United States of America v. State of California et al

Filing 66

ORDER signed by District Judge John A. Mendez on 4/27/2018 DENYING 63 Motion to Intervene. Dana T. Blackmore terminated. (Donati, J)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 12 2:18-cv-490-JAM-KJN Plaintiff, 13 14 No. v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 15 ORDER DENYING DANA T. BLACKMORE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE Defendants. 16 17 Pro se filer Dana T. Blackmore (“Blackmore”) filed a motion 18 to intervene in the litigation pending between the United States 19 and the State of California. 20 join the United States as a plaintiff in intervention. For the 21 reasons set forth below, Blackmore’s motion is DENIED. 1 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 1 26 27 28 ECF No. 63. Blackmore seeks to This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for June 5, 2018. Because Blackmore has failed to show her intervention in this lawsuit is warranted or appropriate, as a matter of law, the Court elected to render a decision prior to any opposition filing. 1 1 I. Intervention As Of Right 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Blackmore first seeks to intervene in this lawsuit as of 4 right. “On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to 5 intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the property 6 or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so 7 situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter 8 impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, 9 unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). 11 part test to determine whether such motion should be granted: 12 13 14 15 16 (1) Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a four the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a “significantly protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the action. 17 Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th 18 Cir. 2011) (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 995 F.2d 1478, 19 1481 (9th Cir. 1993)). 20 To demonstrate a significantly protectable interest, the 21 movant “must establish that (1) the interest asserted is 22 protectable under some law, and (2) there is a relationship 23 between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue.” 24 Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 25 1996) (citations and quotation marks omitted), as amended on 26 denial of reh’g (May 30, 1996). 27 28 In determining the adequacy of representation, courts in the Ninth Circuit consider three factors: “whether the interest of a 2 1 present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all the 2 intervenor’s arguments; whether the present party is capable and 3 willing to make such arguments; and whether the intervenor would 4 offer any necessary elements to the proceedings that other 5 parties would neglect.” 6 Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1986). A presumption 7 of adequacy arises when the applicant and an existing party have 8 the same ultimate objective or where a government acts on behalf 9 of a constituency it represents. People of State of Cal. v. Tahoe Reg’l See League of United Latin Am. 10 Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[U]nder 11 well-settled precedent in this circuit, where an applicant for 12 intervention and an existing party have the same ultimate 13 objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation arises.”); 14 Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (“There 15 is also an assumption of adequacy when the government is acting 16 on behalf of a constituency that it represents.”) (citations 17 omitted), as amended (May 13, 2003). 18 applicant must make a compelling showing that its interests are 19 not adequately represented. Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086. In either case, the 20 B. Application 21 Blackmore has failed to show she is entitled to intervene in 22 this matter as of right. First, she has not identified a legally 23 protected interest of her own. 24 of her “interests,” but the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 does not 25 place any expectations or obligations on private citizens. 26 Blackmore also claims a “significant protectable interest in 27 receiving all protections that all local (and) state law 28 enforcement governmental entities/agencies are obligated to She cites 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as one 3 1 provide to citizens/residents of the State of California.” 2 at 7. 3 not identify any “protections” that state and local law 4 enforcement are “obligated to provide” in which she might claim 5 an interest. 6 interest in the state and local law enforcements’ general 7 “obligation to protect” to assert a “legally protected interest.” 8 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 9 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)(“[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer Mot. But, other than compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, she does A private citizen must plead more than an abstract 10 no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may 11 be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of 12 which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”). 13 Blackmore has not adequately argued or shown that she possesses a 14 legally protected interest related to this litigation. 15 The Court finds that Blackmore’s interests in this 16 litigation do not differ from those of the United States. She 17 allegedly wants to see state and local law enforcement cooperate 18 with federal immigration authorities. 19 the same outcome and will adequately represent those interests. 20 Blackmore claims to have a distinct interest because she is a 21 resident of California and is particularly concerned with the 22 “public safety peril” she perceives. 23 sort of general public interest is presumed to be adequately 24 represented by the United States absent a compelling showing to 25 the contrary. 26 assumption of adequacy when the government is acting on behalf of 27 a constituency that it represents.”); United Nuclear Corp. v. 28 Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982) (“The state is charged The United States seeks Mot. at 10–11. But this See Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086 (“There is also an 4 1 with representing the public interest, and one consequence is 2 that a prospective intervenor that basically asserts the public 3 interest faces a presumption that the state’s representation of 4 the public interest will be adequate.”). 5 personal reasons for wanting to join the lawsuit do not support a 6 finding of inadequate representation, much less constitute a 7 compelling showing of such. 8 Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 775 F. Supp. 353, 359 (D. Or. 1991) 9 (“The interest of a putative intervenor is not inadequately And, Blackmore’s See Oregon Envtl. Council v. Oregon 10 represented by a party to a lawsuit simply because the party to 11 the lawsuit has a motive to litigate that is different from the 12 motive to litigate of the intervenor.”). 13 Further supporting this Court’s conclusion, Blackmore’s 14 Proposed Complaint in Intervention asserts causes of action and 15 prayers for relief identical to those already asserted by the 16 United States in this action. 17 Intervention, ECF No. 63-1, with Complaint, ECF No. 1. 18 identical objectives raise yet another presumption of adequacy. 19 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1305 (“where 20 an applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same 21 ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation 22 arises”). 23 this presumption. 24 Compare Proposed Complaint in These Again, Blackmore has not made any showing to overcome Finally, even assuming Blackmore has a legally protectable 25 interest in this lawsuit—which she has not demonstrated—the 26 United States will represent that interest. 27 to intervene as of right is therefore denied. 28 /// 5 Blackmore’s request 1 II. Permissive Intervention 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Alternatively, Blackmore asks the Court to allow her to 4 intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). The rule 5 provides: 6 intervene who is given a conditional right to intervene by a 7 federal statute; or has a claim or defense that shares with the 8 main action a common question of law or fact. 9 24(b). “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to Fed. R. Civ. P. “[A] court may grant permissive intervention where the 10 applicant for intervention shows (1) independent grounds for 11 jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) the applicant’s 12 claim or defense, and the main action, have a question of law or 13 a question of fact in common.” 14 at 839. 15 Nw. Forest Res. Council, 82 F.3d Even if an applicant satisfies these threshold requirements, 16 the district court has discretion to deny permissive 17 intervention. 18 1998). 19 intervention, a court must consider whether the intervention will 20 ‘unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the 21 original parties.’” 22 Cir. 1989) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3), aff’d sub nom. 23 Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82 (1990). 24 interests of the original parties, a court . . . should evaluate 25 whether the movant’s ‘interests are adequately represented by 26 existing parties.’” 27 consideration in deciding [such] a motion[.]” 28 /// Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. “In exercising its discretion to grant or deny permissive Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Id. “In addition to the “Judicial economy is a relevant 6 Id. 1 B. 2 Irrespective of whether Blackmore meets the threshold Application 3 conditions for permissive intervention, the Court finds 4 intervention inappropriate. 5 interests are adequately represented by the United States. 6 claims and prayers for relief in her Proposed Complaint are 7 identical to those of the United States. 8 the County of Orange is not presently a party to this action, the 9 Court notes that Blackmore’s Motion and Proposed Complaint are As explained above, Blackmore’s The Additionally, though 10 largely comprised of text copied from the County’s Motion and 11 Proposed Complaint filed four days prior to Blackmore’s filings. 12 Compare Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 63, and Proposed Complaint 13 in Intervention, ECF No. 63-1, with Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 14 59, and Proposed Complaint in Intervention, ECF No. 59-2. 15 Judicial economy is certainly not advanced by a putative 16 intervenor who fills the Court’s docket with duplicative 17 pleadings and briefs. 18 claim that her interests are not already represented by others 19 involved in this litigation. 20 It also casts serious doubt on Blackmore’s Blackmore’s request for permissive intervention is denied. 21 III. 22 23 24 25 26 Order For the reasons set forth above, Dana T. Blackmore’s Motion to Intervene is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: April 27, 2018 27 28 7

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