United States of America v. State of California et al

Filing 66

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 4/27/2018 DENYING 63 Motion to Intervene. Dana T. Blackmore terminated. (Donati, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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2:18-cv-490-JAM-KJN

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

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ORDER DENYING DANA T.
BLACKMORE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
INTERVENE

Defendants.

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Pro se filer Dana T. Blackmore (“Blackmore”) filed a motion

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to intervene in the litigation pending between the United States

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and the State of California.

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join the United States as a plaintiff in intervention. For the

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reasons set forth below, Blackmore’s motion is DENIED. 1

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ECF No. 63.

Blackmore seeks to

This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled
for June 5, 2018. Because Blackmore has failed to show her
intervention in this lawsuit is warranted or appropriate, as a
matter of law, the Court elected to render a decision prior to
any opposition filing.
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I.

Intervention As Of Right

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A.

Legal Standard

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Blackmore first seeks to intervene in this lawsuit as of

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right. “On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to

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intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the property

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or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so

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situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter

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impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest,

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unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).

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part test to determine whether such motion should be granted:

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(1)

Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a four

the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must
claim a “significantly protectable” interest
relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must
be so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede its
ability to protect that interest; and (4) the
applicant’s interest must be inadequately
represented by the parties to the action.

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Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th

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Cir. 2011) (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 995 F.2d 1478,

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1481 (9th Cir. 1993)).

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To demonstrate a significantly protectable interest, the

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movant “must establish that (1) the interest asserted is

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protectable under some law, and (2) there is a relationship

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between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue.”

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Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir.

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1996) (citations and quotation marks omitted), as amended on

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denial of reh’g (May 30, 1996).

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In determining the adequacy of representation, courts in the
Ninth Circuit consider three factors: “whether the interest of a
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present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all the

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intervenor’s arguments; whether the present party is capable and

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willing to make such arguments; and whether the intervenor would

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offer any necessary elements to the proceedings that other

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parties would neglect.”

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Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1986). A presumption

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of adequacy arises when the applicant and an existing party have

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the same ultimate objective or where a government acts on behalf

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of a constituency it represents.

People of State of Cal. v. Tahoe Reg’l

See League of United Latin Am.

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Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[U]nder

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well-settled precedent in this circuit, where an applicant for

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intervention and an existing party have the same ultimate

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objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation arises.”);

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Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (“There

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is also an assumption of adequacy when the government is acting

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on behalf of a constituency that it represents.”) (citations

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omitted), as amended (May 13, 2003).

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applicant must make a compelling showing that its interests are

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not adequately represented. Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086.

In either case, the

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B.

Application

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Blackmore has failed to show she is entitled to intervene in

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this matter as of right.

First, she has not identified a legally

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protected interest of her own.

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of her “interests,” but the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 does not

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place any expectations or obligations on private citizens.

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Blackmore also claims a “significant protectable interest in

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receiving all protections that all local (and) state law

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enforcement governmental entities/agencies are obligated to

She cites 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as one

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provide to citizens/residents of the State of California.”

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at 7.

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not identify any “protections” that state and local law

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enforcement are “obligated to provide” in which she might claim

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an interest.

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interest in the state and local law enforcements’ general

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“obligation to protect” to assert a “legally protected interest.”

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See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489

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U.S. 189, 196 (1989)(“[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer

Mot.

But, other than compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, she does

A private citizen must plead more than an abstract

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no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may

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be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of

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which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”).

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Blackmore has not adequately argued or shown that she possesses a

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legally protected interest related to this litigation.

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The Court finds that Blackmore’s interests in this

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litigation do not differ from those of the United States.

She

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allegedly wants to see state and local law enforcement cooperate

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with federal immigration authorities.

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the same outcome and will adequately represent those interests.

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Blackmore claims to have a distinct interest because she is a

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resident of California and is particularly concerned with the

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“public safety peril” she perceives.

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sort of general public interest is presumed to be adequately

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represented by the United States absent a compelling showing to

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the contrary.

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assumption of adequacy when the government is acting on behalf of

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a constituency that it represents.”); United Nuclear Corp. v.

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Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982) (“The state is charged

The United States seeks

Mot. at 10–11.

But this

See Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086 (“There is also an

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with representing the public interest, and one consequence is

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that a prospective intervenor that basically asserts the public

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interest faces a presumption that the state’s representation of

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the public interest will be adequate.”).

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personal reasons for wanting to join the lawsuit do not support a

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finding of inadequate representation, much less constitute a

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compelling showing of such.

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Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 775 F. Supp. 353, 359 (D. Or. 1991)

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(“The interest of a putative intervenor is not inadequately

And, Blackmore’s

See Oregon Envtl. Council v. Oregon

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represented by a party to a lawsuit simply because the party to

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the lawsuit has a motive to litigate that is different from the

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motive to litigate of the intervenor.”).

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Further supporting this Court’s conclusion, Blackmore’s

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Proposed Complaint in Intervention asserts causes of action and

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prayers for relief identical to those already asserted by the

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United States in this action.

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Intervention, ECF No. 63-1, with Complaint, ECF No. 1.

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identical objectives raise yet another presumption of adequacy.

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See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1305 (“where

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an applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same

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ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation

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arises”).

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this presumption.

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Compare Proposed Complaint in
These

Again, Blackmore has not made any showing to overcome

Finally, even assuming Blackmore has a legally protectable

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interest in this lawsuit—which she has not demonstrated—the

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United States will represent that interest.

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to intervene as of right is therefore denied.

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Blackmore’s request

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II.

Permissive Intervention

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A.

Legal Standard

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Alternatively, Blackmore asks the Court to allow her to

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intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).

The rule

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provides:

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intervene who is given a conditional right to intervene by a

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federal statute; or has a claim or defense that shares with the

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main action a common question of law or fact.

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24(b).

“[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to

Fed. R. Civ. P.

“[A] court may grant permissive intervention where the

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applicant for intervention shows (1) independent grounds for

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jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) the applicant’s

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claim or defense, and the main action, have a question of law or

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a question of fact in common.”

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at 839.

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Nw. Forest Res. Council, 82 F.3d

Even if an applicant satisfies these threshold requirements,

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the district court has discretion to deny permissive

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intervention.

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1998).

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intervention, a court must consider whether the intervention will

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‘unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the

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original parties.’”

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Cir. 1989) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3), aff’d sub nom.

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Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82 (1990).

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interests of the original parties, a court . . . should evaluate

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whether the movant’s ‘interests are adequately represented by

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existing parties.’”

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consideration in deciding [such] a motion[.]”

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Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir.

“In exercising its discretion to grant or deny permissive

Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530 (9th

Id.

“In addition to the

“Judicial economy is a relevant

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Id.

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B.

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Irrespective of whether Blackmore meets the threshold

Application

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conditions for permissive intervention, the Court finds

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intervention inappropriate.

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interests are adequately represented by the United States.

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claims and prayers for relief in her Proposed Complaint are

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identical to those of the United States.

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the County of Orange is not presently a party to this action, the

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Court notes that Blackmore’s Motion and Proposed Complaint are

As explained above, Blackmore’s
The

Additionally, though

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largely comprised of text copied from the County’s Motion and

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Proposed Complaint filed four days prior to Blackmore’s filings.

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Compare Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 63, and Proposed Complaint

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in Intervention, ECF No. 63-1, with Motion to Intervene, ECF No.

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59, and Proposed Complaint in Intervention, ECF No. 59-2.

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Judicial economy is certainly not advanced by a putative

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intervenor who fills the Court’s docket with duplicative

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pleadings and briefs.

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claim that her interests are not already represented by others

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involved in this litigation.

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It also casts serious doubt on Blackmore’s

Blackmore’s request for permissive intervention is denied.

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III.

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Order

For the reasons set forth above, Dana T. Blackmore’s Motion
to Intervene is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

April 27, 2018

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