Canfield v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation et al

Filing 25

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota on 10/03/19 ORDERING plaintiff may file a third amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. (Plummer, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DONALD CANFIELD,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:18-CV-1092-KJM-DMC-P

v.

ORDER

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No.

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20).

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This

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means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
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1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

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complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

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rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

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with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

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claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

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and conclusory.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff Donald Canfield names the following as defendants: (1) Ralph Diaz; (2)

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Robert Burton; (3) Lozano; (4) Narinder Saukhla; (5) S. Awatani; (6) Michael D. Fox; (7) J.

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Lewis; (8) Joseph Bick; (9) Deepak Mehta; (10) Michael R. Riedon; (11) John M. Dowbak; (12)

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Wieland; (13) Michelle Ditomas; (14) Andrew Sawicki; (15) Sekhon Simranjit; (16) C. Haless;

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(17) R. Shwatain. See ECF No.20, pgs. 2-3.

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Plaintiff alleges that in 2014 he stumbled and slipped in the shower causing his

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ankle bone to fracture and resulting in substantial injury. See ECF No. 20, pg. 7. After this injury,

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plaintiff was transferred to California State Prison in Vacaville, CA. From thereon, plaintiff made

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numerous complaints about pain arising from his injury and requested medical care. See ECF No.

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20, pg. 4. Plaintiff alleges that, despite his complaints, there was a substantial delay in treatment

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and that such delay ultimately led to the amputation of his foot and part of his leg. See ECF No.

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20, pgs. 4-9.
As to defendant Dr. Narinder Saukhla, plaintiff’s primary care physician, plaintiff

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alleges that defendant’s delay in precuring him surgery resulted in the loss of his leg. See ECF

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No. 20, pg. 4. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that Saukhla had “full knowledge” of his medical

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condition from January 2015 to August 12, 2016. See id. However, plaintiff was not cleared for

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surgery until February 2016, and then was delayed further until August 12. Id. In the interim of

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this delay, plaintiff alleges to have made over 40 medical requests. See id.

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As to all other named defendants, plaintiff makes general allegations that each

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person failed to act within their assigned duties and this failure contributed to the loss of his leg.

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See ECF No. 20, pgs. 4-6.

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II. DISCUSSION
A.

Deliberate Indifference
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

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and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

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of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

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(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

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801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when

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two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such

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that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

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inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

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injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105;

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see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health

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needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by

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Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). An injury or illness is sufficiently serious if the failure to

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treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “. . . unnecessary and

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wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled

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on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see
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also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness

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are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of comment; (2)

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whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily activities; and (3) whether the

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condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

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1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

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than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

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medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

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decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

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1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

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treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See

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Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate

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that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

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rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

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difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

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course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to state a cognizable claim of deliberate

Defendant Narinder Saukhla

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indifference under the 8th Amendment. See ECF No. 20, pg. 4. By separate order issued

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herewith, plaintiff will be required to submit documents necessary for service on this defendant.

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2.

Remaining Defendants

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Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against any of the other named

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defendants. Plaintiff makes blanket allegations towards the defendants by stating that they (1) had

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full knowledge of his serious medical condition, and (2) failed to act, resulting in the amputation

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of his leg. See ECF No. 20, pgs. 4-6. However, plaintiff does not specify what each individual did

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or did not do. These allegations simply make conclusory statements of “deliberate indifference”

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and “com[ing] up short” without any particular statement of fact. See ECF No. 20, pgs. 4-6.

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Simply attaching the claim’s label to each defendant is not enough. To state a claim, a plaintiff

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must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged

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constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Without this,

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the Court cannot engage in any meaningful analysis to determine whether plaintiff has stated a

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cognizable claim for deliberate indifference against the named defendants.

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B.

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Supervisory Liability
The Court observes defendants (1) Ralph Diaz; (2) Robert Burton; and (3) Lozano

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are being charged with liability based merely on their role as supervisors at California State

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Prison. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

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employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no

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respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional

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violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The

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Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on

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knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government

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officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct

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and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory

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personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of

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constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be

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liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v.

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Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

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When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such

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defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

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Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

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1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in

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civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

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Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

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official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.

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Here, plaintiff appears to allege that the named defendants are liable as supervisory
personnel—asserting that as supervisors, these defendants are liable for the conduct of their

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subordinates. See ECF No. 20, pg. 4. This is a respondeat superior theory of liability, which is not

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cognizable under § 1983. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. A supervisor can only be held liable for

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their own actions or inactions resulting in the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, not the

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actions or inactions of their subordinates. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against

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the named defendants.

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III. CONCLUSION

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Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

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amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

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action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

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informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

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Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

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amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

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complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

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plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

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plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

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conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

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Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Finally, plaintiff is advised that if he does not file a third amended complaint

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within the time provided herein, this action shall proceed on the second amended complaint as

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against defendant Narnder Saukhla only and the court will issue findings and recommendations

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that the remaining defendants be dismissed.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a third amended
complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

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Dated: October 3, 2019
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DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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