper grounds for dismissal at this early stage of the litigation. Moreover, the state does not dispute that AB 103 20 subjects immigration detention facilities to unique forms of examination to which no other facilities 21 are subject. 22 23 C. California has no authority to prohibit cooperation with the Federal Government that is contemplated by federal law (SB 54) 24 1. In addition to establishing the circumstances in which aliens can enter, remain in, or be 25 removed from the United States, the INA codifies the Executive Branch’s constitutional and 26 inherent authority to investigate, arrest, and detain aliens suspected of being, or found to be, not 27 28 lawfully in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1231, 1357. Knowledge of the date of release from state or local custody or the home address of aliens covered by these provisions is critical to DHS’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 ability to fulfill its statutory obligations regarding detention and removal. Congress has generally permitted confinement pursuant to state or local criminal sentences to proceed notwithstanding the prospect of or pendency of federal removal proceedings, by providing that the United States “may not remove an alien who is sentenced to imprisonment until the alien is released from imprisonment.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4); see id. § 1231(a)(4)(B) (permitting earlier removal 7 in certain circumstances). In various ways, the INA presumes that the United States will be made 8 aware of the release date of aliens in state or local custody. The United States must detain individuals 9 who have committed certain crimes “when the alien is released,” if the alien is already in the custody 10 11 12 13 of state or local officials. Id. § 1226(c)(1). Aliens subject to a final order of removal must be removed within 90 days, during which time an alien subject to a final order of removal shall be detained pending effectuation of the order. Id. § 1231(a)(2). For aliens subject to criminal confinement, this 14 removal period begins “on the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.” Id. § 15 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii). For other aliens, detention is at the discretion of federal officials, subject to certain 16 constraints set out in federal law. See, e.g., id. § 1226(a). 17 18 19 Congress expressly provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1373 that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of . . . law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way 20 restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, [federal authorities] 21 information regarding the citizenship or immigration status . . . of any individual.” 22 23 24 25 26 2. New Section 7284.6 of the California Government Code deliberately seeks to undermine the system that Congress designed. The statute limits the ability of state and local officers to share release dates, thus inhibiting DHS’s ability to arrest an alien upon release from custody and thus fulfill its statutory responsibilities regarding detention and removal. The effect of the prohibition on 27 providing release dates is compounded by SB 54’s prohibition on sharing personal information, 28 including home addresses, with the Federal Government, § 7284.6(a)(1)(D), depriving DHS of Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 information needed to locate aliens in the absence of an orderly transfer of custody. New Section 7284.6(a)(4) likewise impermissibly undermines the INA’s structure and impedes the enforcement of the immigration laws by limiting the ability of state and local officers to transfer individuals to federal custody. As discussed, the INA contemplates that DHS will be able to take custody of removable criminal aliens directly at the point and place of release from state or local 7 detention. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). Requiring a judicial warrant or judicial finding of probable 8 cause is irreconcilable with the INA, which establishes a system of civil administrative warrants as the 9 basis for immigration arrest and removal, and does not require or contemplate use of a judicial 10 11 12 13 14 warrant for civil immigration enforcement. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1231(a); see Sherman v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 502 F.3d 869, 876-80 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that an executive officer can constitutionally make the necessary probable-cause determination to warrant arrest of an alien “outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause,” without presentment to a judicial officer). 15 3. Sections 7284.6(a)(1)(C) & (D) and 7284.6(a)(4) also violate the doctrine of 16 intergovernmental immunity because the restrictions on information-sharing and transfer apply only 17 18 19 to requests made specifically by immigration authorities. See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 7284.4(e), 7284.6(a)(1), (1)(C), (4). That the statute’s application could extend to cooperating state and local 20 officials carrying out immigration functions only underscores the scope of interference with the 21 enforcement of federal law. See id. § 7284.4(c), (f). 22 23 24 25 26 California asserts that the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity does not apply when “California is regulating law-enforcement matters under the general police power.” Mem. 7. The State identifies no case that has adopted this principle. To the contrary, in Boeing, although a state purported to regulate environmental cleanup—a subject plainly within the state’s authority as a 27 general matter—the Ninth Circuit had no trouble applying the doctrine of intergovernmental 28 immunity. 768 F.3d at 842; see also Reply Br. at I.B.2. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 12 1 4. In prohibiting officials from sharing information such as an alien’s release date, sections 2 7284.6(a)(1)(C) & (D) also directly conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, under which a state or local 3 4 5 6 government may not prohibit the exchange of “information regarding” an individual’s immigration status. Information such as the release date is “information regarding” immigration status within the contemplation of § 1373. That term does not merely denote an alien’s technical immigration status 7 (as California has argued), a reading that construes too narrowly the phrase “information regarding” 8 and disregards the interrelationship between state custody and federal obligations. See Lamar, Archer 9 & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, No. 16-1215, slip op. at 5-9 (S. Ct. June. 4, 2018) (holding that words like 10 11 12 13 “regarding” should be read expansively). Similarly, information such as an alien’s address is relevant to many immigration status issues, such as whether the alien has kept DHS informed of any change of address as required under 8 U.S.C. § 1305. 14 Although California touts the “savings clause” in SB 54, we do not understand California to 15 read its statute to authorize its officers to provide release dates to federal officials as needed. 16 California cannot insulate prohibitions that on their face contravene § 1373 by enacting what is in 17 18 19 effect merely a declaration that the prohibitions do not violate the federal statute. And even if the statute’s scope is somehow limited by the savings clause, the relevant inquiry relates to the statute’s 20 actual application, not to circumstances in which it has no effect. See City of Los Angeles. v. Patel, 135 S. 21 Ct. 2443, 2451 (2015). 22 23 24 25 26 5. California’s invocation of the Tenth Amendment turns principles of federalism on their head. The Federal Government is not requiring California to regulate a particular activity or to enforce a federal regulatory scheme. A state could decline to take aliens potentially subject to removal into custody, or release them prior to the completion of their sentences based on the state’s interest. 27 See 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(4)(B)(ii). The point is that if a state accepts the opportunity provided by 28 Congress and elects to imprison aliens potentially subject to removal before the United States takes Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 13 1 custody, it cannot do so in a way that interferes with the United States’s ability to later remove the 2 aliens. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 290-91 (1981) (“We fail to see 3 4 5 6 why the Surface Mining Act should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow the States a regulatory role.”); see Reply Br. at 1.C.4. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Murphy v. NCAA, 2018 WL 2186168 (S. Ct. May 14, 7 2018), is not to the contrary. The federal statute at issue in that case did not regulate private persons 8 by making sports gambling unlawful under federal law. Instead, the statute purported to make it 9 unlawful for states to authorize sports gambling schemes. The Court left no doubt that – as has 10 11 12 13 always been the case – federal law can preempt state law when federal law regulates private actors pursuant to a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution. Indeed, California recognizes as much in its supplemental brief. Supp. Br. 2. 14 There can be no serious dispute that the INA permissibly regulates aliens by providing for 15 their removal and detention, and, as discussed, the restrictions imposed by SB 54 are preempted quite 16 apart from § 1373. California nevertheless seeks to analogize the question here to that at issue in 17 18 19 Murphy, focusing on § 1373, and urging that the statute cannot validly preempt state law because it is phrased as “a prohibition on ‘state’ or ‘local governmental entit[ies] or official[s],’” Supp. Br. 2 20 (alterations in original). But as the Supreme Court explained, “it is a mistake to be confused by the 21 way in which a preemption provision is phrased.” Murphy, 2018 WL 2186168, at *15. The Court 22 noted, for example, that it had upheld a provision stating that “no State or political subdivision 23 24 25 26 thereof . . . shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any [covered] air carrier.” Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1) (1988 ed.)) (alterations in original). That provision was part of a scheme 27 regulating air carriers, and § 1373 is part of a scheme regulating aliens. In either instance no 28 commandeering occurs because where the Federal Government regulates individuals, including Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 14 1 through access to information concerning those individuals, and states may not obstruct those 2 regulatory schemes. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 913 (1997) (recognizing “duty owed to the 3 4 5 6 National Government, on the part of all state officials, to enact, enforce, and interpret state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the operation of federal law”). Even if SB 54 did not frustrate the enforcement of federal law, and even if preemption of 7 state laws interfering with immigration enforcement function as a “requirement,” California’s 8 argument still fails. A requirement to respond to a federal inquiry about an alien’s release date would 9 in no sense be “commandeering,” but would instead constitute the same type of requirement that 10 11 12 13 could be imposed on a private entity with information relevant to federal enforcement efforts, such as an I-9 form maintained by an employer. The Constitution does not prohibit federal enactments that “do[] not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens,” but instead 14 “regulate[] the States as the owners of data bases.” Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000); see Reply 15 Br. at I.C.4. 16 17 18 19 In addition, the Court has recognized that statutes “which require only the provision of information to the Federal Government[] do not involve . . . the forced participation of the States’ executive in the actual administration of a federal program.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 918. The Supreme 20 Court’s Tenth Amendment cases are not properly read to invalidate reporting requirements, such as 21 the requirement for “state and local law enforcement agencies to report cases of missing children to” 22 the United States. Id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a)). Here, similarly, 23 24 25 26 any requirement that California provide information already in its possession that it already allows localities to disclose to the public, Cal. Gov. Code § 7284.6(a)(1)(C), (D), and that the United States needs to carry out federal law, does not violate the Tenth Amendment. See Reply Br. at I.C.4, n.13 CONCLUSION 27 28 For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss should be denied. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 15 1 DATED: June 6, 2018 CHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General 2 MCGREGOR SCOTT United States Attorney 3 4 AUGUST FLENTJE Special Counsel 5 6 WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Director 7 8 /s/Erez Reuveni EREZ REUVENI Assistant Director U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division Office of Immigration Litigation 450 5th St NW Washington, DC 20530 Telephone: (202) 307-4293 Fax: (202) 616-8202 E-mail: Erez.R.Reuveni@usdoj.gov 9 10 11 12 13 14 DAVID SHELLEDY Civil Chief, Assistant United States Attorney 15 16 LAUREN C. BINGHAM JOSEPH A. DARROW FRANCESCA GENOVA JOSHUA S. PRESS Trial Attorneys 17 18 19 Attorneys for Plaintiff 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 2 3 4 5 6 I hereby certify that on June 6, 2018, I electronically transmitted the foregoing document to the Clerk’s Office using the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California’s Electronic Document Filing System (ECF), which will serve a copy of this document upon all counsel of record. By: /s/ Erez Reuveni EREZ REUVENI 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 17

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