USA v. State of California et al
Filing
28
ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 11/1/2018 GRANTING 20 Motion for Summary Judgment and DENYING 24 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.The court DECLARES that SB 50 is unconstitutional because it violates the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, and PERMANENTLY ENJOINS defendants from enforcing SB 50. CASE CLOSED. (Donati, J)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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2:18-cv-721-WBS-DB
Plaintiff,
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No.
v.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
STATE OF CALIFORNIA; and
CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS
COMMISSION, an agency of
the State of California,
Defendants.
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----oo0oo---Plaintiff United States of America initiated this
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action against defendants State of California and California
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State Lands Commission (“Lands Commission”).
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2017 California law regulating the recording of conveyances of
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federal public lands in California (“SB 50”) is invalid because
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it violates the United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.
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Specifically, plaintiff argues both that the law runs afoul of
27
the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and that it is
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preempted by federal law.
It argues that a
Defendants maintain that SB 50 is a
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proper exercise of the state’s right to regulate conveyances of
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land within its borders.
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Currently before this court are plaintiff’s and
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defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
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& 24.)
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I.
(Docket Nos. 20
Factual and Procedural Background
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California’s SB 50 states that it is the policy of the
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State of California to “discourage conveyances that transfer
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ownership of federal public lands in California from the federal
10
government.”
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Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. signed SB 50 on October 6, 2017.
12
(McVeigh Decl. Ex. 1 (Docket No. 20-2).)
13
effect on January 1, 2018.
14
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 8560(b)(1).
California’s
The law went into
(Id.)
A central mechanism through which SB 50 seeks to
15
discourage conveyances of federal land is the requirement that,
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in order to record a deed or other documents related to the
17
conveyance of federal land with a California county recorder, a
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grantee of federal lands must present a certificate of compliance
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from the Lands Commission.
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penalty of up to $5000 to be levied against any person who
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knowingly presents for filing with a county recorder a document
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related to the conveyance of federal land unaccompanied by a
23
Lands Commission certificate of compliance.
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6223(a).
25
SB 50 also provides for a civil
Cal. Gov’t Code §
SB 50 defines “conveyance” broadly to encompass “any
26
method, including sale, donation, or exchange, by which all or a
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portion of the right, title, and interest of the United States in
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and to federal lands located in California is transferred to
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another entity.”
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not, however, apply uniformly to all conveyances of federal
3
lands.
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Lands Commission is required to waive its right of refusal and
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automatically issue a certificate of compliance.
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Code §§ 8560(b)(2)(D)(ii) & (f).
7
Cal. Pub. Res. Code §
8560(a)(2).
It does
There are six categories of conveyances for which the
Cal. Pub. Res.
Four of these categories were included in Section
8
8560(f) of SB 50, as originally enacted.
They are: conveyances
9
of federal public lands which the Lands Commission deems to be
10
“routine;” conveyances of federal public lands pursuant to a
11
conservation plan; the renewal of a lease that was in existence
12
as of January 1, 2017; and the “conveyance of federal public
13
lands to a federally recognized Native American tribe or lands
14
taken into or out of trust for a Native American tribe or
15
individual Native American.”
16
Id. § 8560(f)(3).
In June 2018, following the plaintiff’s initiation of
17
this action, California amended SB 50 with Senate Bill 854.
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amendment established two new categories of conveyances for which
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the Lands Commission must automatically issue certificates of
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compliance.
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the State of California.
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That
The first is conveyances of federal public lands to
Id. § 8560(f)(5).
The second is:
The conveyance of any federal public lands not
managed by the federal National Forest Service,
the federal Bureau of Reclamation, the federal
Bureau of Land Management, the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service, or the federal National
Park Service unless the land conveyed satisfies
any of the following:
a. Is part of a national monument or
national marine sanctuary.
b. Contains national conservation lands.
c. Is land placed in the National Register
of Historic Places.
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d. Is designated for preservation or
conservation uses.
Id. § 8560(f)(4).
Conveyances of federal land that fall
into any of the six above categories are automatically
entitled to a certificate of conveyance from the Lands
Commission.
No timeframe is prescribed by statute within
which the Lands Commission must complete these automatic
certificate issuances.
(Docket No. 20).)
(Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 21
Lands Commission staff have never
refused to issue a certificate of compliance when requested
to do so.
(Lucchesi Decl. ¶ 12 (Docket No. 24-3).)
Certificates of compliance are not automatically issued
for conveyances of federal land that fall outside the categories
enumerated above.
Prospective purchasers in these conveyances
may only secure a certificate of compliance from the Lands
Commission if the commission is first provided with a right of
first refusal or the right to arrange for the transfer of the
federal public land to another entity (“refusal rights”).
Additionally, under SB 50, conveyances of federal public land
subject to this requirement are “void ab initio” unless the Lands
Commission was provided with these refusal rights.
Cal. Pub.
Res. Code § 8560(b)(2)(A).
SB 50 requires the Lands Commission to evaluate its
right of first refusal at a public hearing.
Id. § 8560(b)(2)(C).
These meetings occur approximately every other month.
Decl. ¶ 4.)
(Lucchesi
To date, the Commission has declined to exercise its
putative right of first refusal to purchase any federal public
lands or arrange for their transfer to a third party.
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(Id. ¶
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10.)
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II.
Legal Standard
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Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that
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there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
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P. 56(a).
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of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a
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reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s
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favor.
Fed. R. Civ.
A material fact is one that could affect the outcome
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
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(1986).
11
III. Analysis
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A.
Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
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governs conflicts between state and federal laws.
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that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
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shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law
17
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
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thereby[.]”
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interpreted the Supremacy Clause as meaning that, “the states
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have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
21
burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
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constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution
23
the powers vested in the general government.”
24
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 317 (1819).
25
U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2.
It provides
The Supreme Court has
McCulloch v.
This principle is known as the doctrine of
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intergovernmental immunity.
Under this doctrine, a state law is
27
invalid if it “regulates the United States directly or
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discriminates against the Federal Government or those with whom
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1
it deals.”
2
(1990).
3
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435
Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws are also invalid
4
if they are preempted by federal law.
“There are two types of
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implied preemption: field preemption and conflict preemption.”
6
Whistler Invs., Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 539
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F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008).
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when Congress “‘so thoroughly occupies a legislative field’ that
9
it effectively leaves no room for states to regulate conduct in
Field preemption is implied
10
that field.”
11
U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
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compliance with both federal and state law is impossible or when
13
state law frustrates Congress’s purpose in enacting a given
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federal statute.
15
(Conflict preemption analysis looks to “whether a party’s
16
compliance with both federal and state requirements is impossible
17
or whether, in light of the federal statute’s purpose and
18
intended effects, state law poses an obstacle to the
19
accomplishment of Congress’s objectives.”).
20
Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
1.
See Whistler Invs., Inc., 539 F.3d at 1164
Intergovernmental Immunity
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Conflict preemption occurs when
a.
Direct Regulation of the Federal Government
Defendants’ argument that SB 50 does not directly
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regulate the United States’ operations or property rests on a
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purported distinction between the conveyance of a given piece of
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real property and the recordation of a document related to that
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conveyance.
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not the former.
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account, SB 50 is merely an expansion of existing California law
SB 50, defendants argue, regulates the latter but
(Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 9.)
6
In this
1
governing all aspects of the title recording process.
2
Gov’t Code §§ 27201 et seq.; Id. §§ 27279 et seq.; Id. §§ 27320
3
et seq.; Id. §§ 27360 et seq.
4
Cf. Cal.
This argument is colorable with respect to those
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conveyances for which the Commission must automatically issue
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certificates of compliance.
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certificates will be issued in these cases (Lucchesi Decl. ¶ 12.)
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Given this, the regulation as it pertains to these conveyances is
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not categorically dissimilar from the preexisting requirements
There is certainty that the
10
for title recordation under the California Government Code.
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Thus, with respect to conveyances automatically entitled to
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certificates of compliance, SB 50 is not an unconstitutional
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“direct regulation” of the federal government.
14
Defendants’ argument that SB 50’s title recordation
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requirements do not constitute a direct regulation of the United
16
States’ operations or property fails, however, with respect to
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those conveyances which are not automatically entitled to a
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certificate of compliance from the Lands Commission.
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conveyances, the issuance of a certificate of compliance is
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conditioned on the extension of refusal rights to the Lands
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Commission.
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For these
Importantly, the question before the court is not
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whether defendants have, or will ever, in fact, directly regulate
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the United States via SB 50’s refusal rights.
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whether the law, as written, seeks to directly regulate the
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United States.
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this reason, it is of no moment that the Lands Commission has yet
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to use the power delegated to it by SB 50 in a manner that
Rather, it is
The court’s analysis is legal, not factual.
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For
1
directly regulates the United States.
2
of Arcata, 629 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2010)(holding that two cities’
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promise that they would only enforce ordinances banning federal
4
agents or employees from engaging in military recruitment to the
5
extent the ordinances were consistent with federal law was
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irrelevant to the analysis of whether the ordinance violated the
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doctrine of intergovernmental immunity).
8
9
See United States v. City
Defendants argue that their track record of
implementing SB 50 in a manner that does not directly regulate
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the United States is relevant because, on its face, the law
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regulates purchasers of federal land, not the government itself.
12
(Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 3
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(Docket No. 26).)
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certificate of compliance from the Lands Commission before
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recording a conveyance and it is the purchasers who must, in
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certain circumstances, offer the Lands Commission refusal rights
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in order to get a certificate of compliance.
18
for Summ. J at 9.)
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that “nothing prevents the legislature from structuring a right
20
of refusal so that it primarily regulates the purchasers, rather
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than the United States.”
22
It is the purchasers who must secure a
(Defs.’ Cross-Mot.
In support of this claim, defendants argue
(Id.)
Defendants are correct that a right of refusal may be
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imposed by statute.
It does not follow, however, that the
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legislature can structure a statutory right of refusal such that
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it can be exercised against a party that lacks an interest in the
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property at issue.
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clarify how a purchaser of federal public lands could grant the
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Lands Commission a right of first refusal to buy or arrange for
Nowhere in their briefing do defendants
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the transfer of land owned by the federal government.
Even if it were possible for the legislature to craft
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such a right of first refusal, there is no evidence that the
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California legislature has done so in this case.
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of the statute lends no credence to this reading, and the Lands
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Commission’s own interpretations of SB 50 have placed the onus on
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plaintiff, not on purchasers, to provide the refusal rights.
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example, in a February 12, 2018 letter to the Bureau of Land
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Management regarding the conveyance of a parcel of land in Santa
The plain text
For
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Barbara County, the Lands Commission wrote that “[t]o comply with
11
state law and validly transfer the parcel, BLM must provide the
12
Commission with the right of first refusal or right to arrange
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for the transfer of the parcel to another entity.” (McVeigh Decl.
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Ex. 9 (Docket No. 20-2).)
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recognized what it now asks this court to deny: rights of first
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refusal, even those created by statute, are exercised against the
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owner of the real property at issue.
18
In this letter, the Lands Commission
SB 50 may not expressly name the federal government as
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its intended object of regulation, but that does not mean the law
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does not directly regulate the United States.
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regulation is most immediately evident in section 8560(b)(2)(A),
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which declares “void ab initio” certain conveyances of federal
23
land if the Lands Commission is not first offered refusal rights
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to that land.
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impose direct and intrusive, though perhaps less proximate,
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regulations on the federal government.
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This direct
The law’s title recordation requirements also
Title recordation is a significant and almost
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inextricable component of the process of land conveyance.1
As a
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result, conditioning purchasers’ ability to record a title to
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recently acquired federal public lands on whether the government
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provided the Lands Commission with refusal rights in those lands
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trespasses on the federal government’s ability to convey land to
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whomever it wants.
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the conveyance of federal land to review by the Lands Commission;
8
its refusal rights requirement and declaration that certain
9
conveyances of federal land are “void ab initio” unless that
The law subjects federal determinations about
10
requirement has been complied with appropriate for California the
11
power to “directly obstruct the activities of the
12
Federal Government.”
13
North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 437–38.
For these reasons, the court agrees with plaintiff that
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SB 50 unconstitutionally directly regulates the federal
15
government with respect to the federal public lands managed by
16
the federal National Forest Service, the federal Bureau of
17
Reclamation, the federal Bureau of Land Management, the United
18
States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the federal National Park
19
Service, as well as with respect to those federal lands that meet
20
the conditions enumerated in Section 8560(f)(4)(A)-(D).
21
Accordingly, these portions of SB 50 unconstitutionally violate
22
the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity.
23
b.
Discrimination against the United States and
those with whom it deals
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25
26
27
In California, nearly all grantees of real property
record the deed instrument in the county in which the property is
located. (Haase Decl. ¶ 23 (Docket No. 20-7).) Moreover, title
recordation is often required by financial institutions and
insurance companies considering providing financing or insurance
coverage to a land owner with respect to a given property. Id.
1
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10
1
Even if a regulation does not directly regulate the
2
United States, it may still violate the doctrine of
3
intergovernmental immunity if it discriminates against the United
4
States or those with whom it deals.
5
are those that are not imposed on “similarly situated
6
constituents of the State” and which have no “basis unrelated to
7
the object’s status as a Government contractor or supplier.”
8
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 438 (1990).
9
Importantly, even regulations that discriminate against those
Discriminatory regulations
10
with whom the government deals may nonetheless survive if, “the
11
inconsistency is directly related to and justified by significant
12
differences between the two classes.” Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of
13
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 804 (1989)(citation and quotation marks
14
omitted).
15
The statutory language of SB 50 makes clear that it
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applies only to purchasers and grantees of federal public lands:
17
only those trying to record documents related to conveyances of
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federal public lands must present a certificate of compliance
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from the Lands Commission, and only they are subject to monetary
20
penalties if they fail to do so.
21
In United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal.
22
2018)(Mendez J.), Judge Mendez considered the constitutionality
23
of a California law that, among other things, imposed civil
24
penalties on California employers that allowed federal
25
immigration enforcement officials into nonpublic areas of their
26
places of business.
27
impermissibly discriminatory.
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attempt to meddle with federal government activities indirectly
See Cal. Gov’t Code § 6223(a).
Judge Mendez found the penalties
They were, he ruled, a “clear
11
1
by singling out for regulation those who deal with the
2
government.”
3
Id. at 1096 (quotations and citation omitted).
Requesting a Lands Commission certificate of compliance
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to which one is automatically entitled may be a relatively minor
5
inconvenience.
6
monetary penalty for attempting to record a document without a
7
Lands Commission certificate of compliance -- a burden born
8
exclusively by those who deal with the federal government.
9
aspects of SB 50 apply to all conveyances of federal public lands
10
in California except those acquired by a federal agency through a
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foreclosure proceeding.
12
8560(a)(3), with id. at § 8561.
13
in United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, these
14
recording requirements impermissibly discriminate against those
15
who deal with the federal government by singling them out for
16
discriminatory, if not particularly burdensome, regulation.
17
It is, however -- like SB 50’s threat of a $5,000
These
Compare Cal. Pub. Res. Code §
Like the monetary fine at issue
Defendants advance no argument that these aspects of SB
18
50 are constitutional.
19
as it applies to the categories of conveyances listed in §
20
8560(f), violates the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity by
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discriminating against the land purchasers who deal with the
22
United States.
23
Accordingly, the court holds that SB 50,
Under SB 50, purchasers of federal lands to which
24
California asserts refusal rights face an even greater burden
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than grantees in conveyances encompassed by § 8560(f).
26
California may exercise a right of first refusal over the real
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property these purchasers seek to acquire, they face a level of
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uncertainty and potential delay that all others are spared from.
12
Because
1
Defendants claim that the lands subject to SB 50’s
2
right of first refusal are of an especially sensitive nature and
3
that they are therefore “not similarly situated to properties
4
that might be sold by non-federal parties in California.”
5
(Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 13.)
6
first refusal is related to and justified by this significant
7
difference, defendants argue, it is constitutional.
8
14.)
9
Because SB 50’s right of
(Id. at 13-
This argument assumes that some categories of federal
10
land, e.g. those designated for conservation use or managed by
11
the National Park Service, are categorically different from all
12
other real property in California.
13
defendants implicitly argue that if a given piece of real
14
property is part of a national monument or is managed by the
15
Bureau of Land Management, its sensitivity and uniqueness are
16
intrinsically greater than those of all other real property in
17
California.
18
defendants’ arguments about the constitutionality of SB 50’s
19
right of refusal requirement.
20
In other words, the
The court rejects this supposition and, with it,
Defendants may be correct that much of the real
21
property encompassed by SB 50’s refusal rights is qualitatively
22
different from a typical residential or commercial real estate
23
transaction.
24
proven, however, is that there are categorical differences
25
between the lands SB 50 subjects to a right of refusal and all
26
other lands within California, including those of special
27
historical, cultural, or natural value not owned by the federal
28
government.
What they do not argue, and what they have not
Defendants come closest to making this argument with
13
1
the claim that federal lands are dissimilarly situated from all
2
other lands in California because they are “preserved for the
3
public’s benefit, while privately held lands are not.”
4
Reply Brief in Supp. Of Cross-Mot. for Summ. J at 6.)
5
quality of federal public lands, however, is so directly linked
6
to their federal status that it cannot serve as the basis for
7
non-discriminatory differentiation.
(Defs.’
This
8
Defendants’ argument also fails because they have not
9
shown that SB 50’s right of refusal requirement is “related to”
10
any distinguishing characteristics of the regulated lands as a
11
class.
12
characteristics associated with “sensitive” or “unique” lands and
13
then subject some federal lands to a right of first refusal
14
because they meet the relevant statutory definition of
15
“uniqueness.”
16
sensitive or unique lands preserved for the benefit of the public
17
by any public or private entity, e.g., a trust or foundation.
18
Rather, SB 50 uncritically uses federal administrative and
19
institutional categories to target the federal government and
20
those with whom it deals for regulation.
21
50’s right of first refusal requirement violates the Supremacy
22
Clause by discriminating against purchasers of land who deal with
23
the federal government.
The law does not, for example, enumerate a set of
The law does not even apply broadly to all
For this reason, SB
24
2.
Preemption
25
Plaintiff also argues that SB 50 is unconstitutional
26
because it is preempted by federal law.
27
argues that SB 50 both intrudes into a field reserved exclusively
28
to Congress, i.e. the disposal of federal property, and directly
14
Specifically, plaintiff
1
conflicts with federal laws authorizing the disposal of federal
2
lands.
3
cite the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution2 and the Act
4
for the Admission of the State of California (“Admission Act”),
5
ch. 50 9 Stat. 452 (1850).
6
in its circumscription of California’s ability to legislate in
7
the field of federal lands disposal.
8
of California is admitted to the Union:
9
Both plaintiff’s field and conflict preemption arguments
The latter is particularly explicit
It provides that the state
upon the express condition that the people of said
state, through their legislature or otherwise, shall
never interfere with the primary disposal of the public
lands within its limits, and shall pass no law and do
no act whereby the title of the United States to, and
right to dispose of, the same shall be impaired or
questioned.
10
11
12
13
14
9 Stat. at 452.
15
presumption against preemption, given the express language of the
16
Property Clause reserving for Congress the power to dispose of
17
federal lands and the Admission Act’s explicit prohibition on
18
California interfering with Congress’s ability to dispose of
19
federal lands, both of plaintiff’s preemption arguments appear
20
compelling.
21
unconstitutionally violates the doctrine of intergovernmental
22
immunity, it need not reach the question of whether federal law
23
preempts SB 50.
24
B.
25
26
27
28
Regardless of whether or not there is a
However, because the court finds that SB 50
Remedy
1.
Injunctive Relief
The Property Clause of the Constitution states that,
“Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States.” U.S. Cons. Art IV § 3, cl. 2.
15
2
1
Plaintiff’s claim that SB 50 unconstitutionally
2
regulates the United States is more than just speculation.
The
3
record before this court makes clear that SB 50, as implemented
4
by defendant SLC, both directly regulates the United States by
5
obstructing its operations, and discriminates against the United
6
States and those with whom it deals.
7
or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Lujan v. Defs.
8
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)(citing Whitmore v.
9
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
These injuries are “actual
10
While some of plaintiff’s arguments about SB 50’s
11
unconstitutional direct regulation of the United States are
12
largely speculative,3 others speak to immediate and ongoing
13
constitutional injuries suffered by plaintiff because of SB 50.
14
Even where the United States has not conveyed or attempted to
15
convey title to its lands, that property is still impermissibly
16
regulated by SB 50’s assignment of refusal rights in it to the
17
SLC.
18
land by clouding the United States’ marketable title.
19
24-25.)
20
Code voids “ab initio” some conveyances of federal lands unless
21
the SLC was provided with refusal rights in those lands.
22
that the federal government has never provided the SLC with
23
refusal rights, all conveyances of federal lands subject to SB
24
50’s refusal rights requirement are arguably void ab initio under
Moreover, SB 50 directly regulates the disposal of federal
(Id. at
Section 8560(b)(2)(A) of the California Public Resources
Given
25
26
27
28
For example, plaintiff notes that “[i]f Congress were
to authorize agencies to dispose of rights of first refusal,
there would be apparently competing rights—thus impairing the
federal agency’s ability to carry out authorized activities.”
(Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 24.)
16
3
1
SB 50.
2
conveyances is of no moment here since the statute expressly
3
conditions a conveyance’s validity on the provision of refusal
4
rights to the SLC, not on the issuance of a compliance
5
certificate by the SLC.
6
That the SLC issued certificates of compliance for these
As implemented to date, SB 50 has also actually
7
discriminated against the United States and those with whom it
8
deals.
9
California real estate transaction has ever received a letter
For example, other than the plaintiff, no seller in a
10
like the one the SLC sent the Department of the Interior,
11
explaining that under SB 50 in order to “validly transfer [a 5.9
12
acre parcel of lands in Santa Barbara county], BLM must provide
13
the [SLC] with the right of first refusal or right to arrange for
14
the transfer of the parcel to another entity.”
15
Ex. 9.)
16
deal with the hassle of requesting a certificate of compliance
17
from the SLC or the threat of a $5,000 fine if they attempt to
18
record a deed to their land without an accompanying certificate
19
of compliance from the SLC.
20
(McVeigh Decl.
Similarly, only grantees of federal land have had to
Though the defendant SLC has never exercised its
21
putative refusal rights, plaintiff has already been injured
22
through the enforcement of SB 50: the statute’s direct regulation
23
of federal lands and their disposal, and its discrimination
24
against the federal government and its grantees are ongoing.
25
These unconstitutional harms to plaintiff are likely to persist
26
as long as SB 50 is in force.
27
concludes that declaratory and injunctive relief are the
28
appropriate remedies.
For these reasons, the court
17
1
2.
Severability
2
Section 8560(g) of the California Public Resources Code
3
states that “[i]f any provision of this section or its
4
application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect
5
other provisions or applications that can be given effect without
6
the invalid provision or application.”
7
such a clause, there is a presumption in favor of severability.
8
Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 331
9
(1975).
Given the presence of
That presumption can be overcome, however, if the
10
invalid provision is grammatically, functionally, and
11
volitionally inseparable from the remainder of the statute.
12
Redevelopment Ass’n. v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 271 (2011).
13
Here, Section 8560(b)(2)(A) of the Public Resources Code and
14
Sections 223 and 27338 of the Government Code may be
15
grammatically separable from the remainder of the law, but
16
functionally and volitionally they are not.
17
favor of severability is overcome and the court declines to sever
18
any part of SB 50.
19
Cal.
The presumption in
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for
20
summary judgment (Docket No. 20) be, and the hereby same is,
21
GRANTED.
22
No. 24) be, and the hereby same is, DENIED.
23
Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment (Docket
The court DECLARES that SB 50 is unconstitutional
24
because it violates the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity,
25
and PERMANENTLY ENJOINS defendants from enforcing SB 50.
26
Dated:
November 1, 2018
27
28
18
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