United States of America v. State of California et al

Filing 95

JOINT LETTER BRIEF re (#85) Order by United States of America. (Genova, Francesca) Modified on 5/21/2018 (Benson, A.).

Case 2:18-cv-00490-JAM-KJN Document 95 Filed 05/17/18 Page 1 of 9
May 17, 2018
The Honorable Kendall J. Newman
United States District Court
Eastern District of California
501 "I" Street, Suite 4-200
Sacramento, CA 95814
RE:

United States v. California, Case No. 2:18-CV-00490-JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal.)

Dear Judge Newman:
The parties respectfully submit this joint letter brief in response to the Court’s May 15 order.
I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

The United States’ Position

The interests of justice require that Plaintiff be granted targeted, expedited discovery to
respond to Defendants’ factual assertions in their opposition that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a
likelihood that it suffers irreparable harm because of Senate Bill 54 (SB 54). Although the parties
have met and conferred extensively and agree in part as to certain discovery, without the
discovery proposed, Plaintiff will be prejudiced in its ability to demonstrate irreparable harm.
Defendants’ claims with respect to harm are premised on factual declarations and their refusal to
provide information within their control concerning whether SB 54 has caused California Law
Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to cease notifying DHS when they release criminal aliens. Good
cause exists for targeted depositions of three declarants, Joe Dominic, Arif Alikhan, and Tom
Wong, as well as limited written discovery concerning whether SB 54 allows LEAs to share
release dates and times with DHS or causes LEAs to release criminal aliens without notification.
B.

California’s Position

Since the United States first made its discovery requests on May 12, the State already has
produced information about its databases, agreed to two depositions of its declarants, agreed to
answer up to ten interrogatories, and agreed to produce any documents relied on in those
interrogatories. But the United States wants more, and with each subsequent meet-and-confer,
has expanded the scope of its “non-exhaustive” requests, even seeking information in its own
possession, custody, or control. Any discovery must be limited to factual assertions in the
declarations, be targeted and proportional, and take into account its delay and the very expedited
timeframe.
Moreover, the United States’ requests regarding Senate Bill (SB) 54 lack “good cause” following
the Supreme Court’s decision on Monday in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., No.
16-478, 584 U.S. __ (May 14, 2018). The Supreme Court held that a federal law prohibiting
states from authorizing sports gambling violates the anti-commandeering doctrine rooted in the
Tenth Amendment because it attempts to dictate “what a state legislature may and may not do.”
Slip Op. at 18 (emphasis added). “A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to
imagine.” Id. Here, the United States seeks the equivalent by attempting to use the INA to
preempt SB 54, and prevent California’s legislature from defining state and local law
enforcement’s proper role. This violates the Tenth Amendment, and because the United States
cannot state a claim concerning SB 54, it cannot obtain discovery concerning it. See, e.g., Wood
v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming stay of discovery where “there was

Case 2:18-cv-00490-JAM-KJN substantive 95 for vacating a prior judgment);
a real question” whether claim presented a Document basisFiled 05/17/18 Page 2 of 9
Wenger v. Moore, 282 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR SEEKING EXPEDITED DISCOVERY
A.

The United States’ Position

Applying the “good cause” standard the Court applied to Defendants’ discovery requests, see
ECF 28 at 2, Plaintiff is entitled to expedited discovery, particularly as it “carries the burden of
proof on its motion,” and “the lack of discovery [] is more prejudicial to [it] than Defendants.”
Friday’s Inc. v. Stripes Rests., Inc., 2015 WL 2341991, *2 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2015).
B.

California’s Position

California agrees that the standard is “good cause,” but that standard is not satisfied here.
Nonetheless, in the spirit of compromise, it has offered to provide the United States with most of
the discovery that it seeks.
III. CLETS DATABASE INFORMATION AND DEPOSITION OF JOE DOMINIC
A.

The United States’ Position

California asserts Plaintiff is not harmed by SB 54’s prohibitions on information sharing
because CLETS provides it access to “criminal-history,” ECF 74 at 3-4, and “personally
identifiable information,” id. at 36, including “addresses,” when “a person is scheduled to be
released,” “name,” “date of birth,” and other “information.” ECF 75 ¶¶ 6-8; see id. ¶¶ 9-13.
California also asserts that although an LEA may not directly provide such information to DHS,
LEAs may provide the same information to CLETS, which DHS may then access. ECF 74 at 34; 75 ¶ 10. California relies exclusively on the declaration of Joe Dominic for these claims,
which form the basis for its argument that SB 54 does not harm Plaintiff because it can access
the information SB 54 prohibits LEAs from sharing through CLETS. While the parties agree that
limited discovery as to CLETS is appropriate, they disagree on the best method. California
suggests 5 interrogatories with accompanying document production, but the information Plaintiff
seeks is factual, and interrogatories are a poor vehicle for such discovery when no time remains
for clarifying answers or resolving disputes concerning their adequacy. Without basic
information regarding CLETS, like who inputs information, what information is in CLETS and
whether it is updated and how current it is, as well as who has access to what, Plaintiff has no
fair opportunity to refute Dominic’s claims. Critical information, which would allow Plaintiff to
respond to California, includes: whether DHS can ascertain release date and time, home address,
and criminal history, both for arrests and convictions with respect to individuals subject to a
detainer. Plaintiff also seeks information necessary to assess the impact of CLETS on Plaintiff’s
harm, such as whether LEAs can input data covered by SB 54 into CLETS, how long it takes
information input into CLETS to be live and accessible to other users, and how quickly data is
entered. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to depose Mr. Dominic for up to four hours regarding factual
assertions at ¶¶ 6-13 of his declaration, and any documents supporting those paragraphs.
B.

California’s Position

CLETS is a law-enforcement communications network accessible to law-enforcement agencies
in California and also to federal agencies, including those within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). CLETS provides access to 54 law-enforcement databases. The United States
seeks, essentially, a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition concerning CLETS, despite the fact that Chief
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Dominic, in his declaration, only discusses Document 95 toFiled 05/17/18two databases. Given
the short amount of time to prepare and the limited scope of Chief Dominic’s proffered
testimony, the United States has failed to demonstrate good cause for a 30(b)(6) deposition,
which is neither appropriate nor proportional at this stage of the litigation. See Lilith Games
(Shanghai) Co. v. uCool, Inc., 2015 WL 3523405, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2015).
Specific detailed questions regarding CLETS are better suited for written discovery to allow time
for the State to provide adequate answers, after the United States identifies its questions with
reasonable particularity. In fact, since last Friday when the meet-and-confer process began,
California voluntarily produced hundreds of pages of information regarding CLETS. California
also offered to answer a limited number of interrogatories, and to produce documents relied upon
in its interrogatory responses. Particularly in light of the written discovery California offered, no
good cause exists to depose Chief Dominic. And if the Court were rule otherwise, then any
deposition should be limited to the paragraphs in the Dominic Declaration that California relies
on to rebut the United States’ claims of irreparable harm, i.e. ¶¶ 6-13. Furthermore, any
discovery, whether written or by deposition, should be limited to the two databases referenced in
Chief Dominic’s declaration—the Supervised Release File and the California Sex Arson
Registry—and a third, the Automated Criminal History System, since the United States has
expressed interest in the criminal history information accessible in CLETS. But requiring Chief
Dominic to prepare to testify to the remaining 51 databases available in CLETS would be unduly
burdensome and disproportionate.
IV.

DEPOSITION OF ARIF ALIKHAN
A.

The United States’ Position

The parties agree that good cause exists for Plaintiff to depose Mr. Alikhan for up to four
hours concerning the contents of his declaration, and for production of documents in support.
B.

California’s Position

California does not agree with the United States’ characterization, but does not object to a
deposition, for up to four hours, of Mr. Alikhan. He is represented by the Los Angeles City
Attorney’s Office, which has agreed to make him available on May 24.
V.

DEPOSITION OF TOM WONG
A.

The United States’ Position

While the parties agree that a four-hour deposition of Mr. Wong is appropriate, the parties
disagree on scope. California exclusively relies on Mr. Wong to contest the veracity of two of
Plaintiff’s core harm claims, i.e. that (1) SB 54 has caused many LEAs to cease providing
notification of a criminal alien’s release, and (2) releasing such individuals rather than
facilitating their transfer endangers the public and federal officers because they reoffend at a high
rate. ECF 2-1 at 35-36. Mr. Wong disputes these premises, asserting that: (1) aliens arrested or
convicted do not tend to “reoffend,” and claims to the contrary are refuted by “statistical
analysis,” ECF 74 at 33-34; Wong. Decl ¶¶ 8-24, 36-37; (2) nearly all LEAs did not cooperate
with federal notification requests prior to SB 54 and Plaintiff fails to present evidence supporting
its claim “that SB 54 has led to a decline in cooperation,” ECF 74 at 34; Wong Decl. ¶ 11; (3)
Plaintiff presents no evidence that SB 54 contributes “materially to an increase in at-large
arrests” or that the “possibility of violence inherent to at-large arrests is greater because of SB
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54,” ECF 74 at 35; see Wong Decl. ¶¶ 8, 40, and (4) cooperation with federal Page 4 of 9
enforcement makes communities less safe. ECF 72 at 2, 40; Wong Decl. ¶¶ 11, 25-35, 37-41.
California suggests Plaintiff should be allowed to depose Mr. Wong on the first of these issues,
but Plaintiff has good cause to examine Mr. Wong on all of them. Only Mr. Wong can speak to
his methods, data, and conclusions with respect to pre-SB 54 cooperation, recidivism, and public
safety, on which California relies. And because Mr. Wong is the only declarant in this case who
asserts that nearly all LEAs did not cooperate with notification requests prior to SB 54, deposing
him is the only way to refute that claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff proposes the following topics: (1)
methods and conclusions concerning whether a jurisdiction is a “sanctuary jurisdiction,” Wong
Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, (2) the dataset analyzed, id. ¶¶ 9-15 (3), the conclusion that 53 of 58 counties did
not cooperate with DHS prior to SB 54, id. ¶ 11; (4) methods for assessing the effects of
sanctuary policies on crime and the economy at the county or municipal level and his
conclusions, id. ¶¶ 8-24, (5) methods for assessing whether criminal aliens may reoffend once
released, such that jurisdictions that release them have higher or lower crimes rates compared to
jurisdictions that do not, id. ¶¶ 8-24, 36-37; (6) methods and data relied on to assess the alleged
chilling effects of immigration enforcement, and the conclusions drawn, id. ¶¶ 11, 25-35, 37-41;
and (7) methods and data relied on for the “survey of undocumented Mexican nationals in San
Diego County,” id. ¶ 28, and how the survey supports the general conclusions concerning all
“sanctuary” jurisdictions in California, id. ¶¶ 28-35, 38-41.
B.

California’s Position

The United States initially sought, and California agreed to allow, the deposition of Dr. Tom
Wong for up to four hours concerning ¶¶ 8-24 and 36-37 of his declaration. Although the United
States seeks to question Dr. Wong regarding increases in at-large arrests, California does not rely
on Dr. Wong to establish these facts, and he does not purport to have knowledge in this area.
Rather, California relies on the United States’ own documents regarding its broadened
enforcement priorities. See ECF 74 at 35:23-27 (relying on DHS Memorandum and ICE report).
Indeed, since its initial request, the United States has expanded the scope of its intended
discovery to include additional paragraphs (¶¶ 25-35 and 38-41) after California already agreed
to a deposition of Dr. Wong, even though California does not rely on information from these
paragraphs to rebut claims of irreparable harm. California does not agree there is good cause to
depose Dr. Wong on those paragraphs. If the Court is inclined to grant the United States’ request
relating to these paragraphs, the State asks that the Court prohibit the United States from seeking
any information relating to the identities of survey respondents, who are not parties or declarants.
See, e.g., Doe I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2000);
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 WL 818255, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2017).
VI.

INTERROGATORIES REGARDING THE “AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC” PROVISION OF
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(A)(1)(C)
A.

The United States’ Position

California asserts that SB 54 allows LEAs to “comply with notification requests if release dates
are ‘available to the public,’” ECF 74 at 4, so “an LEA may adopt a practice of making release
dates public.” Id. California thus suggests that Plaintiff is not harmed by SB 54 because “SB 54
does not prohibit compliance with notification requests,” id. at 21, and that it is LEAs who
decide not to make “that information [] publicly available.” Id. at 35. California relies on
“guidance” issued by the Defendant Becerra a month after Plaintiff filed suit, see, e.g., id. at 4
(citing Part III.1.C of Information Bulletin 2018-DLE-01), that purports to define “available to
the public” as used in § 7284.6(a)(1)(C) to mean “information where a law enforcement agency
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Case or policy of making such information public,” including “disclosing the
has a practice2:18-cv-00490-JAM-KJN Document 95 Filed 05/17/18 Page 5 of 9
information on its website or if it has a practice or policy of providing the information to
individuals in response to specific requests.” See Information Bulletin 2018-DLE-01, III.1.C.
Whether that is true is central to irreparable harm, but California submits no evidence concerning
its guidance and whether it reads § 7284.6(a)(1)(C)) to permit LEAs to adopt a policy of sharing
release dates with DHS in response to specific requests for such information as they assert. ECF
74 at 21, 35. Because the meaning of this phrase and the “guidance” construing that phrase is
highly relevant to whether California’s assertion that “SB 54 does not prohibit compliance with
notification requests” is true, Plaintiff would be unduly prejudiced without an opportunity to
query California concerning its claims. Thus, because California has injected this issue into the
case by issuing the relevant guidance, and making assertions based on that guidance, Plaintiff
requests that California be directed to respond to up to ten interrogatories concerning what LEA
cooperation is or is not permitted by § 7284.6(a)(1)(C) and Information Bulletin 2018-DLE-01.
B.

California’s Position

The United States first presented this request as one question on May 12. After California agreed
in principle that day, the United States identified five questions. Then, after California agreed to
answer up to five interrogatories, the United States sought ten interrogatories, which the United
States has yet to identify with any degree of reasonable particularly. Considering that the
Attorney General’s SB 54 bulletin speaks for itself, ten interrogatories is not reasonable and
proportionate, especially when California was not granted any interrogatories in response to its
expedited discovery motion. If the Court grants ten interrogatories, California believes it is only
fair that they count towards the limit of 25 interrogatories, including all discrete subparts,
permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a). California also reserves its right to object
as it would during the course of ordinary discovery including raising any objections regarding
attorney-client privilege and work-product.
VII. DOCUMENT REQUESTS ON RESPONSES TO NOTIFICATION/TRANSFER REQUESTS
A.

The United States’ Position

Defendants’ opposition is largely centered on their claim that Plaintiff has not satisfied its
burden of showing irreparable harm tied to the decline in information-sharing after SB 54. ECF
74, at 34, 36. California alleges Plaintiff “concedes that it is unable to provide evidence
supporting even its core allegation that SB 54 has led to a decline in cooperation by local
jurisdictions” because it “does not know when [LEAs] are releasing criminal aliens.” Id. at 35.
The second part of this is true: Plaintiff does not know if an LEA released a criminal alien
without notification unless: (1) the LEA tells DHS it has, (2) DHS encounters the alien at large,
confirming their release, or (3) a third-party informs DHS that the alien is at large. See Homan
Depo.,101:4-7. In those circumstances, DHS may note that in its databases. See id., 101:10-19.
But Plaintiff cannot on its own determine how many criminal aliens subject to detainers have
been released without notification, other than in the limited circumstances just described.
California LEAs, and not the United States, know whether criminal aliens were released without
notification in all other circumstances and, therefore, whether SB 54 has caused a decline in
cooperation. Thus, we have proposed, and propose again, providing information concerning
every detainer issued to LEAs in January-March, 2018, including each individual’s name, date of
birth, date of issuance of the detainer, criminal history, and jurisdiction the detainer issued to, in
exchange for California providing information concerning whether the subjects of these detainers
were released to the public without notification. ECF 22. California has refused this request,
leaving Plaintiff without the core information its preliminary injunction arguments turn on—
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whether LEAs are releasing criminal aliensDocument 95 54. Plaintiff is entitled to 6 of 9
that this is the case, and the only fair means of doing so involves limited discovery into whether
LEAs are releasing criminal aliens subject to detainers since SB 54 went into effect.
California has “possession, custody, or control” for purposes of Rule 34 of an LEA’s
information concerning whether it releases criminal aliens without notifying DHS. “Control”
includes a “legal right” to obtain documents on demand, Soto v. Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 619
(N.D. Cal. 1995), is broadly construed, Rogers v. Giurbino, 288 F.R.D. 469, 485 (S.D. Cal.
2012), and is not limited to documents a party has “an absolute, exclusive and unconditional
right” to. In re Legato Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 167, 169 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Defendant
Becerra has the legal right to request the information sought: “[t]he Attorney General shall have
direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law enforcement
officers [] designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices,
and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection,
prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions” “ the Attorney General
may deem advisable.” Cal. Const. art. V, § 13 (emphasis added); see Cal. Penal Code § 13020
(Attorney General may obtain “statistical data” from LEAs); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12560 (similar);
see Brewster v. Shasta Cty., 275 F.3d 803, 809 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Article V, section 13, applies to
all law enforcement officers in California.”). And courts in California routinely hold if the legal
right to access exists in state law, the Attorney General has control under Rule 34. See, e.g.,
Bovarie v. Schwarzenegger, No. 08CV1661, 2011 WL 719206, *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011);
Woodall v. California, No. 1:08-CV-01948, 2010 WL 4316953, *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010).
Moreover, Plaintiff will be denied a fair opportunity to rebut California’s arguments
regarding harm without this information, so its request is “reasonable[] . . . in light of all the
surrounding circumstances.” Am. LegalNet, Inc. v. Davis, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1067 (C.D. Cal.
2009). Where California “has the evidence necessary for resolution of the matter” but claims it
“should not be produced,” it “cannot refuse to provide discovery . . . and then claim that the
opposing party's claims fail for lack of factual support.” See Landrigan v. Brewer, 2010 WL
4269559, *9, *10 n.6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2010), aff'd, 625 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated on
other grounds, 562 U.S. 996 (2010). To the extent California asserts that exercising its authority
to request that LEAs provide this information is burdensome or disproportional, Plaintiff
proposed that the parties select 5-10 jurisdictions, that Plaintiff compile the spreadsheet it
initially offered for those jurisdictions, and that California provide information concerning the
release of criminal aliens that Plaintiff cannot provide (or, as we believe, access through
CLETS). Without such limited discovery, Plaintiff is prejudiced in its ability to show harm, and
the Court lacks an accurate understanding of how SB 54 causes LEAs to release criminal aliens.
B.

California’s Position

California does not possess the information sought by the United States, and the United States
cannot show that California has a “legal right to obtain” “detainer” forms (DHS Forms I-247A)
and related information that is in the possession of non-party local LEAs. See United States v.
Int'l Union of Petroleum and Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“The party seeking production of the documents … bears the burden of proving that the
opposing party has such control.”). On its face, article V, section 13 has no bearing on civil
litigation and discovery matters in general, much less Rule 34. In fact, the relevant language is
limited to “reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of
crime….” Cal. Const. art. V, § 13 (emphasis added). This action hardly concerns a criminal
investigation. In addition, courts construing article V, section 13 have taken a much more
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measured approach than the one advanced by the United States here. See People v. Brophy, 49
Cal.App.2d 15, 28 (1942) (“Manifestly, ‘direct supervision over every district attorney and
sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law’ does not
contemplate absolute control and direction of such officials.”); see also Brewster v. Shasta Cty.,
275 F.3d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding sheriff’s department, when investigating crime,
acts for county, not state, and therefore county is subject to §1983 liability); Goldstein v. City of
Long Beach, 715 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2013) (California district attorneys acted as local, not state,
policymakers). Article V, section 13 simply does not support the idea that the Attorney General
has a legal right to demand any and all documents from any law-enforcement agency statewide,
at any time, to respond to a civil discovery request.
The United States has exclusively pointed to a few prisoner cases where courts have required the
Office of the Attorney General, because it generally serves as counsel for the California
Department of Corrections (CDCR), to produce CDCR records to pro se prisoners. These cases
are easily distinguishable, since the Attorney General does not regularly serve as counsel for
counties and cities. County counsels and city attorneys fill those roles. Furthermore, it is wellestablished that the Attorney General, when acting on behalf of the People, does not have
possession, custody, or control of documents in the possession of non-party State agencies. See
People ex rel. Lockyer v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 1079 (2004) (“Because of
their separate organization, duties and powers, we conclude that [California Code of Civil
Procedure] section 2031 did not envision the People as being in possession, custody or control of
documents created or possessed by nonparty state agencies.”); see also Texas v. Holder, No. 12cv-128 (DST, RMC, RLW), 2012 WL 13070110, at *2-*3 (D.D.C. June 8, 2012) (plaintiff failed
to meet burden of establishing that the Attorney General had control over documents of nonparty
federal agencies). This rule further supports the conclusion that the State does not have control of
information in the possession of local law enforcement agencies. The proper method for the
United States to seek discovery from non-party LEAs needed to prove its claims is by a Rule 45
subpoena.
The United States’ reliance on California Penal Code § 13020 does not fare any better. That
provision is limited to the California Department of Justice’s general role in the collection and
reporting of statewide crime statistics. See, e.g., Kilgore v. Younger, 30 Cal.3d 770, 785 (1982).
The same can be said of Government Code section 12560, which concerns information from
sheriffs regarding “the investigation, detection and punishment of crime[.]” That the Department
happens to be the repository for certain criminal data in California does not mean it has the
information sought by the United States here. Nothing in the Penal Code mandates that the
Department collect civil immigration detainer statistics, and it does not do so. Even if the
Attorney General had a legal right to demand the relevant documents in the context of this civil
discovery dispute (which he does not), ordering him to do so would be unreasonably
burdensome, particularly considering the shortened time frame. There are fifty-eight counties,
each with a sheriff’s department. There are hundreds of municipal police departments (which are
not expressly mentioned in article V, section 13). Also, if the State were ordered to request
documents from hundreds of non-party localities, it is unclear what the State would do when
some would inevitably refuse to comply. It is equally unclear what next steps this Court would
have available.
Additionally, the United States, which tracks compliance with detainer requests, already
possesses the relevant information –– or at the very least a sample of it. ICE policy states: “When
ICE becomes aware that [a law-enforcement agency] failed to honor an immigration detainer
issued by ICE, the ICE immigration officer shall document the declined detainer in the
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ENFORCE Alien Removal Module (EARM) through the use of the detainer lift code of “A Declined by LEA.’” See
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/10074-2.pdf. ICE’s fiscal
year 2017 statistics show that ICE was able to identify 8,170 declined detainers for that year. See
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf.
Additionally, the Director of ICE has testified that ICE tracks when a jurisdiction complies with
a detainer, notification, or transfer request. Dep. of Thomas Homan at 104:15-105:24.
The United States’ request is even more troubling considering the position that it took during the
last dispute resolved by this Court. At the last hearing, this Court warned the United States that if
it did not produce the I-247A data, it was not going to be able to then locate the data weeks later
and attempt to rely on it, when the State was not allowed to obtain it through discovery. Mar. 21,
2018 Hr’g Tr. at 13:20-14:1. Despite representing to this Court that it “does not know” when
LEAs comply with the requests made on the I-247-As (ECF No. 22 at 7), the United States now
admits that it has information regarding compliance with detainer requests for at least a subset of
jurisdictions. To the extent the United States now intends to rely on that data, the State is entitled
to do the same. Mar. 21, 2018 Hr’g Tr. at 13:20-14:1. Thus, in addition to denying the United
States’ last-minute request, the Court should order the United States to produce the data in its
possession regarding the I-247As, and all associated criminal-history information that it intends
to rely upon.

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XAVIER BECERRA
CHAD A. READLER
Attorney General of California
Acting Assistant Attorney General
THOMAS PATTERSON
Senior Assistant Attorney General
MCGREGOR SCOTT
MICHAEL NEWMAN
United States Attorney
SATOSHI YANAI
Supervising Deputy Attorneys General
AUGUST FLENTJE
CHRISTINE CHUANG
Special Counsel
ANTHONY HAKL
CHEROKEE MELTON
WILLIAM C. PEACHEY
LEE I. SHERMAN
Director
Deputy Attorneys General
State Bar No. 272271
Erez Reuveni
300 S. Spring Street
Assistant Director
Los Angeles, CA 90013
Telephone: [phone]
DAVID SHELLEDY
Respectfully Submitted,
Civil Chief, Assistant United States
XAVIER BECERRA
Attorney
Attorney General of California
/s/Lee I. Sherman
LAUREN C. BINGHAM
LEE I. SHERMAN
JOSEPH A. DARROW
Deputy Attorney General
JOSHUA S. PRESS
Attorneys for Defendants
Trial Attorneys
/s/ Francesca Genova
FRANCESCA GENOVA
Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
E-mail: [e-mail]
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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