Canfield v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation et al

Filing 12

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 4/8/2019 DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend; and plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days. (Yin, K)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DONALD CANFIELD,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:18-CV-1092-DMC

v.

ORDER

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges

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Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by failing

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to provide him adequate medical care. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that after Plaintiff fell and

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suffered injury, Defendants delayed providing him a necessary medical treatment, ultimately

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resulting in the amputation of part of his leg and his entire foot. Plaintiff also contends that he

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received a prosthetic leg that did not fit him.

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “…short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v.

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Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual

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allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

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(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s

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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.

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Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their

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pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

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338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be

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facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer

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that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation

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marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The

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sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with

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liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks

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omitted); Moss, 572F.3d at 969.

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II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff has named five Defendants and Does 1-25. The five named Defendants

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are: (1) California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, (2) Dr. Narinder Saukhla, (3)

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Mr. J. Lewis, (4) Dr. Joseph Bick, and (5) Dr. Donald Mathis. Plaintiff contends that Defendants

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were deliberately indifferent in treating his medical needs. Plaintiff alleges that in 2014 he

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stumbled and slipped in the shower causing his bones to chip and resulting in substantial injury.

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As alleged in the complaint, the series of events that occurred after the fall included notice in

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July 2015 that Plaintiff would be transferred to a prison in San Diego where he would undergo

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surgery. Then it seems that Plaintiff was either transferred back to a prison in Tracy or remained

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in Tracy, never having been transferred, and it is unclear from the pleadings whether the subject

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surgery ever occurred. Plaintiff then contends he was transferred to a prison in Vacaville in

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January 2015. It was there that Plaintiff’s foot and part of Plaintiff’s leg were amputated. At

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some point between the incident and amputation Plaintiff alleges he informed multiple

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individuals that he was in constant pain, that he could not walk or sleep due to the plain, and that

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at some point Plaintiff’s foot and leg began to turn black. Plaintiff alleges despite his complaints

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there was a substantial delay in treatment and that such delay ultimately led to the amputation of

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his foot and part of his leg. Plaintiff further alleges in January 2017 he received a prosthetic limb

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that was too long and caused him substantial pain. However, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of

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allegations as to which Defendant(s) caused any of the alleged harm.

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III. ANALYSIS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “…short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v.

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Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Claims must be

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stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.

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1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the

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defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v.

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Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because a plaintiff must allege, with at least some
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degree of particularity, overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and

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conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, to survive screening, Plaintiff’s

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claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to

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reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

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678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

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2009).

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Here, Plaintiff’s claims fail to meet the pleading standard. As a general matter

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Plaintiff fails to attribute any of the alleged violations to any of the Defendants. In other words,

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Plaintiff fails to specifically identify which Defendant(s) caused the alleged constitutional

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violations. Plaintiff must identify the acts of specific defendants and connect those acts with the

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alleged violation. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d at 1129. Plaintiff’s complaint simply states that

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the Defendants generally violated his Eighth Amendment right. While in one instance the

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Plaintiff charges that a single named Defendant violated his Eighth Amendment right, it is unclear

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what action or inaction of that Defendant caused the alleged harm. In other words, in total,

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Plaintiff’s complaint lacks necessary specificity. Plaintiff’s failure to allege with any degree of

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particularity which overt acts by which defendant caused the constitutional violation renders

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Plaintiff’s complaint inadequate. This, however, can be cured if Plaintiff can state with a degree

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of particularity which defendant caused what harm.

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Further, considering plaintiff’s pro se status, the court will explain the legal

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standards pertaining to medical treatment claims. Plaintiff should consider the following

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standards if he reasserts this claim in an amended complaint that meets the pleading standard as

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discussed above:

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The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.
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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when

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two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such

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that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105;

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see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health

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needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is

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sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

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injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

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1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition

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is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

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activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate
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that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

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IV. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT
Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

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amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

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action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

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informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

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Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

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amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

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complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

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plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

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plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

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time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

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1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

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with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
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See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

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V. CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

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Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

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service of this order.

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Dated: April 8, 2019
____________________________________
DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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