Roat v. California Exposition & State Fair et al
Filing
34
ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman on 5/14/2020 GRANTING 30 Motion to Enforce The Settlement Agreement. Exhibit A of Defendants' Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement [30-2] at 5-9 reflects the comprehensive terms of th e Settlement Agreement. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement; Defendants' request for sanctions is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall pay Defendants $3,600 in attorneys' fees. Defendants may deduct the amount from the settlement draft before providing it to Plaintiff; and Within 14 days of this order, the parties shall file their dispositional documents. (Mena-Sanchez, L)
Case 2:18-cv-01701-MCE-CKD Document 34 Filed 05/15/20 Page 1 of 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
BRIAN K. ROAT,
12
13
14
15
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 2:18–cv–1701–MCE–CKD
ORDER
(ECF No. 30)
CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION & STATE
FAIR, et al.,
Defendants.
16
17
This case concerned the alleged violations of plaintiff’s constitutional rights by
18
defendants. (ECF No. 1.) Presently before the undersigned is defendants’ motion to enforce a
19
settlement agreement. (ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff opposes, asserting the settlement agreement
20
should contain additional language not contained in the parties’ draft written agreement. (ECF
21
No. 31.)
22
After thoroughly reviewing the parties’ briefs and considering their arguments, the court
23
concurs with defendants’ position, and finds plaintiff’s version of the settlement agreement to
24
contain extraneous, unnecessary, and potentially settlement-muddling language. Thus, the court
25
GRANTS defendants’ motion to enforce. Further, because plaintiff continued to press his
26
argument after the undersigned informed plaintiff at the February 2020 telephonic hearing that his
27
version would not control, plaintiff is ordered to pay defendants’ attorneys’ fees and costs
28
associated with bringing this motion.
1
Case 2:18-cv-01701-MCE-CKD Document 34 Filed 05/15/20 Page 2 of 5
1
Background
2
On October 24, 2019, the parties agreed to attend a settlement conference before the
3
undersigned. (ECF No. 18.) On December 16, the parties reached a verbal agreement, the
4
settlement was put on the record, and the court ordered dispositional documents entered within 60
5
days. (ECF No. 25.)
6
Throughout January and February of 2020, the parties failed to agree on a final document
7
memorializing their oral agreement. (ECF No. 26.) The court scheduled an informal telephonic
8
conference, and the parties provided a joint letter outlining their positions. (See ECF No. 30-2.)
9
In the joint letter, plaintiff contended the final document should contain statements that he
10
believed his rights were violated and that his version of the facts were true. (Id. at 12.) He also
11
wished to include a provision that he would not be barred from seeking legislative change. (Id.)
12
Defendants contended plaintiff’s desired fact-recitations (a) were superfluous, given the statement
13
in the draft that defendants were denying liability, and (b) were contrary to the non-disparagement
14
clause elsewhere in the document. (Id. at 14-15.) Further, defendants argued plaintiff’s proposed
15
language allowing for legislative action could be construed as allowing plaintiff to bring his
16
Section 1983 claims again—which would defeat the purpose of settlement. (Id. at 15.) The court
17
held an informal settlement conference, found defendants’ version of the agreement to adequately
18
reflect the settlement’s terms, and ordered the disposition documents be submitted within 14 days.
19
(ECF No. 28.)
On March 19, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement and
20
21
set the matter for a May 14, 2020 hearing. (ECF No. 30.) Defendants reasserted their arguments
22
from the February 2020 conference, and note that despite the court’s order, plaintiff has refused to
23
sign the court-approved settlement document. On April 30, 2020, plaintiff filed his opposition,
24
wherein he continued to argue his version of the agreement is reasonable. (ECF No. 31.)
25
Plaintiff also noted that defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees was made by declaration only—
26
lacking an hourly breakdown. (Id.) The court ordered defendants to submit a cost breakdown as
27
to their attorneys’ fee request, and on May 8, 2020, defendants did so. (ECF Nos. 32, 33.)
28
///
2
Case 2:18-cv-01701-MCE-CKD Document 34 Filed 05/15/20 Page 3 of 5
1
Legal Standard
2
A district court has the inherent power to enforce a complete settlement agreement entered
3
into while the litigation is pending before it. In re City of Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954,
4
957 (9th Cir. 1995); Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987). This enforcement power
5
extends to oral agreements. Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002). It
6
also includes authority to award damages or specific performance. T.N.T. Marketing, Inc. v.
7
Agresti, 796 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
At its core, a motion to enforce a settlement agreement “essentially is an action to
8
9
specifically enforce a contract.” Adams v. Johns-Manville Corp., 876 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir.
10
1989). “The construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles
11
of local law which apply to interpretation of contracts generally.” Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d
12
753, 759 (9th. Cir. 1989). Therefore, even though the underlying cause of action presented in this
13
litigation is based upon a federal statute, this court applies California law regarding the formation
14
and interpretation of contracts in determining whether a legally enforceable settlement agreement
15
was reached. United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir.
16
1992); see also Harrop v. West. Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying
17
California law).
18
In California, oral settlement agreements made before the court and oral contracts are
19
enforceable. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 664.6; Cal. Civ. Code § 1622. “The essential elements of a
20
contract are: [1] parties capable of contracting; [2] the parties' consent; [3] a lawful object; and
21
[4] sufficient cause or consideration.” Lopez v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d
22
544, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1550). “Mutual assent usually is
23
manifested by an offer communicated to the offeree and an acceptance communicated to the
24
offeror.” Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1565). The existence of mutual consent is determined by
25
objective criteria; the “parties' outward manifestations must show that the parties all agreed ‘upon
26
the same thing in the same sense.’” Weddington Prod., Inc., v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 277
27
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1580).
28
///
3
Case 2:18-cv-01701-MCE-CKD Document 34 Filed 05/15/20 Page 4 of 5
1
Analysis
2
Here, the parties agreed to the essential terms of the settlement at the December 16, 2019
3
hearing. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (See ECF No. 31.) Thus, for broad-
4
based purposes, the court reiterates that mutual consent is present, and the parties’ oral agreement
5
is enforceable. Doi, 276 F.3d at 1138; Weddington Prod., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277.
6
Instead, plaintiff merely wishes to include in the finalized document certain language
7
concerning his beliefs that defendants violated his rights, as well as language detailing his version
8
of the facts. (See ECF No. 30-2 at 12.) Further, he wishes to include a statement that his “full,
9
unrestricted First Amendment rights” are not to be barred by this action, and therefore he will be
10
allowed to pursue future “claims of violations of Constitutional Rights by Defendants.” Simply,
11
plaintiff believes his version of the agreement is also reasonable, and contends defendants’ lack of
12
argument to be conclusory. (ECF No. 31 at 3.) However, the court has already informed plaintiff
13
(through his counsel) that his proposed language is superfluous and inconsistent with the parties’
14
agreement to settle all claims. As for his ability to maintain his right to fully speak on the case,
15
this clearly contradicts the parties’ agreed-upon non-disparagement clause—which outlines what
16
plaintiff may discuss with outside parties. (See ECF No. 30-2 at 6-7.) Plaintiff contends in his
17
briefing that he promises to not disparage defendants, but appears to miss the point that the
18
inclusion of his factual averments does just that. (See ECF No. 30-2 at 13-16 for comparison.)
19
Thus, defendants’ motion to enforce is granted.
20
Further, the court explicitly informed plaintiff (through counsel) at the February 2020
21
telephonic conference that the draft without his proposed language accurately reflected the
22
parties’ oral agreement. (See ECF No. 28.) Despite this ruling and guidance, plaintiff refused to
23
move forward, necessitating defendants’ motion to enforce. Plaintiff’s actions after the February
24
2020 conference are willfully disobedient and in bad faith, requiring sanctions. Gomez v.
25
Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court has the inherent power to sanction a
26
party [] if it acts in willful disobedience of a court order . . . or when the [] party has acted in bad
27
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, as well as for willful[ ] abuse [of the]
28
judicial processes.”)
4
Case 2:18-cv-01701-MCE-CKD Document 34 Filed 05/15/20 Page 5 of 5
1
Defendants request $4,280 in attorneys’ fees, which they assert covers their costs in
2
having to litigate plaintiff’s unreasonable refusal to sign the draft agreement. (ECF No. 33.) This
3
amount is based on their rate of $200 per hour for 21.4 hours. (Id. at 6-7.) The court finds
4
counsels’ hourly rate reasonable, but disagrees that all 21.4 hours are sanctionable. The period
5
between February 5 and February 20, 2020, should not be not included, as plaintiff pressed his
6
good-faith argument as to the agreement’s language during this time. Therefore, 3.40 hours will
7
not be included in the sanction. (See Id. at 2-3.) However, once the court informed plaintiff that
8
defendants’ argument won the day, plaintiff’s refusal to sign from that point forward was
9
sanctionable. Thus, defendants’ hours spent on this issue from February 27, 2020, forward are
10
recoverable as attorneys’ fee sanctions. Thus, the court awards a sanction of $3,600 in attorneys
11
fees, based on 18 hours of work at $200 per hour.
12
ORDER
13
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
14
1. Defendants’ Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED;
15
2. Exhibit A of Defendants’ Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 30-2 at
16
5-9) reflects the comprehensive terms of the Settlement Agreement. This agreement is
17
enforceable and binding as of the date of this order without any further written agreement;
18
3. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement;
19
4. Defendants’ request for sanctions is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall pay Defendants $3,600 in
20
attorneys’ fees. Defendants may deduct the amount from the settlement draft before
21
providing it to Plaintiff; and
22
23
5. Within 14 days of this order, the parties shall file their dispositional documents.
Dated: May 14, 2020
24
25
26
roat.1701
27
28
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?